Evans, Judge.
These are workmen’s compensation cases, in which the Workmen’s Compensation Board decided'for the claimants, which award was reversed by the superior eourt and claimants (appellants) then appealed to this court for review. There was evidence in the record from which the Workmen’s Compensation Board was authorized to find the following facts to have been proven:
■ Wright & Lopez, Inc., employed certain persons, who resided in Floyd County,, to perform work for it in Cobb County, and as a part of the contract of employment an arrangement was made that whichever one of the em- ' ployees used his automobile in transporting his fellow employees to and from work would be reimbursed in the amount of $3 per day, or $15 per week. The employer also guaranteed payment of seven gallons of gas, per day for such transportation. This arrangement was followed for some time prior to and including the day on which the wreck occurred which gives rise to these cases.
On the day in question, at the end of the day’s work,, the employees did not proceed toward Floyd County immediately, but, first went into Fulton County where they [233]*233bought wine and liquors and then began their homeward journey. There was evidence from which it could be inferred that several of them were drinking whiskey, including the driver, and that said driver turned the car over to one of his fellow employees, who was sober, in order that the sober employee could drive the car. The automobile proceeded on the most direct, or best, route from the liquor store in Fulton County to their home 'in Floyd County, making one or two stops along the way. Wine and whiskey were bought at these stops. The new driver, however, remained sober, and was driving the automobile on that part of the route that they traveled each day, and while on said route, they were involved in a collision in which two of them were killed and three of them were seriously injured.
The claims in these five cases were filed by the three injured claimants, and by the mother of one deceased employee and the -guardian of the minor children of the other deceased employee.
The appellee (the insurer of the employer) insists that the superior court properly .overturned the award of the Workmen’s Compensation Board, and his contentions in this respect are: (a) There was a deviation from the scope of employment, and the trip from the place of employment into Fulton County was such a stepping aside from the terms of employment, including the agreement as to transportation, as precludes an award for the claimants, (b) The employees were voluntarily drunk at the time of the collision and injuries, including the driver, and this conduct precludes an award for the claimants, (c) The driver of the car in which claimants were riding was exceeding the speed limit at the time of the collision, and their death and injuries resulted from the unlawful conduct of one they had voluntarily placed in charge of the car as driver and thus precludes an award for claimants. Held:
1. In a workmen’s compensation case, the award of the board has the same effect as the verdict of a jury, and it [234]*234must be upheld if there is "any evidence” to support it. Even if the appellee is correct in his contention that the evidence strongly preponderated toward his theory of the facts in the case, this is not enough to overturn an award by the board. The superior court and this court are both bound by the finding of the Board of Workmen’s Compensation if there is any competent evidence to support the award. See Delta C & S Airlines v. Perry, 94 Ga. App. 107 (93 SE2d 771); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sanders, 182 Ga. 594 (186 SE 693); Ocean Accident &c Corp. v. Farr, 180 Ga. 266, 270 (178 SE 728); South v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. A., 41 Ga. App. 827 (155 SE 48); Taylor v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 43 Ga. App. 292 (158 SE 623); Hartford Accident &c. Co. v. Ledford, 116 Ga. App. 402 (157 SE2d 318); Ga. Pacific Corp. v. Buchanan, 113 Ga. App. 844 (149 SE2d 831); J. D. Jewell, Inc. v. Ward, 119 Ga. App. 113 (166 SE2d 403); Fulmer v. Aetna Cas &c. Co., 85 Ga. App. 102 (68 SE2d 180).
2. On the question of deviation or stepping aside from scope of employment, by going into Fulton County, this argument might have considerable force if the collision had occurred while going to the whiskey store. But these employees had left the whiskey store and were headed for home on the most direct route; and had actually reached the same route they used every day on their trips to and from work, when the collision occurred. We hold that the employees were in the scope of employment at the time the collision occurred. Davies v. Hearn, 45 Ga. App. 276 (164 SE 273); Atlanta Furniture Co. v. Walker, 51 Ga. App. 781 (181 SE 498); Wicker v. Fidel. & Cas. Co., 59 Ga. App. 521 (1 SE2d 464); Curtis v. Royal Indem. Co., 101 Ga. App. 158 (112 SE2d 819).
