HARWOOD, Justice.
In 1959, an Act was passed providing for the allowance of stenographic assistance to each judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit. For convenience, this Act may be found as Section 125 (28a), Title 13, Code of Alabama 1940 (pocket part). The Act reads:
“Section 1. Each judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit is hereby authorized to. employ such clerical or stenographic assistance as may be necessary to carry out the duties of his office. The salary of each clerk or stenographer employed hereunder by any circuit judge shall be fixed by such judge, subject to the approval of the county governing body of the county in which such judge resides, and shall be paid in equal monthly installments out of the county treasury of such county upon certification by the circuit judge.
“Section 2. This Act shall become effective immediately upon its passage and approval by the Governor, or upon its otherwise becoming a law.” (First Ex. Session, 1959.)
The salaries of the stenographers to the judges were fixed for several years by conferences between the judges and the Chairman of the County Commission. In fairly recent times, the stenographer of one of the judges left his employment to accept a better paying position with a local industry. This employee had not been replaced at the time of the proceedings below.
Sometime during the employment of the stenographers, the practice developed of fixing their compensation on a pay basis identical with that of certain other similar county employees. A .merit system with job descriptions for county employees was later used.
On 31 July 1971, the County Commission by letter requested a tentative budget for the office of each judge. A joint budget was submitted pursuant to this request. Included in this tentative budget were items for secretarial salaries for each judge individually. These salaries ranged from $4,680.00 per annum for one judge, $6,192.00 for a second judge, and $7,200.00 for the third judge, depending on the seniority of the judge by whom the secretary was employed. By letter, the Chairman of the Commission notified the judges that the salaries of the secretaries for the judges would be in accordance with a survey that had been conducted by an employee of the State Personnel Board sometime before. The judges had offered no objection to this survey at the time it was [304]*304made, but specifically refused to be bound by the survey. The judges furnished the job surveyor with job descriptions, and outlines of the duties and responsibilities of their secretaries.
In this job survey, newly employed secretaries to the judges were classified as Clerk Steno II, Range 22, Step 1, at a salary of $348.00 per month. We find nothing in the record pertaining, to the salary scale fixed in the survey for more experienced secretaries.
In a conference in January 1973, between the judges and the Chairman of the County Commission, the judges were informed that the proposed pay scale submitted by the judges in their tentative budget would not be accepted, and that the courts’ secretaries would be paid as “Clerk-Typists.” This salary scale was considerably less than that proposed in the judges’ tentative budget.
It is recited in the decree rendered in this case that at the January 1973 conference :
“The Chairman * * * took the position that he [the Commission] had the authority to fix their [secretaries] compensation and the court must abide by his decision which he felt was fair and in accord with the survey made. The Presiding Judge took the position that the job description was tailored to fit the range rather than vice versa.”
The pay of the secretaries continued to be in the amount fixed in the survey.
Upon the resignation of Judge Hundley’s secretary in March 1973, he thereafter on 18 April 1973, requested a convocation of the judges for the purpose of conducting a wage survey which would reflect the reasonable worth of legal stenographic service in and around the Eighth Judicial Circuit so that it might be certified to the County Commission.
The presiding judge set the convocation for 20 April 1973, and requested that all three judges of the Eighth Judicial Circuit make inquiry in their geographical areas as to the reasonable and fair worth of legal secretaries.
The three judges inquired of the four other courts in the area, of numerous attorneys in the circuit, and of the larger industries as to secretarial pay. The court then convened and made a detailed finding of fact and fixed the salaries of the secretaries in accordance with the evidence adduced as a result of the judges’ inquiries. The Register was directed to certify these findings to the Commission for action “in accord with the common law pertaining to the inherent powers of a constitutional court and by the statute set forth above,” i. e., Sec. 125 (28a), Title 13, Code of Alabama 1940 (pocket part).
As above stated, this finding was rejected by the Commission.
On 27 April 1973, the court issued an order to the Commissioners to show cause why the proposed salary schedule for the judges’ secretaries was not reasonable and why it should not be implemented.
This matter was set for hearing on 3 May 1973. At the hearing the Commissioners first moved that the three judges recuse themselves on the ground that “they have a personal interest in the matters involved.” After an argument on this motion, it was denied, all three judges concurring.
