23CA1404 & 23CA2199 Estate of Gallegos 12-12-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals Nos. 23CA1404 & 23CA2199 City and County of Denver Probate Court No. 20PR420 Honorable Elizabeth D. Leith, Judge
In the Matter of the Estate of Joseph T. Gallegos, deceased.
Joanne Cdebaca, as Personal Representative, Heir and Beneficiary,
Appellant,
v.
Richard Gallegos,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, ORDER VACATED, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Freyre and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 12, 2024
Pat Mellen Law, LLC, Patricia Ann Mellen, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
Jonathan S. Willett, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this probate proceeding concerning the estate of Joseph T.
Gallegos (decedent), Joanne Cdebaca1 appeals orders and the
judgment from the probate court concerning her dispute with
Richard Gallegos (Gallegos) over the administration of decedent’s
estate. We affirm the judgment in part and reverse the judgment in
part, vacate one order entered by the probate court, and remand
the case with directions.
I. Background
¶2 We draw the following factual background from the record
before us.2
¶3 Decedent died in October 2020 and was survived by multiple
children. Decedent’s children included Cdebaca, Vogel, and
Gallegos. Disputes over decedent’s estate arose following his death,
with Cdebaca and Vogel at odds with Gallegos over who was entitled
1 Lisa Vogel is listed on the caption page of the opening brief but
was later dismissed from this appeal. Only Gallegos and Cdebaca (in both her role as personal representative of decedent’s estate and her individual capacity as heir and beneficiary of decedent’s estate) remain parties to this appeal. 2 Transcripts from three hearings are missing due to a malfunction
with the probate court’s FTR system.
1 to various assets of the estate. Those disputes were based in part
on wills and deeds executed by decedent shortly before his death.
¶4 In October 2020, after decedent’s death, Cdebaca initiated the
Denver probate proceedings that are now before us on appeal. The
probate court in those proceedings appointed Cdebaca as the
personal representative (PR) of decedent’s estate.
¶5 In April 2021, despite the ongoing probate proceedings in
Denver, Cdebaca and Vogel initiated a separate action in Jefferson
County seeking to quiet title to two parcels of real property owned
by decedent during his lifetime. In that action, Cdebaca and Vogel
alleged that two quitclaim deeds executed by decedent before his
death were fraudulent. The first deed purported to transfer
ownership of real property on Federal Boulevard in Denver (the
Federal property) exclusively to Gallegos. The second deed
purported to transfer ownership of real property located on Shirley
Place in Lakewood (the Shirley property) to Gallegos and Cdebaca
as tenants in common, with each owning a 50% interest. The
Jefferson County District Court transferred the quiet title action to
Denver for its resolution with all other probate matters concerning
decedent’s estate.
2 ¶6 As relevant to the issues before us, the Denver probate court
held several hearings during which it heard evidence concerning
(1) the disposition of Broncos Towing LLC (Broncos Towing), a
business owned and operated by decedent during his lifetime,
which Cdebaca alleged was part of the estate, and (2) the quitclaim
deeds that purported to transfer the Federal property to Gallegos
and the Shirley property to Gallegos and Cdebaca as tenants in
common.
¶7 After the hearings concerning Broncos Towing, the probate
court found that the business was not part of the estate because
decedent had transferred it to Gallegos before his death. Thus,
Broncos Towing “belong[ed] in totality to Richard Gallegos.”
¶8 Partway through the hearings concerning the disputed parcels
of real property, Cdebaca and Vogel withdrew their quiet title
claims. As a result, the court ruled that Gallegos exclusively owned
the Federal property and Gallegos and Cdebaca each owned a 50%
interest in the Shirley property as tenants in common.
¶9 Arguing that Cdebaca and Vogel had engaged in vexatious
litigation, Gallegos moved for attorney fees and damages. The
probate court granted that motion in May 2023. The following
3 month, the probate court denied Cdebaca and Vogel’s motion for
reconsideration.
¶ 10 In November 2023, the probate court granted a motion from
Gallegos to reform a July 2023 quitclaim deed in which he
mistakenly conveyed to Cdebaca half of his interest in the Shirley
property when he intended to convey his entire interest to three of
his other sisters.
