HOBBS, Justice.
We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals’ judgment in People v. Summitt, 104 P.3d 232 (Colo.App.2004), to determine whether it properly set aside convictions for second degree kidnapping,, second degree assault, and domestic violence. The court of appeals ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence surrounding defendant’s arrest, and admission of the evidence infringed unconstitutionally upon the exercise of defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.1
Taking into account proof before the jury, the circumstances of this case were that defendant seized the victim as she was entering her house, carried her off in his car, prevented her twice from escaping, pushed her from the moving car, repeatedly warned her not to tell third persons that he had pushed her out of the ear, and left the hospital where the victim was being treated after being told by the woman’s relatives to go home. The police arrested the defendant outside his home after they arrived, unsuccessfully sought consent from his mother to enter the home, learned that he was in the house by obtaining his driver’s license through the door, and told his mother that if defendant did not come out of the house they would wait until they had [322]*322obtained an arrest warrant and arrest him. He then came out and was placed under arrest.
The trial court ruled that the circumstances surrounding the arrest were relevant to show defendant’s consciousness of guilt as part of the defendant’s efforts to conceal his crime and avoid arrest; the trial court also instructed the jury that defendant had the constitutional right to remain in his home until the police had secured an arrest warrant.
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the circumstances of the arrest to show consciousness of guilt, because there was no evidence in the case that defendant was in flight and avoiding arrest. However, we disagree with the court of appeals that admission of this evidence burdened unconstitutionally the exercise of defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights; and we find that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling error was harmless and does not warrant reversal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case with directions to reinstate defendant’s convictions.
I.
Evidence before the jury of the circumstances giving rise to the arrest of Matthew Summitt (“Summitt”) included the following. After driving the victim home to her house from a bar late at night, Summitt became angry with her when she wanted the evening to end. Summitt knocked her down outside the house, slung her over his shoulders, carried her to his ear, and drove away. He drove the car into a ditch, causing a flat tire. The victim tried to escape twice while he tried to fix the flat. Both times Summitt forced her back into the car.
Unable to fix the flat, Summitt restarted the car and began driving at a high rate of speed. The victim opened the passenger side door looking for another opportunity to escape. Summitt pushed her out of the moving car.2 He then stopped, put her back in the car, and drove her back to her house, where she lived with an aunt and uncle. While at her house, Summitt warned the victim not to tell anyone he had pushed her out of the car.
The victim’s aunt and uncle drove her to the hospital. Sometime later, Summitt arrived at the hospital. While at the hospital, Summitt again warned the victim in the presence of the aunt not to tell anyone he had pushed her.3 The victim’s uncle told Sum-mitt at the hospital “there [was not] any reason for [Summitt] to be [at the hospital], and the best thing would be for [Summitt] to just go home.” The victim’s aunt also told Summitt to leave. When asked at trial why she had said this to him, she replied “[because he was going to be arrested.” Sum-mitt left the hospital before the police arrived and drove to his house, where he lived with his mother.
Upon arriving at the hospital, the police interviewed the victim and her aunt and uncle. From the interviews, the police determined Summitt’s address and sent a number of officers to that location. The police had an interchange with Summitt’s mother, obtained his driver’s license through a slit in a screen door, and, when they did not obtain her consent to enter the house, they said they would stay outside until an arrest warrant arrived and arrest him. Summitt then exited the house and submitted to arrest.
At trial, the prosecutor told the jury in opening statement that they should pay attention to the circumstances of Summitt’s arrest as important in fitting the pieces of the case together. During the prosecution’s case-in-chief, when Deputy Long began to testify regarding Summitt’s refusal to exit the house and his mother’s refusal to allow the police to enter, defense counsel objected, asserting that the testimony commented improperly on Summitt’s constitutional rights. The trial court sustained the objection, but allowed the officer’s testimony prior to the objection — which related to the eircum-[323]*323stances surrounding Summitt’s arrest — to be admitted as evidence of Summitt’s consciousness of guilt.
