Peo v. Regnier

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 23CA0910
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA0910 Peo v Regnier 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0910 Weld County District Court No. 22CR722 Honorable Meghan Patrice Saleebey, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Timothy Joseph Lloyd Regnier,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Moultrie and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Emmy A. Langley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 A jury convicted Timothy Joseph Lloyd Regnier of four counts

of driving related crimes and one count of possession with intent to

distribute a controlled substance. Regnier appeals his conviction,

arguing that the trial court reversibly erred by (1) denying his

motion to suppress statements he made at the time of his arrest

and (2) excluding statements his girlfriend made to the police. We

disagree and we affirm the judgment of conviction.

I. Background

¶2 One evening, Greeley Police Officer Kyle Penny saw a truck

towing a camper trailer without taillights and with an expired

license plate. Officer Penny stopped the truck and asked the driver,

Regnier, for his license and insurance. Regnier admitted that he

did not have a license and largely acknowledged the other traffic

violations. While speaking with Regnier, Officer Penny saw a

broken meth pipe in the center console. Officer Penny and a second

officer, Kody Klassen, then ordered Regnier and the passenger —

Regnier’s girlfriend, Melissa Armstrong — to step out of the truck.

Officer Penny handcuffed Regnier, found additional drug

paraphernalia on him during a pat-down search, and placed him in

a patrol car. Armstrong remained outside the truck.

1 ¶3 Officer Penny and Officer Klassen searched the truck and

found a large quantity of methamphetamine, a variety of drug

paraphernalia, plastic baggies, a scale, and cash inside two bags on

the front passenger floorboard (below where Armstrong had been

sitting). The officers then arrested Armstrong.

¶4 After Officer Klassen told Regnier that Armstrong “was under

arrest for narcotics possession,” Regnier responded, “If there’s

anything in that truck it’s mine,” and “[Armstrong] doesn’t fuck

with that shit man, I’m the one that has that problem.” Officer

Klassen reported these statements to Officer Penny.

¶5 Officer Penny then had the following exchange with Regnier

while Regnier was handcuffed in the patrol car:

Officer Penny: Do you want to talk to me about anything in the truck?

Officer Penny: Do you want the windows down so you can cool off?

Regnier: No. Um —

Officer Penny: Do you need an ambulance?

Regnier: Anything in there, is mine.

Regnier: No.

2 Officer Penny: You’re all super sweaty, dude.

Regnier: Yea, it’s cuz —

Officer Penny: I want to make sure —

Regnier: Cuz he had the door open for a minute, and I got cooled off and then he closed it —

Officer Penny: Do you want me to open just one so you have a little bit of air flow?

Regnier: No, I’ll be alright.

Officer Penny: Ok.

Regnier: But anything in that truck is mine. Anything in the bags, that shit’s mine.

Officer Penny: Ok. Are you on probation or parole or anything like that?

Regnier: No. Just bond.

Officer Penny: Ok. So all the cash and stuff like that is yours, too?

Regnier: Some of it’s mine.

Officer Penny: Ok. I’m just trying to figure out like who goes to what cuz there’s like a pretty little purse with a bunch of money in it.

Regnier: Yea, I had, I know I had a bunch of meth and stuff, so.

Officer Penny: Ok. I appreciate your honesty.

3 ¶6 Officer Penny later returned to the patrol car and asked

Regnier if a lockbox found in the truck was his and asked for the

code. Regnier said that the box was his and gave Officer Penny the

code. Officer Penny opened the box and found more drug

paraphernalia, plastic baggies, and a scale.

¶7 The traffic stop, arrests, and truck search were captured on

the officers’ body cameras.

¶8 The prosecution charged Regnier with possession with intent

to distribute a controlled substance, driving without compulsory

insurance, driving under restraint, driving with expired license

plates, and a tail lamp violation.1

¶9 Before trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the

statements Regnier made to Officer Penny, arguing that the

statements were the product of a custodial interrogation and were

involuntary. The court denied the motion. Though the court

1 The prosecution also charged Armstrong with drug related crimes,

but she pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and was sentenced to probation.

4 agreed that Regnier was in custody, it found his statements

spontaneous and voluntary.2

¶ 10 At trial, Regnier didn’t testify. His counsel defended on the

theory that the drugs belonged to Armstrong, and that he “took the

fall” to protect her. The jury found Regnier guilty on all counts.

The trial court sentenced Regnier to ten years in prison.

