I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶2
In January 2021, the Northern Colorado Drug Task Force
("NCDTF") received an anonymous tip that claimed
two residents of a home in Berthoud were dealing a variety of
drugs, including methamphetamine. The tip provided specific
information: (1) the address of the house, and that it was
the "corner house behind habitat for humanity"; (2)
a physical description of the residents, along with their
names and phone numbers, and information that they were a
husband and a wife who "sell fentanyl out of their
home"; (3) that the couple's vehicle was a white GMC
Acadia SUV; and (4) that the couple sold "mainly
fentanyl pills" as well as "Oxy blue 30s [and]
meth" that were "[k]ept in his bedroom . . . in the
nightstand across from the bed" and were sold "all
different ways" but mainly "from his mailbox."
¶3
NCDTF did not act on this information for three months. At
that point, NCDTF placed the home under surveillance and
confirmed that the people named in the tip still resided at
the listed address. The surveilling officer saw a woman, who
matched the physical description of the wife in the tip,
doing yard work. She went in and out of a small garden shed
on the property where she brought out typical gardening
tools. Soon, a man who matched the tip's description of
the husband, arrived at the home in a white GMC Acadia SUV,
the same make and model of the vehicle described in the tip,
and went inside the home.
¶4
Several hours into the surveillance, the officer observed an
unknown man, later identified as Marcelino Moreno, arrive at
the house in a pickup truck driven by a woman. Moreno exited
the car, hugged the husband, and followed him into the shed
where the wife had obtained gardening tools. When the two
emerged, neither of them carried any tools that might be
found in a shed. The officer observed that both men seemed to
be "very conscious of their surroundings, looking over
their shoulders, [and] looking up and down the street"
as they returned from the shed. Further, the officer noted
that as Moreno climbed back into the passenger seat of his
truck and drove away, he frequently checked his mirrors and
looked over his shoulder.
¶5
After Moreno left the house, a second officer followed his
truck in a marked patrol car, while the first officer
continued to surveil the house. The second officer
observed that Moreno was uncommonly fixated on his patrol
car, later testifying that "Moreno's actions far
exceeded anything [he had] ever seen of an individual
watching [his] car." About twelve minutes into the
drive, Moreno's truck stopped at a truck stop and parked
at a gas pump. The patrol car followed Moreno into the truck
stop parking lot and parked in a far corner where the officer
could observe Moreno from a distance. Moreno and the woman
went into the truck stop, returned to sit in the vehicle for
a short time, and then drove to another part of the parking
area. At no point did they pump gas.
¶6
Next, the officer observed Moreno park next to an air
compressor station. Moreno exited the car and grabbed the
hose to the air compressor. But Moreno did not actually use
the air compressor on any of the tires, nor did he bring the
hose to the tires. Rather, Moreno held the hose and circled
the vehicle for about five minutes, continually looking up
and away from his vehicle, all the while still paying special
attention to the patrol car.
¶7
A short while later, the first surveilling officer, still
back at the residence, witnessed the husband and wife leave
the house in their SUV. The officer followed the couple to
the truck stop where Moreno was waiting. The couple pulled in
next to Moreno, who exited his own truck carrying a black
backpack and got into the backseat of the couple's SUV,
and the three drove off together. The second officer in the
patrol car then stopped the SUV on suspicion of drug
trafficking activity.
Together,
the officers called a K9 officer, whose dog alerted to the
presence of narcotics. Subsequently, the officers searched
the backpack that Moreno had brought with him into the SUV
and found approximately 460 grams of suspected
methamphetamine and 13.3 grams of suspected fentanyl. After
the search, one officer returned to the truck stop to see if
Moreno's truck remained in the parking lot, but the truck
and the woman were both gone.
¶8
The People charged Moreno with possession of controlled
substances with intent to distribute. Before trial, Moreno
moved to suppress the evidence seized from his backpack,
contending that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that
he was involved in any criminal activity at the time of the
traffic stop.
¶
9 The trial court granted the motion. The court found that,
because three months had passed from the time of the
anonymous tip to the time of the officers' surveillance,
the information contained in the tip was "stale"
and there were "no intervening observations to
corroborate suspected criminal activity." The court
further found that, although the officers' observations
"may have provided [them] with an intuition or hunch of
criminal activity," they did not rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the court suppressed all
evidence obtained from the search of Moreno's backpack.
¶
10 The People then filed this interlocutory appeal.
¶13
We first discuss the relevant legal principles governing
reasonable suspicion. We then apply those principles to the
facts of this case and conclude that, under the totality of
the circumstances, the officers had a reasonable suspicion to
conduct the traffic stop. We therefore reverse the trial
court's order suppressing evidence obtained from the
search and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
A.
Reasonable Suspicion Standard
¶14
The United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution
both protect individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV;
Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. Nevertheless, a police
officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop without
violating an individual's constitutional rights, so long
as the officer can articulate "a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity." People v. Brown, 2019 CO
63, ¶ 10, 461 P.3d 1, 3 (quoting People v.