¶ 11 Cdebaca now raises several challenges to the probate court’s
orders and judgment.
II. Broncos Towing
¶ 12 Cdebaca contends that the probate court erroneously resolved
the dispute surrounding Broncos Towing. Specifically, she argues
that the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address
this matter and that it relied on inadmissible evidence to determine
the existence and value of property belonging to the business. We
discern no error.
A. Additional Facts
¶ 13 As PR of decedent’s estate, Cdebaca included Broncos Towing
in the inventory of estate assets that she submitted to the probate
court. She alleged that Broncos Towing should be considered part
4 of the estate because “no sale or transfer of this business was ever
made,” as reflected by the fact that documents indicating Gallegos’s
ownership of the company “were filed 10 days AFTER decedent[’]s
death.” Cdebaca then filed a petition for the appointment of a
special administrator to operate and preserve Broncos Towing as an
estate asset.
¶ 14 The probate court held hearings to resolve the ownership
status of Broncos Towing. At the end of an August 2022 hearing, in
which Ray Baty, a former Broncos Towing employee, and Gallegos
testified at length about the company’s ownership, the probate
court determined that the business was not an estate asset but was
instead owned by Gallegos.
¶ 15 In addition to contesting ownership of Broncos Towing,
Gallegos sought damages arising from the sale and disposal by
Cdebaca and Vogel of Broncos Towing property previously located
in the backyard of a house belonging to decedent. Cdebaca and
Vogel claimed that they gave Gallegos prior notice of a garage sale
in which they sold some of this property and told him to “come and
take anything he wanted” beforehand. According to Cdebaca,
5 Gallegos attended the garage sale but did not take the property he
later claimed belonged to Broncos Towing.
¶ 16 Gallegos, meanwhile, presented evidence to establish exactly
what Broncos Towing property Cdebaca and Vogel sold or otherwise
discarded, as well as the value of that property. During the August
2022 hearing, Baty and Gallegos both testified extensively about
this property, listing and describing, among other things, specific
vehicles, a motor home, a snowmobile, scooters, trailers, wheel
changers, and an air compressor. At the end of this hearing, the
probate court determined that “the machinery and the vehicles and
the tools that were behind the decedent’s house and in the
neighboring yards belonged to [Broncos] Towing.”
¶ 17 The probate court then took written pleadings from both
parties to determine the value of the Broncos Towing property and
the damages to which Gallegos was entitled. Gallegos submitted
evidence that included a list of missing items, screenshots of Kelley
Blue Book listings and listings of items for sale in online
marketplaces that Gallegos contended were the same or comparable
to those items in the list he submitted, and Google Earth
screenshots of decedent’s house and yard that purportedly
6 displayed the property disposed of by Cdebaca and Vogel. In his
motion for damages, Gallegos estimated that the value of the
disposed-of Broncos Towing property was $30,002.74, which he
explained was, aside from a few exceptions, “50% of the comparable
items listed for sale.” Gallegos also requested treble damages for a
total judgment against Cdebaca of $90,008.22.
¶ 18 The probate court granted Gallegos’s motion but awarded him
only $20,000 in damages for “equipment and property” that was
“the property of Bronco[]s Towing” and was “sitting in the backyard
of [d]ecedent’s property and . . . disposed of by [Cdebaca and
Vogel].”
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
¶ 19 Cdebaca contends that once the probate court determined that
Broncos Towing was not an estate asset, it no longer had subject
matter jurisdiction to address any disputes about the company
during the probate proceedings.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 20 “Subject matter jurisdiction is ‘a court’s power to resolve a
dispute in which it renders judgment.’” In re Estate of Murphy, 195
P.3d 1147, 1150 (Colo. App. 2008) (quoting In re J.C.T., 176 P.3d
7 726, 729 (Colo. 2007)). “A court has subject matter jurisdiction if
the case is one of the type of cases that the court has been
empowered to entertain by the sovereign from which the court
derives its authority.” Id. (quoting Levine v. Katz, 167 P.3d 141,
144 (Colo. App. 2006)). We review jurisdiction de novo and, in
doing so, consider “the nature of the party’s claim and the relief
sought.” Id.
