Grimson, J.
This is a suit in equity for a mandatory injunction. As grounds therefor plaintiffs allege that the defendants in constructing the public highways bounding plaintiffs’ lands failed to do that in accordance with scientific highway construction and engineering; that they have obstructed the natural [1031]*1031drainage of the surface waters by the embankments of the highway; that as a result thereof the surface waters from adjoining lands overflow the highway ditches and flood large portions of plaintiffs’ land; that plaintiffs suffer irreparable damage therefrom; that they have no adequate remedy at law. They allege further'that defendants will continue to keep and maintain said obstruction to the natural flow and drainage of surface waters unless restrained. Plaintiffs ask for an injunction to restrain the defendants from permitting the waters to so accumulate and to order them to remove any obstructions blocking the natural flowage of the surface waters. Upon that complaint, and an affidavit of like content, a temporary restraining order was issued. The defendants make general denial and allege that any accumulation of waters on plaintiffs’ lands was not caused by natural drainage but by their own acts in the building of a private drain across their land and in the construction of a private driveway across the ditch along the east side of their land.
The first question that arises is whether a suit of this nature lies against public officers. An injunction will not lie to restrain public officers from the performance of their legal duties. The authorities are uniform, however, in holding that public officers may be restrained by injunction as far as their acts are shown to be in violation of or non-compliance with law when such acts cause irreparable injury and the injured person has no adequate remedy at law. 40 CJS Highways, Sec 199, p 81; People of the State of New York v. The Canal Board of the State of New York, 55 NY Reports 390; Ex parte Young, 209 US 123, 13 LRA NS 932; 5 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, Sec 321, p 575; Sweigart v. State of Indiana, 213 Ind Rep 157, 12 NE2d 134.
“An injunction .to prevent an officer from doing that which he has no legal right to do is not an interference with his discretion.” 28 Am Jur, Injunction Sec 166, p 356.
“Private citizens who are specially injured by aii obstruction and interested in preventing its continuance may, upon a proper showing, maintain a suit in equity for an injunction. But unless a special injury is shown, the plaintiff will not be entitled to [1032]*1032an injunction.- It has also been held that the injury must be irreparable, or at least not capable of full and complete compensation in damages. This is no doubt a fair statement of the general rule, but the phrase ‘irreparable injury,’ is apt to mislead. It does not necessarily mean, as used in the law of injunctions, that the injury is beyond the possibility of compensation in damages, nor that it must be very great. And the fact that no actual damages can be proved, so that in an action at law the jury could award nominal damages only, often furnishes the very best reason why a court of equity should' interfere in cases where the nuisance is a continuous one.” 2 Elliott Roads and Streets, Sec 850, p 1108.
Where preventive relief is not adequate to the situation a mandatory injunction for the performance of some act to restore the status quo may lie. While such injunctions are not favored by the courts “it is now well settled that unless prohibited from so doing by some constitutional or-statutory provision, a court of equity can, and in a proper case will, award mandatory as well as prohibitive injunctive relief. It may, by its mandate, compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done, as well as it may, by its prohibitive powers, restrain the doing of illegal acts.” 28 Am Jur, Injunctions Sec 17, p 210.
In the case of State of North Dakota, ex rel. Ladd v. The District Court of Cass County et al, 17 ND 285, 115 NW 675, 15 LRA NS 331, this court had for consideration whether the legality of the acts of the Pure Pood Commissioner and whether the powers conferred upon him by the law under which he was authorized to act, might be tested in an action to enjoin him from the commission of acts alleged to be without authority. Many cases bearing on this subject are reviewed (pages 294-295) and the court says:
“These cases establish the principle that a court of chancery has undoubted jurisdiction to interfere by injunction in a case where public officials are proceeding illegally and improperly under claim of right, or where the exercise of such jurisdiction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of suits, or irreparable injury to property.”
In that case Ladd had contended that the courts of this state [1033]*1033“have no authority to entertain an action having for its purpose the enjoining of a public official while executing or claiming to execute a public statute for the' public benefit.” The statute relied on was Sec 6631 RC 1905 (Sec 32-0505 NDRC 1943) Sec 4 which provides that an injunction may not be granted “to prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit.” The court construed that statute to mean that “when a suit is tried wherein it is sought to enjoin an officer from executing a statute he shall not be enjoined when found to be regularly and lawfully executing the statute for the public benefit. If acting in excess of, or without, authority, he is not executing the public statute. There must be some method to protect people and property against the unlawful execution of statutes by public officials, and we think the provision referred to was not intended to preclude an inquiry on the part of the courts in a suit to enjoin as to the legality of official acts.” This court concludes:
“We are of the opinion that an action instituted in the District Court for an injunction is a proper action by which to determine whether the acts of the food commissioner are in accordance with or in violation of law, and that that court has power and jurisdiction to entertain such an action, and if it found that.that official is, under, color of law, proceeding in an unlawful manner, and is illegally condemning the products of the millers of the state, it may permanently enjoin him from so doing.”