Ingram, 984 P.2d 597, 603 (Colo. 1999)); see also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30-31 (1968).
¶15
The reasonable suspicion standard requires
"'obviously less' [proof] than is necessary for
probable cause." Navarette v. California, 572
U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (quoting United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). However, a police
officer's notion of criminal activity must be more than a
"mere generalized suspicion or hunch." People
v. Wheeler, 2020 CO 65, ¶ 13, 465 P.3d 47, 52.
Instead, the officer must have "a specific and
articulable basis in fact for suspecting that criminal
activity has occurred, is taking place, or is about to take
place." Brown, ¶ 10, 461 P.3d at 3
(quoting People v. Perez, 690 P.2d 853, 855 (Colo.
1984)); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22
(explaining that inarticulate hunches violate constitutional
rights). When determining whether a police officer
articulated a reasonable suspicion, courts look for specific
facts "'known to the officer,' which 'taken
together with rational inferences from those facts,' gave
rise to 'a reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity' justifying the intrusion into the
defendant's personal privacy." Wheeler,
¶ 13, 465 P.3d at 52 (quoting People v.
Funez-Paiagua, 2012 CO 37, ¶ 9, 276 P.3d 576,
578-79).
¶16
This standard requires trial courts to consider the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the investigatory stop.
Id. When considering the totality of the
circumstances, officers must articulate specific facts that
support their belief of criminal activity and thus reasonably
warrant an investigatory stop. Brown, ¶¶
10-11, 461 P.3d at 3.
¶17
In their consideration, courts must keep "in mind that
'[a]n officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences
from all the circumstantial evidence, '" even where
such evidence may support other interpretations. Id.
at ¶ 11, 461 P.3d at 3 (alteration in original) (quoting
People v. Threlkel, 2019 CO 18, ¶ 20, 438 P.3d
722, 727). While no one factor is dispositive, we have
previously provided some criteria relevant to this
determination, including (1) the officer's observations
of the "activity by the particular person stopped"
and (2) the officer's "knowledge or suspicion that
the person or vehicle stopped has been involved in some
criminality of the type presently under investigation."
Id. (quoting People v. Bell, 698 P.2d 269,
272 (Colo. 1985)).
¶18
With these standards in mind, we now turn to the facts of
this case.
¶19
Moreno argues (and the trial court found) that because the
anonymous tip was provided more than three months prior to
the surveillance or any other intervening action, the
information was stale. But while the possible staleness of
the tip is problematic and "is certainly a factor, it is
not dispositive; instead, the totality of the circumstances
must be considered." Id. at ¶ 13, 461 P.3d
at 3.
¶20
In this case, the officers testified that the anonymous tip
was heavily detailed: In addition to stating that there was a
large amount of in-and-out traffic, the informant provided
the names and descriptions of the residents, as well as what
types of drugs were being sold, where they were stored, and
how they were sold. Although the information was three months
old, the officers confirmed several facts from the tip such
as the location of the house, the description of the
residents, and the description of their car.
¶21
Further, the officers witnessed Moreno acting in a strange,
hypervigilant manner throughout the time they surveilled him.
Moreno greeted the husband and followed him into a small
shed, emerging empty-handed and being hypervigilant to his
surroundings. Moreno paid extraordinary attention to the
patrol car, both when he drove away from the residence and
when he arrived at the truck stop. Moreno continued to act
strangely at the truck stop-first pulling up next to a gas
pump without filling his gas tank, then moving to the air
compressor and wandering around with the hose for several
minutes but never filling his tires. And finally, Moreno
reunited with the residents at the gas station, less than an
hour after their initial interaction, and immediately got
into their SUV while carrying a black backpack.
¶22
We conclude that "from all the circumstantial
evidence" outlined above, the officers "dr[e]w
reasonable inferences." See id. at ¶ 11,
461 P.3d at 3 (quoting Threlkel, ¶ 20, 438 P.3d
at 727). The details provided in the anonymous tip allowed
them to identify the individuals described in the tip and
then watch them interact with Moreno both at the house and
when they reunited at the gas station. The officers observed
nothing that produced a legitimate explanation for
Moreno's strange behavior at the truck stop, and none
appears to have existed. In our view, the officers reasonably
inferred that Moreno was merely trying to look like he was
engaging in normal activities (pumping gas and filling his
tires) before leaving his truck and joining the residents
from the house in their car.[1]
¶23
Accordingly, after considering the totality of the
circumstances - including the detailed and corroborated tip,
Moreno's strange behavior, his hypervigilance,
and his interaction with the residents-we conclude that the
officers had reasonable suspicion. To be sure, any one of
these facts by itself would be insufficient to give rise to
reasonable suspicion. But taken together, the facts and the
rational inferences that could be drawn from them established
reasonable suspicion to believe that Moreno was carrying
illegal drugs. Under the totality of the circumstances, even
though the evidence may support other interpretations of the
facts, the officers' explanation of the situation
provided an articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.