Gilkison, C. J.
On May 27, 1953, appellant filed his complaint in Marion Superior Court, Room 3, against appellees, asking a declaratory judgment that section 11-1424, Burns’ 1942 Repl., Cumulative Supplement, be declared unconstitutional. Upon motion properly made the venue of the cause was changed to the Hancock Circuit Court. In due time a second amended complaint was filed, and the same was put at issue by answer.
Upon trial there was a finding for appellees, that Sec. 11-1424 Burns’ 1942 Repl. Cumulative Supplement is constitutional, that plaintiff take nothing by his complaint, and that defendants recover costs. Judgment was rendered accordingly. A motion for new trial was overruled and the appeal was perfected.
No procedural questions are presented. All parties direct their efforts to the one question: Is the involved statute constitutional?
That part of the statute particularly questioned is as follows:
“11-1424. Persons to whom issued—Forms— How issued—Duty of Clerks—Expiration—Application—Discharge papers—Duty of permittee—Un-lawful acts.— (a) The director is hereby authorized and required to prescribe and furnish permits to hunt, trap and fish in this state to honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, marines, nurses, or women’s corps of the army, navy, and marines, who served in the army, navy, or marine corps of the United States during the Civil War, the War with Spain, the Philippine Insurrection, the service on the Mexican Border during 1916 and 1917, the World War I or the World War II, who, at the time [331]*331of application for such permit, and who for a full period of six [6] months next preceding the date of application, where [were] bona fide residents of this state.
(b) The form of such permits and the application therefor shall be prescribed by the director. Such permits shall be issued in each county of the state by the clerk of the circuit court, without charge to permittee, only to such soldiers, sailors, marines, nurses, and women’s corps of the army, navy and marines, above mentioned who are, at the time of making application, bona fide residents of such county; except that in the county of Marion, such permits shall be issued only by the director, without charge to permittee, to said soldiers, sailors, marines, nurses and women’s corps of the army, navy and marines only who are bona fide residents of that county.” Acts 1945, Ch. 93, p. 209.
The remaining subsections (c), (d), (e) and (f) are questioned, but the reasons therefor are contained in subsections (a) and (b).
It is appellant’s contention that the involved statute is in conflict with Article 1, Sec. 23 of the Constitution of Indiana, providing:
“The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”
It is further contended that the statute is in conflict with Sec. 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in so far as it provides :
“. . . No state shall make or enforce any law which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
[332]*332[331]*331In determining the constitutionality of the- statute involved, we will indulge all reasonable presumptions [332]*332in its favor. State ex rel. Harrison v. Menaugh et al. (1898), 151 Ind. 260, 266, 51 N. E. 117 and 357; Townsend v. State (1897), 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. 19; Kirtley v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 175, 179, 84 N. E. 2d 712.
Therefore, the burden is upon the attacker, in this case the appellant, to overcome the presumption noted. Weisenberger v. State (1931), 202 Ind. 424, 431, 175 N. E. 238.
The State contends that the involved statute is a proper exercise of the State police power by the Legislature. While much evidence was heard by the trial court, designed to show loss of revenues to the State and incidentally to its Department of Conservation by reason of this law, we do not believe this evidence was required in this case to determine the issue presented by the complaint and answer. It has been well stated that “The general rule is that the federal or state constitution provides the only standard for determining the validity of a statute.” The court will “consider only the statute upon which the charge is founded, and the sections of the state constitution with which it is claimed to be in conflict.” Kirtley v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 175, 180, 84 N. E. 2d 712; Evansville, etc., Ry. Co. v. So. Ind. R. E. Corp., 231 Ind. 648, 654, 109 N. E. 2d 901; Weisenberger v. State (1921), 202 Ind. 424, 431, supra, but “invalidity of the questioned statute may be shown by things which will be judicially noticed.” Weisenberger v. State, supra; Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co. (1926), 270 U. S. 402, 409, 70 L. Ed. 654. See also Quong Wing v. Kirkendall (1911), 223 U. S. 59, 64, 56 L. Ed. 350, 352; Department of Insurance v. Schoonover (1947), 225 Ind. 186, 190.
[333]*333[332]*332In Indiana, all legislative authority is vested in the [333]*333General Assembly. Ind. Const. Art. 4, Sec. 1. The right to legislate is limited only by the restrictions expressly or impliedly imposed by the state constitution, the federal constitution and the laws and treaties made pursuant thereto. Kirtley v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 175, 84 N. E. 2d 712, supra; State ex rel. Harrison v. Menaugh et al. (1898), 151 Ind. 260, 266, 51 N. E. 357, supra; Townsend v. State (1897), 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. 19, supra; Weisenberger v. State (1921), 202 Ind. 424, supra; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, (1907), 168 Ind. 671, 674, 80 N. E. 529, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 418.
