Wade v. Rodriguez

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 1, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-04707·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOSEPH W. WADE, Plaintiff, y- 23 Civ. 4707 (PAE) NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF PLANNING, ORDER DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY INFRASTUCTURE, Defendant.

PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Joseph W. Wade (“Wade”), who is appearing pro se, brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that defendant New York State Office of Planning, Development and Community Infrastructure (“OPDCI”), an office within New York State’s Department of State,! violated Title VII when it considered an individual’s characteristics in its requests for proposals (“RFP”). On June 13, 2023, the Court granted Wade’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. Dkt. 5. As set forth below, the Court (1) construes the complaint as asserting official-capacity claims against Secretary Robert J. Rodriguez of the New York State Department of State, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) dismisses the claims against OPDCI, under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) directs the Clerk of Court to add as the Defendant, Secretary Rodriguez, under Rule 21 of the Federai Rules of Civil Procedure; and (4) directs the Clerk of Court to effect service on Secretary Rodriguez.

' OPDCI is an office within the New York State Department of State. See Department of States, 3093) and Bid Opportunities, https://dos.ny.gow/funding-bid-opportunities (last visited July 11,

STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Although pro se pleadings are entitled to “special solicitude,” id. at 475 (citation omitted), they must still allege a claim “that is plausible on its face,” Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim “facial[ly] plausibil[e] when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), Although a district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir,2014), that tenet “is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678, Pro se status “does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1983) (citation omitted); Mostafa v. City of New York, No, 13 Civ. 155 (PAE), 2014 WL 4354689, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014). BACKGROUND Wade, through his company Owl Contracting, LLC, responded to an RFP “for a major state contract,” for work to be performed in Manhattan. Dit. 1 at 5. OPDCI informed Wade that

he was not awarded the contract. /d at 8. Wade challenges the RFP’s criteria, which includes a formula that considers an applicant’s “diversity.” Id at 12. Specifically, the RFP awards two points, in a 100-point formula, based on responses to a “diversity practices questionnaire,” that “will be scored in accordance with the established matrix.” /d. Wade contends that because he is a white man, “it is impossible for my firm .. . to receive a perfect score of 100 points under my own volition.” Jd. at 10. He alleges that, “[fJor reasons of my race, color and gender, the highest score I can receive without pledging profits to another is 98 out of 100. A clear and transparent ] against, not my content of my character or quality of qualification but my physical characteristics.” Jd Wade seeks money damages and “relief from bias.” Id. DISCUSSION Wade’s claims do not arise under Title Vil because Wade and defendant were not in an employee-employer relationship. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (Title VII states that “[t]he term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an employer[.]”); see Felder v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 27 F.4th 834, 838 (2d Cir. 2022) (where “a plaintiff is found to be an independent contractor and not an employee ... the Title VII claim must fail”). Wade’s claims also do not arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which “protects the equal right of ‘[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States’ to ‘make and enforce contracts’ without respect to race.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). Though Section 1981 provides a remedy for individuals asserting race discrimination in making and enforcing contracts, it “does not provide a separate private right of action against state actors.” Duplan v. City of New York, 888 F.3d 612, 621 (2d Cir. 2018). Because Plaintiff brings his claims against the State of New York, he must pursue any such claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id, at 619 (quoting Jett vy. Dallas Indep, Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989)). Thus, the Court construes Wade’s allegations, that defendant’s consideration of an

applicant’s “diversity” amounted to race- and gender-based discrimination, as asserting an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, in violation of Section 1983. See Jana-Rock Const., Inc. v. New York State Dept of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing standards for Equal Protection claims). For the following reasons, Wade cannot bring such a claim against OPDCI. Because he

may bring suit for prospective injunctive relief against an individual state official, however, see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123

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