Vargas v. City of Tracy

Opinion

----oo0oo---- PATRICK VARGAS, No. 2:22-cv-01454 WBS CSK Plaintiff, v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR CITY OF TRACY; SOUTH SAN SUMMARY JUDGMENT JOAQUIN COUNTY FIRE AUTHORITY; RANDALL BRADLEY, in his individual and official capacities; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants. ----oo0oo---- Plaintiff Patrick Vargas brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law against defendants City of Tracy (“City”), South San Joaquin County Fire Authority (“SSJC Fire Authority” or “Fire Authority”), and Randall Bradley. (Third Am. Compl. (“TAC”) (Docket No. 37).) Defendants move for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 99-100 (“City MSJ”), No. 101 (“Bradley MSJ”), No. 102 (“Fire Authority MSJ”).) I. Facts Plaintiff began working as a firefighter for the Tracy Rural Fire Department in 1994. (See Patrick Vargas Dep. at 36:17-37:1.)1 In 1999, the City of Tracy Fire Department and the Tracy Rural Fire Department merged to form a “joint powers authority” called the South County Fire Authority.2 (Patrick Vargas Dep. at 37:9-14; Bradley Dep. at 33:18-22, 46:22-23.) As a result of this merger, plaintiff became an employee of the City of Tracy. (Patrick Vargas Dep. at 36:19-37:3.) Plaintiff was promoted to interim Division Chief in 2015, to Battalion Chief in 2017, and to Division Chief later in 2017, a position he held until he was terminated in 2022. (Id. at 21:17-22.) Defendant Bradley was hired as Fire Chief for the City of Tracy in December 2015 and then served as interim and permanent City Manager for the City from approximately October 2017 to January 2019. (Bradley Dep. at 49:3-14, 70:9-13, 79:19- 21, 82:1-10.) During this time period, Bradley advocated for restructuring the South County Fire Authority into a “strong” joint powers authority independent of the City, and ultimately convinced the City Council to adopt this proposal (hereinafter “the Plan”). (See Bradley Dep. at 55:6-61:14, 67:5-12.) Pursuant to the Plan, the existing South County Fire Authority was dissolved and a new joint powers authority independent of the City -- defendant South San Joaquin County

1 The depositions and accompanying exhibits cited throughout this Order were lodged with the court.

2 A joint powers authority is a partnership between two public agencies to either jointly manage an endeavor or form a new public agency. (Bradley Dep. at 33:23-34:6.) Fire Authority (“SSJC Fire Authority” or “Fire Authority”) -- was established in 2018. (Bradley Dep. at 80:23-83:2.) Bradley left his position as City Manager in 2019 to serve as Fire Chief of the SSJC Fire Authority. (See Ex. 6 to Bradley Dep.) From the establishment of the SSJC Fire Authority to January 1, 2022, the City of Tracy remained the employer of record for plaintiff, Bradley, and other SSJC Fire Authority employees. (See id. at 82:1-17; Murdaugh Dep. at 27:13-28:14.) On January 2, 2022, the SSJC Fire Authority became the employer of record. (See id.) Plaintiff’s wife, Veronica Vargas, was a member of the Tracy City Council from 2014 to 2022. (See Veronica Vargas Dep. at 30:20-23, 95:15-96:6.) In her role as city councilor, she was involved in the discussions over restructuring the joint powers authority, which began during Bradley’s tenure as City Manager. (See id. at 60:13-25.) Ms. Vargas expressed concern over the Plan’s feasibility and was unsatisfied with the answers she was given concerning it. (Id. at 70:18-71:10, 73:16-74:7, 75:17- 78:6, 100:24-103:4.) Ms. Vargas continued to be involved in implementation of the Plan through her role in the City Council as late as September 1, 2020. (See Pl.’s Ex. A (Docket No. 104-8 at 5-13) at 5.) Plaintiff and his wife largely avoided discussing the Plan with each other to avoid causing tension in their marriage. (See Patrick Vargas Dep. at 108:23-109:12, 138:6-142:23; Veronica Vargas Dep. at 230:9-232:12.) Despite this, plaintiff contends, Bradley confronted plaintiff about his purported discussion of the Plan with Ms. Vargas in June or July 2019, telling plaintiff that he was in a “precarious position” and was being “marginaliz[ed]” because of Ms. Vargas. (See Patrick Vargas Dep. at 105:20-106:9.) Bradley brought allegations of timecard fraud to Human Resources Director Kimberly Murdaugh on September 15, 2020 and third-party investigators ultimately found the allegation unsupported on March 23, 2021. (Murdaugh Dep. at 75:12-76:5.) On March 31, 2021, Bradley contacted Ms. Murdaugh and implored her to further investigate plaintiff, and harassment allegations against plaintiff surfaced on April 7, 