Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Kohler Co.

398 F. Supp. 2d 925, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26913, 2005 WL 2897453
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DecidedNovember 3, 2005
Docket05-C-0025-C
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 398 F. Supp. 2d 925 (Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Kohler Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Kohler Co., 398 F. Supp. 2d 925, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26913, 2005 WL 2897453 (W.D. Wis. 2005).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

CRABB, District Judge.

In this civil action, plaintiff Briggs & Stratton Corp. accuses defendant Kohler Co. of manufacturing and selling a single-cylinder internal combustion engine that infringes claims 1-2, 4, 6-11 and 13 of plaintiffs United States Patent No. 6,382,-166 (the ’166 patent) and claims 1, 2-6, 8, 11-13 and 15-31 of United States Patent No. 6,460,502 (the ’502 patent). Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief under 35 U.S.C. § 271. Defendant asserts six counterclaims, alleging non-infringement, patent invalidity and violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act, Wisconsin antitrust laws, Wis. Stat. §§ 133.03, 133.04, 133.14 and 133.18 and the Wisconsin common law of unfair competition. The case is before the court on plaintiffs motions to strike and for summary judgment on the issues of literal infringement and validity and on defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment limiting damages. Jurisdiction is present. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a) and 1331.

Before setting out the undisputed facts, I will address plaintiffs motion to strike portions of the brief and supporting declarations defendant filed in response to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.

I. MOTION TO STRIKE

On February 16, 2005, plaintiff served its first set of interrogatories and requests *930 for production on defendant. Interrogatory # 1 asked defendant to

[e]xplain in detail, on a claim-by-claim and limitation-by-limitation basis, each of KOHLER’S contentions that any claim of the T66 PATENT or the ’502 PATENT is invalid, void, and/or unenforceable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112, including an identification of documents that KOHLER contends support such contentions, the complete legal and factual bases for such contentions, including claim construction contentions, and each person having knowledge of any factual basis.

Aff. of Joseph T. Miotke, dkt. #81, exh. # 2, at 1. Defendant responded on March 24, 2005. On May 26, 2005, and again on August 9, 2005, defendant supplemented its responses to plaintiffs first set of interrogatories and requests for production.

On July 15, 2005, defendant’s expert, James Brogdon, filed an expert report that included Brogdon’s claim constructions and opinions regarding the invalidity of the ’166 and ’502 patents. On August 4, 2005, defendant filed a second report by Brogdon in response to the report filed by plaintiffs expert, Marthinius van Schoor.

Plaintiff contends that these filings were incomplete and that defendant has included in its brief in response to the motion for summary judgment expert opinions and legal arguments that were not disclosed previously to plaintiff, in violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1). Plaintiff objects to (A) defendant’s new non-infringement argument based on its assertion that the Courage balance system used in defendant’s allegedly infringing engine does not have a counterbalance weight disposed on the second side of the crankshaft; (B) the allegedly new proposed constructions of the terms “counterbalance weight,” “rail,” “adapter,” “runner filler,” “selectable,” and “substantially uniform”; and (C) numerous statements and documentary evidence offered by defendant’s expert, James Grondin, and by defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Terrence Rotter. This evidence includes new claims regarding the obviousness of the T66 patent, allegedly contradictory testimony regarding the design of the Courage engine, testimony discussing “types” of runner fillers, two allegedly inaccurate summary charts and new references to prior art. Plaintiff asks that all arguments and materials not previously disclosed by defendant be stricken under Fed. Rule Civ. P. 37(c)(1) or under the “sham affidavit doctrine.”

Rule 26(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure places upon litigants a duty to supplement “the information contained in [an expert witness’s] report” and “information provided through deposition of the expert” if the party learns that the information previously disclosed was incomplete or incorrect in any material respect. Rule 26(e)(1). Rule 26(e)(2) requires litigants to “seasonably amend” prior responses to interrogatories when a party learns that its earlier responses were incomplete or incorrect in any material respect.

A party who fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(e)(1) or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2) is not permitted to use the undisclosed evidence at trial, at a hearing or on a motion unless the failure is harmless or substantially justified. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). “The determination of whether a Rule 26(a) violation is justified or harmless is entrusted to the broad discretion of the district court.” Mid-America Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., Ltd., 100 F.3d 1353, 1363 (7th Cir.1996).

A. Defendant’s Non-Infringement Argument Regarding the ’166 Patent

Relying on the declaration of its expert, James Brogdon, defendant argues *931 that its Courage series engine does not utilize a counterbalance weight disposed on the second side of the engine’s crankshaft. Defendant asserts that its new position is the logical response to the opinion expressed by plaintiffs expert, Marthinus van Schoor, in his August 5, 2005 invalidity report that the Menen (U.S. Patent No. 4,407,169) counterbalance weight is not disposed on the second side of the crankshaft. The Menen counterbalance weight is “virtually identical” to the Courage counterbalance weight; therefore, defendant argues, if Menen does not have a counterbalance weight disposed on a second side of the crankshaft, neither does the Courage series engine. Although this may be a logical position, it was not disclosed prior to the filing of defendant’s response to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Defendant argues that the non-disclosure was justified because it did not have “an opportunity to respond” to van Schoor’s report before filing its response to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and it had no way of knowing from van Schoor’s July 13, 2005 report on infringement that van Schoor viewed the Menen patent in this way.

Defendant’s argument is dubious in two respects.

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Bluebook (online)
398 F. Supp. 2d 925, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26913, 2005 WL 2897453, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/briggs-stratton-corp-v-kohler-co-wiwd-2005.