Again in Bartles Northern Oil Co. v. Jackman, 29 ND 236, 150 NW 576, this court said: “When other conditions warrant it, injunction will lie to' test the validity of a statute or the lawfulness of the exercise of the powers conferred upon an officer of the law charged with executing it.”
Sec 24-0601 NDRC 1943 provides that the “Board of Township Supervisors of any township in the state shall have general supervision over the roads, highways and bridges throughout the township.” This is verbatim the provision of Sec 2668 of the 1895 Code. It is the law under which the township roads were constructed during all of the pioneer days and until 1945. The sole consideration in the construction of roads during that time was to make them suitable for travel. As is said in Carroll [1034]*1034v. Township of Rye, 13 ND 458, 101 NW 894, “The highway ditches were not dng for drainage purposes, but are the necessary incidental result of the only practicable method of making the roads fit for travel.” Naturally these ditches filled with water. No consideration was given to an outlet for waters so collected. Sometimes the roadway interfered with the natural flow of surface waters. Sometimes such waters were diverted onto lands that were not along their natural drainways. This was especially true in the Red River Valley where the lands are generally quite level and the natural drainways not very definite. This situation had become so serious that seventeen members of the 1945 House of Representatives from the Red River Valley introduced House Bill 269 which was enacted as Chapter 325 SL 1945, now Sec 24-D633 NDRC 1943, for the purpose of correcting this condition. That chapter reads as follows:
“That any and all highways of any kind hereafter constructed or reconstructed by the State Highway Department, any board of county commissioners, any board of township supervisors, their contractors, sub-contractors, or agents, or by any individual firm or cprporation, shall be so designed as to- permit the waters running into such ditches to drain into coulees, rivers and lakes according to the surface and terrain where such highway or highways..'are constructed in accordance with scientific highway construction and engineering so as to avoid the waters .flowing into, and accumulating in the ditches to overflow adjacent and adjoining lands. It is the intention of this act that in thp construction of highways, as herein provided, the natural flow arid drainage-of surface waters shall not be obstructed, but that such water shall be permitted to follow the natural courses according to the surface and terrain of the particular terrain.”
By this law those in charge of the construction of highways in addition to making the roads fit for travel must consider the drainage affected by the construction. It is made their mandatory duty to provide drainage towards a natural water course of any water which may accumulate in the ditches along the highway.
Under this law the highways involved in' the instant case were ■constructed. The question then is whether the board of super[1035]*1035visors in carrying out that work complied with the provisions of this law. If they failed in that respect and obstructed the natural flow of surface waters thereby causing plaintiffs irreparable damage for which they have no adequate remedy at law, their actions, in violation of that law, may be enjoined.
In the case at bar hearing was held upon an order to show cause why the temporary injunction should not be made permanent and upon the evidence so taken it was stipulated that the court should make its final determination in the case.. The court found for the defendants and ordered the injunction vacated and the case dismissed. The plaintiffs appeal from the judgment entered thereon and demand a trial de novo. They allege that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court and assign as error the entry of judgment thereon.
The evidence shows that the plaintiffs are, and have for the last five years, been the owners of the Si of Sec 21, Township 142,, Range 52 in Arthur Township, Cass County, .North Dakota. This is farm land located about twenty miles west of the Red River where the terrain generally is flat and level. A township road had some years ago been graded east and west along the south edge of plaintiffs’ land, a distance of one mile. This roadway was re-built in the late summer of 1950. No culverts were used in the construction of that roadway. In 1946 a ditch and an embankment were constructed on the section line north and south on the east side of plaintiffs’ land, jointly by the Soil Conservation Service and the defendants. That embankment was formed into a roadway and joined the east-west roadway at the southeast corner of the plaintiffs’ land forming there a square corner. No outlet for any water accumulating there was provided.
The plaintiffs’ buildings are located on the- Southeast Quarter (SE4) of plaintiffs’ land just east of the. quarter , line. About 800 feet north of the southeast corner of plaintiffs’ land is a low ridge which extends southwest across the south half of plaintiffs’ land north of their buildings. At the east side of plaintiffs’ land the crest of this elevation or ridge is twenty inches higher than plaintiffs’ .southeast corner. The evidence shows [1036]*1036that the natural drainage of plaintiffs’ land south of this ridge is to the south and east. North of that ridge the drainage is north and east. This elevation or ridge is the divide of the drainage on his land.