I think the question has gone as far as I’m going to allow it to go. I’ll sustain the objection, and I will make the comment that the defendant — I’m allowing this testimony to come in, as it relates to the defendant’s consciousness of guilt, and for no other matter. I will also advise the jury that the police, before they can enter anybody’s home, even for arrest of that person, are required, by law, to obtain ... an arrest warrant, and that a person is not required to allow a police officer into his or her home.
At the close of evidence, prior to bringing the jury into the courtroom and reading instructions, the trial court again clarified that Summitt had a right to remain in his home until the police obtained an arrest warrant, but that he did not have the right to avoid arrest.
I want to make a comment about an issue that came up yesterday. It involved the testimony regarding what occurred at the defendant’s home. There had been an objection raised to that, and the Court did give a curative instruction to the jury, an oral instruction to the jury. The court just wants to expand, I suppose, on the record. Although the defendant does have a right, pursuant to constitution, to be secure in his home, and that the police had no authority to go into his home to affect an arrest, even in this situation, absent a warrant, the defendant did not have a right to avoid arrest, and so therefore I believe that the testimony was, in fact, relevant, and not unduly prejudicial or inappropriately prejudicial to the Defendant.
During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the circumstances surrounding Summitt’s arrest as “hiding” and “huddling” in the house. The prosecution added the following comment on flight, avoidance of arrest, and consciousness of guilt:
(After leaving the hospital) where did he go? He ran, and hid, behind his mother’s doors, and he stayed there until the cops flushed him out. Is that the conduct of a guy that’s done nothing wrong, members of the jury? Or is that somebody huddled up inside, scared out of his wits, that finally the jig is up and he is going to be held responsible for what he has done? And I suggest to you it’s the latter.
The jury convicted Summitt of second degree kidnapping, second degree assault, and domestic violence. Summitt appealed these convictions to the court of appeals. He asserted, in part, that the evidence of his refusal of the police request to exit the house was not relevant to show consciousness of guilt. He also contended that admission of the evidence unconstitutionally implicated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court of appeals agreed with Summitt on both points. Applying constitutional harmless error analysis, it reversed the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial.
On appeal to us, the prosecution contends that the court of appeals erred in its constitutional holding and that this case more properly involves an evidentiary analysis. We agree on both of these points. However, in employing an evidentiary analysis, we conclude that the evidence surrounding the circumstances of Summitt’s arrest did not show that Summitt went to and remained in the house in the course of flight and avoiding arrest. Accordingly, admission of the evidence to show consciousness of guilt was an abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, the admission of the evidence did not unconstitutionally infringe upon or burden Summitt’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the eviden-tiary ruling error was harmless.
II.
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the circumstances of the arrest to show consciousness of guilt, because there was no evidence in the case that defendant was in flight and concealing himself to avoid arrest. However, we disagree with the court of appeals that admission of this evidence burdened unconstitutionally the exercise of defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights; and we find that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling' error was harmless and does not warrant reversal.
[324]*324A.
Standard of Review
A reviewing court may not reverse a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Welsh, 80 P.3d 296, 304 (Colo.2003). To overcome this presumption in favor of the trial court’s ruling, the appellant must demonstrate the decision was “manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” Id.
B.
Evidence of Concealment, Flight, and Avoidance of Arrest to Show Consciousness of Guilt
Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” CRE 401. If the evidence is logically relevant to a consequential fact, the court must then determine whether, under CRE 403, the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v. Carlson, 712 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Colo.1986). In reaching its decision, the trial court must determine whether and how the evidence at issue is relevant to the case and, if so, to what extent its probative value might be outweighed by any unfair prejudice to the defendant. Welsh, 80 P.3d at 304.
The test of relevancy is whether it renders the claimed inference more probable than it would be without the evidence. Bush v. Jackson, 191 Colo. 249, 251, 552 P.2d 509, 511 (1976). According to this test, it does not matter that other inferences may be equally probable; it is for the jury to determine what motivated the behavior. Id.