¶ 21 The probate court’s jurisdiction is defined by the Colorado
Constitution and state statutes. Article VI, section 9(3) of the
Colorado Constitution provides that the probate court has
“exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters of probate” in the City
and County of Denver. Section 15-10-302(1)-(2), C.R.S. 2024,
states that “[t]he court has jurisdiction over all subject matter
vested by article VI of the state constitution and by articles 1 to 10
of title 13, C.R.S.,” and “[t]he court has full power to make orders,
judgments, and decrees and take all other action necessary and
proper to administer justice in the matters which come before it.”
¶ 22 Section 13-9-103, C.R.S. 2024, defines the probate court’s
jurisdiction with more specificity. The court “has original and
exclusive jurisdiction in [Denver] of . . . [t]he administration,
8 settlement, and distribution of estates of decedents, wards, and
absentees.” § 13-9-103(1)(a). The court also “has jurisdiction to
determine every legal and equitable question arising in connection
with decedents’ . . . estates, so far as the question concerns any
person who is before the court by reason of any asserted right in
any of the property of the estate.” § 13-9-103(3) (emphasis added).
¶ 23 The statutory phrase “in connection with” has been
interpreted broadly as conferring jurisdiction on the probate court
over claims “logically relating to the estate.” Murphy, 195 P.3d at
1151 (“The commonly understood meaning of ‘in connection with’
contemplates a logical and contextual relationship or association
exhibiting ‘coherence’ or ‘continuity.’ . . . In other words, it means to
‘further, advance, promote, or share a continuity of purpose.’”)
(quoting People v. Baer, 973 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Colo. 1999))).
2. Analysis
¶ 24 As an initial matter, the parties dispute preservation of this
issue. A challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, however,
may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal.
See Herr v. People, 198 P.3d 108, 111 (Colo. 2008). And in any
event, the probate court addressed this argument, thereby
9 satisfying the objective of the preservation rule. See Berra v.
Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010)
(“[T]o preserve the issue for appeal all that was needed was that the
issue be brought to the attention of the trial court and that the
court be given an opportunity to rule on it.”).
¶ 25 Turning to the merits of Cdebaca’s argument, we conclude
that Gallegos’s pursuit of damages for the disposed-of Broncos
Towing property was “logically related to the estate.” Murphy, 195
P.3d at 1150-51. The property in question was stored in the yard of
one of decedent’s houses until his death. While Cdebaca was acting
as PR for decedent’s estate, she claimed Broncos Towing was an
estate asset, and she and Vogel sold or otherwise discarded the
company’s property while cleaning out decedent’s house and
managing decedent’s affairs following his death. It was only after
the probate court ruled that Broncos Towing belonged to Gallegos
that Cdebaca and Vogel began claiming that the probate court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address that issue.
Accordingly, because Gallegos’s claims were “logically related to the
estate” and, therefore, arose “in connection with” the estate, the
probate court had jurisdiction to resolve the questions of who
10 owned Broncos Towing and what damages were owed for its missing
property pursuant to section 13-9-103(3).
C. Evidence of Ownership and Value of Property
¶ 26 Cdebaca contends that the probate court relied on
inadmissible evidence when determining how to value the Broncos
Towing property. As best we can ascertain, she argues that the
Google Earth screenshots were irrelevant and were not properly
authenticated, and that the screenshots of Kelley Blue Book and
online marketplace listings were inadmissible hearsay.
¶ 27 We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Leaf
v. Beihoffer, 2014 COA 117, ¶ 9. A court abuses its discretion when
its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.
“Even when a trial court may have abused its discretion in
admitting certain evidence, reversal is not required if the error was
harmless under the circumstances.” People v. Summitt, 132 P.3d
320, 327 (Colo. 2006).
¶ 28 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
11 the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” CRE 401.
¶ 29 “Authentication is a condition precedent to admissibility of
physical evidence that is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the evidence in question is what its proponent
claims.” People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16, ¶ 12 (citing CRE 901(a)).
