The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY August 5, 2021
2021COA104
No. 19CA1772, People v. Stone — Constitutional Law — Fourth Amendment — Searches and Seizures — Warrantless Search — Consent Exception
A division of the court of appeals considers for the first time
whether an occupant’s consent to a law enforcement officer’s entry
into his or her home extends to the officer’s re-entry into the home
after the officer has briefly left it. The division concludes that,
where the initial entry and the re-entry are closely related in time
and purpose, the initial consent extends to the subsequent re-entry. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA104
Court of Appeals No. 19CA1772 Jefferson County District Court No. 18CR3901 Honorable Jeffrey R. Pilkington, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Adrienne Marie Stone,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Román and Davidson*, JJ., concur
Announced August 5, 2021
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rebecca A. Adams, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Scott Poland, Alternate Defense Counsel, Lakewood, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2020. ¶1 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution protect individuals
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Unless one of the
exceptions to the search warrant requirement applies, law
enforcement officers are barred from entering a person’s home
without a warrant. One of those exceptions applies when a person
with authority over the home freely and voluntarily consents to the
law enforcement officer’s entry into the home. This case addresses
the scope of that consent.
¶2 We consider in this case a novel issue of Colorado law —
whether an occupant’s consent to a law enforcement officer’s entry
into the occupant’s home extends to the officer’s re-entry into the
home after the officer has briefly left it, where the initial entry and
the re-entry are closely related in time and purpose, and the
occupant did not revoke or limit the initial consent. We conclude
that, under these circumstances, the occupant’s initial consent
extends to the officer’s re-entry into the home.
¶3 Adrienne Marie Stone appeals her judgment of conviction
based on her contention that the court erred by admitting evidence
obtained during an illegal search of her house. We affirm.
1 I. Background Facts
A. The Officers’ Entry into Stone and N.M.’s House
¶4 Sergeant Betsy Westbrook of the Arvada Police Department
responded to a report of a disturbance involving a seventeen-year-
old, N.M., who said that Stone, his mother, had threatened him
with a knife. Upon arriving at Stone and N.M.’s house, Westbrook
spoke with N.M.’s sister, M.M., who was standing in front of the
house. M.M. told Westbrook that, three days earlier, Stone had
threatened N.M. with a knife. M.M. said that she was worried for
N.M.’s safety because Stone was headed to the house, was very
angry with N.M., and had told him to “pray for his life.”
¶5 While speaking with M.M., Westbrook noticed that a young
man holding a baby briefly opened the front door of the house and
then closed it. Suspecting that the young man was N.M.,
Westbrook knocked on the door. N.M. opened the door, agreed to
speak with Westbrook, and identified himself. Westbrook asked
N.M. whether she could speak with him inside the house. N.M.
responded affirmatively and expressly invited her inside.
¶6 Upon entering the house, Westbrook observed a stairway filled
with boxes, clothing, and other items that “block[ed] free
2 movement.” In addition, she saw that the kitchen and living room
were cluttered and that a young child was “crawling over” a baby
gate set up between the living room and kitchen. Westbrook said
that the child “could just climb up on different things and get over
[the baby gate] easily.”
¶7 N.M. led Westbrook into the kitchen, where he showed her a
knife that he said Stone had used to threaten him. Westbrook took
two photographs of the knife with her cell phone. She then left the
house to retrieve her department-issued camera from her car so she
could take better pictures of the interior of the house than she
could with the cell phone.
¶8 As she stepped outside the house, Westbrook saw that Stone
had arrived. Stone was upset that a police officer and M.M. were at
the house. Stone also appeared to be yelling at a neighbor.
Because the situation involving Stone was “rapidly unfolding,”
Westbrook re-entered the house without her camera.
¶9 Blaine Engdahl, a resource officer at N.M.’s school, also
arrived at the house. After speaking briefly with M.M., Engdahl saw
N.M. at the front door. He entered the house with N.M. and, like
Westbrook, observed the clutter inside the house. Engdahl noted
3 that “[t]he movement through the house was by pathways through
the clutter,” which extended “up the stairs to the second floor.”
