Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc.

499 F. Supp. 53, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 1, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9402
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 7, 1980
DocketCiv. A. 78-598
StatusPublished
Cited by49 cases

This text of 499 F. Supp. 53 (Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 1, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9402 (W.D. Pa. 1980).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TEITELBAUM, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA), brought the instant action against defendant, Essex Group, Inc. (Essex), in three counts. The first count requests the Court to reform or equitably adjust an agreement entitled the Molten Metal Agreement entered into between ALCOA and Essex. The second count alleges that the Molten Metal Agreement was modified by oral amendment and that Essex has breached the amended agreement. The second count seeks a declaratory judgment that the alleged breach by Essex excuses ALCOA’s further performance and seeks as well an award of damages caused by the alleged breach of Essex. The third count asks for a declaratory judgment that ALCOA’s prior notice of termination of the Molten Metal Agreement was proper or, in the alternative, that ALCOA may terminate the Molten Metal Agreement if it be determined by this Court to be a contract for the sale of goods. Essex denies all of ALCOA’s material allegations. Essex further counterclaims that ALCOA is liable to it for damages based on ALCOA’s failure to deliver to Essex the amounts of molten metal ALCOA is contractually obligated to deliver under the Molten Metal Agreement and seeks entry of an order specifically enforcing its right to receive molten aluminum from ALCOA in the amounts requested.

Jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy and is one of the few issues in the case sub judice not in dispute.

In 1966 Essex made a policy decision to expand its participation in the manufacture *56 of aluminum wire products. Thus, beginning in the spring of 1967, ALCOA and Essex negotiated with each other for the purpose of reaching an agreement whereby ALCOA would supply Essex with its long-term needs for aluminum that Essex could use in its manufacturing operations.

By December 26, 1967 the parties had entered into what they designated as a toll conversion service contract known as the Molten Metal Agreement under which Essex would supply ALCOA with alumina which ALCOA would convert by a smelting process into molten aluminum. Under the terms of the Molten Metal Agreement, Essex delivers alumina to ALCOA which ALCOA smelts (or toll converts) into molten aluminum at its Warrick, Indiana, smelting facility. Essex then picks up the molten aluminum for further processing.

The price provisions of the contract contained an escalation formula which indicates that $.03 per pound of the original price escalates in accordance with changes in the Wholesale Price Index-Industrial Commodities (WPI) and $.03 per pound escalates in accordance with an index based on the average hourly labor rates paid to ALCOA employees at the Warrick plant. The portion of the pricing formula which is in issue in this case under counts one and two is the production charge which is escalated by the WPI. ALCOA contends that this charge was intended by the parties to reflect actual changes in the cost of the non-labor items utilized by ALCOA in the production of aluminum from alumina at its Warrick, Indiana smelting plant. In count one of this suit ALCOA asserts that the WPI used in the Molten Metal Agreement was in fact incapable of reasonably reflecting changes in the non-labor costs at ALCOA’s Warrick, Indiana smelting plant and has in fact failed to so reflect such changes.

It is ALCOA’s contention in count one of its complaint that the shared objectives of the parties with respect to the use of the WPI have been completely and totally frustrated, that both ALCOA and Essex made a mutual mistake of fact in agreeing to use the WPI to escalate non-labor costs at Warrick. ALCOA is seeking reformation or equitable adjustment of the Molten Metal Agreement so that pursuant to count one of its complaint, the pricing formula with respect to the non-labor portion of the production charge will be changed to eliminate the WPI and substitute the actual costs incurred by ALCOA for the non-labor items used at its Warrick, Indiana smelting plant. Essex opposes relief under count one contending that: 1) ALCOA cannot obtain reformation of the Molten Metal Agreement on the grounds of mutual mistake since ALCOA has failed to establish any antecedent agreement on pricing not expressed in the Molten Metal Agreement; 2) ALCOA assumed the risk that its prediction as to future costs would be incorrect; 3) ALCOA has failed to prove that enforcement of the Molten Metal Agreement would be unconscionable.