“The burden to authenticate ‘is not high — only a prima facie
showing is required,’ and ‘a district court’s role is to serve as a
gatekeeper in assessing whether the proponent has offered a
satisfactory foundation from which the jury could reasonably find
that the evidence is authentic.’” Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting United States v.
Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 133 (4th Cir. 2014)). CRE 602 prohibits a
witness from testifying to “a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of
the matter.” The “threshold for satisfying the personal-knowledge
requirement is not very high and may be inferable” from the “total
circumstances surrounding the matter.” Murray v. Just In Case
Bus. Lighthouse, LLC, 2016 CO 47M, ¶ 33 (citation omitted).
¶ 30 Although hearsay is not admissible, CRE 802, “[m]arket
quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published
12 compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by
persons in particular occupations” are not excluded by the hearsay
rule. CRE 803(17). This exception to the hearsay rule includes
online resources satisfying these criteria. See People v. Thornton,
251 P.3d 1147, 1149 (Colo. App. 2010) (“We hold that the Kelley
Blue Book may be admitted as proof of value under . . . CRE
803(17), without the need for expert testimony to substantiate the
Blue Book’s valuation.”).
¶ 31 Cdebaca takes issue with the probate court accepting
Gallegos’s “submission of undated unauthenticated Google [E]arth
photos” as evidence of the missing Broncos Towing property.
However, the probate court does not appear to have based its
conclusions about which property was missing on these images.
Rather, it seems the court credited the list of items that Gallegos
submitted, which appears to have come from Gallegos’s personal
knowledge of the missing property as demonstrated by his August
2022 testimony in which he described his familiarity with decedent,
Broncos Towing, and the property at issue.
13 ¶ 32 The nature and extent of Gallegos’s familiarity with this
property went to the weight the fact finder might give his testimony,
not to its admissibility. See Robinson v. People, 927 P.2d 381, 384
(Colo. 1996) (the witness’s degree of familiarity with the defendant
goes to the weight to be given to the witness’s identification of the
defendant, not the admissibility of such testimony). Because
neither the burden to authenticate evidence nor the threshold for
satisfying the personal-knowledge requirement are high, Glover,
¶ 13; Murray, ¶ 33, we see no error in the probate court’s decision
to credit Gallegos’s list of missing items informed by his personal
knowledge. Even if Cdebaca is correct that the probate court erred
in admitting the Google Earth screenshots because they were
irrelevant and unauthenticated, these errors were harmless and
therefore do not warrant reversal.
¶ 33 Cdebaca also sees error in the probate court’s decision to
“award[] damages of $20,000 for these alleged missing assets with
no substantiation for the costs assigned per item” and without
requiring Gallegos to “offer any expert valuation but rather submit[]
unauthenticated printouts of hearsay online information.” This
argument is likewise unavailing.
14 ¶ 34 “Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other
published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the
public or by persons in particular occupations” are not excluded by
the hearsay rule. CRE 803(17). And online resources satisfying
these criteria are not excluded; specifically, “the Kelley Blue Book
may be admitted as proof of value under . . . CRE 803(17), without
the need for expert testimony to substantiate the Blue Book’s
valuation.” Thornton, 251 P.3d at 1149. The screenshots of Kelley
Blue Book and online marketplace listings that Gallegos submitted
were thus not inadmissible hearsay and did not require
substantiation via expert testimony. The probate court’s decision to
award Gallegos $20,000 of the $90,008.22 that he requested, based
in part on the Kelley Blue Book and online marketplace listings,
was not erroneous.
¶ 35 As the record exists before us, we cannot say that the probate
court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.
III. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Deed Reformation
¶ 36 Cdebaca contends that the probate court erred by granting
Gallegos’s motion to reform his July 2023 quitclaim deed because it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this question. We agree.
15 A. Additional Facts
¶ 37 In July 2023 — two months after the probate court granted
Gallegos’s motion for attorney fees and damages and one month
after it denied Cdebaca and Vogel’s motion for reconsideration —
Gallegos executed a new quitclaim deed for the Shirley property. At
that time, following the court’s rulings in the previous months,
Gallegos and Cdebaca each had a 50% interest in the Shirley
property as tenants in common. Gallegos’s new quitclaim deed
conveyed half of his interest in the property to three other sisters of
his and conveyed the remaining half of his interest to Cdebaca.