Thereupon the Commissioners filed a written answer. The answer, in parts pertinent to this appeal reads:
“Considering the total welfare of the County, its income, its obligations and required expenditures, the salary schedule of the stenographers and clerical employees of the other officers of the County required to be paid by the Commission and that of its own stenographers and clerical employees, it declined to approve the salary schedule submitted to it for approval by the Judges of the court.
[305]*305“It will approve such schedule which may be submitted to it, fixed for Morgan County by the State Personnel Board for all stenographic and clerical employees of Morgan County.”
The Commissioners declined to offer any evidence, and after counsel had presented their arguments as to the legal principles involved, counsel for the Commissioners moved for submission of the cause on their answer. The matter was then taken under advisement by the court.
On 7 May 1973, a decree was entered by the Honorable Newton B. Powell, Presiding Judge, by which it was considered adjudged and decreed that the salary schedule for their respective stenographers theretofore determined by the court was reasonable and was to be put in force, and the Morgan County Commission was taxed with costs, and was ordered to pay the salaries of the stenographers as fixed by the court.
The decree entered by the court is quite lengthy, covering some 31 transcript pages.
The facts are recited in the first three pages and thereafter a number of cases are cited from a substantial number of other jurisdictions supportive of the conclusions reached in the decree that the court had inherent power and statutory power, to fix the salaries of the secretaries, and order the payment of the salaries by the Board of Commissioners.
As stated in State ex rel. Day et al. v. Bowles et al., 217 Ala. 458, 116 So. 662:
“A county is a unit of government invested with important functions of local character, and also in relation to the state, its revenues, the administration of its laws, etc. These functions involve the exercise of legislative, judicial, and executive or administrative powers. These powers are, in the main, conferred and defined by state legislation, and to be exercised by a governing body or bodies of legislative creation.”
By Section 12, Title 12, Code of Alabama 1940, whose precursors have been in seven prior codes, the authority of county governing bodies and their powers to act in certain areas, is spelled out in detail. By Section 14, Title 12, Code of Alabama 1940, in addition to the authority granted generally in Section 12, it is specifically provided that the courts of county commissioners, boards of revenue, or other county governing bodies, must adopt a budget system for the conduct of the affairs of the county, and to this end may appropriate from the county treasury sufficient funds to pay the actual expenses of the county as shown by the budgét so adopted.
In the aspect of appropriating money from the county treasury, a county governing body must be deemed as exercising a legislative power.
While many of the cases concerning the point now contain statements relative to the exercise of legislative, executive, or judicial power on the state level, no valid reason appears to deny the application of these same principles on a lower or county level. No distinction is made therefore in our discussion of the powers and limitations of the functions of the three branches of government whether on the state level or county level.
In brief counsel for appellants have raised three material points :
(1) That the court below did not possess inherent power, nor statutory power, under Section 125 (28a), Title 13, supra, to order the Commission to put into effect the salary schedule fixed by the judge or judges, since this concerned the appropriation of public funds, a matter within the province of the legislative branch of government rather than the judicial branch;
(2) That the court erred in denying appellants’ motion that either or all of the judges recuse themselves from conducting this proceedings since they were interested in the outcome, and,
[306]*306(3) Counsel for the Association of County Commissions of Alabama, as amicus curiae, have sought to raise the point that the act authorizing secretaries for the judges of the Eighth Judicial Circuit was a local act and void because not advertised.
1. Inherent Power of a Court to order Appropriation of Monies for Operative Expenses.
Historically and traditionally the Constitutions of all the states and of the United States have separated the powers of government into three branches, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. Section 42 of our Constitution of 1901, and its precursors in our previous constitutions, is but a reflection of this settled principle.
Within their respective spheres each branch of government is supreme. State v. Stone, 224 Ala. 234, 139 So. 328. Judicial power and legislative power are coordinate, and neither can encroach upon the other. Ex parte Huguley Water System et al., 282 Ala. 633, 213 So.2d 799. The authority to determine the amount of appropriations necessary for the performance of the essential functions of government is vested fully and exclusively in the legislature. Abramson v. Hard, 229 Ala. 2, 155 So. 590. Section 72, Alabama Constitution of 1901, provides: “No money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon appropriation made by law * * *”
The idea of separation of powers of the three branches of government was well understood by the framers of the United States Constitution, and fully accepted by the framers of the various state Constitutions. As observed by James Madison in The Federalist (No. 47), the concept “goes no farther than to prohibit anyone of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another department.”