Evidence of flight and concealment to avoid arrest can be admissible to show consciousness of guilt, People v. Bates, 190 Colo. 291, 294, 546 P.2d 491, 493 (1976), “but only if it can be shown the defendant was aware he or she was being sought,” People v. Perry, 68 P.3d 472, 475 (Colo.App.2002) (internal citations omitted); see also Ortega v. People, 162 Colo. 358, 364, 426 P.2d 180, 183 (1967) (“[T]he defendant’s conduct at the time of arrest may properly be shown as a circumstance tending to show consciousness of guilt.”); 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C.Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 85, at 420 (1994) (“Proof that after the charged crime the accused acted in ways apparently calculated to avoid detection, arrest, prosecution, or conviction is often relevant in suggesting a guilty mind.”). Flight means a deliberate attempt to avoid detection and arrest. People v. Morant, 179 Colo. 287, 292, 499 P.2d 1173, 1176 (1972); Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 415, 444 P.2d 267, 270 (1968).
Such evidence can be relevant because “[f]rom a guilty mind, guilt itself may be inferred.” 1 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, § 85, at 420 (going on to discuss the circumstantial nature of such evidence, its dependence on inferences, and cautioning against its potential misuse). Although admissible, such evidence is “universally considered to be insufficient, standing alone, to support a conviction.” Id. at 421-22 (flight evidence is insufficient, standing alone, to support a conviction); see also Bernard v. People, 124 Colo. 424, 426, 238 P.2d 852, 853 (1951) (holding evidence of escape and flight “is admissible, not in proof of the crime itself, but in corroboration of other evidence thereof’); see also United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir.2000) (in a mail fraud case, distinguishing between use of false exculpatory statements “to prove circumstantially consciousness of guilt [rather than] as direct evidence of guilt”).
C.
Application to this Case
The court of appeals ruled that the evidence the trial court admitted regarding the circumstances of Summitt’s arrest was not relevant to Summitt’s consciousness of guilt. Summitt, 104 P.3d at 236. We agree that the trial court’s admission of the circumstances of the arrest to show consciousness of guilt was error, because this proffered evidence did not show that Summitt was in flight or was concealing himself to avoid ar[325]*325rest. At best, this evidence only showed that Summitt did not come out of the house while his mother was talking to the police about their request to enter without a warrant. They knew he was in the house because they obtained his driver’s license through the door and saw him through a window. Remaining in a house while the police are attempting to gain consent to enter is not evidence of concealment and avoidance of arrest.
While the record contains evidence that Summitt told the victim not to say he pushed her from the car, it lacks proof of flight and concealment to avoid arrest. The victim testified that Summitt pushed her out of the ear and repeatedly warned her in route to her house and at the hospital not to tell anyone he had pushed her from the car. The victim’s aunt testified that Summitt, at the hospital, told the victim not to tell anyone about the circumstances of her injury.
Although the trial court allowed the jury to find that Summitt was avoiding arrest, the evidence on this point was lacking. Rather, the evidence showed that Summitt left the hospital and went home after the victim’s aunt and uncle urged him to leave. The uncle’s testimony says nothing about telling Summitt the police were on the way and he would be arrested if he did not leave; rather, the uncle simply said to him there was no reason for him to be at the hospital and he should go home. The aunt’s testimony was that she also told Summitt to go home; while she testified that her motivation for saying this was he would be arrested at the hospital, there was no testimony that she told him the police were on the way and he would be arrested if he did not leave.
(Prosecutor)
Q. All right. At the emergency room, did Mr. Summitt show up?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did you ever tell him to leave?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Why did you tell him to leave?
A. Because he was going to be arrested.
⅜ ⅝ ⅜
(Defense Attorney)
Q. Do you remember, telling her, that at some point Matt did ask are you okay?
A. When — when Matt walked into the room, he says something went up to (the victim), and said up to her ear, and I kept telling him, you have got to go, you have got to go, because I knew the cops were coming. Did I actually hear him say, are you okay, no, I did not.