¶ 38 Two months later, Gallegos filed a motion with the probate
court seeking to reform that quitclaim deed. Gallegos explained in
his motion that he had mistakenly included Cdebaca in the
conveyance and had instead intended to transfer his entire interest
in the Shirley property to his three sisters. In November 2023, the
probate court granted Gallegos’s motion, finding that (1) the Shirley
property “is related to the [e]state of [decedent] and is statutorily
within the ambit of this [c]ourt’s jurisdiction”; and (2) “providing a
75% ownership interest in the Shirley [p]roperty to [Cdebaca] is not
16 as the [d]ecedent intended and is not as . . . Gallegos intended and
would unjustly enrich [Cdebaca].”
B. Analysis
¶ 39 As detailed above, we review subject matter jurisdiction de
novo. Murphy, 195 P.3d at 1150. The probate court “has
jurisdiction to determine every legal and equitable question arising
in connection with decedents’ . . . estates, so far as the question
concerns any person who is before the court by reason of any
asserted right in any of the property of the estate.” § 13-9-103(3).
This includes jurisdiction over claims “logically related to the
estate.” Murphy, 195 P.3d at 1151.
¶ 40 Cdebaca alleges that, when granting Gallegos’s motion, the
probate court “asserted indefinite jurisdiction” over the assets of
decedent’s estate, and “stated it retained perpetual jurisdiction to
resolve essentially any disputes regarding the Shirley . . . property.”
Cdebaca cites nothing, and we can locate nothing, in the record to
support this characterization of the probate court’s actions. That
said, we do agree that the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction
when it granted Gallegos’s motion to reform the July 2023 quitclaim
deed.
17 ¶ 41 The probate court had jurisdiction to determine all legal and
equitable questions stemming from decedent’s estate and all claims
logically related to his estate. It exercised this jurisdiction when
adjudicating the competing claims to decedent’s assets between
Gallegos and Cdebaca and Vogel, culminating in the court’s May
2023 grant of Gallegos’s motion for attorney fees and damages and
its June 2023 denial of Cdebaca and Vogel’s motion for
¶ 42 However, the deed reformation issue concerned Gallegos’s
decision in July 2023 — after the probate court’s resolution of the
dispute between Gallegos and Cdebaca and Vogel over decedent’s
estate — to convey his interest in the Shirley property to others. At
that time, the Shirley property was no longer part of decedent’s
estate. Unlike the Broncos Towing dispute, what Gallegos later
decided to do with the property he received from the estate did not
present a question arising in connection with the estate or a claim
logically related to the estate such that it would fall within the
probate court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
¶ 43 In other words, the question of Gallegos’s intent when
executing the July 2023 quitclaim deed did not “concern[] any
18 person who [wa]s before the court by reason of any asserted right in
any of the property of the estate.” § 13-9-103(3). Rather, Gallegos’s
motion to reform the quitclaim deed concerned an asserted right in
property that everyone agreed already belonged to him. The fact
that Gallegos received this property from the estate is immaterial.
¶ 44 Nor does it matter, as Gallegos argues on appeal, that the
initial quiet title action that Cdebaca and Vogel filed concerning the
Shirley property was transferred to the probate court to be resolved
as part of these proceedings. The quiet title action concerned
determining ownership of the Shirley property for purposes of
administering decedent’s estate, not determining ownership of that
property following a later separate conveyance by an individual who
inherited it from the estate.
¶ 45 When granting Gallegos’s motion, the probate court reasoned
that decedent never intended that Cdebaca would own a seventy-
five percent interest in the Shirley property. That may well be true,
but the probate court lost jurisdiction to effectuate decedent’s
intent over this question once it divided the ownership interest in
the Shirley property between Gallegos and Cdebaca. After that
division was complete, Gallegos was free to do as he wished with his
19 50% interest, and his actions no longer concerned decedent’s
estate.
¶ 46 In sum, because Gallegos’s request did not arise in connection
with the estate, the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to resolve it. Accordingly, we vacate the probate court’s order
granting Gallegos’s motion to reform the July 2023 quitclaim deed.
