[183]*183Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture, acting for the Secretary of Agriculture, found that respondent, a registrant under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 42 Stat. 159, 7 U. S. C. § 181 et seq., wilfully violated §§ 307 (a) and 312 (a) of the Act, 7 U. S. C. §§ 208 (a) and 213 (a), by incorrect weighing of livestock, and also breached § 401, 7 U. S. C. § 221, by entries of false weights. An order was entered directing that respondent cease and desist from the violations and keep correct accounts, and also suspending respondent as a registrant under the Act for 20 days. Upon review of the decision and order, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld, as supported by substantial evidence, the findings that respondent violated the Act by short-weighting cattle, and also sustained the cease-and-desist order and the order to keep correct accounts. The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the 20-day suspension. 454 F. 2d 109 (1972). We granted certiorari to consider whether, in doing so, the Court of Appeals exceeded the scope of proper judicial review of administrative sanctions. 409 U. S. 947 (1972). We conclude that the setting aside of the suspension was an impermissible judicial intrusion into the administrative domain under the circumstances of this case, and reverse.
Respondent operates a stockyard in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. As a registered “market agency” under § 303 of the Act, 7 U. S. C. § 203, respondent is authorized to sell consigned livestock on commission, subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act and the Secretary’s implementing regulations.1 Investigations of respondent’s op[184]*184erations in 1964, 1966, and 1967 uncovered instances of underweighing of consigned livestock. Respondent was informally warned to correct the situation, but when a 1969 investigation revealed more underweighing, the present proceeding was instituted by the Administrator of the Packers and Stockyards Administration.
Following a hearing and the submission of briefs, the Department of Agriculture hearing examiner found that respondent had “intentionally weighed the livestock at less than their true weights, issued scale tickets and accountings to the consignors on the basis of the false weights, and paid the consignors on the basis of the false weights.” 2 The hearing examiner recommended, in addition to a cease-and-desist order and an order to keep correct records, a 30-day suspension of respondent’s registration under the Act.
The matter was then referred to the Judicial Officer.After hearing oral argument, the Judicial Officer filed a decision and order accepting the hearing examiner’s findings and adopting his recommendations of a cease-and-desist order and an order to keep correct records. The recommended suspension was also imposed but was reduced to 20 days. The Judicial Officer stated:
“It is not a pleasant task to impose sanctions but in view of the previous warnings given respondent we conclude that we should not only issue a cease and desist order but also a suspension of respondent [185]*185as a registrant under the act but for a lesser period than recommended by complainant and the hearing examiner.” 30 Agri. Dec. 179, 186 (1971).
The Court of Appeals agreed that 7 U. S. C. § 204 authorized the Secretary to suspend “any registrant found in violation of the Act,” 454 F. 2d, at 113, that the suspension procedure here satisfied the relevant requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 558, and that “the evidence indicates that [respondent] acted with careless disregard of the statutory requirements and thus meets the test of wilfulness.’ ” 454 F. 2d, at 115. The court nevertheless concluded that the suspension order was “unconscionable” under the circumstances of this case. The court gave two reasons. The first, relying on four previous suspension decisions, was that the Secretary’s practice was not to impose suspensions for negligent or careless violations but only for violations found to be “intentional and flagrant,” and therefore that the suspension in respondent’s case was contrary to a policy of “ ‘achieving] . . . uniformity of sanctions for similar violations.’ ” The second reason given was that “[t]he cease and desist order coupled with the damaging publicity surrounding these proceedings would certainly seem appropriate and reasonable with respect to the practice the Department seeks to eliminate.” Id., at 114, 115.
The applicable standard of judicial review in such cases required review of the Secretary’s order according to the “fundamental principle . . . that where Congress has entrusted an administrative agency with the responsibility of selecting the means of achieving the statutory policy 'the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.’ ” American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 112 (1946). Thus, the Secretary’s choice of sanction was not to be overturned unless the Court of Appeals might find it “unwarranted [186]*186in law or . . . without justification in fact . . . Id., at 112-113; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941); Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U. S. 411, 413-414 (1958); FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U. S. 244, 250 (1967); 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law §30.10, pp. 250-251 (1958). The Court of Appeals acknowledged this definition of the permissible scope of judicial review3 but apparently regarded respondent’s suspension as “unwarranted in law” or “without justification in fact.” We cannot agree that the Secretary’s action can be faulted in either respect on this record.
