Peo v. Suazo

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 5, 2024
• Docket: 22CA0668
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

22CA0668 Peo v Suazo 09-05-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA0668

Mesa County District Court No. 20CR1466

Honorable Matthew D. Barrett, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Chastity Renea Suazo,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III

Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE

Dunn and Bernard*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced September 05, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Assistant Attorney

General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, John Plimpton, Deputy State

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.

1

¶ 1 Defendant, Chastity Renea Suazo, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding her guilty of possession

with intent to distribute methamphetamine, conspiracy to

distribute methamphetamine, and possession of drug

paraphernalia. We affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 In 2020, the Western Colorado Drug Task Force (Task Force)

began investigating Suazo and others for their involvement in a

conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine. In

September 2020, Detective Chad Simpson applied for a search

warrant that authorized him to affix a GPS device to Suazo’s vehicle

after another officer witnessed Suazo involved in a possible hand-

to-hand drug sale.

¶ 3 A month later, Detective Simpson and other Task Force

officers surveilling Suazo observed her with Bruce Seagrave, who

was also under investigation for involvement in the drug

conspiracy. Officers saw Suazo and Seagrave seated in different

cars parked in front of a storage facility unit. When Suazo drove

away from the storage facility, Detective Simpson — who was aware

Suazo had an active warrant for driving on a suspended license —

2

notified Seargent Shaver Hansen, a Mesa County sheriff’s deputy,

who in turn initiated a traffic stop of Suazo.

¶ 4 Suazo pulled into the driveway of a residence. Once Suazo’s

car came to a stop, she “quickly exited the vehicle” and locked the

keys inside of it. While running Suazo’s driver’s license, Sergeant

Hansen observed “a [s]harp[]s container” in the car’s back

passenger seat, which he presumed contained used hypodermic

needles. Suazo continued to place and take phone calls despite

Sergeant Hansen asking her to stop. Suazo’s husband, Earnest

Vega, arrived at the location of the traffic stop shortly thereafter and

offered to “take the car immediately.”

¶ 5 Sergeant Hansen requested the assistance of a drug-detection

dog to conduct a drug sniff of the vehicle, and Officer Joey Gonzalez

and his K-9, Merlin, arrived on the scene. After Merlin positively

alerted on the front passenger side door, the officers searched

Suazo’s car and found the following items: a sharps container with

used hypodermic needles, a used hypodermic needle inside of a

purse, a set of brass knuckles, approximately a half of a pound of

methamphetamine inside of the pocket of a winter coat, $864.01 in

cash, and three cell phones. Suazo was arrested on multiple

3

charges, including driving under restraint and possession of drug

paraphernalia.

¶ 6 In the days following Suazo’s arrest, officers searched Suazo’s

storage unit and residence. In Suazo’s storage unit, officers found

“a pay owe sheet . . . with various names and quantities next to the

names,” hypodermic syringes, and a used pipe commonly used to

smoke methamphetamine. In Suazo’s home, officers found a pencil

case with individual small bags, needles, a digital scale with

suspected methamphetamine residue, Suazo’s photo ID and mail,

bigger plastic bags, and a safe.

¶ 7 The prosecution charged Suazo with possession with intent to

manufacture or distribute more than 112 grams of

methamphetamine, possession of an illegal weapon, driving under

restraint, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conspiracy to

distribute more than 225 grams of methamphetamine. The jury

found Suazo guilty of possession with intent to sell or distribute

more than 112 grams of methamphetamine, possession of drug

paraphernalia, and conspiracy to sell or distribute more than 225

grams of methamphetamine. The jury acquitted Suazo of the

remaining charges.

4

¶ 8 The district court imposed a $100 fine for the possession of

drug paraphernalia charge and sentenced Suazo to concurrent

sentences of twenty-four years in the custody of the Department of

Corrections for the possession with intent to distribute and the

conspiracy to sell or distribute charges.

¶ 9 Suazo appeals her convictions asserting that (1) the district

court erred by denying her motions to suppress the evidence seized

from her car during the traffic stop; (2) the district court erred by

permitting Detective Simpson to testify about the search warrant to

affix the GPS tracking device to her vehicle; (3) her convictions for

possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute

violate double jeopardy; (4) the district court erred by considering

her lack of remorse at sentencing; and (5) the alleged errors are

cumulative. We address each contention in turn.

II. Denial of Motions to Suppress

¶ 10 Suazo argues that the district court erred by denying her

pretrial motions to suppress because (1) law enforcement lacked

justification to extend the traffic stop, and (2) the drug-detection

dog’s alert was unreliable.