It seems that the questioned statute grants privileges and immunities to one class of citizens, which upon the same terms do not equally belong to all citizens. The General Assembly may not lawfully enact such a law unless it is done in a valid exercise of the police power of the state. Classification may be made and valid laws may be enacted under the police power to protect the public health, public morals, public order, public safety or public welfare. Kirtley v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 175, 181, 84 N. E. 2d 712, supra; Department of Insurance v. Schoonover (1947), 225 Ind. 186, supra; State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud (1942), 220 Ind. 552, 567, 44 N. E. 2d 972.
One question presented is: Is former military service a proper classification for a discrimination in legislation relating to taxation or licenses? This question has been answered by a text writer, thus:
“. . . In a majority of insances in which the question has been presented, exemption from the payment of occupation or license taxes solely on a basis of war service has been held to violate equality guaranties of the Federal and state Constitutions.
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Gilkison, C. J.
On May 27, 1953, appellant filed his complaint in Marion Superior Court, Room 3, against appellees, asking a declaratory judgment that section 11-1424, Burns’ 1942 Repl., Cumulative Supplement, be declared unconstitutional. Upon motion properly made the venue of the cause was changed to the Hancock Circuit Court. In due time a second amended complaint was filed, and the same was put at issue by answer.
Upon trial there was a finding for appellees, that Sec. 11-1424 Burns’ 1942 Repl. Cumulative Supplement is constitutional, that plaintiff take nothing by his complaint, and that defendants recover costs. Judgment was rendered accordingly. A motion for new trial was overruled and the appeal was perfected.
No procedural questions are presented. All parties direct their efforts to the one question: Is the involved statute constitutional?
That part of the statute particularly questioned is as follows:
“11-1424. Persons to whom issued—Forms— How issued—Duty of Clerks—Expiration—Application—Discharge papers—Duty of permittee—Un-lawful acts.— (a) The director is hereby authorized and required to prescribe and furnish permits to hunt, trap and fish in this state to honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, marines, nurses, or women’s corps of the army, navy, and marines, who served in the army, navy, or marine corps of the United States during the Civil War, the War with Spain, the Philippine Insurrection, the service on the Mexican Border during 1916 and 1917, the World War I or the World War II, who, at the time [331]*331of application for such permit, and who for a full period of six [6] months next preceding the date of application, where [were] bona fide residents of this state.
(b) The form of such permits and the application therefor shall be prescribed by the director. Such permits shall be issued in each county of the state by the clerk of the circuit court, without charge to permittee, only to such soldiers, sailors, marines, nurses, and women’s corps of the army, navy and marines, above mentioned who are, at the time of making application, bona fide residents of such county; except that in the county of Marion, such permits shall be issued only by the director, without charge to permittee, to said soldiers, sailors, marines, nurses and women’s corps of the army, navy and marines only who are bona fide residents of that county.” Acts 1945, Ch. 93, p. 209.
The remaining subsections (c), (d), (e) and (f) are questioned, but the reasons therefor are contained in subsections (a) and (b).
It is appellant’s contention that the involved statute is in conflict with Article 1, Sec. 23 of the Constitution of Indiana, providing:
“The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”
It is further contended that the statute is in conflict with Sec. 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in so far as it provides :
“. . . No state shall make or enforce any law which shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
[332]*332[331]*331In determining the constitutionality of the- statute involved, we will indulge all reasonable presumptions [332]*332in its favor. State ex rel. Harrison v. Menaugh et al. (1898), 151 Ind. 260, 266, 51 N. E. 117 and 357; Townsend v. State (1897), 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. 19; Kirtley v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 175, 179, 84 N. E. 2d 712.
Therefore, the burden is upon the attacker, in this case the appellant, to overcome the presumption noted. Weisenberger v. State (1931), 202 Ind. 424, 431, 175 N. E. 238.
The State contends that the involved statute is a proper exercise of the State police power by the Legislature. While much evidence was heard by the trial court, designed to show loss of revenues to the State and incidentally to its Department of Conservation by reason of this law, we do not believe this evidence was required in this case to determine the issue presented by the complaint and answer. It has been well stated that “The general rule is that the federal or state constitution provides the only standard for determining the validity of a statute.” The court will “consider only the statute upon which the charge is founded, and the sections of the state constitution with which it is claimed to be in conflict.” Kirtley v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 175, 180, 84 N. E. 2d 712; Evansville, etc., Ry. Co. v. So. Ind. R. E. Corp., 231 Ind. 648, 654, 109 N. E. 2d 901; Weisenberger v. State (1921), 202 Ind. 424, 431, supra, but “invalidity of the questioned statute may be shown by things which will be judicially noticed.” Weisenberger v. State, supra; Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co. (1926), 270 U. S. 402, 409, 70 L. Ed. 654. See also Quong Wing v. Kirkendall (1911), 223 U. S. 59, 64, 56 L. Ed. 350, 352; Department of Insurance v. Schoonover (1947), 225 Ind. 186, 190.
