McENTEE, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellants are several former professional football players who played in the National Football League (“NFL”) and retired before the 1959 season. They brought an action against the NFL and two of its officers and against the National Football League Players’ Association (“NFLPA”) and two of its officers, seeking to recover funds allegedly due in consequence of a trust fund agreement referred to as the “Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan.”
Appellants alleged, in part, that an oral contract came into existence on April 23, 1959 between the NFLPA (on behalf of the plaintiffs and others) and the NFL (through Commissioner Bert Bell acting as the League’s agent). According to the plaintiffs, this contract provided that NFL players who retired prior to the 1959 season would be included in a players’ pension plan, would be given pension credits for their years of NFL play before 1959, and would (if sufficient funds became available) be accorded benefits from the pension funds.
We need not reproduce here all the facts adduced by appellants as probative of the existence of the oral contract from which their asserted rights to pension benefits allegedly derive. It would require several paragraphs to describe the full factual context in which that contract is said to have been made. For present purposes, however, it suffices to quote the following exchange between William Howton (President of the NFLPA in 1959) and Commissioner Bert Bell:
“Howton :
‘Look, we kind of got coerced into accepting this thing. This was Carroll’s suggestion. None of us are included in this plan and it’s not the plan we want.’
Bell: ‘Look, we had to take this plan going on. There was a pretty good fight going on. There was some tempers flaring in the owners’ group. They kind of pushed it in.’
Howton :
‘Bert, we want the retroactive part of it.’
Bell:
‘Look, I assure you, the money will go to retroactive benefits.’ ”
This brief conversation constitutes the nucleus of appellants’ theory that a binding oral contract (to which they were parties) was made on April 23, 1959. The conversation allegedly took place in a Philadelphia hotel on that date after the NFL owners had approved a pension plan which would
embrace certain NFL players, but not the present appellants.
As did the court below, we shall turn first to the alleged contract between appellants and the NFL. The court declined to hold on motion for summary judgment that no
agreement
existed between Commissioner Bell and the NFLPA, stating that the existence of such an agreement was “an issue of fact appropriate for determination by trial.”
See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). It immediately proceeded to hold, however, that
even if
such an agreement did exist it did not constitute an enforceable contract. The court’s summary judgment
as to this issue had three independent bases: 1) “no reasonable person could find on the basis of the evidence . . . that Commissioner Bell had either actual or apparent authority to bind the ‘NFL’ to a pension agreement;” 2) “there was no legal consideration given for the alleged promise by Commissioner Bell to provide plaintiffs pension coverage;” 3) the alleged contract is too indefinite to be enforced. Because we find the last-mentioned reason to be a fully satisfactory basis for the summary judgment on the contractual issue, we do not pass on either of the other grounds.
It is fundamental
that for a contract to be enforceable it must be of sufficient explicitness so that a court can per
ceive what are the respective obligations of the parties.
Fahringer v. Estate of Strine,
420 Pa. 48, 58, 216 A.2d 82, 88 (1966);
Lombardo v. Gasparini Excavating Co.,
385 Pa. 388, 392, 123 A.2d 663, 666 (1956);
Beachler v. Mellon-Stuart Co.,
354 Pa. 341, 343, 47 A.2d 147, 149 (1946).
See also Willowood Condominium Association, Inc. v. HNC Realty Co.,
531 F.2d 1249, 1251 (5th Cir. 1976);
Interocean Shipping Co. v. National Shipping and Trading Corp.,
462 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1972);
Heldenbrand v. Stevenson,
249 F.2d 424, 427-28 (10th Cir. 1957);
Air Technology Corp. v. General Electric Co.,
347 Mass. 613, 626, 199 N.E.2d 538, 548 (1964);
Ansorge v. Kane,
244 N.Y. 395, 155 N.E. 683 (1927) (Pound, J.).
Applying this principle to the present case, we are convinced that the district court properly found that the alleged oral contract was too indefinite to be enforced even if it fulfilled the other conditions of a valid contract (e. g. consideration) and even if Commissioner Bell was in fact capable of binding the NFL (the issue of apparent authority). The court listed the following as examples of questions left unanswered and unanswerable by the terms of the purported contract:
—“Would the pension plan cover players in the old American Football Conference, some of whose players and teams joined the NFL?”
—“Would there be special treatment for players whose careers were disrupted by World War II?”
—“Would coverage be extended to players on now defunct teams, and if so, would this disqualify the plan for IRS purposes?”
—“What does it mean to say the players will be included when ‘sufficient’ funds are available?”
The purported oral contract provides no answer to these questions.
It is clear that any agreement which leaves unanswered such critical questions cannot by any reasonable stretch of the imagination be said to represent a real meeting of the minds.
While an enforceable contract might be found in some circumstances if one or more such questions were left unanswered,
see
note 6
supra,
the accumulation in the instant ease of so many unanswered questions is convincing evidence that there never was a consensus ad idem between the parties.
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McENTEE, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellants are several former professional football players who played in the National Football League (“NFL”) and retired before the 1959 season. They brought an action against the NFL and two of its officers and against the National Football League Players’ Association (“NFLPA”) and two of its officers, seeking to recover funds allegedly due in consequence of a trust fund agreement referred to as the “Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan.”
Appellants alleged, in part, that an oral contract came into existence on April 23, 1959 between the NFLPA (on behalf of the plaintiffs and others) and the NFL (through Commissioner Bert Bell acting as the League’s agent). According to the plaintiffs, this contract provided that NFL players who retired prior to the 1959 season would be included in a players’ pension plan, would be given pension credits for their years of NFL play before 1959, and would (if sufficient funds became available) be accorded benefits from the pension funds.