There is another elevation or ridge commencing about fifty rods north of plaintiffs’ buildings and north of the east-west ridge which runs north and a little east across the western edge of the Northwest Quarter (NWi) of the Southeast Quarter (SEi) of plaintiffs’ land. There is a break or washout between the two ridges.
The west portion of plaintiffs’ land north of the divide is quite flat and lower than the portion east of the north-south ridge. In the fall of 1948 plaintiffs had a ditch dug to drain that portion of their land. That ditch commenced in the northwest corner and angled southeast through the washout between the ridges and then “kind of makes a turn” northeast on the north side of the east-west ridge. They had that ditch deepened in 1949 so that at its deepest point in the washout between the ridges it was four feet deep. Generally the ditch was only one and a half or two feet deep and eight to ten feet wide. It drains the. water on plaintiffs’ land north of the east-west ridge into the north and south ditch east of plaintiffs’ land. The water then flows north along that ditch to a culvert near the northeast corner of defendants’ land and through it to a natural drain-way.
The evidence shows that about thirty rods west of plaintiffs’ southeast corner there are two small potholes which have always been filled with water covering an area of from one to two acres each. Outside of that no noticeable amount of water had accumulated in that corner until after the embankment on the east side of plaintiffs’ land was constructed. Before that time the water had drained'into sloughs south and east of plaintiffs’ corner. Mr. Bradsteen, the engineer in charge, warned the township board at the time of building that north-south grade that unless a culvert were put in where the two embankments joined water would collect there. At one time the township board authorized the placing of a culvert there but afterwards •countermanded that order. Since that north-south embankment [1037]*1037was constructed plaintiffs claim that from twenty to forty acres of their lands were covered with water every spring until July and made useless for raising grain.
The defendants claim that as the water from the northwest part of plaintiffs’ land flowing in their private ditch came to the north side of the east-west ridge it spilled over that ridge and drained towards the southeast corner of their land to cause the accumulation of that water. Both the plaintiff, Charles Viestenz and Bradsteen, field man and surveyor of the Soil Conservation Service, who had made the surveys for plaintiffs’ ditch, testified that a big head of water from the north and west could spill over the east-west ridge. However, the plaintiff, Charles Viestenz, who lives just south of the east-west ridge and naturally most interested in the flow of this water, said he had never seen such an overflow. Defendants’ witnesses said they believed the water had overflowed but there was no positive testimony that it had. Bradsteen testified that the ditch could in no way cause such overflow. The ditch itself from one and one half to four feet deep, eight to ten feet wide and fully a mile long would hold considerable water and lower the general level of the water coming towards the ridge from the north that much. To that extent the ditch would lessen the danger of an overflow. Furthermore, the ditch would expedite the flow of the water north of the ridge into the east highway ditch. Clearly the plaintiffs’ private ditch instead of causing an overflow of the water over the east-west ridge would tend to prevent that.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs had, prior to the digging of the ditch built dikes eighty rods each way along the northwest corner of their land to prevent the waters from the west and north from accumulating on that low lying section of their land. Then in 1950 a soil conservation ditch and embankment had been constructed north and south along the west boundary of plaintiffs’ land for the purpose of draining the water from the west towards the north and away from plaintiffs’ land. This indicates that the plaintiffs, instead of causing drainage towards the southeast portion of plaintiffs’ land did everything possible to lessen the danger of the water draining that way.
Defendants also claim that the plaintiffs’ private driveway [1038]*1038over the ditch on the east side of plaintiffs’ land is responsible for this accumulation of water. That driveway is located at the crest of the east-west ridge. It was built on July 3, 1950, just three months before this action was started. All of the water in the southeast corner of which plaintiffs complain had accumulated prior thereto. That private driveway, located as it was on the crest of the ridge, could in no way affect the accumulation of water on plaintiffs’ land. The water on the north side flowed north and only the natural drainage on the 800 foot south slope of the ridge could run south. The plaintiffs’ private driveway could have no effect on that.
The evidence shows that there was an unusual amount of surface water in the spring of 1950 caused by an extra fall of snow and rain. That, however, would have no bearing on the issues here involved unless the surface waters north of the east-west ridge were sufficiently increased to cause them to overflow the ridge and that such overflow was due to the plaintiffs’ private ditch. There is no evidence of such an overflow.