2021, prompting a second investigation during which Bradley placed plaintiff on paid administrative leave. (See Docket No. 104-2 at 288; Docket No. 104-4 at 63-67; Ex. 20 to Bradley Dep.; Murdaugh Dep. at 150:9- 23, 179:10-14.) Bradley allegedly pushed to expand the scope of the investigation, which concerned Ms. Murdaugh because there were no other specific allegations of misconduct and Bradley’s suggested course of action did not align with existing City policies. (Murdaugh Dep. at 133:13-134:16, 136:18-137:4.) The harassment investigation -- which, according to Ms. Murdaugh, ultimately exceeded the original investigatory scope she established -- concluded in August 2021 and sustained allegations of harassment and misconduct, but City officials had concerns about the integrity of the findings and commissioned an additional investigation into the harassment investigation. (See Exs. 18, 20 to Murdaugh Dep.; Murdaugh Dep. at 132:18-134:22, 167:5-17, 180:16-181:4, 183:20-21, 195:24-197:20, 199:6-10.) This additional investigation was completed in December 2021 and found that the harassment investigation used unreliable methodologies and was biased because “Bradley’s participation in the investigation as both the decisionmaker and a witness evidences the investigation was not conducted in an impartial manner.” (See Ex. 22 to Murdaugh Dep.) City officials concluded that the harassment investigation did not provide a basis to terminate plaintiff and directed that plaintiff be removed from administrative leave and return to work, but Bradley terminated plaintiff on January 12, 2022. (See Ex. 21 to Murdaugh Dep.; Murdaugh Dep. at 203:22-207:25; Bradley Dep. at 386:10-24, 395:13-396:24.) II. Discussion Plaintiff brings three claims under § 1983: the first claim alleging First Amendment retaliation based on speech, the second claim alleging First Amendment retaliation based on association, and the third claim alleging deprivation of procedural due process. (TAC ¶¶ 127-52.) Plaintiff also brings two state law claims: the fourth claim alleging violation of the California Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 3252 et seq.; and the fifth claim alleging violation of California Labor Code § 98.6. (Id. ¶¶ 153-74.) On their motions for summary judgment, defendants bear the burden of persuasion to show that there is no genuine dispute of material fact on plaintiff’s claims. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). A. Bradley and the SSJC Fire Authority 1. Section 1983 a. Monell Liability Plaintiff brings all three constitutional claims against the SSJC Fire Authority, which is a municipal entity. Because § 1983 does not provide for vicarious liability, local governments “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 693 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. Plaintiff bases his claims against the SSJC Fire Authority on the theory that Bradley was a “final policymaker.” “[W]here action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). In support of its argument that Bradley was not a final policymaker, the SSJC Fire Authority cites only Bradley’s Employment Agreement, which states that Bradley was under the authority of the Fire Authority’s Board. However, the cited document undercuts rather than supports the Fire Authority’s position, as it states that Bradley “[i]mplements and oversees all aspects of personnel and labor relations with [Fire] Authority employees, including personnel management, discipline, handling grievances, negotiating labor agreements, and meeting and conferring with the [Fire] Authority’s recognized bargaining units.” (Ex. 6 to Bradley Dep. at 10.) That document gives no indication that Bradley’s authority over employment matters was subject to Board control or approval. (See generally id.) The absence of Board oversight tends to be supported by the evidence before the court concerning plaintiff’s termination, which Bradley apparently decided upon and effectuated without any Board input. (See Bradley Dep. at 393:11-22, 395:13-398:3.) Accordingly, because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Bradley possessed final policymaking authority over employment decisions, the SSJC Fire Authority’s motion for summary judgment will not be granted based upon Monell. b. First Amendment Retaliation Based on Speech Plaintiff contends that Bradley, on behalf of the Fire Authority, took adverse employment actions against him based on Bradley’s perception that plaintiff spoke negatively of the Plan to his wife, Ms. Vargas, who was a city councilor and was involved in the adoption and implementation of the Plan. Regardless of whether plaintiff actually spoke to his wife about the Plan, a retaliation claim based on “perceived speech” -- i.e., speech that the plaintiff was incorrectly thought to have made -- is cognizable under the First Amendment. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 578 U.S. 266, 268 (2016) (government employee could maintain a First Amendment retaliation claim where he was demoted because “the official believed, but incorrectly believed, that the employee had supported a particular candidate for mayor”) (emphasis in original); DeCrane v. Eckart, 12 F.4th 586, 594 (6th Cir. 2021) (recognizing First Amendment retaliation claim premised on erroneously “perceived speech” based on Heffernan). “‘[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting individuals to retaliatory actions after the fact for having engaged in protected speech.’” Adams v. County of Sacramento, 116 F.4th 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468, 474 (2022)). Under the test established by Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), “it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish that (1) [he] spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) [he] spoke as a private citizen rather than a public employee; and (3) the relevant speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action.” Adams, 116 F.4th at 1010 (cleaned up).3 “If a plaintiff establishes such a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that (4) it had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently than other members of the general public; or (5) it would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the protected speech.” Id. (cleaned up). To demonstrate that retaliation was a “substantial or motivating factor behind an adverse employment action,” a plaintiff can “(1) introduce evidence that the speech and adverse action were proximate in time, such that a jury could infer that the action took place in retaliation for the speech; (2) introduce evidence that the employer expressed opposition to the speech; or (3) introduce evidence that the proffered explanations for the adverse action were false and pretextual.” Anthoine v. N. Cent. Ctys. Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 750 (9th Cir. 2010). “As with proof of motive in other contexts, this element of a First Amendment retaliation suit . . . involves questions of fact 3 Defendants do not meaningfully address the first or second Pickering factors. that normally should be left for trial.” Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). Here, plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of retaliatory motive to survive summary judgment. As laid out in detail above, there is evidence indicating that Bradley expressed opposition to plaintiff’s perceived communication with Ms. Vargas concerning the Plan (see Patrick Vargas Dep. at 105:20-106:9) and that there was a close proximity in time between Ms. Vargas’ actions on the City Council regarding the Plan and the chain of events beginning with Bradley’s allegation of timecard fraud (see Pl.’s Ex. A at 5; Murdaugh Dep. at 75:12-76:5). There is also evidence tending to show that Bradley’s proffered reason for plaintiff’s termination was pretextual. After an independent investigation found that the harassment investigation into plaintiff was biased by Bradley’s involvement, City officials concluded that the harassment investigation’s findings did not warrant termination and instructed Bradley to remove plaintiff from administrative leave, but Bradley terminated plaintiff regardless. (See Murdaugh Dep. at 203:22- 207:25, 213:19-214:23; Ex. 22 to Murdaugh Dep. at 3; Bradley Dep. at 386:10-387:16, 395:13-396:24.) This evidence plainly establishes a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether plaintiff’s termination was based on Bradley’s retaliatory animus for plaintiff’s perceived speech and connection with Ms. Vargas. See Anthoine, 605 F.3d at 750. Further, Bradley and the Fire Authority have not pointed to any evidence that taking adverse employment action in response to plaintiff’s speech served legitimate operational purposes. See Moser v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 984 F.3d 900, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2021) (“mere speculation that an employee’s speech will cause disruption” was insufficient to demonstrate the government had a legitimate interest under Pickering). Accordingly, Bradley and the SSJC Fire Authority’s motions for summary judgment on the first claim for First Amendment retaliation based on plaintiff’s speech must be denied.