Along with the constitutionally mandated doctrine of separation of powers, two principles probably antedating the written Constitutions produced in this country, have been fully accepted, (1) the independence of the judiciary, and (2) the inherent power of a court to protect its judicial function. These principles are often interlocking, though in a pure sense it would seem that independence of the judiciary relates to freedom of a court from outside influences, including political influence, in the exercise of judicial functions. Life tenure, and to a lesser degree, constitutional provisions that a judge’s salary may not be lowered during his term of office, evidence this concept.
The courts have always exercised inherent power to protect its adjudicatory processes, to control such processes, to ward off encroachments upon recognized judicial functions, and in emergencies to order payment of small sums essential to the operation of a court, such payment as for meals and lodging, for a jury, etc. In such instances the exigency originated from a past expense necessarily incurred in an emergency, and not for a future expense.
It does not seem to have been the intent of the people, as evidence by their Constitutions that the judiciary was to be utterly and completely independent of all political control. It has always been considered, until recently, that it was within the province of the legislature to fix judicial salaries. The provisions in most state Constitutions fixing a judge’s tenure for a term of years only and providing for the election of judges, reflects an intention on the part of the people to impose to a degree some limitation on the absolute independence of the judiciary.
In drafting and enacting their Constitutions, the people have given the power to the legislature to tax, and to disburse the proceeds thus raised. This, for the reason that the members of the legislature are closer to the people, and in position to weigh the financial needs of all of the governmental agencies. Their decisions in these matters are political, not judicial. The legislature through committee hearings and close contact with all of the govern[307]*307ment functions and their needs are thus in position to distribute and apportion the state monies from a -usually inadequate treasury. Clearly, the courts have neither the time nor the equipment for making such decisions.
However, in recent years the courts of several states have, by emphasizing the “Independence of the Judiciary-Inherent Power” theories, reached conclusions that the judiciary, being a coordinate branch of government, has independent fiscal power to maintain itself, and to order the legislative branch to appropriate such monies to the judiciary as the judiciary may find reasonably necessary in the operation of their courts.
Among the many decisions, though not all, holding to this effect, and cited and commented upon in the decree here involved are: Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738; Noble County Council v. State, 234 Ind. 172, 125 N.E.2d 709; Commissioners Court of Lubbock County v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.Civ.App.); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193; Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit of the State of Michigan v. County of Wayne, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228; McAfee v. State ex rel. Stodola, 284 N.E.2d 778 (Ind.); Carlson v. State ex rel. Stodola, 247 Ind. 631, 220 N.E.2d 532; Norman & Warden v. Van Elsberg, 262 Or. 286, 497 P.2d 204; Powers v. Isley, 66 Ariz. 94, 183 P.2d 880; Mann v. County of Maricopa, 104 Ariz. 561, 456 P.2d 931; Bass v. County of Saline, 171 Neb. 538, 106 N.W.2d 860; Board of Commissioners of Vigo County v. Stout, 136 Ind. 53, 35 N.E. 683; In re Salaries for Probation Officers of Bergen County, 58 N.J. 422, 278 A.2d 417; Birdsall v. Prima County, 106 Ariz. 266, 475 P.2d 250; State ex rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99 (Mo.).
The most far-reaching decision concerning the inherent powers of a court to establish its own fiscal policy is Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. den. 402 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1665, 29 L.Ed.2d 138, decided in 1971. It appears that the Court of Common Pleas had submitted its budget for the fiscal year ending 1 July 1971 to the Finance Director of the City of Philadelphia who pared the proposed budget by some $3,200,000.00. The Court requested an additional $5,200,000.00 from the City Council, and hearings were had on this request. The Council refused the request for additional funds, and approved only the Mayor’s recommendation which was based on the original recommendation of the finance director.
The Court thereupon brought mandamus to compel the Mayor and City Council to appropriate the requested additional funds. A Superior Court judge was specially designated by the Supreme Court to hear the matter. After disallowing ten of the twenty-two items included in the budget proposed by the judges, the special judge awarded some $2,500,000.00 in items contained in the budget proposed by the judges and ordered the Mayor and City Council to appropriate this additional amount. The Supreme Court affirmed with some modifications the lower court’s mandamus order.
