Carlo Bianchi & Co. v. United States

167 Ct. Cl. 364, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 127, 1964 WL 8556
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 17, 1964
DocketNo. 466-54
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 167 Ct. Cl. 364 (Carlo Bianchi & Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carlo Bianchi & Co. v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 364, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 127, 1964 WL 8556 (cc 1964).

Opinion

Seed, Justice {Ret.),

sitting by designation, delivered the opinion of the court;

In 1946 the plaintiff contracted with the government to construct a flood control dam in upstate New York. Incident to the project was the construction of a tunnel 710 feet long with a diameter of 13 feet after concreting. The [366]*366contract called for steel ribs and liner plates to be installed as tunnel support in the 50 feet at each end of the tunnel. No other protection than the concreting was provided for the central 610 feet. Plaintiff deemed it necessary to provide steel support for the entire length. This suit is for the large additional expense allegedly involved in installing ribs and liner plates beyond the 50 feet at each mouth.

The plaintiff’s request for authority to use permanent steel supports throughout was first presented by letter to the contracting officer in April 1947, before the supports had been installed. The officer refused to authorize the additional expense on the grounds that the contractor had been furnished full information as to rock conditions at the tunnel site, that the contract limited steel support to one hundred feet, and that the contract placed the cost of protection of the safety of workmen during construction on the contractor. An appeal was taken to the Board of Claims and Appeals of the Corps of Engineers. While that appeal was pending the plaintiff installed the supports for which compensation was claimed.

In June 1948 the Board held a hearing and in December of that year it rendered its decision denying plaintiff’s claim.1 In 1954 plaintiff timely instituted this action in this court. In this suit, varying the claim presented to the Board for estimated costs of installing the support, plaintiff requested a total of $233,425.25 costs allegedly incurred as a consequence of the government’s refusal to authorize support throughout the tunnel. The primary issue here, too, is the necessity for the additional support. Plaintiff does not contend that this issue is not one of “fact” under the standard “Disputes Clause” in plaintiff’s contract:

“Except as otherwise specifically provided in this contract, all disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract shall be decided by the contracting officer subject to written appeal by the contractor within 30 days to the head of the department concerned or ■his duly authorized representative, whose decision shall [367]*367be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto. In the meantime the contractor shall diligently proceed with the work as directed.”

As the claim was presented under this clause, the suit is governed by the “Wunderlich Act,” 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-322 (1958), which provides that the Board’s decision on matters covered by the Disputes Clauses “shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence.” The case was sent to a Commissioner who conducted a second hearing admitting evidence not presented to the Board. The Commissioner recommended that plaintiff recover. This court accepted the Commissioner’s findings and conclusions, 144 Ct. Cls. 500, and, after receiving additional evidence on the question of damages, entered judgment for plaintiff. 157 Ct. Cls. 432 (May 9,1962).

The Supreme Court reversed, 373 U.S. 709 (1963), holding that the Wunderlich Act prevents de novo consideration by a court where an administrative determination has been made. Bather the Supreme Court held the reviewing court is limited to a determination whether there is substantial evidence, based on the record developed before the Board, to support the administrative conclusions.

The case was again sent to the Commissioner after remand from the Supreme Court decision. The Commissioner, after examining the record of the Board hearing, concluded that the Board’s finding for the government was not based on substantial evidence.2 The parties are agreed that under the Wunderlich Act our scope of review is the same as that exercised by the federal courts of appeals under the standards of Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U.S. 474, and its progeny.3

The task before this court under the Supreme Court decision is to review the determination of the Board of Claims and Appeals of the Corps of Engineers and decide [368]*368wb.etb.er there was substantial evidence in tbe record as a whole before that Board to justify its conclusion. In reaching our conclusion, we cannot disregard plaintiff’s evidence. However, even though we might have decided as an original matter with plaintiff on balance, the decision of the Supreme Court requires us to go further and uphold the Board’s decision if there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision on the record as a whole.

Plaintiff and defendant are agreed that the original contract called for steel ribbing only in the 50 feet of the tunnel nearest to each end. Plaintiff contends, however, that the condition of the rock was such that steel ribs and liner plates were required throughout the tunnel. Accordingly, plaintiff contends that recovery should be granted under paragraph TP4-08 of the specifications, which provides that “Payment for all costs of furnishing and placing liner plates, and tunnel supports, * * * specified herein or directed by the Contracting Officer, will be made at the applicable unit price * * Plaintiff contends that the evidence establishes that the officer should have directed the installation of the liner plates and ribs involved, and therefore that the government should pay for the support. Plaintiff also points to TP4-03, which provides:

“TP4 — 03. Tunnel Protection. — a. Scope. — The tunnel protection shall be furnished and placed as required for distances of approximately the first 50 feet at each end of the tunnel which includes the underground portion of the outlet transition. Such tunnel protection conforming to the cross-sectional shape of the tunnel and transition, shall consist of steel arch ribs and corrugated steel liner plates as indicated on the drawings or required, including tie rods and spreaders. * * *” [Underscoring supplied]

As an alternative theory, plaintiff argues that the condition of the rock was sufficiently different from that revealed by test borings to show the supports became necessary by virtue of changed conditions within the meaning of Article 4 of the contract:

“Article 4. Changed Conditions. — Should the contractor encounter, or the Government discover, during the [369]*369progress of the work subsurface and/or latent conditions at the site materially differing from those shown on the drawings or indicated in the specifications, or unknown conditions of an unusual nature differing materially from those ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of the character provided for in the plans and specifications, the attention of the contracting officer shall be called immediately to such conditions before they are disturbed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
167 Ct. Cl. 364, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 127, 1964 WL 8556, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carlo-bianchi-co-v-united-states-cc-1964.