Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court Adams County
District Court Case No. 23CR3152 Honorable Jeffrey D. Ruff,
Judge
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant: Brian S. Mason, District
Attorney, Seventeenth Judicial District Cameron Munier,
Senior Deputy District Attorney Todd Bluth, Senior Deputy
District Attorney Brighton, Colorado
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee: Megan A. Ring, Public
Defender James Beck, Deputy Public Defender Brighton,
Colorado
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court, in
which CHIEF JUSTICE MARQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL,
JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER
joined.
ORDER
2
BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE,
¶1
The Fourth Amendment forbids law enforcement from conducting
an investigatory stop based on a mere hunch that crime is
afoot. See People v. Wheeler, 2020 CO 65, ¶ 13,
465 P.3d 47, 52 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
27 (1968)). In this case, the district court suppressed
evidence because it found that deputies executed an
investigatory stop of a vehicle based on a mere hunch. But
the deputies initiated the stop only after learning that the
vehicle's license plates were registered to a different
vehicle. Because this constitutes reasonable suspicion rather
than a mere hunch, we reverse the district court's order
concluding that the stop was unlawful.
¶2
Additionally, as part of the investigatory stop, the deputies
commanded both occupants to exit the vehicle. Because
deputies may, for their own safety, give a command to exit a
vehicle during an investigatory stop, we also reverse the
district court's determination that the deputies'
command was unlawful.
¶3
Finally, during the encounter, the deputies observed a glass
pipe in Travis Barnett's vehicle and identified it as
drug paraphernalia. The manner in which the deputies
discovered the glass pipe is unclear.[1] Because we conclude that
both the
3
initial stop and the subsequent order to exit the vehicle
were lawful, on remand the trial court will need to make
additional findings regarding how the deputies discovered the
pipe and further rulings on the propriety of the search.
¶4
Accordingly, we hold that a license plate registered to a
different vehicle provides reasonable suspicion of motor
vehicle theft and thus justified the investigatory stop
conducted here. Additionally, we hold that under these facts,
the command to exit the vehicle was justified. Therefore, we
reverse the district court's suppression order and remand
the case for the district court to make factual findings and
conclusions of law regarding the discovery of the glass pipe
that are consistent with this opinion.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶5
Deputy Alvarado patrolled a motel parking lot because he
believed it was a hot spot for crime. There, he spotted a red
2002 GMC Yukon, a model of car that he testified is commonly
stolen. He then drove by the Yukon and became suspicious when
its two occupants looked away. Deputy Alvarado did not
initiate any contact at this time; instead, he ran a check on
the Yukon's license plates and discovered that they were
registered to a black 2013 Ford.
¶6
Deputy Alvarado then coordinated with his colleague, Deputy
Mohr, to conduct an investigatory stop on the parked Yukon.
Deputy Alvarado's bodycam captured these events: The
deputies pulled their patrol cars up on either side of
4
the Yukon before rapidly approaching on foot. They ordered
both the driver, Barnett, and the passenger to put their
hands up, and then Deputy Alvarado informed Barnett that the
plates did not match the Yukon. Barnett responded, "I
just bought this yesterday," and began lowering his
hands. Deputy Alvarado stopped him by replying,
"Don't reach for nothing." He then ordered
Barnett to keep his hands up and asked whether Barnett had
any weapons. Barnett responded that he did not. Next, Deputy
Alvarado ordered Barnett to exit the Yukon. Once Barnett was
out of the car, Deputy Alvarado conducted a pat-down of
Barnett and then ordered him to wait at the front bumper of
one of the patrol cars. Deputy Mohr ordered the passenger to
join Barnett.
¶7
Deputy Alvarado asked Barnett if he had a bill of sale for
the Yukon, and Barnett answered that both the bill of sale
and the title were "somewhere in the back" of the
Yukon. Barnett then attempted to return to the Yukon, but
Deputy Alvarado ordered him to stop, explaining that Barnett
could not access the car because he did not trust Barnett or
know if there were weapons in the car. Deputy Mohr then
interjected, "I'll be honest with you, dude.
You've got meth pipes in-we're going to search the
car. Just tell him where the title's at." Barnett
then pointed the deputies to the title, disclosing that it
was under items on the front floorboard.