In the proceedings in the lower court, the special judge ruled that the burden was upon the relator court to show the reasonableness of the budget, and further ruled that the City could not present evidence as to the efficient use of funds by the court in its present court budget.
In an excellent comment in 120 Penn.L. R. 1187 (1972), the author points out that while the budget requests of a court might be entirely reasonable for the efficient operation of the court, the budget determined by the legislature may at the same time be reasonable since that body must consider the competing demands for funding made by the many governmental branches, departments, agencies and boards, and the distribution of funds in light of the totality of the demands and the condition of the public treasury.
[308]*308In the comment in the Pennsylvania Law Review above mentioned, it is noted that in a subsequent case, Glancey v. Casey, 447 Pa. 77, 288 A.2d 812 (1972), the far-reaching doctrine announced in Tate, supra, appears to have been modified.
“In Glancey, the court appears to have cut back on Tate’s more far-ranging implications. The Glancey court denied the request of the judges of the newly-constituted Philadelphia Municipal Court that mandamus issue to order that their salaries be paid retroactively to their assumption of office. The court maintained that it was powerless to override the legislature’s express provision of a somewhat shorter period of retroactivity.
In its opinion, the court all but abandoned inherent-power rhetoric. At the same time, somewhat inconsistently, it held to its position that the legislature had a constitutional duty, even in the absence of the express constitutional provisions theretofore obtaining, to provide ‘adequate’ compensation to the judiciary. Such compensation was necessary in order to preserve the separation of powers.”
But be that as it may, this court appears to have refused to give to the “Independence of the Judiciary-Inherent Power” idea any such scope as evidenced in several of the cases cited and relied on in the decree of the court below.
In Jefferson County v. Capanes, 235 Ala. 449, 179 So. 637, a restaurant owner had sued Jefferson County in assumpsit for the cost of meals furnished to a bailiff attending jurors ordered to be kept together. Judgment in the lower court was for the plaintiff. The judgment was reversed by this court. From the citations of authorities in the brief of the appellee restaurant owner, it is apparent that the argument was made with vigor that such costs were recoverable on the basis of the inherent power of a court to incur all expenses necessary for the holding of court and the discharge of judicial duties. This court disposed of this point in the following language :
“Whatever may be the inherent powers of the courts in other jurisdictions, it is well settled in this state that public officers are entitled to only such fees and costs as are expressly authorized. Mobile County v. Williams, Judge, 180 Ala. 639, 61 So. 963, and cases there cited, as well as section 7255 of the Code of 1923. The feed of the bailiff may not be a fee or cost, strictly speaking, but it is an allowance to him in addition to his regular compensation, and to be entitled to same there must be express statutory authority therefor.”
This view is unquestionably sound. If the courts have inherent power to determine their fiscal needs and to order the same paid, then surely this same power should be accorded to the executive branch even though this branch possesses no machinery of its own to order such payments. In their wisdom the people have given' to the legislative branch the power and authority to appropriate public monies. Without the centralization of this power in one branch, and if each branch of government be considered fiscally independent, though the judicial and executive branches are without power to tax and raise money, then it can be said with certitude that fiscal chaos would follow as day follows night.
We hold therefore that the court below erred in ordering the governing body of Morgan County to put into effect the salary scales set for secretaries in the budget proposed by the judges.
Power to fix secretarial salaries arising out of the Act authorizing the Judges of the Eighth, Judicial Circuit to employ secretaries, and fix their salaries, with the approval of the County Governing Body.
Counsel for the appellee further argue that the action of the court below in ordering the county governing body to put into [309]*309effect the scale of secretarial salaries as fixed by the court was fully warranted by the provisions of the Act authorizing the employment of secretaries by the Judges of the Eighth Judicial Circuit. This Act has been set out at the beginning of this opinion and will not again be set out. It does authorize the judges to employ secretaries and fix their salaries, but with the approval of the county governing body.
Counsel for the appellee contends that since the Act authorizes the judges to fix the salaries of the secretaries, such language clearly evidences a legislative intent to place this function in the hands of the judges, and if the amounts fixed by the judges are reasonable, and there is a presumption in favor of the judges’ findings in this regard, then the burden is upon the county governing body to show otherwise, and absent such showing the phrase “with the approval of the county governing body” must be considered as creating a mere ministerial duty on the part of the county governing body to approve the salaries as fixed by the judges.
