Peo v. Marceleno

CourtColorado Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 26, 2026
Docket24CA0195
StatusUnpublished

This text of Peo v. Marceleno (Peo v. Marceleno) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Colorado Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Peo v. Marceleno, (Colo. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

24CA0195 Peo v Marceleno 02-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0195 Weld County District Court No. 22CR1016 Honorable Timothy Kerns, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Danny Marceleno,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Fox and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 26, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Patrick R. Henson, Alternate Defense Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Danny Marceleno, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered after a bench trial at which he was found guilty

of possession of contraband in the second degree. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Deputies at the Weld County jail moved Marceleno, an inmate,

to a “dry cell” because they suspected he possessed narcotics. A

dry cell lacks a toilet and fountain so that inmates suspected of

having contraband can’t dispose of it. A body scan and strip search

of Marceleno revealed a small cellophane bag containing a white

powdery substance concealed in his genital area. A subsequent

search of Marceleno’s cell revealed a second cellophane bag

containing bean paste hidden in his mattress and a third

cellophane bag containing a white, crystal-like substance located in

a pair of pants in a shared clothes hamper. Deputies disposed of

the bag of bean paste because, as a food product, it couldn’t be

stored in evidence. They sent the other two bags to a Colorado

Bureau of Investigation (CBI) lab for analysis.

¶3 Believing that the substances in the bags contained

methamphetamine, Deputy Brian Hammond conducted a

videotaped interview of Marceleno to obtain more information.

1 During the interview, Marceleno made several inculpatory

statements about the substances in the bags found on his person

and in his mattress.

¶4 The prosecution charged Marceleno with one count of

possession of contraband in the second degree. § 18-8-204.2,

C.R.S. 2025. Marceleno waived his right to a jury trial and

proceeded to a bench trial.

¶5 At trial, a CBI forensic scientist testified that the bag found in

the shared clothes hamper tested positive for methamphetamine.

However, the forensic scientist didn’t analyze the substance found

on Marceleno’s person.

¶6 In a detailed oral ruling, the district court found Marceleno

guilty and sentenced him to eighteen months in the custody of the

Department of Corrections.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶7 Marceleno contends that the prosecution presented

insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of contraband in

the second degree because (1) CBI didn’t chemically test the

substances in the bags found on his person and in his mattress

and (2) the prosecution didn’t establish that he possessed the

2 substance found in the shared clothes hamper. We conclude the

prosecution satisfied its burden, even without a chemical test, by

presenting circumstantial evidence regarding the substances found

on his person and in his mattress. Given our conclusion, we need

not address whether Marceleno possessed the substance found in

the shared clothes hamper.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶8 In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we “review the

record de novo to determine whether the evidence before the [fact

finder] was sufficient both in quantity and quality to sustain the

defendant’s conviction.” Johnson v. People, 2023 CO 7, ¶ 13

(quoting Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010)). We

evaluate whether the evidence, “direct and circumstantial, when

viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion

by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291).

¶9 With exceptions not relevant here, a person confined in a

detention facility commits possession of contraband in the second

degree if they knowingly obtain or possess contraband.

3 § 18-8-204.2(1). The definition of contraband includes controlled

substances. § 18-8-204(2)(o), C.R.S. 2025. Section 18-18-102(5),

C.R.S. 2025, defines a controlled substance as a drug, substance,

or immediate precursor included in schedules I through V as set

forth in sections 18-18-203 to -207, C.R.S. 2025.

Methamphetamine is a schedule II drug. § 18-18-204(2)(c)(II),

C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 10 The prosecution need not necessarily present a chemical test

to prove that a particular substance is contraband. See People v.

Steiner, 640 P.2d 250, 252 (Colo. App. 1981). Instead, the

prosecution may satisfy its burden through circumstantial

evidence. See id.; People in Interest of J.G., 97 P.3d 300, 303 (Colo.

App. 2004). Examples of such circumstantial evidence include

representations and admissions made by the defendant, behavior

consistent with use or possession of the controlled substance, and

the defendant’s furtiveness. See, e.g., J.G., 97 P.3d at 303; Steiner,

640 P.2d at 252; People v. Edwards, 598 P.2d 126, 128 (Colo.

1979).

4 B. Analysis

¶ 11 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution and affording the prosecution the benefit of every

reasonable inference, we conclude that the prosecution presented

sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Marceleno committed possession of contraband in the second

degree.

¶ 12 Marceleno doesn’t dispute that the prosecution presented

evidence that deputies found one small bag containing a white

powdery substance concealed in his genital area and a second bag

containing bean paste hidden in his mattress. From this evidence,

the district court could reasonably infer that Marceleno knowingly

possessed the substances in the two bags. See People v. Miralda,

981 P.2d 676, 679 (Colo. App. 1999) (“Intent may . . . be established

from circumstantial evidence and from the inferences that may

reasonably be drawn from those circumstances.”); People v.

Summitt, 132 P.3d 320, 324 (Colo. 2006) (evidence of concealment

“can be admissible to show consciousness of guilt”).

¶ 13 Marceleno’s primary argument is that the prosecution

presented insufficient evidence that the substances in the two bags

5 constituted “contraband” under section 18-8-204.2(1). We disagree.

Deputy Hammond testified that the substance in the bag found on

Marceleno’s person appeared to be methamphetamine. Moreover,

in the body camera footage submitted into evidence by the

prosecution, Deputy Hammond told Marceleno that the substance

found on his person tested positive for methamphetamine. While

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Related

People v. Miralda
981 P.2d 676 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1999)
People v. Steiner
640 P.2d 250 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1981)
People v. Edwards
598 P.2d 126 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1979)
People v. Summitt
132 P.3d 320 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2006)
In the Interest of J.G.
97 P.3d 300 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 2004)
Sylvia Johnson
2023 CO 7 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2023)

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