ALCOA alleges in the second count of its complaint that when it became evident that the WPI was not accomplishing the objectives of the parties under the Molten Metal Agreement, discussions were begun between ALCOA and Essex which culminated in a meeting held between Mr. Krome George, Chief Executive Officer of ALCOA, and others of ALCOA and Mr. Paul O’Malley, President of Essex, on July 21, 1975. At that time, Mr. George and Mr. O’Malley allegedly orally agreed to reform the Molten Metal Agreement to reflect the original objectives of the parties. The oral agreement allegedly replaced the WPI with the actual costs incurred by ALCOA. Essex denies entering into the alleged oral agreement and has accordingly refused to perform consistent with its terms. In its second count, ALCOA requests that declaratory judgment be entered whereby Essex’s breach of its alleged oral agreement to reform the Molten Metal Agreement be declared sufficient grounds to excuse any further performance by ALCOA of that Agreement. In addition, ALCOA seeks that it be awarded damages in excess of *57 $11,900,000 accruing to the date of judgment resulting from Essex’s breach, plus interests and costs.

ALCOA asks in its third count that it be excused from further performance of the Molten Metal Agreement. ALCOA alleges that its performance is excused by a clause which is contained in a document referred to as the December 27, 1967 Letter Agreement (the Side Letter Agreement). That clause provides that ALCOA and Essex, acting in good faith, entered into the Molten Metal Agreement with the understanding that it was a contract for the furnishing of services by ALCOA to Essex. The clause further provides that in the event a final decision of a court construed the Molten Metal Agreement as a contract for the sale of goods it could be terminated by either party. The Side Letter Agreement was a product of concern that an admittedly preferential price to Essex would threaten a violation of the RobinsonPatman Act if the various transactions could be lumped together and considered to be in substance the sale of aluminum rather than what appears as a matter of form, the sale of services.

ALCOA argues it should be permitted to terminate the Molten Metal Agreement under the terms of the Side Letter Agreement. ALCOA urges that this Court should determine whether the Molten Metal Agreement is a contract for the sale of goods.

As previously indicated, Essex has filed a counterclaim to the ALCOA complaint. The original counterclaim of Essex contends that under the terms of the Molten Metal Agreement as implemented during the years 1977, 1978 and the first six months of 1979, ALCOA has, on numerous occasions, breached the Molten Metal Agreement by improperly failing to deliver the amounts of molten aluminum required by the contract.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Murray, H. v. Willistown Township
169 A.3d 84 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2017)
Exelon Generation Co. v. General Atomics Technologies Corp.
559 F. Supp. 2d 892 (N.D. Illinois, 2008)
Mill Run Associates v. Locke Property Co., Inc.
282 F. Supp. 2d 278 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2003)
Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co.
763 A.2d 401 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2000)
USX Corp. v. Adriatic Insurance
64 F. Supp. 2d 469 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1998)
Unihealth v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.
14 F. Supp. 2d 623 (D. New Jersey, 1998)
Liebersohn v. Ali (In Re Fineberg)
202 B.R. 206 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1996)
Sonfast Corp. v. York International Corp.
875 F. Supp. 1088 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1994)
In Re St. Mary Hospital
155 B.R. 345 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1993)
Beaver Creek Coal Company v. Nevada Power Company
968 F.2d 19 (Tenth Circuit, 1992)
G.C. Murphy Co. v. M. Goldfarb-My Florist Inc.
11 Pa. D. & C.4th 614 (Alleghany County Court of Common Pleas, 1991)
Atlas Corp. v. United States
895 F.2d 745 (Federal Circuit, 1990)
Atlas Corporation v. United States
895 F.2d 745 (Federal Circuit, 1990)
Smith v. Commonwealth National Bank
557 A.2d 775 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1989)
American Fence Co., Inc. v. MRM SEC. Systems, Inc.
710 F. Supp. 37 (D. Connecticut, 1989)
Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc.
756 P.2d 1209 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
499 F. Supp. 53, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 1, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9402, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aluminum-co-of-america-v-essex-group-inc-pawd-1980.