This evidence suggests only that the victim’s aunt was thinking the police might be coming, not that she actually conveyed such a thought to him or that they were actually on their way to arrest him. Our cases describe flight as a deliberate attempt to avoid detection and arrest. See Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 415, 444 P.2d 267, 270 (1968). Here, the evidence showed only that Sum-mitt left the hospital and went back to his house after the uncle and the aunt told him to leave.
Likewise, the police officers’ testimony concerning the circumstances of the arrest at Summitt’s home shows only that Summitt did not come out of the house during the time they were asking his mother for consent to enter the house. Summitt was not avoiding detection because he produced his driver’s license through the door, and the police saw him looking through a window of the house. After she refused consent to enter, the police then explained they had the house surrounded and would stay while they obtained a warrant for his arrest. Summitt then came out of the house.
The trial court did not explain its rationale for allowing admission of the circumstances surrounding Summitt’s arrest, other than to say he was allowing it for the purpose of showing consciousness of guilt. However, up to that point in the testimony at trial, there was no foundation in the evidence to show that Summitt was in flight and concealing himself to avoid detection and arrest. The police did not initially make the mother aware they were there to arrest Summitt; they said this only after being refused consent to enter.
Under these circumstances, the evidence that Summitt was remaining in his house while his mother talked to the police at the door seeking consent to enter lacked probative value on the issue of flight and conceal[326]*326ment to avoid arrest. Our cases require proof that defendant fled and was concealing himself to avoid apprehension. See People v. Fletcher, 193 Colo. 314, 318, 566 P.2d 345, 348 (1977) (stating that giving a flight instruction is not error when there is proof that defendant fled or concealed himself for any length of time to frustrate his apprehension); Robinson v. People, 114 Colo. 381, 386, 165 P.2d 763, 765 (1946); see 1 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, § 85, at 422-23 (resolving whether behavior indicates flight “turns heavily on other circumstances (like the awareness of the accused that he was being sought in connection with the crime)”).
We conclude that the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling; contrary to its ruling, the fact that Summitt remained in the house while the police talked to his mother about obtaining consent to enter was not relevant to show his consciousness of guilt. We now turn to the court of appeals’ constitutional holding, before taking up the harmless error question.
D.
Summitt’s Fourth Amendment Rights
The court of appeals held that admission of the evidence surrounding Summitt’s arrest “place[d] the defendant on the horns of a dilemma: either abandon his right to privacy by leaving a constitutionally protected area and surrendering to what may be an unlawful arrest or refuse to surrender and thereby create evidence of self-accusation.” Summitt, 104 P.3d at 236. The court of appeals reasoned that Summitt was not avoiding detection and arrest because he provided his license to the police and did not attempt to surreptitiously leave the house after the police arrived. While we agree with the court of appeals on this point, we disagree that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling violated Summitt’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Contrary to the analysis of the court of appeals and the arguments of the defendant, this case does not raise a Fourth Amendment issue because (1) the police never entered Summitt’s home and (2) the record does not show that he was standing on his right to have the police obtain an arrest warrant. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Sum-mitt voluntarily exited his home after the police told his mother they were in the process of obtaining an arrest warrant.
Summitt analogizes his constitutional claim to the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). In Griffin, the Court held that a state could not make adverse inferences on the defendant’s refusal to testify under the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on requiring a defendant to incriminate himself. 380 U.S. at 614-15, 85 S.Ct. 1229. The state’s negative comments on the defendant’s failure to testify in that case violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229.
Expanding on this, in Doyle, the United States Supreme Court held that using a defendant’s silence for impeachment purposes after he received the Miranda warnings violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 426 U.S. at 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240. The Court reasoned that an accused’s silence after receiving Miranda warnings could mean nothing more than the individual’s decision to exercise those rights. Id. at 617, 96 S.Ct. 2240. The Court also noted that, while Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that an accused’s choice to remain silent will not carry a penalty, this promise is implicit in those warnings; thus, using defendant’s silence to impeach at trial his or her explanation of the events was fundamentally unfair. Id. at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240.