c. First Amendment Retaliation Based on Association Plaintiff alleges that Bradley and the SSJC Fire Authority retaliated against him based on his association with his wife. Though the Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed this type of claim, the Second Circuit has held that “a spouse’s claim that adverse action was taken solely against that spouse in retaliation for conduct of the other spouse should be analyzed as a claimed violation of a First Amendment right of intimate association.” See Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 44 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Freeman v. County of Riverside, No. 18-cv-2171 JFW KKX, 2019 WL 7905733, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2019) (quoting Lewis v. Eufaula City Bd. of Educ., 922 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2012)) (“[T]he First Amendment may also be violated where the speech that invoked the government’s retaliatory response was not made by the plaintiff herself, but rather by a person in a close relationship with the plaintiff, and the government retaliated against the plaintiff for her perceived association with the other person and that person’s speech.”); Isakhanova v. Muniz, No. 15-cv-03759 TEH, 2016 WL 1640649, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2016) (same). This holding aligns with Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court case law explaining that a claim for “expressive association” via a close family relationship such as marriage is cognizable under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Board of Dir. v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987); Erotic Serv. Provider Legal Educ. & Rsch. Project v. Gascon, 880 F.3d 450, 458 (9th Cir.), amended, 881 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2018); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685 (9th Cir. 2001); IDK, Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 1988). Bradley and the Fire Authority’s arguments concerning this claim are essentially the same as those discussed above with respect to the First Amendment retaliation claim based on plaintiff’s speech -- i.e., the third, fourth, and fifth elements of the Pickering analysis. (See Fire Authority Reply at 10-12; Bradley Reply at 8-12.) See also Adler, 185 F.3d at 44 (applying Pickering test to First Amendment retaliation claim based on association with spouse). Based on the evidence discussed above, there are genuine disputes of material fact concerning whether Bradley took retaliatory employment actions in response to plaintiff’s association with his wife, whether those adverse actions were otherwise justified, and whether those adverse actions would have been taken absent retaliatory intent. Accordingly, Bradley and the SSJC Fire Authority’s motions for summary judgment must also be denied on the second claim for First Amendment retaliation based on association. d. Procedural Due Process Plaintiff does not oppose defendants’ request for summary judgment on the procedural due process claim. (See Bradley Opp’n (Docket No. 105) at 32; Fire Authority Opp’n (Docket No. 106) at 31-32.) Accordingly, Bradley and the SSJC Fire Authority’s motions for summary judgment will be granted as to the third claim for deprivation of procedural due process. e. Qualified Immunity “Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). Bradley argues perfunctorily that he is entitled to qualified immunity but fails to present any argument concerning why the rights at issue here were not “clearly established” under the applicable standard. Accordingly, he has not met his burden of persuasion and qualified immunity will be denied. 2. State Law Claims a. Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act Plaintiff’s fourth claim alleges violation of several provisions of the California Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 3252 et seq. This statute sets forth a hodgepodge of procedural rights, which for unexplained reasons apply only to firefighters.4 Needless to say, if this 4 For example, plaintiff pleads the provisions of the Act which provide (1) that “no firefighter shall be prohibited from engaging, or be coerced or required to engage, in political activity,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 3252(a); (2) that “[a] firefighter claim in its entirety remains in the case it will ultimately convert the trial from an inquiry into whether defendants deprived plaintiff of his constitutional rights under the First Amendment into an exposition of whether plaintiff was accorded all of the procedural amenities the California legislature has conferred upon him as a firefighter. Bradley and the Fire Authority do not address all statutory