Willowood Condominium Association, Inc. v. Hnc Realty Company

Fifth Circuit

Willowood Condominium Association, Inc. v. Hnc Realty Company

531 F.2d 1249, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 11313

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedMay 17, 1976

Docket74--3939

StatusPublished

Cited by18 cases

This text of 531 F.2d 1249 (Willowood Condominium Association, Inc. v. Hnc Realty Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Willowood Condominium Association, Inc. v. Hnc Realty Company, 531 F.2d 1249, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 11313 (5th Cir. 1976).

Pincite

Opinion

SIMPSON, Circuit Judge:

Willowood Condominium Association, Inc., and Ramblewood West, Inc., brought suit properly grounded in diversity jurisdiction against the H.N.C. Realty Company, H. N.C. Mortgage and Realty Investors, and Southern Financial Group, Inc., alleging that the various defendants had breached a contract or commitment to make a loan. The defendants denied a contract had been made. The suit went to trial. The district court initially severed the issue of liability from that of damages. Plaintiffs rested their case as to liability following three days presentation of evidence. The district court thereupon granted an unopposed motion to dismiss Southern Financial Group, Inc., as a defendant, and, after arguments by counsel, granted motions for instructed verdicts exonerating H.N.C. Realty, Inc., and H.N.C. Mortgage and Realty Investors from all liability. Plaintiffs appeal.

The three corporate defendants are engaged in the business of transacting commercial loans involving real estate. H.N.C. Realty, Inc., 1 (Realty) is a Connecticut corporation. H.N.C. Mortgage and Realty Investors (the Trust) is a Massachusetts business trust engaged in business as a real estate investment trust, known in current vernacular as an REIT. Both Realty and the Trust actively provide funds for real estate loans. Southern Financial Group, Inc., 2 (S.F.G.) is a Florida corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Realty. The business of S.F.G. is to act as real estate broker for Realty, as well as other entities.

Plaintiffs, Willowood Condominium Association, Inc., (Willowood) and Ramblewood West, Inc., were organized for the purpose of developing a condominium project in Longview, Texas, by Bill Jones and four other individuals. A mortgage broker engaged by Jones put Willowood into contact with the H.N.C. group. Bill Jones, on behalf of Willowood, was eventually engaged in negotiations with Ben Jacoby, the vice president of S.F.G. Two letters were written by Jacoby to Jones which plaintiffs contend constituted a contract on the part of defendants to loan 4.7 million dollars for the development of plaintiffs’ condominium project, and consequently the two letters are at the crux of this suit. 3 The first of these letters, dated February 27, 1973, sets forth terms upon which a loan to the plaintiffs would be made, subject to approval of the loan committee of the parent company, Realty. Subsequently, the plaintiffs received the second letter stating the loan committee had acted favorably upon the loan, subject to three minor changes within the loan package. There was no written acceptance of these terms by plaintiffs. The loan was never consummated, and this suit was filed for damages.

The correct standards for the granting of a directed verdict were set out by this Court in Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 5 Cir. 1969, 411 F.2d 365. Where “the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict”, id. at 374, the granting of a directed verdict is proper. Unless there appears to “be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question . ”, id. at 375, we should not disturb that verdict.

The defendants contend, and the trial judge held, that (1) the letters relied upon *1251 by the plaintiffs as a loan commitment are not sufficiently detailed to constitute a binding agreement or contract, (2) vice president of S.F.G. Jacoby had neither express, implied, nor apparent authority to bind either Realty or the Trust, and that (3) the purported contract was unenforceable as violative of the Statute of Frauds, Section 26.01 Texas Business and Commerce Code, in several respects. Because we hold the defendants’ first point to be correct, we affirm, finding it unnecessary to dissect the agency powers of Jacoby and prefermitting any detailed examination of the Statute of Frauds.

An enforceable contract must be sufficiently certain to define the nature and extent of the parties’ obligations. See, e. g., Bendalin v. Delgado, Tex.1966, 406 S.W.2d 897; Moore v. Dilworth, 1944, 142 Tex. 538, 179 S.W.2d 940. 4 It is hornbook law as well as clearly the law of Texas that “ ‘[a] court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what it is. It is not enough that the parties think that they have made a contract; they must have expressed their intentions in a manner that is capable of understanding.’ 1 Corbin, Contracts, 2nd ed. 1963, § 95.” quoted in Bendalin v. Delgado, supra, 406 S.W.2d at 899. “It is said to be fundamental that a person may not be subjected by law to a contractual obligation unless the character of such obligation is fixed with a reasonable degree of definiteness by an express or implied agreement of the parties; that an agreement must not only identify the subject matter but also must spell out the essential commitments and agreements of the parties with respect thereto; and that the courts cannot specifically enforce contracts or award substantial damages for their breach when they are wanting in reasonable certainty.” Charles v. Charles, Tex.Ct. of Civ. App.1972, 478 S.W.2d 133, 136 (writ, ref’d, n. r. e.).

In the instant ease, the two letters, when read together, contain ambiguities affecting, or fail to mention altogether, items of a nature that we consider essential to a contract of this type. The loan contemplated was for a great deal of money by any standards, for 4.7 million dollars. Evidence introduced at trial as well as reference to ordinary business practices convinces us that a loan of such an amount is not a casual thing, but an enterprise carefully entered into by each party. With no delineation of essential elements of the proposed loan — elements we find unexplained and undetermined within the letters relied upon by the plaintiffs — there is no evidence of the “mutual assent” or “meeting of the minds” necessary to the formation of a contract. 5 There can be no binding contract between the parties if essential terms were left open for future negotiations between them. Page & Wirtz Construction Co. v. Van Doran Bri-Tico Co., Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo, 1968, 432 S.W.2d 731, writ ref’d n. r. e.; Engelman Inc. v. Sanders Nursery Co., Tex.Civ.App. El Paso, 1940,140 S.W.2d 500, writ ref’d; Hume v. Bogle, Tex.Civ. App. Austin 1918, 204 S.W. 673, no writ.

The letter of February 27 gives us a hint as to the details of the agreement to be negotiated, but leaves essential questions unanswered.

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