From this precedent, Summitt argues that Griffin and Doyle prohibit the prosecution from using evidence surrounding a defendant’s exercise of a constitutional right as evidence of guilt because it would penalize exercise of that right — in this case, Sum-mitt’s Fourth Amendment right to insist on an arrest warrant while in the privacy of his own home. See McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397, 401 (Colo.1981) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)).
[327]*327But, to raise such a claim, Summitt would have to show that he was insisting on the police obtaining an arrest warrant and remained in his home until they had one. To the contrary, the evidence in this case was that he voluntarily exited the house when the police told his mother that they would wait there until they obtained an arrest warrant.
Thus, the record here is devoid of police non-consensual entry into Summitt’s home, or that his remaining in the home for a time while the police were negotiating for entry, or for him to come out, was in any way connected to his interest in requiring the police to obtain an arrest warrant. In light of the record, the court of appeals erred in finding a violation of Summitt’s Fourth Amendment rights.
E.
Harmless Error
Even when a trial court may have abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence, reversal is not required if the error was harmless under the circumstances. People v. Bastardo, 191 Colo. 521, 526, 554 P.2d 297, 301-02 (1976). In regard to evidentiary trial error, harmless error analysis requires an inquiry into whether, viewing the evidence as a whole, the contested evidence substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings. Medina v. People, 114 P.3d 845, 858 (Colo.2005); People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605, 612 (Colo.1983). Only error that affects the “substantial rights” of the defendant may warrant reversal. C.A.R. 35(e); People v. Welsh, 80 P.3d 296, 310 (Colo.2003).
An error in a criminal trial will be disregarded if there is not a reasonable possibility that it contributed to the jury’s guilty verdict. Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338, 342 (Colo.1986). If properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly shows guilt, the error is harmless. See id.
Reviewing the evidence as a whole, we find uncontroverted testimony proving Summitt’s guilt on the kidnap, assault, and domestic abuse charges for which the jury convicted him. He abused the victim verbally, calling her “a whore” when she wanted to end the evening; pushed her to the ground outside her home; seized her; carried her to his car; prevented her twice from escaping; pushed her out of the car while speeding away, causing her serious injury; and repeatedly attempted to bully her into not telling her story of the crimes.
Seven witnesses testified during the trial: the victim, the doctor who treated the victim, two police officers involved in the investigation, the victim’s aunt and uncle, and an investigator hired by Summitt’s attorney. The victim testified in great detail regarding the events of the evening, and specifically testified that Summitt pushed her from the car.
Of the remaining six witnesses, three testified, without objection, that the victim separately told each of them Summitt pushed her from the ear. First, the doctor who examined the victim after the accident testified that the victim told him that Summitt pushed her from the car. The police officer who interviewed the victim at the hospital also corroborated this fact. The officer testified that, during his interview of the victim at the hospital, the victim told him that Summitt pushed her from the car. Finally, the victim’s aunt, a defense witness, testified that the victim told her that Summitt pushed her from the ear.
Given the overwhelming proof in the record that Summitt committed the crimes for which the jury convicted him, we conclude the trial court’s evidentiary error was harmless and did not substantially influence the verdict or affect the fairness of the trial proceedings.
Although the prosecution’s closing argument contained comment on the circumstances of the arrest to show consciousness of guilt, we do not consider this to be grounds for setting aside Summitt’s convictions. First, the defense did not object to the argument. Second, even if no defense objection need have been made in light of the trial court’s admission of the circumstances of arrest, see Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 833, 841 (Colo.2000), the trial court also instructed the jury that Summitt had the right to remain in the house until the police obtained an [328]*328arrest warrant. In light of this instruction, it is logical and permissible to conclude that the jury followed the instruction, see Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283, 1288 (Colo.2000), and that (1) the jury gave little or no weight to the circumstances of the arrest in finding Summitt guilty and (2) admission of the circumstances of arrest and the prosecutor’s comment were not so prejudicial as to require reversal.
III.
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand this case to it with directions to reinstate Summitt’s convictions.
MARTINEZ, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment.
COATS, J., concurring in part and in the judgment.
EID, J., does not participate.