We read the Court of Appeals’ opinion to suggest that the sanction was “unwarranted in law” because “uniformity of sanctions for similar violations” is somehow mandated by the Act. We search in vain for that requirement in the statute.4 The Secretary may suspend [187]*187“for a reasonable specified period” any registrant who has violated any provision of the Act. 7 U. S. C. § 204. Nothing whatever in that provision confines its application to cases of “intentional and flagrant conduct” or denies its application in cases of negligent or careless violations.
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[183]*183Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture, acting for the Secretary of Agriculture, found that respondent, a registrant under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 42 Stat. 159, 7 U. S. C. § 181 et seq., wilfully violated §§ 307 (a) and 312 (a) of the Act, 7 U. S. C. §§ 208 (a) and 213 (a), by incorrect weighing of livestock, and also breached § 401, 7 U. S. C. § 221, by entries of false weights. An order was entered directing that respondent cease and desist from the violations and keep correct accounts, and also suspending respondent as a registrant under the Act for 20 days. Upon review of the decision and order, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld, as supported by substantial evidence, the findings that respondent violated the Act by short-weighting cattle, and also sustained the cease-and-desist order and the order to keep correct accounts. The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the 20-day suspension. 454 F. 2d 109 (1972). We granted certiorari to consider whether, in doing so, the Court of Appeals exceeded the scope of proper judicial review of administrative sanctions. 409 U. S. 947 (1972). We conclude that the setting aside of the suspension was an impermissible judicial intrusion into the administrative domain under the circumstances of this case, and reverse.
Respondent operates a stockyard in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. As a registered “market agency” under § 303 of the Act, 7 U. S. C. § 203, respondent is authorized to sell consigned livestock on commission, subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act and the Secretary’s implementing regulations.1 Investigations of respondent’s op[184]*184erations in 1964, 1966, and 1967 uncovered instances of underweighing of consigned livestock. Respondent was informally warned to correct the situation, but when a 1969 investigation revealed more underweighing, the present proceeding was instituted by the Administrator of the Packers and Stockyards Administration.
Following a hearing and the submission of briefs, the Department of Agriculture hearing examiner found that respondent had “intentionally weighed the livestock at less than their true weights, issued scale tickets and accountings to the consignors on the basis of the false weights, and paid the consignors on the basis of the false weights.” 2 The hearing examiner recommended, in addition to a cease-and-desist order and an order to keep correct records, a 30-day suspension of respondent’s registration under the Act.
The matter was then referred to the Judicial Officer.After hearing oral argument, the Judicial Officer filed a decision and order accepting the hearing examiner’s findings and adopting his recommendations of a cease-and-desist order and an order to keep correct records. The recommended suspension was also imposed but was reduced to 20 days. The Judicial Officer stated:
“It is not a pleasant task to impose sanctions but in view of the previous warnings given respondent we conclude that we should not only issue a cease and desist order but also a suspension of respondent [185]*185as a registrant under the act but for a lesser period than recommended by complainant and the hearing examiner.” 30 Agri. Dec. 179, 186 (1971).
The Court of Appeals agreed that 7 U. S. C. § 204 authorized the Secretary to suspend “any registrant found in violation of the Act,” 454 F. 2d, at 113, that the suspension procedure here satisfied the relevant requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 558, and that “the evidence indicates that [respondent] acted with careless disregard of the statutory requirements and thus meets the test of wilfulness.’ ” 454 F. 2d, at 115. The court nevertheless concluded that the suspension order was “unconscionable” under the circumstances of this case. The court gave two reasons. The first, relying on four previous suspension decisions, was that the Secretary’s practice was not to impose suspensions for negligent or careless violations but only for violations found to be “intentional and flagrant,” and therefore that the suspension in respondent’s case was contrary to a policy of “ ‘achieving] . . . uniformity of sanctions for similar violations.’ ” The second reason given was that “[t]he cease and desist order coupled with the damaging publicity surrounding these proceedings would certainly seem appropriate and reasonable with respect to the practice the Department seeks to eliminate.” Id., at 114, 115.