IV. Attorney Fees
¶ 47 Cdebaca challenges the award of attorney fees3 to Gallegos,
arguing in part that the probate court abused its discretion by
granting fees for work on matters that were outside the scope of the
probate court’s fee award. Because we conclude that the probate
court erred in its approach to awarding attorney fees and that the
fee award requires greater clarification, we reverse the award of
attorney fees and remand for a hearing on their reasonableness.
3 Cdebaca also appears to take issue with the probate court’s award
of costs against her and its refusal to grant her request for her own fees and costs, but these issues receive only cursory attention in Cdebaca’s opening brief. Because we do not address undeveloped arguments, we decline to consider these contentions. See Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 41 (“We don’t consider undeveloped and unsupported arguments.”), aff’d, 2021 CO 56.
20 A. Additional Facts
¶ 48 When granting Gallegos’s motion for attorney fees and
damages, the probate court cited In re Estate of Lewis, 93 P.3d 605
(Colo. App. 2004), and sections 15-10-602(7)(b) and (d), C.R.S.
2024, as support for its award. Under the reasoning of Lewis and
the requirements of the statute, the court explained, Gallegos was
entitled to attorney fees because “the services provided by counsel
for . . . Gallegos have resulted in an order beneficial to the estate, as
[the] representation prevented the unjust attempts by . . . [Cdebaca]
and . . . Vogel to deprive . . . Gallegos of property which the
[d]ecedent intended for him, to include real property and property of
the [d]ecedent’s business, known as Bronco[]s Towing.”
¶ 49 The probate court also awarded attorney fees under section
13-17-102, C.R.S. 2024, finding that “[Cdebaca] individually and in
her capacity as PR for the estate and . . . Vogel made claims and
brought litigation against . . . Gallegos which did not have
substantial justification.”
¶ 50 The probate court awarded Gallegos $54,320 in attorney fees.
In doing so, it credited an affidavit from Gallegos’s counsel
explaining that the dollar amount comprised Gallegos’s legal fees
21 minus, among other things, “all fees associated with the dispute
over ownership of Broncos Towing.”
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 51 We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs for
an abuse of discretion. Accetta v. Brooks Towers Residences Condo.
Ass’n, 2021 COA 147M-2, ¶ 43. A trial court abuses its discretion
when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or
based on a misapplication or misunderstanding of the law. Credit
Serv. Co. v. Skivington, 2020 COA 60M, ¶ 17.
¶ 52 It is also an abuse of discretion when a trial court awards
attorney fees without holding a requested evidentiary hearing.
Shyanne Props., LLC v. Torp, 210 P.3d 490, 493 (Colo. App. 2009).
¶ 53 An award of attorney fees must contain sufficient findings of
fact to allow meaningful appellate review. Yaekle v. Andrews, 169
P.3d 196, 201 (Colo. App. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 195 P.3d
1101 (Colo. 2008); see also C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-22(2)(c).
C. Analysis
¶ 54 Cdebaca contends that while the probate court purportedly
“limited the award of attorney[] fees to those associated with the
quiet title dispute,” it nonetheless granted all of the fees listed in
22 Gallegos’s attorney’s affidavit. This was error, she asserts, because
some of the billing entries on that affidavit “include[d] fees for
activities that can be easily correlated to . . . activities [other than
the quiet title dispute], such as the Bronco[]s Towing hearing in
August 2022.” Cdebaca identified this apparent discrepancy in the
probate court, arguing that supporting documentation that
Gallegos’s attorney submitted did not provide sufficient detail to
assess the affidavit’s accuracy, and expressly requested “a hearing
to address the reasonableness of the costs claimed and their
relationship to the issues litigated.”
¶ 55 The probate court never held the requested hearing. Instead,
it issued an order crediting the affidavit and granting all of the
requested attorney fees. Because due process requires that a court
hold a hearing when requested to determine the reasonableness
and necessity of attorney fees, Roberts v. Adams, 47 P.3d 690, 700
(Colo. App. 2001), the court abused its discretion by not holding the
hearing that Cdebaca requested in response to Gallegos’s attorney’s
affidavit.
