Walker v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development

734 F. Supp. 1289
District Court, N.D. Texas·Decided September 22, 1989·No. CA 3-85-1210-R·Published·Cited by 7 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION — WALKER III: JOINDER OF THE CITY OF DALLAS AS A DEFENDANT SUBJECT TO THE CONSENT DECREE

BUCHMEYER, District Judge.

This is a class action that involves racial discrimination in low-income public housing in the City of Dallas and its suburbs. The original parties were the plaintiff class (“plaintiffs”), the Dallas Housing Authority (“DHA”), and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).

*1290 This opinion, 1 however, concerns the City of Dallas. 2 And, it holds:

(i) that the City of Dallas will be joined as a party defendant in this case;
(ii) that the Consent Decree approved on Jan. 20, 1987 will be modified so that it is binding on the City of Dallas;
(iii) that the plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to liability against the City of Dallas because the undisputed facts establish that the City was a substantial cause of DHA’s deliberate racial segregation and discrimination in its public housing programs in Dallas; and
(iv) the scope of the injunction to be entered against the City of Dallas and the specific modifications that will be made to the Consent Decree — as well as the financial obligations to be imposed upon the City as a result of this opinion — will be determined after a hearing and the presentation of evidence by all parties.

These rulings should come as no surprise. In April of 1988, the “Housing Mediation Team” appointed by the Mayor recommended that “the City of Dallas should voluntarily agree to enter into the Walker v. HUD Consent Decree,” stating:

“... We believe that there is strong sentiment by all parties with whom we have talked that the City has had an active, historical involvement in the DHA’s operations and, therefore, bears some responsibility for the condition of public housing in Dallas. As a result, we have concluded that the City will be brought into the lawsuit involuntarily and will likely face enormous legal expenses in its defense. If the City is found liable, it then faces the likelihood of considerable financial outlays. It is for these reasons that we believe the City should enter the Consent Decree voluntarily.”

To show why the City of Dallas should be joined as a defendant in this case subject to the Consent Decree — and why summary judgment as to liability should be entered against the City — this opinion will discuss (i) the procedural history, (ii) the relationship between DHA and the City, (iii) the long, unbroken history of deliberate segregation and discrimination in public housing by DHA and by the City of Dallas (iv) the conduct of the City and its officials concerning the Consent Decree, and (v) the applicable law.

I.. The Procedural History

The complete procedural history of this action — both before and after the original parties settled the ease with a Consent Decree approved by the Court on Jan. 20, 1987 — is detailed in the Walker I companion opinion. However, these additional facts are necessary to show the procedural setting for this opinion.

On Sept. 8, 1988, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Modify the Consent Decree and to Enjoin the City of Dallas. 3 Then, on Dec. 21, 1988, the plaintiffs filed an “alternative” Motion to Add the City of Dallas as a Party Defendant (and to file a Supplemental Complaint against the City). Both motions sought injunctive relief against the City of Dallas for the following reasons:

“1) There is a need for additional resources to accomplish the purposes and programs of the Consent Decree,
“2) The City of Dallas has a legal obligation to assist in the disestablishment of the racial segregation in DHA's programs and the housing patterns of the City of Dallas,
*1291 “3) The City of Dallas has opposed and attempted to obstruct the operation of the Consent Decree,
“4) The City of Dallas was a substantial cause of the creation and maintenance of racial segregation and discrimination in the housing assistance programs administered by the Housing Authority of the City of Dallas [DHA].”

The City of Dallas filed its reply to the plaintiffs’ first motion (the motion to modify the Consent Decree) on Oct. 7, 1988. However, the City did not respond to the second motion (the motion to add the City as a party defendant); instead, it simply filed an answer to the plaintiffs’ Supplemental Complaint on Jan. 11, 1989. 4

On Dec. 12 and 14, 1988, a hearing was held on the plaintiffs’ Motion to Modify the Decree and to Enjoin the City of Dallas. 5 The evidence presented at that time primarily concerned the plaintiffs’s liability claims against the City, and it did not focus on what specific relief should be granted. However, the plaintiffs sought a broad injunction which would:

(i) prohibit the City of Dallas from racial discrimination in “housing-related actions” and from obstructing the operation of the Consent Decree;
(ii) require the City to provide a “local program of housing assistance that meets the replacement housing requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1437p” for the units to be demolished at the West Dallas Project; 6
(iii) require the City to provide “the counseling and transportation services” necessary to help black families move to non-minority areas in Dallas and its suburbs under DHA’s § 8 assistance program; 7
(iv) require the City to improve the “facilities and neighborhoods of DHA’s family housing projects” so they are equal to the facilities and neighborhoods of the “predominately white-occupied HUD assisted projects”; and
(v) require the City to implement an effective code enforcement program “to eliminate substandard conditions” at DHA’s public housing projects and § 8 assisted units.

The plaintiff’s Dec. 21, 1988 motion (to add the City as a party defendant) was expressly based upon the testimony and exhibits presented at the Dec. 12, 1988 hearing. This was also true of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (also filed Dec. 21, 1988). And, the response by the City of Dallas to this summary judgment motion was based upon “the exhibits and testimony admitted into evidence at the Dec. 12, 1988 hearing.” 8

II. Relationship Between DHA And The City of Dallas

1.

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Walker v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development, 734 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Tex. 1989).

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