[333]*333[332]*332In Indiana, all legislative authority is vested in the [333]*333General Assembly. Ind. Const. Art. 4, Sec. 1. The right to legislate is limited only by the restrictions expressly or impliedly imposed by the state constitution, the federal constitution and the laws and treaties made pursuant thereto. Kirtley v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 175, 84 N. E. 2d 712, supra; State ex rel. Harrison v. Menaugh et al. (1898), 151 Ind. 260, 266, 51 N. E. 357, supra; Townsend v. State (1897), 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. 19, supra; Weisenberger v. State (1921), 202 Ind. 424, supra; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, (1907), 168 Ind. 671, 674, 80 N. E. 529, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 418.
It seems that the questioned statute grants privileges and immunities to one class of citizens, which upon the same terms do not equally belong to all citizens. The General Assembly may not lawfully enact such a law unless it is done in a valid exercise of the police power of the state. Classification may be made and valid laws may be enacted under the police power to protect the public health, public morals, public order, public safety or public welfare. Kirtley v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 175, 181, 84 N. E. 2d 712, supra; Department of Insurance v. Schoonover (1947), 225 Ind. 186, supra; State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud (1942), 220 Ind. 552, 567, 44 N. E. 2d 972.
One question presented is: Is former military service a proper classification for a discrimination in legislation relating to taxation or licenses? This question has been answered by a text writer, thus:
“. . . In a majority of insances in which the question has been presented, exemption from the payment of occupation or license taxes solely on a basis of war service has been held to violate equality guaranties of the Federal and state Constitutions. In a few cases, however, such an exemption has been upheld as valid. Statutes exempting veterans from the payment of poll [334]*334taxes, property taxes, and various other types of taxes or licenses have occasionally been sustained.” 12 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law, Sec. 501, p. 183 and many authorities there cited.
As supporting the majority rule see Marallis v. Chicago (1932), 349 Ill. 422, 429, 182 N. E. 394, 83 A. L. R. 1222 and Anno. p. 1233 et seq.; State v. Garbroski (1900), 111 Iowa 496, 498, 82 N. W. 959, 82 Am. St. Rep. 524, 56 L. R. A. 570; Commonwealth v. Hana (1907), 195 Mass. 262, 266, and authorities there cited, 81 N. E. 149, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 799, 122 Am. St. Rep. 251, 11 Ann. Cas. 514; State v. Whitcom (1904), 122 Wis. 110, 122, 96 N. W. 468; State v. Shedroi (1903), 75 Vt. 277, 282, 54 Atl. 1081, 63 L. R. A. 179, 98 Am. St. Rep. 825.
Our court has consistently held that the means used by the General Assembly to protect the public health, morals, order, safety or welfare, must have some reasonable relation to the accomplishment of the end in view. Blue v. Beach et al. (1900), 155 Ind. 121, 131, 56 N. E. 89; Fairchild, Pros. Atty. v. Schanke et al. (1953), 232 Ind. 480, 488, 113 N. E. 2d 159; Kirtley v. State, supra, at page 181. If such a law is enacted by the legislature granting privileges or immunities to a class of citizens and withholding the same from the others and the validity of the law is properly questioned, it then becomes the duty of the courts to review such legislation and determine whether it relates to and is appropriate to secure the object in view. In such an examination the court will looks to the substance of the thing involved. Blue v. Beach et al., supra, at page 131; Bruck v. State ex rel. Money (1950), 228 Ind. 189, 198, 199, 91 N. E. 2d 349.
To ascertain the purpose of conservation laws with respect to Indiana wildlife, we may look to the several [335]*335laws enacted concerning it. In 1881 the legislature provided for the appointment of a Commissioner of Fisheries. Sec. 2 of that act defined the duties of the Commissioner thus:
“It shall be the duty of said Commissioner to examine the various lakes, rivers, streams and water courses in this State, and ascertain whether they can be rendered more productive in the supply of fish; also what measures are desirable and expedient to effect this object either in propagating and protecting the fish that at present frequent the same, or in the selection and propagation of other species of fish therein (or both) ; said commissioner shall also inquire into and test the best modes of the artificial propagation of fish in the various waters of the State, and shall procure and superintend the procuring of the fish, fish eggs or spawn, as shall be necessary for said waters and the propagation of the same therein.” Acts 1881, ch. 53, Sec. 2, page 516, R. S. 1881, Sec. 5725.
