Patterson v. Iowa Bonus Board

71 N.W.2d 1, 246 Iowa 1087, 1955 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 354

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: June 7, 1955
• Docket: 48709
• Status: Published

Opinions

Smith, J.

In 1921 the Thirty-ninth General Assembly enacted chapter 332, known as the Soldiers Bonus Law, for the benefit of veterans of “World War I.” Pursuant to its provisions, and in compliance with section 5 of Article VII of the Constitution of Iowa, the Act was submitted to, and approved by, vote of the people at the general election in November 1922.

The Act (section 1) provided for a state bond issue of $22,000,000, the proceeds of which were “to be expended for the payment of a bonus to the persons defined in section four * * * or for the benefit of such persons, as prescribed by section eight.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 4 designated all Iowa veterans who served in World War I “at any time between April 6, 1917, and November 11, 1918”- — with certain exclusions and limitations not material here. Each was to receive “as a bonus, the sum of fifty cents for each day that such person was in active service, such bonus not to exceed a total sum of three hundred and fifty dollars.”

Section 8 provided: “Disability fund. After the payment of all approved claims and expenses of administration * * * all funds remaining * * * after December 31, 1924, not.in excess of two million dollars, shall constitute an additional bonus to be administered by the bonus board for the amelioration of the condition of residents of this state within the classes as defined in section four of this act, who are suffering from disability. All funds remaining * * * after December 31, 1924, in excess of tbe two million dollars disability fund, shall be applied to the payment of the debt herein created.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Under section 11 of the Act a “direct annual tax” was levied to provide for payment of the bonds and interest thereon “sufficient to produce the sum of” $1,100,000 “each year for twenty years.”

On January 1, 1928, the Bonus Board transferred from the bonus fund to the “disability fund”, as provided by section 8 of the Act, the sum of $1,821,023.68.

Prom March 15 of that year (1928) to March 15, 1954, disability cash payments under section 8 of the Act were paid in the sum of $1,720,454.83. The fund, as of the latter date, nevertheless amounted to $2,355,000, and was invested in United States Bonds and Treasury Bills.

The Fifty-fifth General Assembly (1953) enacted the bill in question here, House File 365 (chapter 256, Acts of the 55th G. A.) “amending” section 8 of the Soldiers Bonus Law already described, and directing the Bonus Board and State comptroller to transfer $2,000,000 “from the bonus and disability fund, established under the terms of section 8” to the Board of Control of State Institutions “for the construction and equipment of a nursing home at the Iowa Soldiers Home at Marshalltown, Iowa, which nursing home and the use thereof shall constitute a/n additional bonus for the amelioration of the condition of residents of this state, as defined in section 4 of said chapter, who are suffering from disability.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The latter Act would have become effective July 4, 1953, but for a temporary injunction entered herein June 30, 1953.

This suit is brought by plaintiffs, who all qualify under section 4 of the Soldiers Bonus Law (and at least one who has been paid disability bonus under section 8), “on their own behalf and on behalf of the classes of persons whom they represent.” They seek to enjoin defendant officials from transferring funds as directed by said chapter 256, Acts of the Fifty-fifth General Assembly (House File 365) asserting said legislation is unconstitutional and void, and in violation of Article YII and other provisions of the Constitution of Iowa. They appeal from the trial court’s decree denying their petition. The facts are all stipulated.

I. We recognize of course the well-settled proposition that courts will declare an Act of the legislature unconstitutional only if it is shown to be so beyond a reasonable doubt. As said in City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 1117, 184 N.W. 823, 832, 188 N.W. 921, 23 A. L. R. 1322: “All presumptions are in its favor,, and a statute will not be held unconstitutional unless its contravention of constitutional guaranties is so clear, plain and palpable as to leave no reasonable doubt on the subject; and where the language is reasonably susceptible of different meanings, the courts will lean to that construction which is consistent with its validity.” The principle is toó elementary and well settled to require laboring.

In Miller v. Schuster, 227 Iowa 1005, 1020, 289 N.W. 702, 709, after conceding that appellant’s contention in that case raised a doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute under attack in that case (see pages 1014, 1015) we said: “But * * * the burden upon appellant requires more than a reasonable doubt as to the validity of the statute. It is necessary that the statute be shown to be invalid beyond a reasonable doirbt.” See also cases compiled and cited in Knorr v. Beardsley, 240 Iowa 828, 839, 38 N.W.2d 236.