¶ 10 After Westbrook and Engdahl spoke with N.M. and saw the
interior of the house, they returned outside, where Westbrook
“made the decision to contact Jefferson County protection services”
about the children. A caseworker from protection services, Misty
Bogle, arrived and entered the house. Upon evaluating the
condition of the house, Bogle concluded it was unfit for children
and that the children needed to be removed from it.
¶ 11 While Bogle, Westbrook, and N.M. gathered the children’s
belongings, a code enforcement officer, Nicole Miller, and another
police officer, Devoney Cooke, entered the house. Cooke
photographed the interior of the house while she, Westbrook, and
Miller walked through it together. Over the next couple of hours,
other law enforcement officers also entered the house.
¶ 12 Stone was arrested and charged with one count of felony
menacing, seven counts of child abuse, and one count of violation
of a protection order that the neighbor had obtained against her.
One of the counts of child abuse was later dismissed because N.M.
was not under the age of sixteen at the time of the alleged abuse.
4 B. The Suppression Hearing and the Trial
¶ 13 Stone filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence of the knife
and the condition of the house, arguing that the “[l]aw enforcement
[officers] conducted a warrantless search of [her] residence without
probable cause and her consent,” and that “all evidence obtain[ed]
[from the search] should be suppressed.”
¶ 14 The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, at which
Westbrook and Cooke testified. At the hearing, Westbrook
described her interactions with N.M., the condition of the house,
and the photographs she took of the knife. Westbrook did not
testify that she took any photographs in the house other than those
of the knife. In addition, Cooke testified about her observations
when she walked through the house. Cooke said that, at
Westbrook’s direction, she photographed the interior of the house.
¶ 15 Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order finding
that Westbrook’s and Engdahl’s initial entries into the house were
lawful because N.M. voluntarily gave them consent to enter. It
concluded, however, that Bogle’s, Cooke’s, and Miller’s entries (as
well as these of any other officials) violated Stone’s Fourth
Amendment rights. Thus, it excluded “all evidence secured through
5 such actions . . . includ[ing] all photographs taken during these
entries.”
¶ 16 At trial, Westbrook and Engdahl testified about their
interactions with N.M. and the condition of the house. The jury
found Stone guilty on all counts.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
¶ 17 “Review of a trial court’s suppression order presents ‘a mixed
question of law and fact.’” People v. Peluso, 2021 CO 16, ¶ 10, ___
P.3d ___, ___ (quoting People v. Allen, 2019 CO 88, ¶ 13, 450 P.3d
724, 728). We review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo and
defer to the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
competent evidence in the record. Id.
¶ 18 If we conclude that the trial court erred, we next determine
whether the error is of constitutional dimension. The admission of
evidence in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights is a
constitutional error. See People v. Summitt, 132 P.3d 320, 323
(Colo. 2006). We must reverse if the trial court made a
constitutional error unless “the evidence properly received against a
defendant is so overwhelming that the constitutional violation was
6 harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bartley v. People, 817 P.2d
1029, 1034 (Colo. 1991).
B. Westbrook’s Entry and Re-Entry into the House
¶ 19 Stone first contends that the trial court erred by admitting
Westbrook’s testimony about the clutter in the house and the
photographs she took during her initial entry and re-entry into the
house. Before we address this argument on the merits, however, we
turn to the parties’ disagreement regarding the specific photographs
that the court held were inadmissible in its ruling on Stone’s
suppression motion.
1. The Photographs of the House
¶ 20 Stone argues that, at trial, the court erred by allowing the
prosecutor to admit into evidence photographs that the court had
ruled in its suppression order were inadmissible.
a. The Pre-Trial Colloquy
¶ 21 On the first day of trial, the prosecutor asked the court to
clarify its earlier ruling regarding the admissibility of photographs
taken during the search. Although Westbrook did not say at the
suppression hearing that she had taken any photographs inside the
house other than the photographs of the knife, the prosecutor told
7 the court on the morning of trial that, during her initial entry and
re-entry, Westbrook had also used her cell phone to take
photographs of the interior of the house. The prosecutor said that
any photographs Westbrook took of the interior of the house were
similar to the photographs that Cooke took inside the house.