II. Motion to Suppress

¶ 11 Regnier contends that the trial court reversibly erred by

denying his motion to suppress his statements to Officer Penny. He

specifically argues that the statements should’ve been suppressed

because they were the product of a custodial interrogation in

violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and were

involuntary.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 12 To protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination, officers must provide certain warnings before they

interrogate someone who is in custody. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444;

2 In its ruling, the court referred to Regnier as being “Mirandized”

while being driven to jail. But from our review of the body camera video, it doesn’t appear that Regnier was advised of his rights before speaking with Officer Penny.

5 see People v. Eugene, 2024 CO 59, ¶ 14. If they do not, any

resulting statements are inadmissible. Effland v. People, 240 P.3d

868, 873 (Colo. 2010).

¶ 13 Police interrogation includes express questioning as well as

“any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those

normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should

know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from

the suspect.” People v. Cisneros, 2014 COA 49, ¶ 72 (citation

omitted); see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). To

determine if a suspect was interrogated, we consider the totality of

the circumstances. People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 241 (Colo.

1999).

¶ 14 We review a trial court’s suppression order as a mixed

question of fact and law, meaning we defer to the court’s factual

findings if supported by the record but review its legal conclusions

de novo. People v. Barnett, 2024 CO 73, ¶ 13. When, as here, the

statements sought to be suppressed are recorded, we independently

review the recording. See id.

¶ 15 If a statement obtained in violation of Miranda is admitted over

a defendant’s objection, reversal is required unless the error was

6 harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which means there is no

reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.

See People v. Frye, 2014 COA 141, ¶ 6 (citation omitted). To

consider whether the error was constitutionally harmless, we

examine, among other factors, the cumulative nature of the

statements. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.

B. Regnier was Subjected to Custodial Interrogation

¶ 16 The parties do not dispute that Regnier was in custody and

had not been read his Miranda rights when Officer Penny

approached him. The dispute instead centers on the trial court’s

finding that Regnier’s statements to Officer Penny were

spontaneous. Regnier maintains that Officer Penny interrogated

him and that his statements claiming ownership over anything in

the truck — which included drugs, cash, and the lockbox — were

inadmissible.

¶ 17 We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances,

Officer Penny interrogated Regnier. That’s because when Officer

Penny first asked Regnier if he wanted “to talk to [him] about

anything in the truck,” Officer Penny had already discovered drugs

in the truck, knew that Regnier was aware and upset that

7 Armstrong had been arrested for the drugs, and understood that

Regnier had told Officer Klassen that everything in the truck was

his. Thus, Officer Penny’s initial question asking Regnier if he

wanted to talk specifically about anything in the truck was not a

general informational question. Rather, it was a question

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Cisneros,

¶ 72. Even beyond that, Officer Penny followed up with express

questioning about who owned the drug paraphernalia, cash, and

lockbox found in the truck. Again, these questions were reasonably

likely to elicit incriminating responses. People v. Beaver, 725 P.2d

96, 99 (Colo. App. 1986) (noting that an incriminating response is

“any response that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial”).

¶ 18 We are not otherwise persuaded by the People’s suggestion

that Regnier’s responses were “spontaneous” simply because Officer

Penny interspersed his interrogative questions with other

innocuous ones. Unlike Regnier’s unprompted and volunteered

statements to Officer Klassen, his statements to Officer Penny were

prompted by questions likely to elicit incriminating responses. Cf.

People v. Madrid, 179 P.3d 1010, 1015 (Colo. 2008) (finding no

interrogation when officer asked no questions and the defendant’s

8 statements were “spontaneous interruptions, rather than responses

to express questioning or its equivalent”).

¶ 19 But the fact that Regnier volunteered nearly identical

statements to Officer Klassen demonstrates why admitting his

statements to Officer Penny was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. Officer Klassen testified at trial that Regnier admitted that

anything in the truck was his and that Armstrong didn’t “mess with

that type of stuff.” And the jury saw Regnier’s spontaneous

admissions to Officer Klassen on the bodycam video. Because the

cumulative statements to Officer Penny added nothing, the error in

admitting them “could not have contributed to the jury’s verdict.”

People v. Stone, 2021 COA 104, ¶ 32; see also People v. Davis, 2018

COA 113, ¶¶ 22-23 (concluding that any error in admitting the

defendant’s statements to an officer in violation of the Fifth

Amendment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because

overlapping admissible statements were made to another officer).