It follows as a matter of course that we must proceed with caution and can only declare unconstitutionality when such conclusion is unavoidable. Knorr v. Beardsley, supra; Cook v. Hannah, 230 Iowa 249, 297 N.W. 262. And we must construe the statute under attack so as to uphold its constitutionality if possible. Knorr v. Beardsley, supra; Cook v. Marshall County, 119 Iowa 384, 93 N.W. 372, 104 Am. St. Rep. 283.

On the other hand it is our sworn duty to protect and uphold the constitution. McGuire v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 131 Iowa 340, 348, 108 N.W. 902, 33 L. R. A., N. S., 706; Reed v. Wright, 2 (Greene) Iowa 15, 20, 21. The duty, in a proper case, to declare a statute unconstitutional cannot be declined. If the constitution and the statute conflict the constitution must prevail. 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, section 88; 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, sections 92, 94, note 58, page 214.

II. Article VII of the Iowa Constitution pertains to “State Debts.” Section 1 prohibits the state from becoming liable as surety for the obligations of others under any circumstances. Grout v. Kendall, 195 Iowa 467, 471, 192 N.W. 529.

Other sections give qualified permission to contract indebtedness under prescribed safeguards.

We are) principally concerned here with' section 5: Method of “Contracting debt — submission to the people. Except the debts herein before specified in this article, no debt shall be hereafter contracted by, or on behalf of this State, unless such debt shall be authorized by some law for some smgle work or object, to be distinctly specified therein; * * * but no such law shall take effect until at a general election it shall have been submitted to the people, and have received a majority of all the votes east * * *; and all money raised by authority of such law, shall be applied only to the specific object therein stated, or to the payment of the debt created thereby; * * *.”

We have emphasized above the language involved here and have omitted parts not pertinent to- this controversy.

We have to construe the constitutional provision as well as the original Bonus Law and the proposed amendment to it.

The real intention of the latter is however not in doubt. It proposed to take $2,000,000 now held in trust by the Bonus Board (under section 8 of the original Bonus Law) the interest on which is now being used for the “amelioration of the condition” of disabled veterans of World War I, and transfer it to the Board of Control of State Institutions, to be used in the building of a nursing home at the Iowa Soldiers Home at Marshalltown to replace the present main building of that institution which has been condemned and is to be demolished “within one year after the said nursing home is occupied.”

It is frankly stated: “Upon construction of the new nursing home, the present nursing home and hospital would serve as the dormitory to house persons now in the main building.”

It is true the proposed amendment states the new nursing home “shall constitute an additional bonus for the amelioration of the condition” of disabled World War veterans. But this neither alters nor conceals the real purpose.

The Soldiers Home at Marshalltown is a public institution, maintained by specific appropriations made each biennium by the legislature. It will be noted that under the proposed amendment this money is to be used solely for the construction and equipment of the building. If such building is to be used, appropriations for the Home must be the source thereof. Clearly one of two situations must result: If, as claimed by defendants, this building will be for the sole use of World War I veterans, then general funds are being used for a special purpose, and discrimination in the use thereof exists between the veterans of the several wars. If to be used as a general facility at the Home for all those entitled to use the Home, then Bonus funds clearly are being used for a purpose not contemplated and by parties not entitled thereto.

It is argued by the defense that a bill authorizing a “capital improvement” does not usually provide for “operational expenses or maintenance” but that “such funds ordinarily are supplied later by way of biennial appropriation.”

The argument is a confession that the amendment would make section 8 of the Bonus Law ineffective without financing from other sources not provided by the Bonus Law. It reveals the fallacy of any attempt to substitute a “capital improvement” for the “additional bonus” contemplated by section 8 of the Bonus Law.

In this connection it is pertinent to note that section 6 of this same Article "VHI of the Constitution forbids by implication the repeal of any such law after its approval by the people and after debt has been contracted under it; but expressly authorizes the legislature to “forbid the contracting of any further debt, or liability, under such law.” We fear the amendment we are considering would offend the spirit of this provision by placing the effective continuance of the “additional bonus” at the mercy of future legislatures.