Admittedly, this argument is supported by a number of the cases cited in the decree.
We do not think, however, that the conclusion is in accord with the decisions of this court.
In State ex rel. Daly v. Henderson, Governor, 199 Ala. 428, 74 So. 951, an Act authorized the Attorney General to incur investigative expenses, such expenses to be paid upon certified account of the Attorney General, to be approved by the Governor. The Governor refused to approve an account for such expenses, and a petition for mandamus to compel such payment was filed. Demurrer was sustained to the petition. On appeal, this court affirmed. The court stated that:
“The only question we need to consider at this time is whether the Governor has discretion to approve or disapprove accounts of this character, or whether the approval required of him by the statute is merely ministerial.”
As to the significance of the phrase “to be approved by the Governor” this court wrote:
“And so, too, the Legislature might have required the Governor to countersign the Attorney General’s certificate as a matter of mere form, signifying nothing in fact, but until that meaning shall have the support of some argument drawn from extrinsic circumstances or conditions in view of which the act may have been passed, the court deems it best to assign to the phrase ‘approved by the Governor’ that meaning which it carries to the common understanding, viz., that it was intended, as a condition precedent to payment, to evoke the Governor’s official sanction of the expenditure, his commendation and judgment that it was for the public good. The court does not see its way clear to a definition of the phrase which would exclude the right of the Governor to exercise judgment and discretion in approving or disapproving the expenditures submitted to him.”
A closer case analogically is Gardner v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 213, 111 So.2d 904. There a statute provided that whenever it was proposed to locate a cemetery located in the jurisdiction of a county, application would be made to a county governing body who in turn would refer the application to the county board of health for investigation from a sanitary standpoint. Upon completion of such investigation, the county board of health would report its findings to the county governing body and “either approve or disapprove the application.” Thereafter the county governing body “shall either grant or deny the application, giving due weight in reaching either conclusion to the views expressed by the county board of health.”
The county governing body of Mobile County denied an application to locate a cemetery in Mobile County after the county board of health had approved the loca[310]*310tion. Mandamus was sought to compel approval by the county governing body. The petition for the writ was denied. The decree was affirmed.
On appeal the appellant contended that the statute made approval by the county governing body merely a ministerial act after an application had been approved by the county board of health. In disposing of this contention, this court wrote:
“* * * We are unable to agree with this construction. If such were the case, there would be no necessity for filing the application with any authority other than the county board of health, and the county board of health would not be limited to an ‘investigation from a sanitary standpoint.’ The statute also provides that when the report is received from the board of health, the governing body ‘shall either grant or deny the application, giving due weight in reaching either conclusion to the views expressed by the county board of health.’ This seems to indicate clearly that the Legislature intended to vest discretion in the governing body to deny the application even if it were approved from a sanitary standpoint.”
This same rule has been applied with respect to approving security bonds and it is held to be a matter of discretion on the part of the approving authorities. Baker v. Denniston-Boykin Co., 245 Ala. 407, 17 So.2d 148; Ex parte Harris, 52 Ala. 87.
Many of the courts of our sister states have construed the words “subject to the approval” or similar phrases, as has this court. See Avery v. Norfolk County, 279 Mass., 598, 181 N.E. 707; McCarten v. Sanderson, 111 Mont. 407, 109 P.2d 1108; Brown v. City of Newburyport, 209 Mass. 259, 95 N.E. 504; Harris v. Board of Education, 216 N.C. 147, 4 S.E.2d 328; Snider v. State, 206 Ind. 474, 190 N.E. 178; Fuller v. Board of Univ., 21 N.D. 212, 129 N.W. 1029; Baynes v. Bank of Caruthersville (Mo.App.), 118 S.W.2d 1051.
Courts cannot ignore plain meaning of a statute, Ott v. Moody, 283 Ala. 288, 216 So.2d 177, and absent any indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be given meaning generally accepted in popular, everyday usage. State v. International Paper Co., 276 Ala. 448, 163 So.2d 607; State v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 269 Ala. 610, 114 So.2d 893.