¶ 22 Based on the prosecutor’s representation that Westbrook had
taken photographs depicting the interior of the house, defense
counsel did not object to the admission of the photographs. But the
court nonetheless noted that Westbrook had not testified that she
photographed the interior of the house. The court said to the
prosecutor, “I heard [Westbrook] just as you heard her on the
stand. I didn’t get my camera. I took a photograph of the knife.”
The court said, “Maybe it was [Westbrook] just didn’t explain it.”
The prosecutor responded, “I think I did not explain that correctly.”
¶ 23 At trial, the court admitted photographs of the inside of the
house, as well as photographs of the knife.
b. The Trial Court Erred by Admitting the Photographs of the Interior of the House
¶ 24 The transcript of the suppression hearing supports the court’s
original understanding that, while in the house, Westbrook
8 photographed the knife but not the interior of the house. At the
hearing, Westbrook acknowledged that “the only photograph [I] took
on the first entry was the knife.” She did not mention taking any
additional photographs after re-entering the house. Rather, at the
suppression hearing, Cooke was the only witness who said she had
taken photographs depicting the interior of the house — and the
court later ruled that Cooke had entered the house unlawfully.
¶ 25 The prosecutor’s “clarification” on the first day of trial that
Westbrook, in fact, photographed the interior of the house was not
evidence, and thus the trial court erred by treating it as such. See
Quest Servs. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071, 1088 n.10 (Colo. 2011).
This is especially true because the prosecutor’s “clarification”
contradicted Westbrook’s testimony at the suppression hearing that
the only photographs she took during her first entry into the house
depicted the knife.
¶ 26 Further, the prosecutor contended that the photographs of the
interior of the house were “similar” to photographs that Westbrook
allegedly took — even though, at the suppression hearing,
Westbrook never said she photographed the interior of the house.
Moreover, the prosecutor did not establish at trial who took the
9 photographs of the interior of the house or, more generally, that
Westbrook’s alleged photographs of the interior of the house
actually existed. Thus, based on the evidence presented at the
hearing, we understand that Cooke took the photographs of the
interior of the house that were admitted into evidence
¶ 27 We hold that the trial court erred by admitting the
photographs of the interior of the house because the prosecutor did
not introduce evidence establishing that Westbrook took any such
photographs; Westbrook testified at the suppression hearing that,
while in the house, she only photographed the knife; Cooke,
however, said that she took photographs inside the house; and the
trial court ruled that Cooke entered the house illegally.
c. Even Though the Trial Court Erred by Admitting the Photographs of the Interior of the House, the Error Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
¶ 28 Because we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting
photographs obtained in violation of Stone’s Fourth Amendment
rights, we must determine whether the admission of the
photographs was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Bartley,
817 P.2d at 1034.
10 ¶ 29 When determining whether a constitutional error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, we should consider “(1) the importance
of the [erroneously admitted] evidence to the [prosecution’s] case;
(2) whether the evidence is cumulative; and (3) the overall strength
of the [prosecution’s] case.” People v. Omwanda, 2014 COA 128, ¶
32, 338 P.3d 1145, 1150. The “inquiry is whether the jury’s guilty
verdict in this ‘trial was surely unattributable to the error.’” Id.
(quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)).
¶ 30 Here, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the improperly admitted photographs of the interior of the
house were cumulative of Westbrook’s testimony regarding her
observations inside the house, which, as discussed below, infra Part
II.B.2, was admissible.
¶ 31 At trial, Westbrook testified that the photographs depicting the
interior of the house were consistent with her own observations.
She testified that the house “was very cluttered[,] . . . dirty[,] . . .
[and] unsafe.” She noted that the house was unsafe because she
observed piles of things that could fall on a child; a very young child
almost falling over a baby gate and tripping over items scattered on
11 the floor; and “old dishes and food and . . . everything around [that]
just was . . . a hazard to a small child.”
¶ 32 The photographs of the interior of the house that the court
admitted into evidence were cumulative because they did not add
anything material to Westbrook’s description of the cluttered and
hazardous conditions she saw in the house. See People v. Espinoza,
989 P.2d 178, 182 (Colo. App. 1999). Because the photographs
were cumulative of Westbrook’s testimony, the trial court’s error in
admitting them could not have contributed to the jury’s verdict and
was therefore constitutional harmless error. See Griego v. People,
19 P.3d 1, 8 (Colo. 2001); Omwanda, ¶ 32, 338 P.3d at 1150.
2. The Photographs of the Knife and Westbrook’s Trial Testimony
¶ 33 We next turn to Stone’s argument that the trial court erred by
admitting the photographs Westbrook took of the knife and her trial
testimony regarding her observations of the interior of the house.