The applicable standard of judicial review in such cases required review of the Secretary’s order according to the “fundamental principle . . . that where Congress has entrusted an administrative agency with the responsibility of selecting the means of achieving the statutory policy 'the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.’ ” American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 112 (1946). Thus, the Secretary’s choice of sanction was not to be overturned unless the Court of Appeals might find it “unwarranted [186]*186in law or . . . without justification in fact . . . Id., at 112-113; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941); Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U. S. 411, 413-414 (1958); FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U. S. 244, 250 (1967); 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law §30.10, pp. 250-251 (1958). The Court of Appeals acknowledged this definition of the permissible scope of judicial review3 but apparently regarded respondent’s suspension as “unwarranted in law” or “without justification in fact.” We cannot agree that the Secretary’s action can be faulted in either respect on this record.
We read the Court of Appeals’ opinion to suggest that the sanction was “unwarranted in law” because “uniformity of sanctions for similar violations” is somehow mandated by the Act. We search in vain for that requirement in the statute.4 The Secretary may suspend [187]*187“for a reasonable specified period” any registrant who has violated any provision of the Act. 7 U. S. C. § 204. Nothing whatever in that provision confines its application to cases of “intentional and flagrant conduct” or denies its application in cases of negligent or careless violations. Rather, the breadth of the grant of authority to impose the sanction strongly implies a congressional purpose to permit the Secretary to impose it to deter repeated violations of the Act, whether intentional or negligent. Hyatt v. United States, 276 F. 2d 308, 313 (CA10 1960) ; G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F. 2d 286 (CA7 1958); In re Silver, 21 Agri. Dec. 1438, 1452 (1962).5 The employment of a sanction within the authority of an administrative agency is thus not rendered invalid in a particular case because it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases. FCC v. WOKO, 329 U. S. 223, 227-228 (1946); FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U. S., at 250, 251; G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States, supra, at 296; Hiller v. SEC, 429 F. 2d 856, 858-859 (CA2 1970); Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F. 2d 107, 110 (CA2 1967) ; Kent v. Hardin, 425 F. 2d 1346, 1349 (CA5 1970).
Moreover, the Court of Appeals may have been in error in acting on the premise that the Secretary’s practice was to impose suspensions only in cases of “intentional and flagrant conduct.” 6 The Secretary’s practice, rather, apparently is to employ that sanction as in his judgment [188]*188best serves to deter violations and achieve the objectives of that statute. Congress plainly intended in its broad grant to give the Secretary that breadth of discretion. Therefore, mere unevenness in the application of the sanction does not render its application in a particular case “unwarranted in law.”
Nor can we perceive any basis on this record for a conclusion that the suspension of respondent was so “without justification in fact” “as to constitute an abuse of [the Secretary’s] discretion.” American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S., at 115; Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U. S., at 414; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 455 (1954). The Judicial Officer rested the suspension on his view of its necessity in light of respondent’s disregard of previous warnings. The facts found concerning the previous warnings and respondent’s disregard of these warnings were sustained by the Court of Appeals as based on ample evidence. In that circumstance, the overturning of the suspension authorized by the statute was an impermissible intrusion into the administrative domain.
Similarly, insofar as the Court of Appeals rested its action on its view that, in light of damaging publicity about the charges, the cease-and-desist order sufficiently redressed respondent’s violations, the court clearly exceeded its function of judicial review. The fashioning of an appropriate and reasonable remedy is for the [189]*189Secretary, not the court. The court may decide only whether, under the pertinent statute and relevant facts, the Secretary made “an allowable judgment in [his] choice of the remedy.” Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U. S. 608, 612 (1946).
Reversed.