Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County

190 N.W.2d 228, 386 Mich. 1

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: September 30, 1971
• Docket: 9 June Term 1969, Docket No. 52,381. No. 18 June Term 1970. No. 34 April Term 1971
• Status: Published

Opinions

Adams, J.

(dissenting). I agree with Justice T. E. Brennan that much of the problem stems from the existing hodgepodge of statutes dealing with court personnel. A major legislative overhaul is indicated. Failing such, the courts, and this Court in particular, should assume control of all court personnel in accordance with the inherent judicial power lodged in one court of justice.

I agree with Justice T. E. Brennan that the circuit court is the public employer of its employees with authority to act in accordance with MCLA § 423.201 et seq. (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.455[1] et seq.). That act provides that a public employer shall bargain collectively with the representatives of its employees. However, I do not find anything in that act dealing with the appropriation of funds to pay employees or that would authorize an action of mandamus to compel payment. In determining whether such a writ should issue, I would apply the standard for the use of the inherent power of the courts of which I wrote in 383 Mich 10, at p 43.

The danger of the issuance of such a writ to force payment of compensation “of all employees of the circuit court established by the law or needed in the operation of the circuit court” is that it disregards the realities of a county’s financial resources.

The problem is cogently stated in the concurring opinion of Justice Jones in Commonwealth, ex rel. Carroll, v. Tate (1971), 442 Pa 45, 58, 59 (274 A2d 193), in which case he wrote:

“While I concur in the result achieved by the majority, I must note my disagreement with the precedent thereby established.

“At first glance, the majority’s statement—‘the deplorable financial conditions in Philadelphia must yield to the Constitutional mandate that the Judiciary shall be free and independent and able to provide an efficient and effective system of Justice’ —would appear most commendable. Stated differently, the majority essentially holds that whatever amount is ‘reasonably necessary’ for judicial administration must be awarded even though the City may have no available funds. With this proposition I cannot agree; in my opinion, the computation of a ‘reasonably necessary’ amount must consider the financial resources available to the city. However, tbe record demonstrates that these additional funds have already been set aside and that the City of Philadelphia will not be forced into ‘involuntary bankruptcy.’ It is for this fact that I am able to concur.

“The majority fails to realize the full import of its standard. If this Court holds that funds must be afforded the Judiciary if ‘reasonably necessary,’ could a future majority, while stressing the fundamental co-equality of all three branches of government, logically deny this same standard to the Executive branch of government (the Legislative branch already controlling the power of the purse) ? Unless that majority is prepared to nominate the Judiciary for a primus inter pares status, this question must be answered in the negative. Although the Executive, unlike the Judiciary, is ofttimes able to resolve these difficulties in the political arena, I would be most reluctant to rely on the mercurial world of politics as the Executive’s only recourse.

“Predictably, a future City Council could then be swamped by ‘reasonably necessary’ requests from the Police Department, Sanitation Department, Recreation Department and all other departments of the Executive branch. Unquestionably more money would enable each of these departments to better serve the community. However, the sum of these ‘reasonably necessary’ requests may very well, in some future instance, exceed a municipality’s available revenue resources. Projecting the present majority’s original premise and realizing all three branches operate in an imperfect world, I must take issue with the majority’s overly optimistic precedent.

“Certainly taxes could be increased to cover any impending deficit. Certainly those of us in the Judicial branch of government must zealously defend our independence. Perhaps my prediction is a bit too gloomy. However, I would all too eagerly embrace the majority if only it would recognize that what is ‘reasonably necessary’ cannot fail to consider the financial plight of the city.”

In the absence of a showing that employees are essential to assure the existence or basic functioning of the court, I vote to deny the writ.