provisions relied upon by plaintiff. In particular, they do not appear to address the requirement under § 3254(f) to provide written notice within 30 days of any decision to impose discipline. (See Bradley MSJ at 28-32; Fire Authority MSJ at 28- 32.) With respect to the administrative appeal process requirement under § 3254(b), defendants argue that because plaintiff was an at-will employee, he possessed no administrative shall not be subjected to punitive action, or denied promotion, or be threatened with that treatment, because of the lawful exercise of the rights granted under this chapter, or the exercise of any rights under any existing administrative grievance procedure,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 3254(a); (3) that “[p]unitive action . . . shall not be undertaken by any employing department or licensing or certifying agency against any firefighter who has successfully completed the probationary period without providing the firefighter with an opportunity for administrative appeal,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 3254(b); and (4) that “[i]f, after investigation and any predisciplinary response or procedure, the employing department or licensing or certifying agency decides to impose discipline, that agency shall notify the firefighter in writing of its decision to impose discipline within 30 days of its decision, but not less than 48 hours prior to imposing the discipline,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 3254(f). In opposition to the motions, plaintiff also argues that he maintains a claim under a separate provision of the Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 3254(d). However, plaintiff did not plead his claim under that section. (See TAC ¶ 153.) appeal rights. However, defendants have not cited, nor is the court aware of, any evidence or authority indicating that plaintiff’s at-will status terminated his statutory rights under the Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act. See County of Riverside v. Superior Ct., 27 Cal. 4th 793, 806–07 (2002) (analogous Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act “is, like many other statutory schemes enacted for the protection of a class of employees, not subject to blanket waiver,” and therefore waiver of rights under Bill of Rights Act must be “a voluntary and knowing act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences”); Vincent v. City of Cal. City, No. 1:18-cv-00549 LJO JLT, 2018 WL 3524621, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2018) (assuming Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act applied to “at-will management employee”). Further, with respect to the requirement under § 3252(a) that firefighters not be prohibited from or coerced into engaging in political activity, there is a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment. For instance, there is evidence suggesting that Bradley pressured plaintiff into trying to convince Ms. Vargas to stop questioning Bradley’s plan in her role as city councilor. (See Patrick Vargas Dep. at 105:20-108:12, 140:11-22.) The court will not, and need not, address all of the portions of the Act pled by plaintiff, but for the reasons discussed above, Bradley and the SSJC Fire Authority’s motions for summary judgment on the fourth claim under the Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act will be denied. b. Cal. Labor Code § 98.6 Bradley and the SSJC Fire Authority argue that they are entitled to statutory immunity under California Government Code § 820.2, which provides that “a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused”; and California Government Code § 815.2(b), which provides immunity to a public entity for the actions of an employee who is himself immune from liability. “[T]he burden rests with government defendants to demonstrate that they are entitled to § 820.2 immunity for a specific policy decision made by an employee who consciously balanced the decision’s risks and benefits.” Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 640 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 795 n.8 (1968)). Bradley and the Fire Authority have entirely failed to satisfy this burden. They merely state in conclusory fashion that they are entitled to statutory immunity, but do not engage in any analysis. Accordingly, immunity under § 820.2 (and derivative immunity under § 815.2(b)) will not be granted. Plaintiff’s claim under § 98.6 is premised upon the alleged retaliation for plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. (See TAC ¶ 169; Fire Authority Opp’n at 31.) See also Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp., 120 Cal. App. 4th 72, 86 (2004) (discussing claim under § 98.6 premised on