Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney

439 U.S. 24, 99 S. Ct. 295, 58 L. Ed. 2d 216, 1978 U.S. LEXIS 140, 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8673, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 520

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: November 13, 1978
• Docket: 77-1792
• Status: Published

Opinions

Per Curiam.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. In Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567 (1978), we stated that “[t]o dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas, the employer need only 'articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’ ” Id., at 578, quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973). We stated in McDonnell Douglas that the plaintiff “must ... be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the employer’s] stated reason for [the plaintiff’s] rejection was in fact pretext.” Id., at 804. The Court of Appeals in the present case, however, referring to McDonnell Douglas, stated that “in requiring the defendant to prove absence of discriminatory motive, the Supreme Court placed the burden squarely on the party with the greater access to such evidence.” 569 F. 2d 169, 177 (CA1 1978) (emphasis added).¹

While words such as “articulate,” “show,” and “prove,” may-have more or less similar meanings depending upon the context in which they are used, we think that there is a significant distinction between merely “articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” and “prov[ing] absence of discriminatory motive.” By reaffirming and emphasizing the McDonnell Douglas analysis in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, supra, we made it clear that the former will suffice to meet the employee's prima facie case of discrimination. Because the Court of Appeals appears to have imposed a heavier burden on the employer than Furnco warrants, its judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for reconsideration in the light of Furnco, supra, at 578.²

It is so ordered.

1 While the Court of Appeals did make the statement that the dissent quotes, post, at 27, it also made the statement quoted in the text above. These statements simply contradict one another. The statement quoted in the text above would make entirely superfluous the third step in the Furnco-McDonnell Douglas analysis, since it would place on the employer at the second stage the burden of showing that the reason for rejection was not a pretext, rather than requiring contrary proof from the employee as a part of the third step. We think our remand is warranted both because we are unable to determine which of the two conflicting standards the Court of Appeals applied in reviewing the decision of the District Court in this case, and because of the implication in its opinion that there is no difference between the two standards. We, of course, intimate no view as to the correct result if the proper test is applied in this case.

2 We quite agree with the dissent that under Furnco and McDonnell Douglas the employer’s burden is satisfied if he simply “explains what he has done” or “produe[es] evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.” Post, at 28,29. But petitioners clearly did produce evidence to support their legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for refusing to promote respondent during the years in question. See 569 F. 2d, at 172-173, 178; App. to Pet. for Cert. B-2 to B-24. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners had not met their burden because the proffered legitimate explanation did not “rebut” or “disprove” respondent’s prima facie case or “prove absence of nondiscriminatory motive.” 569 F. 2d, at 177 — 179 ; see App. to Pet. for Cert. B-25. This holding by the Court of Appeals is further support for our belief that the court appears to have imposed a heavier burden on the employer than Furnco, and the dissent here, require.