5
¶8
Deputy Alvarado retrieved the title from the passenger side
of the car. After running the Yukon's title documents
through the computer in his patrol car (and finding that the
Yukon had not been reported stolen), Deputy Alvarado informed
Barnett that he was going to search the car because he had
seen a pipe that resembled drug paraphernalia.[2] During the
search, he found a glass pipe containing drug residue that
was "not marijuana"; he later testified that such a
pipe is commonly used to smoke methamphetamine and other
controlled substances. Under the driver's seat, Deputy
Alvarado also found cash and plastic bags containing what
appeared to be substantial amounts of methamphetamine.
¶9
Subsequently, the People charged Barnett with possession with
intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance,
criminal impersonation,[3] and obstructing a peace officer.
Barnett moved to suppress the evidence collected as a result
of the stop. Following a hearing, the district court granted
the motion. The court determined that the deputies' stop
was predicated on a mere hunch and that
6
both Alvarado's command to exit the vehicle and his
pat-down of Barnett were unjustified. Thus, the court
concluded that the subsequent search was
illegal.[4]
¶10
The People then filed this interlocutory appeal. They concede
that Deputy Alvarado lacked a reasonable basis for his
pat-down search of Barnett, but they contest two of the
district court's rulings: that Deputy Alvarado lacked
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop and
that the deputies impermissibly commanded Barnett and the
passenger to exit the vehicle during the stop.
II.
Analysis
¶11
We begin by addressing this court's jurisdiction and the
standard of review. We then assess the deputies' actions
and conclude that the mismatched license plates justified the
investigatory stop. Additionally, we consider whether the
command to exit the vehicle was justified and conclude that,
under the circumstances, it was.
A.
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
¶12
"Under section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (202[4]), and C.A.R.
4.1(a), the People may file an interlocutory appeal from a
district court's order granting a defendant's motion
to suppress evidence." People v. Johnson, 2024
CO 47, ¶ 21,
7
549 P.3d 1008, 1013. Here, it is undisputed that the People
properly certified this interlocutory appeal.
¶13
We review an order suppressing evidence as a mixed question
of fact and law. People v. Dacus, 2024 CO 51, ¶
23, P.3d . We accept the trial court's findings of fact
so long as they are supported by competent evidence. Id.
But see People v. Bohler, 2024 CO 18, ¶ 17, 545
P.3d 509, 514 (noting that "we may independently review
recordings including police bodycam footage").
We assess the legal significance of the facts de novo.
Dacus, ¶ 23.
B.
The License Plate Discrepancy Provided Deputy Alvarado with
Reasonable Suspicion of Motor Vehicle Theft
¶14
"[A] police officer may conduct a brief investigatory
stop without violating an individual's constitutional
rights, so long as the officer can articulate 'a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.'"
People v. Moreno, 2022 CO 19, ¶ 14, 507 P.3d
1005, 1008 (quoting People v. Brown, 2019 CO 63,
¶ 10, 461 P.3d 1, 3). Reasonable suspicion requires
"more than a mere generalized suspicion or hunch."
Wheeler, ¶ 13, 465 P.3d at 52. It demands
"a specific and articulable basis in fact for suspecting
that criminal activity has occurred, is taking place, or is
about to take place." Brown, ¶ 10, 461
P.3d at 3 (quoting People v. Perez, 690 P.2d 853,
855 (Colo. 1984)). To determine if a deputy's suspicion
was reasonable, we analyze the totality of the information
available to the deputy, and we consider whether rational
inferences from those facts indicate criminal activity and
thus justify the
8
deputy's intrusion into the defendant's privacy.
Moreno, ¶ 15, 507 P.3d at 1008; People v.
Threlkel, 2019 CO 18, ¶ 19, 438 P.3d 722, 727.
¶15
Barnett argues that Deputy Alvarado possessed only the
"barest hunch" that the Yukon might be stolen. We
disagree. Deputy Alvarado discovered that the license plates
on the Yukon were registered to a different vehicle, and such
a discrepancy presents a reasonable suspicion that the motor
vehicle may be stolen. See § 18-4-409(3)(e),
C.R.S. (2024) (providing that a person commits second degree
motor vehicle theft when they knowingly obtain another's
vehicle without authorization and "unlawfully attach[]
or display[] a license plate . . . other than those plates
officially issued for the motor vehicle"). Mismatched
plates are as suspicious as missing registration papers,
which provide reasonable suspicion. See People v.
H.J., 931 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Colo. 1997).
¶16
Therefore, because Deputy Alvarado possessed reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, he was authorized to initiate
the investigatory stop.
C.