We need not reproduce here all the facts adduced by appellants as probative of the existence of the oral contract from which their asserted rights to pension benefits allegedly derive. It would require several paragraphs to describe the full factual context in which that contract is said to have been made. For present purposes, however, it suffices to quote the following exchange between William Howton (President of the NFLPA in 1959) and Commissioner Bert Bell:
“Howton :
‘Look, we kind of got coerced into accepting this thing. This was Carroll’s suggestion. None of us are included in this plan and it’s not the plan we want.’
Bell: ‘Look, we had to take this plan going on. There was a pretty good fight going on. There was some tempers flaring in the owners’ group. They kind of pushed it in.’
Howton :
‘Bert, we want the retroactive part of it.’
Bell:
‘Look, I assure you, the money will go to retroactive benefits.’ ”
This brief conversation constitutes the nucleus of appellants’ theory that a binding oral contract (to which they were parties) was made on April 23, 1959. The conversation allegedly took place in a Philadelphia hotel on that date after the NFL owners had approved a pension plan which would
embrace certain NFL players, but not the present appellants.
As did the court below, we shall turn first to the alleged contract between appellants and the NFL. The court declined to hold on motion for summary judgment that no
agreement
existed between Commissioner Bell and the NFLPA, stating that the existence of such an agreement was “an issue of fact appropriate for determination by trial.”
See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). It immediately proceeded to hold, however, that
even if
such an agreement did exist it did not constitute an enforceable contract. The court’s summary judgment
as to this issue had three independent bases: 1) “no reasonable person could find on the basis of the evidence . . . that Commissioner Bell had either actual or apparent authority to bind the ‘NFL’ to a pension agreement;” 2) “there was no legal consideration given for the alleged promise by Commissioner Bell to provide plaintiffs pension coverage;” 3) the alleged contract is too indefinite to be enforced. Because we find the last-mentioned reason to be a fully satisfactory basis for the summary judgment on the contractual issue, we do not pass on either of the other grounds.
It is fundamental
that for a contract to be enforceable it must be of sufficient explicitness so that a court can per
ceive what are the respective obligations of the parties.
Fahringer v. Estate of Strine,
420 Pa. 48, 58, 216 A.2d 82, 88 (1966);
Lombardo v. Gasparini Excavating Co.,
385 Pa. 388, 392, 123 A.2d 663, 666 (1956);
Beachler v. Mellon-Stuart Co.,
354 Pa. 341, 343, 47 A.2d 147, 149 (1946).
See also Willowood Condominium Association, Inc. v. HNC Realty Co.,
531 F.2d 1249, 1251 (5th Cir. 1976);
Interocean Shipping Co. v. National Shipping and Trading Corp.,
462 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1972);
Heldenbrand v. Stevenson,
249 F.2d 424, 427-28 (10th Cir. 1957);
Air Technology Corp. v. General Electric Co.,
347 Mass. 613, 626, 199 N.E.2d 538, 548 (1964);
Ansorge v. Kane,
244 N.Y. 395, 155 N.E. 683 (1927) (Pound, J.).
Applying this principle to the present case, we are convinced that the district court properly found that the alleged oral contract was too indefinite to be enforced even if it fulfilled the other conditions of a valid contract (e. g. consideration) and even if Commissioner Bell was in fact capable of binding the NFL (the issue of apparent authority). The court listed the following as examples of questions left unanswered and unanswerable by the terms of the purported contract:
—“Would the pension plan cover players in the old American Football Conference, some of whose players and teams joined the NFL?”
—“Would there be special treatment for players whose careers were disrupted by World War II?”
—“Would coverage be extended to players on now defunct teams, and if so, would this disqualify the plan for IRS purposes?”
—“What does it mean to say the players will be included when ‘sufficient’ funds are available?”
The purported oral contract provides no answer to these questions.
It is clear that any agreement which leaves unanswered such critical questions cannot by any reasonable stretch of the imagination be said to represent a real meeting of the minds.
While an enforceable contract might be found in some circumstances if one or more such questions were left unanswered,
see
note 6
supra,
the accumulation in the instant ease of so many unanswered questions is convincing evidence that there never was a consensus ad idem between the parties. We are fully persuaded that there was no genuine issue of material fact left to resolve concerning the existence of a contract, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), and the court cor
rectly granted the motion for summary judgment.
The contractual claim was Count II; Counts I, III, and IV of the complaint all dealt with various breaches of fiduciary duties owed by the present NFLPA towards appellants. Although in places the complaint does not state with maximum clarity that these alleged fiduciary duties derived from the oral contract discussed above, appellants did so state in their “Memorandum in Objection to Defendant’s [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment or to Dismiss This Action as a Class Action.”
This Memorandum indicates very clearly the relatively narrow base on which appellants’ claim of breach of fiduciary duties was founded:
“. . . Plaintiffs are not asking these Defendants to bargain for them, but rather that they be compelled
to carry out the agreement that was bargained for
on April 23, 1959, at which time the pension plan was agreed to in principal [sic], and thereafter adopted in 1962.”
“. . . Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants on their portion of trust and confidence owed a duty to them to refrain from placing their personal interests ahead of Plaintiffs in administering the trust
in accord with the original agreement
to create the pension fund . .” (Emphasis supplied).
While we have considerable doubt as to whether any basis for a fiduciary duty could be found apart from the alleged contract of April 23, 1959, we do not pass on that issue since appellants clearly chose to focus exclusively on the contract as the basis for fiduciary obligations.
Accordingly, since we have sustained the district court’s summary judgment as to the nonexistence of an enforceable contract, logic compels us to sustain its summary judgment on Counts I, III, and IV.
Affirmed.