Defendants’ witnesses admit that the road embankments act as dikes around that southeast corner and hold the water accumulating in the ditches and cause it to overflow on plaintiffs’ land. The defendants concede that the natural drainage from that corner of plaintiffs’ land is south and east. As a result the natural flow of surface water has been obstructed at the southeast corner of plaintiffs’ land. The plaintiffs by their conduct have not augmented the quantity or accelerated the flow of surface water toward the southeast corner. Solely because of the obstructions created by the township grades water accumulates on and, damages-the plaintiffs’ land and results in the exact situation which Chapter 325 SLND 1945, Sec 24-0633, 1949 Supp to NDIiC 1943 is intended to prevent. That law specifically enjoins road constructing officials to construct highways “so as to avoid the waters flowing into and accumulating in the ditches to overflow adjacent and adjoining lands.” It further provides: “It is the intention of this act that in the construction of highways, as herein provided, the natural flow and drainage of surface waters shall not be obstructed, but that such water [1039]*1039shall be permitted to follow the natural courses according to the surface and terrain of the particular terrain.”
It follows that the action of the township board in so constructing the highways as to permit the accumulation of waters in the ditches to overflow plaintiffs’ land was in violation of the law.
The next question is whether the plaintiffs have suffered irreparable damage by the flooding of their land for which they have no adequate remedy at law. That must be determined upon the evidence introduced. 39 Am Jur p 426.
“Ordinarily to warrant injunctive relief, it must clearly appear that some act has been done, or is threatened, which will produce irreparable injury to the party asking for such relief . . . An injury is irreparable when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages, and it is not necessary that the pecuniary damage be shown to be great . . . Acts which result in a serious change of, or are destructive to, the property affected either physically or in the character in which it has been held or enjoyed, ... do an irreparable injury. . . 43 CJS Injunctions, Sec 23, pp 446,447, 448.
The evidence shows that the plaintiffs own and farm land adjoining the highway. Because of the manner of construction of the highway embankments or grades the ditches thereof overflow with surface waters and flood a portion of the plaintiffs’ land. The amount of flooding depends upon the amount of surface waters flowing into the ditches of the highway each spring. Some years there might not be enough to flood any appreciable portion of their land. Other years the flooding will cover as much or more than forty acres. The water affects additional areas around the edges of the flooded portion. Usually such water seeps away by July. Defendants’ use of the.land is absolutely taken away during such floods. The land covered .and affected is made useless for grain farming. The season is then too advanced for raising any grain that year. The soils may be affected. The water becomes stagnant and the area becomes a breeding place for insects. Weeds will grow and the seeds may be carried long distances by the winds. Such an area [1040]*1040of stagnant water often becomes a real nuisance to the immediate surroundings.
“A wrongful interference with waters or water rights, the wrongful ponding or casting of water upon the premises of another, or an unsanitary, disagreeable, harmful, or dangerous condition caused by an accumulation of water,'or by the pollution thereof, may constitute a nuisance.” 56 Am Jur Waters, Sec 432, p 847.
Moreover, the flooding of the plaintiffs’ land because of the unlawful acts of the defendants disturbs the plaintiffs in their possession of the land during each flooding and constitutes trespass. 52 Am Jur Trespass, Sec 11, p 843. As the flooding may appear every year that becomes an intermittent trespass each year.
The plaintiffs have the right to sue for damages for the trespass on their land by the unlawful acts of the defendants and for the nuisance created by the flooding of their lands. That, however, would mean an action every year the waters flooded their land. The actual duration of the flooding and the area covered may differ every year. A recurrent suit for damages is not an adequate remedy under the circumstances. Only in a court of equity can the situation be dealt with adequately and with justice to all concerned.
“As a general rule, where an injury committed by one against another is continuous or is being constantly repeated, so that the complainant’s remedy at law requires the bringing of successive actions, that remedy is inadequate and the injury will be prevented by injunction. The fact that an injured person has the right of successive actions for the continuance of the wrong does not make it an adequate remedy at law which bars the jurisdiction of a court of equity to grant an injunction to restrain the continuance of the injury.” 43 CJS, Injunctions, Sec 24, p 449.
“The wrongful flooding of land may be enjoined, in a proper case. Such flooding has frequently been restrained on the ground that it constitutes a continuing, or recurrent trespass or nuisance.” 56 Am Jur, Waters, Sec 442, p 857.
“Where the nuisance is continuous or recurrent an injunction may be granted, since a suit at law is an inadequate remedy be[1041]*1041cause damages could be recovered only at the time of the bringing of the action and a multiplicity of suits would be necessary.” 39 Am Jur, Nuisances, Sec 158, p 428.