violation of a constitutional right); Napear v. Bonneville Int’l Corp., 669 F. Supp. 3d 948, 966 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 2023) (Drozd, J.) (same). As explained above, plaintiff’s First Amendment claims survive summary judgment. Thus, plaintiff’s § 98.6 claim, premised on the alleged violation of his First Amendment rights, similarly survives summary judgment, and the court will deny Bradley and the Fire Authority’s motions as to that claim. B. The City Plaintiff does not oppose the City’s request for summary judgment on the third claim for procedural due process and fifth claim under Labor Code § 98.6. (See City Opp’n (Docket No. 104) at 45.) Accordingly, summary judgment in the City’s favor will be granted on the third and fifth claims. In contrast to Bradley and the SSJC Fire Authority, the City clearly cannot be held liable on any of plaintiff’s remaining claims. With respect to the § 1983 claims, Bradley was not a final policymaker for the City under Monell. The City of Tracy Municipal Code establishes that the City Manager has “the power to control, order, and give directions to all heads of departments and to subordinate officers and employees of the City.” City of Tracy Mun. Code § 2.08.060. The City’s Personnel Rules designate the City Manager and Human Resources Director as the officials ultimately responsible for various personnel matters, including disciplinary action. (See Ex. 31 to Murdaugh Dep. at 1-3, 35-39.) Bradley therefore was not a final policymaker for the City. See Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013) (municipal code provision and personnel rules delegating employment decisions to city manager established that city manager was final policymaker with respect to employment decisions). Further, Bradley’s employment agreement was with the SSJC Fire Authority and he reported to the Fire Authority’s Board, not to the City. (See Bradley Dep. at 363:3-9; Ex. 6 to Bradley Dep.) And based on the evidence already discussed above, Bradley -- not any City official -- was responsible for the alleged violations. Bradley allegedly expressed opposition to plaintiff’s perceived speech. (See Patrick Vargas Dep. at 105:20-106:9.) Bradley allegedly defied the limitations put in place by City policy and the City’s Human Resources Director in order to influence the harassment investigation. (See Murdaugh Dep. at 132:18-134:22, 180:16-181:4; Ex. 22 to Murdaugh Dep. at 3.) Bradley chose to place plaintiff on administrative leave during that investigation, only informing the City after deciding on that course of action. (See Ex. 20 to Bradley Dep.; Murdaugh Dep. at 150:9-151:23.) City officials apparently tried to stymie Bradley’s influence and ensure plaintiff was treated fairly by commissioning an independent investigation into the harassment investigation and, based on the results thereof, ordered Bradley to remove plaintiff from administrative leave and allow him to return to work. (See Exs. 20-22 to Murdaugh Dep.; Murdaugh Dep. at 132:19-134:22, 167:5-17, 195:24-199:10, 203:22-207:25, 213:19- 214:23; Bradley Dep. at 386:10-24.) Bradley disregarded the City’s instructions and terminated plaintiff shortly after the Fire Authority became plaintiff’s employer of record. (See Bradley Dep. at 386:10-387:16, 395:13-396:24; Murdaugh Dep. at 27:13-28:14.) While the City did initiate the investigations in response to fraud and harassment allegations and made a tne nnn nn TE OS IEE III OIE EIEIO ED eee

recommendation for a written reprimand following the conclusion of the final investigation (see Ex. 21 to Murdaugh Dep.), there is no indication that the City did so in a biased manner or violated applicable procedural protections. The City cannot be held responsible for Bradley’s actions, which often appeared to contradict City policy and orders, merely because Bradley for a short period of time nominally remained an employee for purposes of the transition process for the newly autonomous SSJC Fire Authority. Accordingly, the City’s motion for summary judgment will be granted in its entirety. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the City of Tracy’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 99) be, and the same hereby is, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Randall Bradley’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 101) and the South San Joaquin County Fire Authority’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 102) be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED as to the third claim for deprivation of procedural due process under § 1983. The motions are DENIED in all other respects. Dated: February 21, 2025 bette 2d. □□ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18