Baatz v. Smith

104 N.W.2d 787, 361 Mich. 68, 1960 Mich. LEXIS 300

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: September 15, 1960
• Docket: Docket 39, 40, 41, Calendar 48,051, 48,052, 48,053
• Status: Published

Opinions

Dethmers, C. J.

Plaintiffs commenced suits .against defendants, hotelkeepers, in assumpsit, on June 13, 1958, for personal injuries and resultant damages sustained on April 30,1954, while they were paying guests in defendants’ hotel. Plaintiffs alleged in their declarations that another, former guest of defendants’ hotel, who was a confirmed alcoholic, had been evicted therefrom, became disgruntled, harbored a grudge on that account, had threatened injury to the hotel, and on one occasion had set fire to it, all as defendants knew or should have known; and' that, on the night in question, he did cause dynamite to explode in the hotel, injuring plaintiffs.

The trial court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss on the ground that the actions were barred by. the 3-year statute of limitations, CLS 1956, § 609.13, subd 2 (Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp § 27.605, subd 2), which reads as follows:

“2. Actions to recover damages for injuries to person or property and actions for trespass upon lands shall be brought within 3 years from the time said actions accrue, and not afterwards.”

Plaintiffs insist that the quoted statutory limitation applies only to actions sounding in tort but not to those brought in assumpsit even though based on tortious acts which -are claimed to constitute, as well, a breach of contract.

In Coates v. Milner Hotel, Inc., 311 Mich 233, plaintiff brought suit, more than 3 years after her cause /of action had accrued, against defendant hotel company therein, charging that, because of that defendant’s negligence, while she was a paying guest in the hotel, her room had been entered by an intoxicated person who had violently assaulted her. The relevant holding in that case is well expressed in the fifth syllabus, which reads as follows:

“The 3-year statute limiting the time within which an action for injuries to the person may be brought applies to all actions to recover for an injury to the person arising because of negligence whether based' upon implied contract or tort (CL 1929, § 13976, as amended by PA 1941, No 72).”

Plaintiffs suggest that Coates should be re-evaluated and overruled. The only question is the meaning of the statutory language. It limits, in express and plain words, to 3 years, actions to recover damages for injuries to person. Such was the nature of 'the action in Coates. The statutory language permitted of no other holding in the case. It was right then. It still is. And so, here, whether brought in tort or assumpsit, these are actions to recover damages for injuries to person. Accordingly, the 3-year limitation applies.

Whether application of the statutory limitation, as :in Coates, works an injustice or not is a policy question for legislative determination and control. Our function is to apply the statute’s clear language.

New York cases cited by plaintiff are: Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corporation, 305 NY 140 (111 NE2d 421, 37 ALR2d 698); Robins v. Finestone, 308 NY 543 (127 NE2d 330); Golia v. Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York, 7 Misc 2d 919 (166 NYS2d 889). The support plaintiffs find in Golia, as cited, appears to have been pretty much dissipated • upon review of that case in 6 App Div 2d 884 (177 NYS2d 550). The section of the New York stat-. ute involved differs from that of Michigan in that it expressly applies to actions for injuries “resulting from negligence”. The reasoning in them becomes involved with questions of whether the causes of.' action did or did not arise out of defendants’ negligence. The Michigan statute presents no such -question, leaving these New York cases of scant assistance to us. In accord with the Michigan view expressed in Coates are Farbach Chemical Co. v. Commercial Chemical Co., 101 Ohio App 209 (136 NE2d 363); Seymour v. Union News Co., 349 Ill App 197 (110 NE2d 475); Strzelczyk v. Marki, 169 Cal App 2d 703 (337 P2d 846); and Katz v. Manhattan General, 2 App Div 2d 876 (156 NYS2d 302), which hold immaterial the form of action pursued. Smith v. White Tower Management Corporation, 129 NYS2d 545; and Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91 (297 P2d ), hold that, at all events, actions such as these against an innkeeper cannot he predicated on contract liability under the theory of implied warranty.

Regardless of the discussion of the question as to whether an action is based on contract or tort in the cases from other jurisdictions, that question is not controlling under our statute.

Affirmed. Costs to defendants.

Carr, Kelly, Black, and Edwards, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, C. J.

1 PA 1915, No 314, ch 9, § 13, as amended, CLS 1956, § 609.13 (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.605)

2 PA 1915, No 314, ch 11, § 1, as amended, CL 1948, § 611.1 (Stat Ann § 27.651). See Sunderland, The Michigan Judicature Act of 1915, part 2, Forms of Action, 14 Mich L Rev 383.

4 Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision. Pinal Report, part 2, Proposed Statutes and Comments, pp 306, 307.