3. On the question of intoxication of the driver of the vehicle, the driver himself, Willie C. Jenkins, testified as follows in this respect: "Q. How much whiskey did you drink there?” (Kingston — shortly before the wreck). "A. I didn’t drink any.” He also testified that he did not have anything to drink at any time on the trip except a Pepsi-[235]*235Cola in Kingston shortly before the wreck. This was direct evidence, therefore, that he was not drinking, but was cold sober, although we readily concede there was other testimony from which it could be inferred that he had taken a drink. The above testimony was sufficient upon which to make a finding that the driver was not intoxicated. As to the testimony of intoxication of those who were riding with him, this is not enough to preclude a recovery.
It has been held that one who enters a car driven by an intoxicated driver, may still recover if the circumstances were such as to suggest the driver, despite intoxication, was able to drive with proper skill and diligence. Sparks v. Porcher, 109 Ga. App. 334 (136 SE2d 153). Conversely, of course, if the driver is so obviously drunk as to be incapacitated to drive, one electing to become a passenger with such knowledge could not recover where the collision is caused by the driver’s intoxication. But where the driver is sober, there is no duty upon the passenger to remain awake in order to become a backseat driver, and to warn the driver against hazards. The passenger has the right to assume the driver will obey the law and drive properly; and no duty of any kind devolves upon the passenger to take steps for his own protection until he has knowledge of the danger. Browning v. Kahle, 106 Ga. App. 353, 358 (126 SE2d 892). It is true -that the passenger cannot "close his eyes to known and obvious danger,” but that does not mean that he must keep a watch ahead, so if the driver makes a mistake, he may correct the driver. Such conduct on the passenger’s part would be as likely to cause injury as to prevent it because only one person can drive a car at a time. There is an ancient proverb that "Too many cooks spoil the broth.” In the instant case, where the evidence is sufficient to show that the driver was cold sober and capable of driving the car, the passengers did not preclude themselves from recovering by drinking whiskey while en route to their destination. And this is especially true in [236]
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Evans, Judge.
These are workmen’s compensation cases, in which the Workmen’s Compensation Board decided'for the claimants, which award was reversed by the superior eourt and claimants (appellants) then appealed to this court for review. There was evidence in the record from which the Workmen’s Compensation Board was authorized to find the following facts to have been proven:
■ Wright & Lopez, Inc., employed certain persons, who resided in Floyd County,, to perform work for it in Cobb County, and as a part of the contract of employment an arrangement was made that whichever one of the em- ' ployees used his automobile in transporting his fellow employees to and from work would be reimbursed in the amount of $3 per day, or $15 per week. The employer also guaranteed payment of seven gallons of gas, per day for such transportation. This arrangement was followed for some time prior to and including the day on which the wreck occurred which gives rise to these cases.
On the day in question, at the end of the day’s work,, the employees did not proceed toward Floyd County immediately, but, first went into Fulton County where they [233]*233bought wine and liquors and then began their homeward journey. There was evidence from which it could be inferred that several of them were drinking whiskey, including the driver, and that said driver turned the car over to one of his fellow employees, who was sober, in order that the sober employee could drive the car. The automobile proceeded on the most direct, or best, route from the liquor store in Fulton County to their home 'in Floyd County, making one or two stops along the way. Wine and whiskey were bought at these stops. The new driver, however, remained sober, and was driving the automobile on that part of the route that they traveled each day, and while on said route, they were involved in a collision in which two of them were killed and three of them were seriously injured.
The claims in these five cases were filed by the three injured claimants, and by the mother of one deceased employee and the -guardian of the minor children of the other deceased employee.
The appellee (the insurer of the employer) insists that the superior court properly .overturned the award of the Workmen’s Compensation Board, and his contentions in this respect are: (a) There was a deviation from the scope of employment, and the trip from the place of employment into Fulton County was such a stepping aside from the terms of employment, including the agreement as to transportation, as precludes an award for the claimants, (b) The employees were voluntarily drunk at the time of the collision and injuries, including the driver, and this conduct precludes an award for the claimants, (c) The driver of the car in which claimants were riding was exceeding the speed limit at the time of the collision, and their death and injuries resulted from the unlawful conduct of one they had voluntarily placed in charge of the car as driver and thus precludes an award for claimants. Held:
1. In a workmen’s compensation case, the award of the board has the same effect as the verdict of a jury, and it [234]*234must be upheld if there is "any evidence” to support it. Even if the appellee is correct in his contention that the evidence strongly preponderated toward his theory of the facts in the case, this is not enough to overturn an award by the board. The superior court and this court are both bound by the finding of the Board of Workmen’s Compensation if there is any competent evidence to support the award. See Delta C & S Airlines v. Perry, 94 Ga. App. 107 (93 SE2d 771); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sanders, 182 Ga. 594 (186 SE 693); Ocean Accident &c Corp. v. Farr, 180 Ga. 266, 270 (178 SE 728); South v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. A., 41 Ga. App. 827 (155 SE 48); Taylor v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 43 Ga. App. 292 (158 SE 623); Hartford Accident &c. Co. v. Ledford, 116 Ga. App. 402 (157 SE2d 318); Ga. Pacific Corp. v. Buchanan, 113 Ga. App. 844 (149 SE2d 831); J. D. Jewell, Inc. v. Ward, 119 Ga. App. 113 (166 SE2d 403); Fulmer v. Aetna Cas &c. Co., 85 Ga. App. 102 (68 SE2d 180).