Stone contends that the court should have excluded this evidence
because Westbrook violated Stone’s Fourth Amendment rights when
she entered the house without Stone’s consent.
¶ 34 The trial court concluded that N.M. “knowingly, voluntarily[,]
and intelligently consented” to Westbrook’s entry, and that N.M.’s
12 consent encompassed both Westbrook’s initial entry and her re-
entry after stepping outside the house to retrieve the camera from
her car. Stone contends that this conclusion was in error because
(1) N.M., as a minor at the time, lacked the authority to consent to a
law enforcement officer’s entry into the house; and (2) even if N.M.
had the authority to consent to Westbrook’s initial entry, his
consent did not extend to Westbrook’s re-entry into the house. We
are not persuaded.
a. The Consent Exception to the Warrant Requirement
i. Valid Consent
¶ 35 A warrantless entry into a person’s home is presumptively
unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. People v. Stock, 2017
CO 80, ¶ 15, 397 P.3d 386, 390. The prosecution carries “the
burden of establishing that [a] warrantless search is . . . justified
under one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant
requirement.” People v. Fuerst, 2013 CO 28, ¶ 11, 302 P.3d 253,
256 (quoting People v. Winpigler, 8 P.3d 439, 443 (Colo. 1999)).
¶ 36 One exception to the warrant requirement is “[a] search
conducted pursuant to consent freely and voluntarily given by a
13 person with ‘common authority’ over the [searched] premises.”
People v. Strimple, 2012 CO 1, ¶ 20, 267 P.3d 1219, 1223. Consent
is voluntary if it is “the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker.” People v. Berdahl, 2019 CO
29, ¶ 20, 440 P.3d 437, 442 (quoting People v. Munoz-Gutierrez,
2015 CO 9, ¶ 16, 342 P.3d 439, 444). “Conversely, a consensual
search is involuntary when police overbear the consenting party’s
will and critically impair the party’s ‘capacity for
self-determination.’” Munoz-Gutierrez, ¶ 17, 342 P.3d at 444
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)).
¶ 37 When determining whether a person voluntarily consented to a
law enforcement officer’s entry into a residence, “courts must apply
an objective test that takes into account the totality of the
circumstances and determines whether the defendant could
reasonably have construed the police conduct to be coercive.”
Berdahl, ¶ 23, 440 P.3d at 442. A consenting person’s youth is a
factor in determining the voluntariness of the person’s consent.
United States v. Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th
Cir. 1998). However, the fact that the person giving consent is a
minor does not necessarily preclude effective consent and is only
14 one factor within the totality of the circumstances a court must
consider when determining whether the consent was voluntary.
Blincoe v. People, 178 Colo. 34, 37, 494 P.2d 1285, 1286 (1972); see
United States v. Sanchez, 608 F.3d 685, 690 (10th Cir. 2010).
Other relevant factors include the consenting person’s education,
intelligence, and state of mind, and whether the person was aware
that he or she was free to withhold consent. Berdahl, ¶ 23, 440
P.3d at 442.
ii. Consent by a Co-Occupant
¶ 38 In certain circumstances, a co-occupant can validly consent to
a search of the residence even though the law enforcement officers
are investigating a different co-occupant. Co-occupants “have
common authority [to consent to a search] where there is ‘mutual
use of the property by persons generally having joint access [to] or
control [of the residence] for most purposes.’” Peluso, ¶ 13, ___ P.3d
at ___ (quoting United States. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7
(1974)). If one co-occupant is not present during the search, “the
consent of one who possesses common authority over [the] premises
. . . is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom
15 that authority is shared.” Fuerst, ¶ 12, 302 P.3d at 256 (quoting
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170).