III. We have already held the? World War I Bonus Law, as originally enacted, did not offend the “single work or object” provision. Grout v. Kendall, supra (195 Iowa 467, 471). See also Knorr v. Beardsley, 240 Iowa 828, 855, 38 N.W.2d 236, 251, which involved similar language in the World War II Act.

These decisions are sound but they do not meet our difficulty here. They hold in the language of the Knorr v. Beardsley opinion that “There can be no serious controversy over the singleness of purpose and the unity of object with respect to items (1) and (2).” These items correspond to sections 4 and 8 in the World War I Bonus Law.

But these decisions involved no construction of the language of section 8 of the Bonus Law. Their holding must be held applicable to the law unmodified as attempted by the amendment we are considering since no such proposition was before the court.

IY. Section 4 of the Bonus Law clearly contemplated payment of a cash bonus to each member of the class on the basis of fifty cents for each day spent in active service. After this cash bonus was distributed and expenses of administration paid, what remained of the proceeds of the bond issue (not in excess of $2,000,000) was (under section 8) to “constitute an additional bonus to be administered by the bonus board for the amelioration of the condition of (members of the class) suffering from disability.” The effect of the decision in Grout v. Kendall, supra, was to uphold this second provision (section 8) as a part of the same “single object” — the payment of an additional bonus.

We cannot assume the word “bonus” had one meaning in section 4 of the Act and a different meaning in section 8. The word “additional” does not mean “different” nor imply the word bonus was used in a different sense. It is a sound rule of construction to' assume the word was used throughout with the same meaning. “Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433, 52 S. Ct. 607, 609, 76 L. Ed. 1204. It is noted in this decision that the presumption is not “rigid” and that the meaning may vary where the subject matter is not Ihe same in the several places where such identical words are used. Manifestly, however, this qualification cannot aid the defense here in face of the “single work or object” provision of the constitution, and the requirement of an approving vote of the people.

This canon of construction is thus stated in 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 271: “* * * it is ordinarily regarded as reasonable to assume, or presume, or conclude prima facie, that words used in one place in a legislative enactment have the same meaning in every other place in the statute * * *.” There is abundant citation of authority to support it. See also text and citations in 59 C. J. 1003, note 82; 82 C. J. S. , Statutes, section 348, page 728, note 14.

This presumption should surely be given great weight where, as here, a constitutional provision requires the Act to be limited to a single object “distinctly specified.” The use of the term “additional bonus” to prescribe what was to be done with the $2,000,000 “disability fund” must have had a purpose. It was entirely unnecessary if the intention was merely to call it a “fund” to be administered for the designated purpose. It is our duty to assume the words used had some meaning.

Undoubtedly the “single object” was the payment of a bonus — of course for the benefit of veterans of World War I. The preamble of the Act clearly stated: “An Act authorizing the state of Iowa to become indebted * * * to procure funds for and pay a bonus to persons who served”, etc. Then followed details not pertinent here. There was no further reference to the object or purpose of the Act.

The allocation of the bonus was to be in two categories: First, every member of the class was to be paid a cash bonus on the basis of fifty cents for each day he had been in active service (section 4) : and second, after all were so paid, the fund remaining (“not in excess of $2,000,000”) was to be administered as an “additional” bonus on the basis of “disability.” (Section 8.)

The members of the class were to receive the bonus in varying amounts depending on length of service and degree of disability, but there is no suggestion it was a different Jcind of bonus, or something in lieu thereof,

The proposed “amendment” would transform or redefine the term “additional bonus for the amelioration of” (members of the class) “suffering from disability” into a quite different thing— a mere “fund” to be used in building a nursing-home service to be rendered (if rendered at all) at one place only in the entire state.

We are not required here to determine what would have been the result had the original Bonus Law made clear that the term “additional bonus” was to be given the broad definition which is now attempted to be placed on it. It did not do so but went to the vote of the people in language which clearly, under popular usage, implied an additional cash bonus.

It is proper to point out, as do plaintiffs here, that “the category of veterans suffering from disability is varied and wide” and not all can be “ameliorated” by the service offered by a nursing home. We think section 8 of the Bonus Law (perhaps anticipating that inevitability) provided a cash bonus to enable the recipient to seek the particular “amelioration” called for by his peculiar form of disability. Only by this interpretation could it ever have been held sections 4 and 8 were for a “single object.”