At the same session the legislature provided for the protection of wild game, wild birds, and fish by appropriate laws. See Public Offenses. Acts 1881, Chap. 37, Secs. 196 to 210, inclusive, pp. 218, 219, 220. R. S. 1881, Secs. 2105 to 2120 inclusive. When the Act of 1881 authorizing the appointment of a Commissioner of Fisheries and defining his duties (Acts 1881, ch. 53, Sec. 2, supra) was repealed by Acts 1899, ch. 31, p. 44, and the appointment of a commissioner of Fisheries and Game was provided for, Sec. 2 of the repealed act was incorporated in the Act of 1899, and the duties of the Commissioner was greatly extended, by causing him, among other things, to give his attention to:
“. . . The best methods of preserving and propagating the game birds and song birds now in the State” and to “introduce such varieties of food and game birds, foreign to the State, as may be deemed for the best interest of the people of the State. . . . Said Commissioner shall also see that all laws
[336]*336for the protection of fish and game are enforced.
»
The commissioner and his deputies were given special authority to make arrests of violators of the fish and game laws by Sec. 4 of the act, and by Sec. 7, the commissioner was given authority to assist in the prosecution of offenders against the fish and game laws.
In 1919, the legislature created “the department of conservation.” Division No. 5 of this act, Sec. 19, p. 387, Acts 1919, was entitled “Division of Fish and Game.” By that Act all the duties that theretofore had belonged to the Commissioner of Fisheries, or the Commissioner of Fisheries and Game were given to the department of conservation, along with many additional duties and much additional authority. See Sec. 4743 Burns’ 1926, Ind. Statutes. Also, Secs. 2779-2861.
By the Acts of 1945, Ch. 353, p. 1705, Sec. 60-701 Burns’ 1951 Repl., The Department of Conservation, and the conservation commission were abolished, and Indiana Department of Conservation was created and made a legal entity. Sec. 5, of this act, Sec. 60-703a, Burns’ 1951 Repl. transferred all the jurisdiction, authorities, rights, powers, duties, responsibilities, causes of action or defense theretofore vested in “The Department of Conservation” or its director, or the conservation commissioner or its director to the Indiana Department of Conservation and its Director.
A short synopsis of the development of conservation laws in Indiana has been given in order that we may have an idea of the purpose of such laws with respect to “wildlife” generally in the state of Indiana. It seems safe to say that, from the beginning, the purpose has been to protect and propagate such life, for the benefit of the people generally in Indiana and elsewhere. Almost within our generation [337]*337we have witnessed the extermination of the passenger pidgeon, the Carolina parakeet and the drummer pheasant. The policy of the state probably has been influenced by these experiences.
The present resident yearly license fee to hunt, trap and fish in Indiana is two dollars, Sec. 11-1403 Burns’ 1942 Repl. Suppl.
There are many other license fees provided for by Indiana law for the taking of wild game and fish in many different ways. And it is expressly provided by law that:
"... No monies accruing to the state of Indiana from license fees paid by hunters shall be diverted for any other purpose than the administration of the division of fish and game of the department of conservation.” Sec. 11-912 Burns’ 1942 Repl. And: "Any and all license fees and any and all monies taxed and collected by, or coming into the hands of the director pursuant to, or by virtue of any of the provisions of this act shall be paid into the state treasury and shall become a part of the fish and game protection and propagation fund, and said fund shall be expended in the propagation of, protection, and purchase of fish, frogs, mussels, wild birds, wild animals, or game, and all other expenses in connection therewith.” Sec. 11-1803, Burns’ 1942 Repl.
We judicially know that a high percent of persons of hunting age in Indiana and elsewhere in the nation are ex-members of the armed forces of America, and that to exempt them from paying the fee for a hunting and fishing license will have a tendency to deplete the fund available for the protection and propagation of fish, game, wild birds, etc.; and thereby to retard and delay conservation objectives. So the question is posed: Is a legislative act that tends to produce this result an act that will protect the public health, morals, order, [338]*338safety, or welfare? We think this question must be answered in the negative. Such legislation could not have even a tendency to protect either public health, morals, order, safety or welfare. The legislature could with equal propriety exempt persons from procuring a license to sell intoxicating liquor, practice medicine, dentistry, veterinary, and every line of human endeavor for which a license is now or may be hereafter required. Such a result would be destructive of the purposes authorizing police power legislation. By no stretch of the imagination could it be helpful thereto.
A careful examination of the statute involved indicates that it was the legislative intent to make a small state gift to the indicated donees, at the expense of state conservation. It authorizes the destruction of wildlife without provision for its propagation and protection. We cannot believe that the indicated beneficiaries would want that to occur. In other words while they may enjoy hunting and fishing; the pleasure would disappear if there was no game or fish to take.
The involved statute, Sec. 11-1424 Burns’ 1942 Cumulative Supplement, Indiana Acts 1945, Chapter 93, pp. 209, 210, 211, is in contravention of Article 1, Section 23 of the Constitution of Indiana, and of Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
For the reasons given the judgment is reversed, with instructions to sustain the motion for new trial.
Emmert, J., dissenting with opinion, to follow.