¶ 39 Even where the co-occupant lacks actual authority to consent
to a search, he or she may still possess apparent authority to
validate the search. Under the apparent authority doctrine, “[a]
warrantless search is . . . valid based upon the consent of a third
party whom officers, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to
possess common authority over the premises, even if the person in
fact does not [possess such authority].” Peluso, ¶ 14, ___ P.3d at
___. The apparent authority doctrine applies only when the
consenting party lacked actual authority. Petersen v. People, 939
P.2d 824, 830-31 (Colo. 1997).
¶ 40 When officers seek consent to search a jointly occupied
residence, “a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of
consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the
consent of a fellow occupant.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103,
122-23 (2006). In order to vitiate a co-occupant’s consent, “(1) the
objecting occupant must have been physically present on the
premises as officers ‘propose[d] to make a consent search’; and (2)
the objecting occupant must have objected as officers ‘propose[d] to
16 make a consent search.’” Williams v. People, 2019 CO 108, ¶ 35,
455 P.3d 347, 354 (quoting Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292,
306 (2014)). “[I]f the objecting resident does not take part in the
threshold colloquy between the officers and his co-occupant, he
‘loses out,’” and the co-occupant’s consent will validate the search.
Id. at ¶ 1, 455 P.3d at 348 (quoting Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121).
b. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Finding that N.M. Validly Consented to Westbrook’s Entry into the House
¶ 41 Stone contends that N.M. “had no legal authority over the
residence to give constitutionally valid third-party consent” because
he was a minor at the time and Westbrook did not “reasonably
inquire” regarding his authority. Stone also contends that, after
being told that Stone was on her way to the house, Westbrook had
a duty to wait for Stone to arrive and to ask her for permission to
enter the house. Finally, Stone argues that Westbrook exceeded
any consent N.M. gave her when she re-entered the house. We
consider and reject each of these contentions.
i. N.M. Voluntarily Consented to Westbrook’s Entry
¶ 42 As noted, “the fact that one is a minor does not necessarily
preclude effective consent . . . .” Blincoe, 178 Colo. at 37, 494 P.2d
17 at 1286. Rather, age is one factor within the totality of the
circumstances that a court can consider when determining whether
a person voluntarily consented to a search. Sanchez, 608 F.3d at
690; Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d at 1231. At seventeen, N.M.
was nearly a legal adult. Stone does not argue that he was
impaired intellectually or in such a state of mind that he could not
understand what Westbrook was asking. Moreover, Stone does not
contend that Westbrook coerced N.M. into letting her into the
house. N.M. knew Westbrook was a police officer because she
identified herself as such and wore a uniform. See Sanchez, 608
F.3d at 690. For these reasons, we conclude that N.M. voluntarily
gave Westbrook consent to enter the house.
ii. N.M. Had Actual Authority to Consent to Westbrook’s Entry
¶ 43 We agree with the trial court that N.M. had actual authority to
consent to Westbrook’s entry. The record shows, and Stone does
not deny, that N.M. resided in the house and had “joint access [to]
or control [of it] for most purposes.” Peluso, ¶ 13, ___ P.3d at ___
(quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7). Very simply, the house was
N.M.’s home. Thus, N.M., as a co-occupant, had actual authority to
consent to Westbrook’s entry into the house. See id. (“Where a
18 residence is jointly occupied by more than one person, the consent
of one occupant with common authority over the premises is
sufficient to permit a warrantless search.”).
¶ 44 Because N.M. had actual authority to consent to Westbrook’s
entry into the house, Stone’s reliance on Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177 (1990), in support of her contention that Westbrook had a
duty to reasonably inquire regarding N.M.’s authority, is misplaced.
Rodriguez addressed an individual’s apparent authority to consent
to a law enforcement officer’s entry into a residence. Because
actual authority and apparent authority are mutually exclusive,
and N.M. had actual authority to consent to Westbrook’s entry for
the reasons explained above, the apparent authority doctrine does
not apply here. See Petersen, 939 P.2d at 831.
