Weaver v. Palmer Brothers Co.

270 U.S. 402, 46 S. Ct. 320, 70 L. Ed. 654, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 420
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 15, 1926
Docket510
StatusPublished
Cited by128 cases

This text of 270 U.S. 402 (Weaver v. Palmer Brothers Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Weaver v. Palmer Brothers Co., 270 U.S. 402, 46 S. Ct. 320, 70 L. Ed. 654, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 420 (1926).

Opinions

[408]*408Mr. Justice Butler

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellee is a Connecticut corporation, and for more than fifty years it and its founders have manufactured comfortables in that State, and have sold them there and in other States. An Act of the legislature of Pennsylvania, approved June 14, 1923, regulates the manufacture, sterilization and sale of bedding. Section 1 of the Act prescribes the following definitions: “ Mattress ” means any quilted pad, mattress, mattress pad, mattress protector, bunk quilt or box spring, stuffed or filled with excelsior, straw, hay, grass, corn husks, moss, fibre, cotton, wool, [409]*409hair, jute, kapok, or other soft material. “ Pillow,” “ bolster,” or “ feather bed ” means any bag, case, or covering made of cotton or other textile material, and stuffed or filled with any filler mentioned in the definition of mattress, or with feathers or feather down. The word “ comfortable ” means any cover, quilt, or quilted article made of cotton or other textile material, and stuffed or filled with fibre, cotton, wool, hair, jute, feathers, feather down, kapok, or other soft material. “ Cushion ” means any bag or case made of leather, cotton, or other textile material, and stuffed or filled with any filler, except jute and straw, mentioned in the definition of “pillow,”1 or with tow. The word “ new ” as used in the Act means any material or article which has not been previously manufactured or used for any purpose. “ Secondhand ” means any material or article of which prior use has been made. “ Shoddy ” means .any material which has been spun into yarn, knit or woven into fabric, and subsequently cut up, torn up, broken up, or ground up.

Section 2 provides: “ No person shall employ or use in the making, remaking, or renovating of any mattress, pillow, bolster, feather bed, comfortable, cushion, or article of upholstered furniture: (a) Any material known as ‘ shoddy/ or any fabric or material from which ‘shoddy’ is constructed; (b) any secondhand material, unless, since last used, such secondhand material has been thoroughly sterilized and disinfected by a reasonable process approved by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry; (c) ‘any new or secondhand feathers, unless such new or secondhand feathers have been sterilized and disinfected by ,a reasonable process approved by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry.” Punishment by fine or-imprisonment is prescribed for every violation of the Act, and each sale is declared to be a sepárate offense.

The Act took effect January 1, 1924. • Appellant is charged with its enforcement, and threatened to proceed [410]*410against the appellee and its customers. January 29, 1924, appellee brought this suit to enjoin the enforcement of the Act on the grounds, among others, that, as applied to the business of appellee, it is repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. An application under § 266 of the Judicial Code for a temporary injunction was denied. The decree was affirmed by this court. 266 XJ. S. 588. Later,- defendant answered, and there was a trial at which much evidence was introduced. The District Court found that the statute infringes appellee’s constitutional rights insofar as it absolutely prohibits the use of shoddy in the manufacture of comfortables; and to that extent the decree restrains its enforcement. This appeal is under § 238 of the Judicial Code. .

The question for decision is whether the provision pmv porting absolutely to forbid the use of shoddy in com-fortables violates the due process clause of the equal protection clause. The answer depends on the facts of the case. Legislative determinations express or implied are entitled to great weight; but it is always open to interested parties to show, that the legislature has transgressed the limits of its power. Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413. Invalidity may be shown by things which will be judicially noticed (Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59, 64), or by facts established by evidence. The burden is on the attacking party to establish the invalidating facts. See Minnesota Bate Cases, 230 U. S. 352. 452.

For many years prior to the passage of the Act com-fortables made in appellee’s factories had been sold in Pennsylvania. In 1923, its business in that State exceeded $558,000 of which more than $188,000 was for comfortables filled with shoddy. About 5000 dozens of these were filled with shoddy made of new materials, and about 3000 dozens with secondhand shoddy. Appellee [411]*411makes approximately 3,000,000 comfortables annually, and about 750,000 of these are filled with materials defined by the Act as shoddy. New material from which appellee makes shoddy consists of clippings and pieces of new cloth obtained from cutting tables in garment fabi-tones; secondhand shoddy is made of secondhand garments,, rags, and the like. The record shows that annually/many million pounds of fabric, new and secondhand, are made into shoddy. It is -used for many purposes. It is rewoven into fabric; made into pads to be used as filling material for bedding; and is used in the' manufacture of blankets, clothing, underwear, hosiery, gloves, sweaters and other garments. The evidence is to the effect that practically all the woolen cloth woven in this country contains some shoddy. That used to make comfortables is a different grade -from that used in the textile industry. Some used by appellee for that pur- ' pose is made of clippings from new ’woolen underwear and other high grade and expensive materials. ' Comfortables made of secondhand shoddy sell at lower prices than those filled with other materials.

Appellant claims that, in order properly to protect health, bedding material should be sterilized.- The record shows that, for the sterilization of secondhand materials from which it makes shoddy, appellee usés effective steam sterilizers. There is ho controversy between the parties as to whether shoddy may be rendered harmless by disinfection or sterilization. While it is sometimes made from filthy rags, and from other materials that have been exposed to infection, it stands undisputed that all'dangers to health may be eliminated by appropriate treatment at low cost. In the course of its decision the District Court said, “ It is conceded by all parties that shoddy may be rendered perfectly harmless by sterilization.” The Act. itself impliedly determines that proper sterilization is practicable and effective. It permits the use of second[412]*412hand materials and.new and secondhand feathers when sterilized, and it regulates processes for such sterilization.

There was no evidence that any sickness or disease was ever caused by the use of shoddy. And the record contains persuasive evidence, and by citation discloses the opinions of scientists eminent in fields related to public health, that the transmission of disease-producing bacteria is almost entirely by immediate contact with, or close proximity to, infected persons; that such bacteria perish rapidly when separated from human or animal organisms; and that there is no probability that such bacteria, or vermin likely to carry them, survive after the period usually required for the gathering of the materials, the production of shoddy, and the manufacture and the shipping of comfortables.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
270 U.S. 402, 46 S. Ct. 320, 70 L. Ed. 654, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 420, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weaver-v-palmer-brothers-co-scotus-1926.