¶ 56 Regarding the merits of Cdebaca’s contention that the probate
court incorrectly awarded fees beyond the scope of the quiet title
23 action, we lack sufficient information on appeal to assess this
argument. When the probate court awarded fees, it emphasized
Cdebaca and Vogel’s attempts to deprive Gallegos of property that
decedent intended for him, specifically mentioning “real property
and property of the [d]ecedent’s business, known as Bronco[]s
Towing.” However, the probate court’s later explanation for the fee
amount stated that Gallegos’s attorney’s affidavit “did not include
charges related to the dispute over Bronco[]s Towing.” Yet that does
not precisely reflect the affidavit’s language; rather, the affidavit
stated that Gallegos’s attorney had “removed from the billing all fees
associated with the dispute over ownership of Broncos Towing.”
(Emphasis added.) The affidavit was silent as to whether the
requested fees included work associated with any other disputes
about Broncos Towing, such as the disposed-of property for which
Gallegos received damages. And as Cdebaca points out below and
on appeal, the invoices that Gallegos’s attorney submitted appear to
reflect at least some work associated with Broncos Towing disputes.
¶ 57 The record on appeal leaves us uncertain about which specific
work the probate court’s fee award encompassed and whether the
fees requested by Gallegos’s attorney stayed within those bounds.
24 Accordingly, we reverse the award of attorney fees and remand for a
hearing on their reasonableness.
¶ 58 Due to our reversal of the attorney fee award and the mixed
disposition of this opinion, we decline to award Gallegos the fees
and costs that he requests for defending this appeal.
V. Cdebaca’s Liability
¶ 59 Finally, Cdebaca contends that the probate court reversibly
erred by assessing damages, fees, and costs against her in her
individual capacity as heir and beneficiary of decedent’s estate
when it assigned joint and several liability to Cdebaca and Vogel
and decedent’s estate. We discern no error.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 60 As noted above, we review a trial court’s award of attorney fees
and costs for an abuse of discretion. Accetta, ¶ 43. A trial court’s
decision to allocate costs between parties or to impose joint and
several liability lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Schuessler v. Wolter, 2012 COA 86, ¶ 89.
¶ 61 Section 15-12-808(2), C.R.S. 2024, states that “[a] personal
representative is individually liable for obligations arising from
ownership or control of the estate or for torts committed in the
25 course of administration of the estate only if he is personally at
fault.”
¶ 62 Cdebaca asserts on appeal that she should not be held
individually liable for damages, costs, or fees because the probate
court “documented no findings of fact or conclusions of law” to
support such an award against her as an individual. As support for
this contention, Cdebaca simply cites the limiting language of
section 15-12-808(2) and asserts that the probate court “baldly”
found her individually liable.
¶ 63 However, as Gallegos points out, in its order granting
Gallegos’s motion for attorney fees and damages the probate court
explicitly found Cdebaca liable as an individual and explained the
basis of that finding. The order stated that “[t]he [c]ourt finds from
the evidence adduced at trial that [Cdebaca] both individually and
as PR . . . did attempt to deprive . . . Gallegos of the property given
to him by . . . [d]ecedent.” The probate court described how
Cdebaca took and disposed of property belonging to Broncos Towing
that sat in the backyard of a house belonging to decedent. The
order also explained that “[t]he [c]ourt finds that [Cdebaca]
26 individually and in her capacity as PR for the estate . . . made
claims and brought litigation against . . . Gallegos which did not
have substantial justification.”
¶ 64 This record contradicts Cdebaca’s claim on appeal that the
probate court “documented no findings of fact or conclusions of law
to support” imposing individual liability against her. We therefore
conclude that the probate court did not abuse its discretion by
awarding fees against Cdebaca personally.
VI. Disposition
¶ 65 We affirm the probate court’s resolution of the dispute
surrounding Broncos Towing as well as its imposition of individual
liability against Cdebaca. However, we vacate the probate court’s
order granting Gallegos’s motion to reform his July 2023 quitclaim
deed. We also reverse the award of attorney fees and remand the
case with directions to the probate court to hold a hearing on the
reasonableness of those fees.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE LUM concur.