In the case of Byram et al. v. Lawein, 57 SD 403, 232 NW 907, involving the discharging of water onto plaintiffs’ land by the defendants, the South Dakota Court says: “Defendant has no right to drain any water other than the natural surface water on the plaintiff’s right of way. . . . The fact that the damage is but trifling does not authorize the refusal of an injunction where the trespass is a continuing one. 40 Cyc 656. Equity looks chiefly to the nature of the injury inflicted and the fact of its constant repetition or continuation, rather than to the magnitude of the damage resulting.” Citing cases. See also Little Falls Fibre Co. v. Henry Ford & Son, 212 NYS 630; Farrell v. City of Ontario, 36 Cal App 754, 173 P 392; Hoglino v. Giorgetta, 20 Colo App 338, 78 P 612; O’Brien v. Murphy, 189 Mass 353, 75 NE 700; Davis v. Frankenlust Twp. 118 Mich 494, 76 NW 1045; Stone v. Roscommon Lumber Co. et al., 59 Mich 24, 26 NW 216; Rueckert v. Sicking, 20 O App 162, 153 NE 129.
In Heath v. M. St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co. et al., 126 Minn 470, 148 NW 311, the court said: “The defendants so constructed and maintained an embankment on the right of way that at every heavy rainfall destructive quantities of sand and material therefrom were cast upon the adjoining land of plaintiff. This constituted a continuing trespass and nuisance, entitling plaintiff to an injunction and damages.”
In Lake Erie and W. R. Co. v. Young, 135 Ind 426, 41 Am St Rep 430, 35 NE 177, the court held: “Where a railroad company has begun the construction of an embankment across a natural stream, with a culvert insufficient to permit the passage of the water in times of rain and melting snow, an injunction will issue at the suit of the landowner whose land will be flooded from year to year, and who would otherwise be compelled to bring numerous suits for damages for the continuous injuries.”
In the case of White et al. v. N. C. & St. L. Railway, 1 Tenn App 467, it was held: “Where a railroad had built a fill or embankment which stopped the natural drainage, but provided a [1042]*1042culvert to take care of the water and in later years through natural causes the culvert was filled up and could no longer be made to drain complainant’s land and the water collected there and destroyed the use of the land, and soured adjoining land and formed a breeding place for mosquitoes, held a mandatory injunction would issue to compel defendant to put in a culvert to drain the land.”
This rule also applies against a municipality. In the suit of Cromer v. City of Logansport, 38 Ind App 661, 78 NE 1045, the court held: “Where plaintiff’s property was damaged during every recurring ordinary rainfall by surface water accumulated by defendant’s street improvements for which no proper outlet had been provided, plaintiff was entitled to an injunction to restrain the future recurrence of such injury.”
In Bartles Northern Oil Co. v. Jackman, 29 ND 236, 150 NW 576, this court said: “Although a legal remedy may be adequate for any single act of trespass or any single wrong, yet when such acts or wrongs are continuous in their nature, and the entire wrong may be prevented by . injunction, that form of proceeding is preferable to one at law, because full compensation for the entire wrong cannot be obtained in one action at law.”
We have come to the conclusion under the circumstances shown to exist in this case that the plaintiffs have suffered an irreparable injury for which they have no adequate remedy at law.
The plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an'injunction restraining the defendants from maintaining the highways along plaintiffs’ land in such- a manner as to impound surface waters on their land. They are also entitled to a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to construct or alter the highway grades or ditches, or both, so as to provide for the outlet of surface waters from the plaintiffs’ land and prevent the recurrent overflow of the land herein involved by waters flowing in or accumulating in the highway ditches.
There is some evidence that an outlet for the accumulated waters may be obtained by placing a culvert through the embank[1043]*1043ment of the east and west highway at the southeast corner of plaintiffs’ land and deepening the ditch toward the south along the section line.
The evidence also indicates that if the plaintiffs’ private driveway, which appears to have been constructed without authority, is removed, the ditch towards the north from the southeast corner of plaintiffs’ land along the east side of their land may be deepened through the east-west ridge to provide an outlet towards the natural drainage to the north and east.
The best method, however, of finding an outlet for these waters must be determined by the township board in accordance with good engineering practices as provided in Sec 24-0633 NDRC 1943. See also Ritter v. Drainage District No. 1, 148 Nebr 873, 29 NW2d 782, 788.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings in accordance herewith.
Morris, C. J., and Sathre, J., concur.