Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Kohler Co.

408 F. Supp. 2d 697, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 353, 2006 WL 41250
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJanuary 5, 2006
Docket05-C-0025-C
StatusPublished

This text of 408 F. Supp. 2d 697 (Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Kohler Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Kohler Co., 408 F. Supp. 2d 697, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 353, 2006 WL 41250 (W.D. Wis. 2006).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

CRABB, District Judge.

This is a civil action in which plaintiff Briggs & Stratton Corp. accuses defendant Kohler Co. of manufacturing and selling a single-cylinder internal combustion engine that infringes plaintiffs United States Pat *699 ent No. 6,382,166 (the ’166 patent) and United States Patent No. 6,460,502 (the ’502 patent). Defendant has asserted six counterclaims, alleging non-infringement, invalidity and violations of the Sherman Act, Wisconsin antitrust laws and the Wisconsin common law of unfair competition.

On November 3, 2005, the court issued a summary judgment order in which it construed the term “rail” as used in the ’166 patent to mean “a bar that serves to direct substantially the motion of a component along the axis of the rail.” Order dated Nov. 3, 2005, dkt. # 110, at 104. Subsequently, both parties filed motions for reconsideration, from which it became apparent that the court’s construction of the term “rail” was too broad, encompassing not only rails, but also structurally distinct features such as the pins found in the Kollock, Shirai and Murata patents. Therefore, on November 25, 2005, at what was scheduled to be the final pretrial conference in this case, I withdrew the construction of the term “rail” and heard argument from the parties regarding what construction would most accurately reflect the meaning of the term as it is used in the T66 patent. Also, I vacated the portion of the November 3 order finding that defendant had infringed the 166 patent and set supplemental briefing on the proper construction of the term rail. I reserved the right to reinstate the original summary judgment findings at a later stage in the proceedings.

Now before the court are the parties’ supplemental briefs on the construction of the term rail and plaintiffs “Motion to Reinstate Summary Judgment of Infringement of the 166 Patent and that the Claims of the 166 Patent Are Not Anticipated.” 1 After reviewing each of the constructions proposed by the parties at summary judgment and thereafter, and having considered the points raised at oral argument and in the supplemental briefs, I conclude that the term rail should be construed to mean “a bar supported along its length that serves to' direct substantially the motion of a component that slides along the axis of the rail.” Plaintiffs motion for reinstatement of summary judgment of infringement will be denied because the parties dispute whether the ribs of defendant’s engine “direct substantially” the movement of the engine’s counterbalance weight along the axis of the ribs. However, because none of the prior art upon which defendant relies anticipates the T66 patent, I will grant plaintiffs motion for summary judgment of non-anticipation of the ’166 patent.

A. Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Revised Claim Construction

When construing a claim term, the court must not limit or broaden the claims, but rather must define, as a matter of law, the invention that has been patented. Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2001). The court must be careful not to restrict the scope of a patent by importing limitations not contained in the patent claims. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2005). At the same time, the court must not permit a claim term to be read in a way that enlarges the patent beyond the scope of the invention itself. Netword, LLC, 242 F.3d at 1352. Simple though it may sound, striking a balance between an overly restrictive and an overly broad construction can be as treacherous as navigat *700 ing between Scylla and Charybdis, as this case has demonstrated.

As a remedy for the overly broad construction adopted in the November 3 summary judgment order, the parties have proposed several alternative constructions which they contend capture more closely the meaning of the term “rail” as it would be understood by those skilled in the art of mechanical engineering. Plaintiff has proposed two definitions:

1. A bar that serves to direct substantially the planar motion of a component that slides along the axis of the rail. Pit’s Br. in Resp. to Dft.’s M. for Reconsideration, dkt. # 165, at 2.
2. A bar supported along its length that serves to direct substantially the motion of a component that slides along the axis of the rail. Id.

Defendant offers a third alternative:

A bar that is interconnected to a component that supports the rail along its length, and which fits into the recess or slot of an interfacing component and acts to direct the linear motion of either component along the axis of the bar. Def.’s Supp. Br. on Claim Constr., dkt. # 203, at 8.

At the November 25, 2005 hearing, I heard oral argument concerning plaintiffs proposed definitions. At the time, I indicated a preference for plaintiffs first proposal because it resembled more closely the construction adopted on summary judgment. However, having heard the parties arguments and having studied the briefs, I conclude that adopting the “planar motion” description would create more problems than it would solve, given the parties’ starkly different interpretations of the meaning of “planar.” Therefore, I will focus on plaintiffs second proposed construction and defendant’s alternative construction, neither of which contains the phrase “planar motion.”

From the parties’ proposed definitions, it appears that they agree upon several key elements of the term “rail” as it is used in the T66 patent. First, a rail is a bar supported along its length. 2 Second, a rail directs substantially the motion of another component along the rail’s axis. Plaintiff would add the requirement that the moving component “slide” along the axis of the bar, while defendant would add that (1) the rail directs the linear motion of the moving component and (2) the rail and moving component are interconnected by means of a slot or recess.

Plaintiff suggests that a rail directs the motion of a component by permitting it to slide along the rail’s axis. I understand “sliding” to mean movement along the length of the rail during which the moving component contacts the rail to some extent as it moves. I do not understand “sliding” to require perfect or constant contact with the surface of the rail. Although defendant has not included the word “slide” in its proposed construction, it does not dispute that a rail directs the motion of a component that slides along the rail’s axis. Because this description is not a limitation, but rather a characterization of how one skilled in the art would understand a rail to function, it is a reasonable addition to the claim construction.

Defendant proposes that a rail directs the linear motion of the moving component. This limitation is a transparent attempt to re-litigate the question of linear motion addressed at length in the November 3, 2005 summary judgment order.

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408 F. Supp. 2d 697, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 353, 2006 WL 41250, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/briggs-stratton-corp-v-kohler-co-wiwd-2006.