¶ 45 Westbrook also was not required to wait for Stone to arrive
and to ask her for consent to enter the house. Where a potentially
objecting co-occupant is “nearby but not invited to take part in the
threshold colloquy” regarding consent to search the premises, the
potentially objecting co-occupant “loses out” and the present co-
occupant’s consent to the search controls. Williams, ¶¶ 24, 35, 455
P.3d at 352, 354 (quoting Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121). Although at
19 the time of Westbrook’s initial entry into the house, Westbrook
knew that Stone would soon be arriving at the house, Stone was not
present and therefore could not object to the entry. Stone cites to
no authority suggesting that police officers are required to obtain
the consent of an absent co-occupant where another co-occupant
with actual authority has already given valid consent to entry.
iii. N.M.’s Initial Consent Extended to Westbrook’s Re-Entry
¶ 46 We next address Stone’s contention that Westbrook’s re-entry
into the house exceeded the scope of N.M.’s consent to her initial
entry. Stone suggests that Westbrook, “after observing the
condition [of the house] on the first entry, [was required] to secure a
search warrant” before she could legally re-enter the house. We
disagree.
¶ 47 Absent an objection to “subsequent, closely related entries and
searches, after valid consent to an initial entry,” the consenting
person’s “initial consent [can] extend[] to the subsequent entries.”
Phillips v. State, 625 P.2d 816, 818 (Alaska 1980). “[W]hile one
consensual entry does not entitle a law enforcement official to
return at any substantially later time, an officer’s momentary
exit . . . does not invalidate” an otherwise legal search or seizure.
20 Commonwealth v. Moye, 586 A.2d 406, 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
Thus, for consent to encompass a subsequent re-entry, the entry
and re-entry must be closely related in time and purpose. See
People v. Franklin, 2016 IL App (1st) 140059, ¶ 17, 62 N.E.3d 1145,
1150 (The court observed that the officer “never abandoned his
investigation, relinquished control over the defendant’s house, or
indicated an intent not to seize [the contraband]. He only briefly
interrupted his search to call for backup” and to speak to the
prosecutor. (quoting People v. Logsdon, 567 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991))); cf. United States v. McMullin, 576 F.3d 810, 816
(8th Cir. 2009) (holding that consent to an initial entry does not
extend to a subsequent entry if the purpose of the initial entry has
been accomplished).
¶ 48 Westbrook had not completed her investigation when she
momentarily stepped out of the house to retrieve her camera. As
noted above, she wanted the camera so she could take more
accurate photographs than she could with her cell phone.
Westbrook’s time out of the house was so brief that she did not
reach her car before she decided to re-enter. Importantly, there is
21 no evidence that N.M. revoked his consent or otherwise objected to
Westbrook’s re-entry into the house.
¶ 49 Based on this record, we conclude that N.M.’s consent to
Westbrook’s initial entry extended to her re-entry into the house.
See Phillips, 625 P.2d at 818; Franklin, ¶ 17, 62 N.E.3d at 1150;
Moye, 586 A.2d at 409. Because N.M. did not revoke his consent or
object to Westbrook’s re-entry, Westbrook was not required to ask
N.M. for consent to re-enter the house. See Phillips, 625 P.2d at
818.
¶ 50 For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err
by finding that Westbrook’s re-entry was lawful because it fell
within the scope of the consent N.M. gave her when she first
knocked on the door.
C. Stone’s Challenge to Engdahl’s and Bogle’s Testimony at Trial
¶ 51 Stone also appears to challenge the admissibility of Engdahl’s
trial testimony based on her contention that he entered the house
illegally. But she does not provide any citations to the record or
legal authority in support of her argument regarding Engdahl’s
testimony.
22 ¶ 52 For these reasons, Stone’s argument is undeveloped, and we
do not address it on the merits. See People v. Liggett, 2021 COA 51,
¶ 53, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (acknowledging that appellate courts do not
address undeveloped arguments).
¶ 53 But even if the argument were developed, because Engdahl’s
trial testimony regarding the interior conditions of the house was
cumulative of Westbrook’s testimony, Engdahl’s testimony could
not have contributed to the jury’s verdict. Thus, any error in the
admission of Engdahl’s testimony would have been harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Griego, 19 P.3d at 8; Omwanda,
¶ 32, 338 P.3d at 1150.
¶ 54 Finally, Stone also appears to challenge the legality of Bogle’s
entry into the house. But the trial court excluded Bogle’s testimony
regarding her observations of the interior of the house. Stone does
not point to any evidence admitted at trial regarding Bogle’s
observations of the condition of the house. Therefore, this issue is
moot.
III. Conclusion
¶ 55 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE DAVIDSON concur.