V. The word “bonus” is of course one of varying meaning depending on the context in which it is used. See 11 C. J. S., Bonus, page 515 et seq. Various definitions are given in Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition, but this seems a fair summary so far as applicable here, viz.: “1. Something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by, or strictly due to, the recipient; specif. : * * * c. Money, or an equivalent, given in addition to- an agreed compensation. * * * 2. a. Money, insurance, or the like, granted by a government to its discharged soldiers.” It can hardly be argued here that what is proposed is the “equivalent” of money.

We think it quite obvious the intention expressed in section 8 of the Bonus Law was to pay disabled veterans of the class defined in section 4 an additional cash bonus, adjustable to their varying needs on account of disability. Our conclusion is fortified by considerations beyond those already stated:

For one thing, the word “bonus”, when applied to & provision made by a grateful government to veterans who have served tbeir country actively and honorably in the armed forces in time of war, certainly in common usage connotes payment in cash. “As a general rule words used in a statute are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning, unless it is plain from the statute that a different meaning is intended.” 82 C. J. S., Statutes, section 329b. State ex rel. McElhinney v. All-Iowa Agricultural Assn., 242 Iowa 860, 868, 48 N.W.2d 281; 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 238, citing Flood v. City National Bank, 218 Iowa 898, 902, 253 N.W. 509, 95 A. L. R. 1168, Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 140 Iowa 182, 118 N.W. 276, 23 L. R. A., N.S., 1284, 132 Am. St. Rep. 261, 17 Ann. Cas. 750, and many cases from other jurisdictions.

We doubt if any person who voted in the election in 1922 when the Bonus Law was submitted to the people, whether he voted for or against it, had anything but a cash bonus in his mind. We may take judicial notice of the popular conception of the term “soldiers bonus” as ordinarily meaning something payable in cash. “Invalidity may be shown by things which will be judicially noticed * * * or by facts established by evidence.” Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U. S. 402, 410, 46 S. Ct. 320, 321, 70 L. Ed. 654.

And certainly the construction placed on the Act by the officers upon whom devolved the administration of the Bonus Law reveals no other thought except payment in cash. We have said repeatedly and unfalteringly that great weight should be given to the construction of a statute by such officials.

Possibly our latest pronouncement to that effect is found in State ex rel. McElhinney v. All-Iowa Agricultural Assn. (supra): “A well-recognized rule is that, while not controlling, courts give much weight to the construction of statutes by administrative officials charged with their operation and enforcement. Especially where such construction is of long standing it will not be lightly discarded by the courts.” (242 Iowa at page 868.)

Section 8 of the Bonus Law has since 1928 been considered and administered by the Bonus Board and other officials as meaning a cash bonus for disabled veterans of World War I, the amount in each, case based upon careful inquiry into the individual’s needs. The evidence of the adoption of that construction is unmistakable.

Payments under it were begun March 15, 1928. During the subsequent twenty-six-year period (to March 15, 1954) they have aggregated $1,720,454.83. In the year this suit was commenced (1953) 654 persons were paid $261,069.44 by the issuance of 5464 warrants. Four hundred ninety-one of them have been rated “total permanently disabled.” Twenty were receiving care cost of $129 per month because they were totally helpless.

The Bonus Board has utilized the facilities of the Soldiers Relief Commission of each county in the state in determining the qualifications and condition of applicants and the cost of service appropriate to their needs.

The construction thus placed on section 8 of the Bonus Law by those charged with its administration is an impressive consideration confirming our analysis of the language of the Act itself. Even the legislature seems to have deemed an amendment was necessary to change it. Certainly no one would argue the Bonus Board could have diverted the fund as is proposed here.

VI. While we are not concerned with the wisdom of the proposed legislation, it is proper, as bearing on the question of reasonable construction, to consider the inadequacy and impropriety of its provisions for performing the functions of an “additional bonus” as the term appeared in the Bonus Law. It would invest the $2,000,000 in building and equipping a 200-bed nursing home with no provision for cost of operation and maintenance except the income from the relatively small remaining fund or the expenditure of the fund itself. The figures, already quoted for the year 1953 eloquently speak the inadequacy and impropriety of the proposed plan. Over 600 were paid additional bonus that one year. Nearly 500 were classified as totally disabled. Twenty were totally helpless.

