Connecticut § 53a-5 Criminal liability; mental state required.

Connecticut Statutes

§ 53a-5 — Criminal liability; mental state required.

Connecticut § 53a-5

Title 53aPenal Code

Ch. 951Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability

This text of Connecticut § 53a-5 (Criminal liability; mental state required.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-5 (2026).

Text

When the commission of an offense defined in this title, or some element of an offense, requires a particular mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms “intentionally”, “knowingly”, “recklessly” or “criminal negligence”, or by use of terms, such as “with intent to defraud” and “knowing it to be false”, describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.

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When the commission of an offense defined in this title, or some element of an offense, requires a particular mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms “intentionally”, “knowingly”, “recklessly” or “criminal negligence”, or by use of terms, such as “with intent to defraud” and “knowing it to be false”, describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.

Legislative History

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 5.) Cited. 173 C. 35; 186 C. 45; 201 C. 505; 202 C. 520; 209 C. 75; 235 C. 477; 242 C. 211. When a statute requires state to prove that defendant intentionally engaged in the statutorily proscribed conduct, section does not require court to presume that the statute requires state to prove that defendant had knowledge of a circumstance described in the statute. 265 C. 35. Cited. 9 CA 161; Id., 686; 17 CA 339; 19 CA 609; 40 CA 643.