2. On the question of deviation or stepping aside from scope of employment, by going into Fulton County, this argument might have considerable force if the collision had occurred while going to the whiskey store. But these employees had left the whiskey store and were headed for home on the most direct route; and had actually reached the same route they used every day on their trips to and from work, when the collision occurred. We hold that the employees were in the scope of employment at the time the collision occurred. Davies v. Hearn, 45 Ga. App. 276 (164 SE 273); Atlanta Furniture Co. v. Walker, 51 Ga. App. 781 (181 SE 498); Wicker v. Fidel. & Cas. Co., 59 Ga. App. 521 (1 SE2d 464); Curtis v. Royal Indem. Co., 101 Ga. App. 158 (112 SE2d 819).
3. On the question of intoxication of the driver of the vehicle, the driver himself, Willie C. Jenkins, testified as follows in this respect: "Q. How much whiskey did you drink there?” (Kingston — shortly before the wreck). "A. I didn’t drink any.” He also testified that he did not have anything to drink at any time on the trip except a Pepsi-[235]*235Cola in Kingston shortly before the wreck. This was direct evidence, therefore, that he was not drinking, but was cold sober, although we readily concede there was other testimony from which it could be inferred that he had taken a drink. The above testimony was sufficient upon which to make a finding that the driver was not intoxicated. As to the testimony of intoxication of those who were riding with him, this is not enough to preclude a recovery.
It has been held that one who enters a car driven by an intoxicated driver, may still recover if the circumstances were such as to suggest the driver, despite intoxication, was able to drive with proper skill and diligence. Sparks v. Porcher, 109 Ga. App. 334 (136 SE2d 153). Conversely, of course, if the driver is so obviously drunk as to be incapacitated to drive, one electing to become a passenger with such knowledge could not recover where the collision is caused by the driver’s intoxication. But where the driver is sober, there is no duty upon the passenger to remain awake in order to become a backseat driver, and to warn the driver against hazards. The passenger has the right to assume the driver will obey the law and drive properly; and no duty of any kind devolves upon the passenger to take steps for his own protection until he has knowledge of the danger. Browning v. Kahle, 106 Ga. App. 353, 358 (126 SE2d 892). It is true -that the passenger cannot "close his eyes to known and obvious danger,” but that does not mean that he must keep a watch ahead, so if the driver makes a mistake, he may correct the driver. Such conduct on the passenger’s part would be as likely to cause injury as to prevent it because only one person can drive a car at a time. There is an ancient proverb that "Too many cooks spoil the broth.” In the instant case, where the evidence is sufficient to show that the driver was cold sober and capable of driving the car, the passengers did not preclude themselves from recovering by drinking whiskey while en route to their destination. And this is especially true in [236]*236the case sub judice because the evidence is sufficient to show that their consumption of alcoholic beverages had no causal relationship whatever with the collision.
Argued September 15, 1971
Decided November 15, 1971
Rehearing denied December 17, 1971.
E. J. Clower, Rogers, Magruder & Hoyt, J. Clinton Sumner, Jr., for appellants.
Richard W. Best, for appellees.
4. On the question of speed of the car at the time of the collision, the driver, Willie C. Jenkins, testified that the car was running "about 60 or 65” immediately before the collision. Surely this could not be equated with wilful and wanton conduct, which is essential before denial of a recovery because of speed violation. Carroll v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 78, 82 (146 SE 788); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pardue, 39 Ga. App. 87 (2) (146 SE 638).
5. In the case before us the basic issues of liability,dependency, compensation, medical and burial expenses were properly considered by the deputy director and later by the board, and the lower court was without power, authority or jurisdiction to set aside the awards.
Judgments reversed.
Bell, C. J., Pannell, Deen and Quillian, JJ., concur. Hall, P. J., concurs specially. Jordan, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., dissent. Whitman, J., not participating.