¶ 20 While we conclude that the trial court erred by finding

Regnier’s statements to Officer Penny “spontaneous,” because the

statements were cumulative to properly admitted evidence, the error

was constitutionally harmless.

9 C. Regnier’s Statements Were Voluntary

¶ 21 Regnier next argues that irrespective of whether he was

subject to custodial interrogation, his statements to Officer Penny

were coerced and therefore the court erred by admitting them. We

disagree.

¶ 22 A defendant’s statements must be voluntary to be admitted

into evidence. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II,

§ 25; see Effland, 240 P.3d at 877. A statement is involuntary if (1)

the defendant’s will was overborne by coercive police conduct and

(2) that coercion played a significant role in inducing the statement.

People v. Cerda, 2024 CO 49, ¶ 37.

¶ 23 To assess voluntariness, we consider the totality of the

circumstances, including:

• whether the defendant was in custody;

• whether the defendant was free to leave;

• whether the defendant was aware of the situation;

• whether the police read Miranda rights to the defendant;

• whether the defendant understood and waived their

Miranda rights;

10 • whether the defendant had an opportunity to confer with

counsel or anyone else before or during the interrogation;

• whether the defendant made a statement during the

interrogation or volunteered it later;

• whether the police threatened or promised anything,

either directly or impliedly, to the defendant;

• the method or style of the interrogation;

• the defendant’s mental and physical condition just before

the interrogation;

• the interrogation’s length; and

• the interrogation’s location and physical conditions.

Id. at ¶ 38.

¶ 24 While we review a court’s suppression order as a mixed

question of fact and law, see id. at ¶ 22, the ultimate determination

of whether a statement is voluntary is a legal question we review de

novo. Effland, 240 P.3d at 878.

¶ 25 After viewing the bodycam video, we conclude that Regnier’s

statements to Officer Penny were voluntary. Though he was in

custody and the officers didn’t read him his Miranda rights, Regnier

was aware that the police had found drugs in the truck. Knowing

11 that, and before Officer Penny questioned him about what was in

the truck, Regnier blurted out to Officer Klassen that everything in

the truck was his. When Officer Penny followed up with Regnier, he

made no threats or promises and was calm and polite. Nothing

about the questioning was threatening, aggressive, or intimidating.

Regnier himself was composed and displayed no signs of physical or

mental distress. And the interaction at issue lasted less than three

minutes. See People v. Mumford, 275 P.3d 667, 671 (Colo. App.

2010), aff’d, 2012 CO 2.

¶ 26 Because the totality of the circumstances shows no coercive

police conduct, we conclude that the trial court didn’t err by finding

Regnier’s statements voluntary.

III. Armstrong’s Statements

¶ 27 At trial, defense counsel sought to question Officer Penny

about Armstrong’s statements that the items the officers found in

the truck belonged to Regnier. The trial court allowed some of the

testimony but excluded additional testimony about Armstrong’s

statements, finding that it was inadmissible hearsay. Regnier

contends that this was reversible error.

12 ¶ 28 We review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of

discretion. Zapata v. People, 2018 CO 82, ¶ 25. We review

preserved claims of evidentiary error under the harmless error

standard and will reverse only if the error substantially influenced

the verdict or affected the trial’s fairness. See Crim. P. 52(a); see

Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12.

¶ 29 Though the parties argue at some length about the

admissibility of Armstrong’s statements to Officer Penny, we don’t

need to determine whether the statements were admissible because

any error in failing to admit them was harmless. That’s because

Armstrong’s statements to Officer Penny were admitted through

other evidence. See People v. Pack, 797 P.2d 774, 776 (Colo. App.

1990) (concluding that the exclusion of a cumulative statement is

harmless). Indeed, the prosecution introduced Officer Penny’s

bodycam video which included most of Armstrong’s statements to

Officer Penny while she was being arrested. And, most critically,

Armstrong testified at trial about her statements to Officer Penny

and admitted that she had told him that the drugs and

paraphernalia found in the truck belonged to Regnier, not her.

13 ¶ 30 Though Regnier says the excluded evidence “was highly

relevant to his defense,” he fails to acknowledge that the excluded

testimony was cumulative to other admitted evidence and doesn’t

explain how excluding cumulative testimony substantially

influenced the verdict or affected the trial’s fairness. Because

Officer Penny’s testimony about Armstrong’s statements was

cumulative to other admitted evidence, any error in excluding it was

harmless. See id.

IV. Disposition

¶ 31 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE MOULTRIE and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.