Concern for the Deputies' Safety Justified the Command to
Exit the Vehicle
¶17
During an investigatory stop, deputies may order drivers and
passengers to exit vehicles, which possess a unique potential
for escape and concealment of weapons, so long as the order
constitutes a reasonable safety precaution. Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-14 (1997) (citing
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)
(describing an officer's order to vacate a vehicle during
a
9
lawful investigatory stop as "at most a mere
inconvenience . . . when balanced against legitimate concerns
for the officer's safety")). And while restraints on
a person's liberty during an investigatory stop must be
reasonable, deputies are not obliged to employ the least
intrusive means possible. People v. White, 2023 CO
43, ¶ 53, 531 P.3d 397, 408.
¶18
Here, the district court determined that the command to exit
was not reasonable-and, therefore, its fruits required
suppression-because "peace officers [cannot] remove
people from their cars, when there is no reasonable belief
that a defendant is armed and dangerous, for the mere purpose
of getting a better look at the contents of the car that may
not otherwise be in plain view while the car is
occupied." The district court hinged its reasoning on
People v. Sandoval, No. 20CA1285 (Jan. 11, 2024),
which pertained to evidence obtained from a pat-down.
¶19
Although we agree (and the People concede) that the
pat-down of Barnett was improper, pat-downs demand
greater justification than exit orders. Pat-downs, during
which a deputy touches a person's body, are more invasive
than the "mere inconvenience" of being ordered to
briefly exit a stopped vehicle. See Mimms, 434 U.S.
at 111. Therefore, to conduct a pat-down, a deputy must have
"an articulable and objectively reasonable belief"
that the person "is armed and dangerous."
Johnson, ¶ 27, 549 P.3d at 1014. By contrast,
orders to exit a vehicle
10
during an investigatory stop do not constitute an additional
seizure and thus do not require a deputy to reasonably
believe that the passengers are armed and dangerous. See
People v. Harmon, 2019 COA 156, ¶ 23, 461 P.3d 618,
623; see also People v. Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 66,
¶ 29, 379 P.3d 330, 337 (citing People v.
Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 312 (Colo. 1984) ("We
conclude that a police officer in the course of a valid
traffic stop may order the driver to get out of the car and
walk to the rear of the vehicle ....")). Therefore, the
order that the occupants exit the car was lawful.
D.
Further Findings Necessary
¶20
Finally, although we have determined that both the initial
stop and subsequent exit command were lawful, we cannot
conclude from the existing record whether the motion to
suppress should have been granted. That is because it is
unclear exactly how the deputies discovered the
glass pipe-the ultimate evidence at issue in this case. Was
it in plain view when Barnett and his passenger left the
vehicle? Or did the deputies' search of the vehicle
reveal the pipe? If the latter, at what point in the search
did the pipe emerge? How the deputies discovered the pipe
impacts the legality of the search. See People v.
Alameno, 193 P.3d 830, 834 (Colo. 2008) (citing
People v. Pitts, 13 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 2000))
("[E]vidence that is not supported by a valid search
warrant may still be admissible if it falls under one of
several exceptions to the warrant requirement,
11
such as the plain view exception."). Accordingly, on
remand, the trial court should make further findings
regarding the discovery of the glass pipe and then decide,
consistent with those findings, whether the evidence must be
suppressed.[5]
III.
Conclusion
¶21
We hold that a license plate registered to a different
vehicle provides reasonable suspicion of motor vehicle theft
and thus justified the investigatory stop here. Additionally,
we hold that under these facts, the command to exit the
vehicle was justified. Accordingly, we reverse the
suppression order and remand this case to the district court
with instructions to make factual findings and conclusions of
law regarding the discovery of the glass pipe that are
consistent with this opinion.
---------
Notes:
[1] Understandably, the district court did
not make credibility determinations on this issue after
deciding that everything discovered during the search was
fruit of the poisonous tree.
[2] It is unclear when and how the
deputies first observed the glass pipe. The bodycam footage
shows the pipe for the first time during the search and, at
that time, it is on the floor in front of the driver's
seat. But it is unclear from the record whether this was when
and where the deputies first discovered it.
[3] Barnett identified himself by a first
name other than Travis during the investigatory stop.
[4] Presumably, the trial court did not
make any factual findings regarding the search of the car
because it found that the stop was unjustified.
[5] To be clear, we are not directing the
trial court to return this matter to this court after it
makes its conclusion about the search of the car.