Bruce E. Heatly v. Commissioner of Social Security
This text of 382 F. App'x 823 (Bruce E. Heatly v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Bruce E. Heatly appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the decision and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir.2002). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir.2004). Under this limited standard of review, we may not make fact-findings, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir.2005).
A person who applies for Social Security disability benefits must prove his disability. 1 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512. The Social Security Regulations outline a fíve-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir.1999). In step one, the claimant must show that he has not engaged in substantial gainful activity; and in step two, he must prove a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Id. In step three, the impairment is compared to listed impairments; if the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, disability is automatically established. Id. If step three’s impairment listing does not establish disability, in step four the claimant must show an inability to perform past relevant work. Id. If the claimant makes a sufficient showing of inability to perform past relevant work, in step five the Commissioner bears the burden of showing other available work that claimant is able to perform. Id.
We first address Heatly’s contention that the ALJ erred at step two of the sequential evaluation by not finding that his chronic pain syndrome was a severe impairment. A severe impairment is one that significantly limits the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities. Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir.1997).
Here, the ALJ determined that the only severe impairment Heatly suffered from was status-post cervical fusion, despite that Heatly separately had been diagnosed with chronic back pain. 2 Even if the ALJ erred in not indicating whether chronic pain syndrome was a severe impairment, the error was harmless because the ALJ concluded that Heatly had a se *825 vere impairment: and that finding is all that step two requires. See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir.1991) (applying the harmless error doctrine to social security cases); Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588 (11th Cir.1987) (“the finding of any severe impairment ... whether or not it results from a single severe impairment or a combination of impairments that together qualify as severe” is enough to satisfy step two) (emphasis added).
Nothing requires that the ALJ must identify, at step two, all of the impairments that should be considered severe. Instead, at step three, the ALJ is required to demonstrate that it has considered all of the claimant’s impairments, whether severe or not, in combination. See id.; Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir.1984) (explaining that the ALJ must make “specific and well-articulated findings as to the effect of the combination of impairments”). Here, that the ALJ did consider all of Heatly’s impairments (whether severe or not) in combination is clear. The ALJ discussed in detail Heatly’s testimony and medical history, which included Heatly’s pain complaints, his limitations due to pain, and the diagnoses he received related to his pain. See Jones v. HHS, 941 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir.1991) (a simple expression of the ALJ’s consideration of the combination of impairments constitutes a sufficient statement of such findings). 3
We now address Heatly’s argument that the ALJ erred at step five of the evaluation. Heatly contends that, because he had a non-exertional impairment of chronic pain syndrome, the ALJ should not have relied on the vocational Grids 4 to make a determination that he was not disabled and, instead, should have used the testimony of a vocational expert.
At step five, in appropriate circumstances, the ALJ may use the Grids (instead of vocational testimony) to establish whether alternative gainful work exists that a claimant can perform and, in turn, to determine whether the claimant is disabled. Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (11th Cir.1989). Exclusive reliance on the grids is inappropriate when a claimant “cannot perform a full range of work at a given level of exertion or the claimant has non-exertional impairments that significantly limit basic work skills.” Jones, 190 F.3d at 1229. A claimant’s basic work skills are significantly limited by non-exertional impairments if the claimant cannot perform a full range of work at a given work level. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1243 (11th Cir.2004).
Here, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Heatly’s chronic pain did not limit significantly his ability to perform adequately a full range of light works. 5 Both *826 Heatly’s own testimony about his daily activities and medical evidence belied his contention that his chronic back pain limited his ability to perform a full range of light work.
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382 F. App'x 823, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bruce-e-heatly-v-commissioner-of-social-security-ca11-2010.