Laffat A. SRYOCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Defendant-Appellee

764 F.2d 834, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 30817, 10 Soc. Serv. Rev. 79
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedJuly 2, 1985
Docket84-8940
StatusPublished
Cited by457 cases

This text of 764 F.2d 834 (Laffat A. SRYOCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Defendant-Appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Laffat A. SRYOCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Defendant-Appellee, 764 F.2d 834, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 30817, 10 Soc. Serv. Rev. 79 (11th Cir. 1985).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Claimant/appellant Laffat Sryock appeals from the Secretary’s decision denying him social security disability benefits. We remand for further administrative proceedings.

I. FACTS

Appellant is a 52-year old high school graduate who formerly worked as an electrician. He suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) with bul-lous emphysema. Although appellant has complained of frequent shortness of breath, his pulmonary functions tests were essentially normal. Dr. Grant, his treating physician, was of the opinion that appellant was disabled.

The Administrative Law Judge (AU) found that claimant suffered from COPD and emphysema without significant respiratory complications; that he was unable to perform his past relevant work as an electrician; that he retained the residual functional capacity to perform at least light work (as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567), except for work involving a “heavily polluted environment”; and that, under Rule 202.14 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“the grids”), 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, App. 2, table no. 2 [hereinafter cited as “Med.-Voc. Guidelines”], appellant was not disabled. 1 Sryock then commenced this action in district court. The district court affirmed the Secretary’s decision and this appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rejection of Treating Physician’s Opinion

Appellant contends that the Secretary’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, in that the AU failed to articulate specific reasons for rejecting the opinion of Dr. Grant, the treating pulmonary specialist. We disagree. “The law is clear that, although the opinion of an examining physician is generally entitled to more weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician, the AU is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526 (1980).” Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. Unit B. 1981). In view of the clinical evidence supporting the AU’s determination, it was not error to reject Dr. Grant’s conclusion as to disability.

B. Non-Exertional Impairments and The Use of “The Grid’’

Appellant argues that in light of his non-exertional impairment (the inability to work in a heavily polluted environment) it was improper for the Secretary to rely on the grids in reaching a disability determination.

In a disability determination, a claimant has the initial burden of showing an impairment serious enough to prevent work in his or her previous job. Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1355 (11th Cir.1982), vacated *836 and remanded sub nom. Heckler v. Broz, 461 U.S. 952, 103 S.Ct. 2421, 77 L.Ed.2d 1311, adhered to, 711 F.2d 957, modified, 721 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir.1983). If this burden is met, the burden shifts to the Secretary to prove that the claimant is capable, considering his age, education, and work experience, of engaging in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

The Medical-Vocational Guidelines come into play at this second stage. Those guidelines include detailed grid regulations which, based on a claimant’s residual functional capacity, 2 age, education, and work experience, compel a conclusion on the issue of ability to perform other substantial work, and thus as to whether the claimant is disabled. Broz, 677 F.2d at 1355; Med.Voc. Guidelines, § 200.00(a).

The grid regulations are not applicable in all situations.

At a given residual functional capacity, if a claimant is capable of some work at that level but not a full range of work, then that level of the grids is not applicable. [Med.-Voc. Guidelines] at §§ 201.-00(h), (i), 202.00(b); [other citations omitted]. Second, in determining residual functional capacity only exertional limitations are considered, i.e. ability to lift, stand, push, pull, handle, etc. If a claimant has nonexertional impairments that significantly limit the ability to do basic work activities — for example, sensory impairments such as skin or respiratory sensitivity and mental or emotional impairments — then the grid regulations do not apply. Id. at § 200.00(e).

Broz, 677 F.2d at 1356. However, when both exertional and nonexertional 3 work impairments exist the grids may still be applicable. 4 “[N]on-exertional limitations can cause the grid to be inapplicable only when the limitations are severe enough to prevent a wide range of gainful employment at the designated level.” Murray v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 934, 935 (11th Cir.1984); Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524, 536-37 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957, 103 S.Ct. 2428, 77 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1983). Therefore, when both exertional and nonexertional limitations affect a claimant’s ability to work, the ALJ should make a specific finding as to whether the nonexertional limitations are severe enough to preclude a wide range of employment at the given work capacity level indicated by the exertional limitations. Courts will review this determination only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. See Murray, 737 F.2d at 935; Allen v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 726 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir.1984); Dellolio v. Heckler, 705 F.2d 123, 127-28 (5th Cir. 1983); Hernandez v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 857, 862 (5th Cir.1983); Kirk, 667 F.2d at 537.

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764 F.2d 834, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 30817, 10 Soc. Serv. Rev. 79, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/laffat-a-sryock-plaintiff-appellant-v-margaret-m-heckler-ca11-1985.