In Webster’s New International Dictionary, Third Edition, the word “approval” is defined to mean “1. The act of approving, approbation, sanction. 2. Certification as to the acceptability (as of a request for capital expenditures).”
The phrase “subject to the approval of” necessarily includes the right of disapproval. We do not see how the legislature could have more clearly expressed an intention to make approval by the county governing body a prerequisite to establishing the salaries of the secretaries as fixed by the judges. There is nothing in the entire context of the statute imposing any limitation on the power of the county governing body to approve, or disapprove the salaries.
We would, therefore, be unjustified in limiting the plain intent of the statute. While those courts which take the view that the words “subject to the approval of” are limited by the power given to another to “fix” the salaries in the same statute, we consider it more persuasive to conclude that the true intent of the legislature was to place in the county governing body, which body appropriates the public monies, the final say-so in the disposition of such funds, and thus centralize in the legislative body a function lawfully and traditionally delegated to that body by the legislature.
Denial of Motion of Recusal
Section 6, Title 13, Code of Alabama 1940, among other things forbids any judge of any court to sit in any cause or proceeding in which he is interested without the consent of the parties entered of record, or put in writing.
[311]*311The statutory causes of disqualification of a judge are not exclusive of the common law principles on the same subject, one of which is that no judge ought to act where, from interest or any other cause, he is supposed to be partial to one of the suitors. Smith v. Pitts, 139 Ala. 152, 36 So. 20; Bryce v. Burke, Probate Judge, 172 Ala. 219, 55 So. 635. Nor should a judge act if he has any interest, the probable and natural tendency of which is to create a bias in the mind of the judge for or against a party to the suit. Woodmen of the World v. Alford, 206 Ala. 18, 89 So. 528.
Here the record shows that these proceedings were instituted by the circuit judges. After they had investigated the salaries paid secretaries in surrounding circuits and in law offices, and industries, they sent their proposed salary schedule for secretarial salaries to the County Commission. By letter, the Chairman of the County Commission, apparently acting for the Commission, informed the judges that the salary schedule would continue as that recommended by the report of the representative of the State Personnel Board. The judges then issued a show cause order to the Commission, signed by all three judges. The motion that each of the three judges recuse himself followed. This motion being denied, the Commission filed its answer hereinabove mentioned. The decree later entered was signed only by the presiding judge.
In other words, we have here a show cause order issued by the three judges, based upon evidence they themselves had gathered, and a decree by one of the judges, based upon this same evidence.
Under the circumstances it appears that the only inference that could be drawn is that the judges, individually and collectively, could hardly be considered as impartial arbiters, nor lacking in any interest the natural tendency of which would be to create bias in favor of the correctness of their recommendations as to the salaries of their secretaries.
We hold, therefore, that the motion that the judges recuse themselves should have been granted and its refusal was error.
In this connection, we note that of the cases cited in the decree here appealed from, Smith v. Miller (Colo.); Noble County Council v. State (Ind.); Commissioners Court of Lubbock County (Tex. Civ.App.); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate (Pa.); Judges etc. v. State of Michigan (Mich.); McAfee v. State ex rel. Stodola (Ind.), all cited supra, were heard before specially appointed judges.
Birdsall v. Pima County (Ariz.) and State ex rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis County (Mo.), all cited supra, were originally brought in appellate courts.
In six of the cases cited in the decree either special judges were not appointed, or the opinion does not indicate either way.
The question of whether the Act providing for secretaries for the Judges of the Eighth Judicial Circuit is a local Act and void because not advertised.
This point was raised in the amicus curiae brief filed by counsel for the Association of County Commissioners of Alabama.
We pretermit consideration of this point for the following reason:
The question was not raised in the proceedings below, nor was it raised in the brief filed by the appellants.
An amicus curiae is limited to the issues made by the parties to a suit, and issues not made in proceedings below, nor raised in brief of appellant, cannot be injected into a review by any action on the part of the amicus curiae. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. City of Huntsville, 275 Ala. 184, 153 So.2d 619; Anderson v. Smith, 274 Ala. 302, 148 So.2d 243.
Reversed and rendered.
[312]*312MERRILL, COLEMAN, MADDOX and McCALL, JJ., concur.
JONES, J., concurs specially.
HEFLIN, C. J., and FAULKNER, J., dissent.
BLOODWORTH, J., recuses himself.