The use of $2,000,000 for a 200-bed nursing home to meet such a situation (doubtless state-wide) would seem, on its face, perilously close to an improper diversion of trust funds, entirely aside from constitutional considerations. What about the needs of those totally disabled members who manifestly could receive no adequate service? How about the partially disabled? And how about the cost of operation which would have to be borne by other funds, not provided under and by the Bonus Law, under, and in conformity with, constitutional limitations and provisions ?

We are abundantly convinced the $2,000,000 originally set aside under section 8 of the Bonus Law was intended to furnish an “additional” bonus of the same character as that provided by section 4, a cash bonus, but allotted according to the varying nature and degree of disabilities of the recipients. Only in that way could it be administered fairly and equitably as a bonus.

VII. Defendants find an analogy between the “single work or object” provision involved here and the provisions of section 26, Article III, of the 1846 Constitution, which says: “Every law shall embrace but one object, which shall be expressed in the title.” (It is significant the present Constitutional Article III, section 29, has substituted the word “subject” for “object” in the corresponding section.)

Conceding some apparent logic in the analogy, the language defendants themselves quote from the old opinion in State ex rel. Weir v. County Judge, 2 (Clarke) Iowa 280, 282, is a sufficient answer to their contention: “The intent” (of said section 26, Article III of the 1846 Constitution) “was to prevent the union, in the same act, of incongruous matter, and of objects having no connection, no relation.”

And again they quote from Santo v. State, 2 (Clarke) Iowa 165, 210, 63 Am. Dec. 487: “The object may be a broader or narrower one, but if it be a bona fide object for legislative attainment, and the several steps embraced in it are fairly conducive to that end or object, it is still a unit.” (Emphasis supplied.)

These decisions obviously treat the word “object” as meaning “subject” which may account for the change in words when the Constitution of 1857 was drawn.

The flaw in defendants’ argument at this point is their failure to recognize the narrowness of the stated object of this Bonus Law. It does not state the broad objective of furnishing “amelioration of the condition” of the disabled class, and section 8 which, mentions it narrows the object by specifying “an additional bonus” for that purpose. That was the single object “specified” in the Act, not the “amelioration” of disability. Certainly the distribution under section 4 was not for amelioration of disability.

The proposed “amendment” not merely oversteps the reasonable bounds of a “bonus”, but as a practical matter it renders impossible a continued “amelioration” by payment of bonus, the very object “distinctly specified” in the original Act.

VIII. We make no pronouncement upon plaintiffs’ argument that they have a “vested interest in and right to the disability bonus.” Every word we have written assumes their right to insist that the fund be preserved sacred to the purpose of its creation by law enacted and approved under constitutional limitations and safeguards.

They are either actual or potential beneficiaries of the trust. They belong to the class designated.

Nor need we discuss other constitutional safeguards which it is argued are violated by the so-called “offending” Act. What we have said requires a reversal of the decision of the trial court, rendering unnecessary any consideration of possible conflict with other constitutional provisions, or the sufficiency of the wording of the proposed legislation to constitute an “amendment.”

We are not to be understood as declaring illegal the purpose of providing a nursing home for disabled veterans. Neither the legality nor the wisdom of such a project is involved. The legality of the original Act was based on the fact it provided a bonus payable in cash whether its amount in individual eases was measured by the recipient’s length of service or by that measure plus needs created by his disability. Whether the legislature could have defined the words “additional bonus” (in the Act itself) as is now attempted or could have omitted them entirely from section 8 is not before us.

It is not a light nor a pleasant matter to pass judgment on the Acts of the co-ordinate branches of our Government. But the same constitution we all revere and have sworn to uphold — the charter under which we all function — places that duty upon the court.

We are abidingly convinced — beyond a reasonable doubt— that the Act in question here does not conform to the very constitutional provision under which the Bonus Law was enacted. The decision of the trial court must therefore be and is reversed. — Reversed.

Wennerstrum, C. J., and Oliver, Smith, Mulroney, Hats, and Larson, JJ., concur. Mulroney, Hays and Oliver, JJ., specially concur. Thompson, Bliss and Garfield, JJ., dissent.