5

A. Additional Relevant Facts

¶ 11 Suazo filed two pretrial motions to suppress seeking to exclude

evidence obtained from the search of her vehicle. The district court

denied Suazo’s motions following an evidentiary hearing.

¶ 12 Relying on Suazo’s active warrant for her arrest, the court

concluded, “[T]here’s no dispute that there was reasonable

suspicion, if not probable cause, to effectuate the stop of [the]

vehicle.” The court also concluded that the traffic stop was not

unlawfully extended because Seargent Hansen had an objectively

reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal activity had

occurred or was occurring based on (1) Suazo’s decision to pull into

a private driveway and immediately exit her vehicle and lock the

keys in the car; (2) Seargent Hansen’s observation that Suazo’s

vehicle contained a “sharps” container and used and unused

hypodermic needles; (3) Seargent Hansen’s knowledge that the Task

Force wanted to contact Suazo for investigation; and (4) Suazo’s

agitated behavior, which included placing phone calls to Vega to

come get the car.

¶ 13 The court also found that about twenty-four minutes passed

between the traffic stop and the time Suazo was arrested on her

6

active warrant. From there, another fifteen minutes passed before

the drug-detection dog arrived — resulting in Suazo being detained

for a total of thirty-eight minutes, which the court found was not

unreasonable. Finally, relying on the drug-detection dog’s training

and certifications, as well as Officer Gonzalez’s credible testimony,

the court concluded that the dog’s alert was reliable.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 14 Our review of court’s ruling on a motion to suppress involves a

mixed question of fact and law. People v. Moreno, 2022 CO 19,

¶ 12. We defer to the district court’s factual findings as long as

they’re supported by sufficient competent evidence in the record.

Id. We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions. People

v. Cline, 2019 CO 33, ¶ 13.

C. Justification to Extend Traffic Stop

¶ 15 Suazo first challenges the district court’s ruling as to Seargent

Hansen’s justification to extend the traffic stop. We discern no

error.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 16 The State and Federal Constitutions protect individuals from

unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. U.S. Const.

7

amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. A warrantless search is

presumptively unreasonable and thus unconstitutional unless an

exception to the warrant requirement exists. People v. McKnight,

2019 CO 36, ¶ 23. One exception to the warrant requirement is an

investigatory stop. People v. Funez-Paiagua, 2012 CO 37, ¶ 7; see

also People v. Gamboa-Jimenez, 2022 COA 10, ¶ 36 (investigatory

stops typically include traffic stops).

¶ 17 Investigatory stops must be justified by an officer’s

“reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the detainee is

committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime” and,

further, are “limited in scope to a brief detention to confirm or

dispel that suspicion.” People v. Fields, 2018 CO 2, ¶ 12.

¶ 18 Seizures resulting from a suspected traffic violation can

become unreasonable if they are “‘prolonged beyond the time

reasonably required to complete’ the mission of the traffic stop.”

People v. Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 66, ¶ 20 (quoting Illinois v.

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). However, if an officer

“discovers information giving rise to a new reasonable suspicion,

the encounter may lawfully be extended to permit further

investigation.” Id. at ¶ 21. To determine whether a traffic stop was

8

unreasonably extended, “we must ‘consider[] the facts and

circumstances that gave rise to the initial stop plus any additional

information learned by the officer before issuing a warning or

citation.’” Gamboa-Jimenez, ¶ 39 (quoting People v.

Cervantes-Arredondo, 17 P.3d 141, 148 (Colo. 2001)).

2. Analysis

¶ 19 Suazo concedes Seargent Hansen had reasonable suspicion to

conduct an investigatory stop due to her invalid driver’s license and

the active warrant for her arrest. See id. at ¶ 37 (“[A]n officer only

needs to have reasonable suspicion that a driver has committed a

traffic violation to pull the driver over.”). However, Suazo contends

the officer impermissibly extended the stop for the drug-detection

dog, Merlin, to arrive.

¶ 20 But Sergeant Hansen had more than reasonable suspicion

when he initiated the traffic stop — he had probable cause to arrest

Suazo based upon her outstanding warrant. See People v. Gouker,

665 P.2d 113, 116 (Colo. 1983) (an outstanding warrant is prima

facie evidence of probable cause); see also Fields, ¶ 12 (“[I]f probable

cause for an arrest has been acquired, the detention no longer need

be justified as an investigatory stop but is rather justified as an

9

arrest.”). Seargent Hansen testified that he decided to arrest Suazo

and then request the K-9 unit based on her outstanding warrant,

his observation of drug paraphernalia in Suazo’s car, and her

erratic behavior during the traffic stop. Though she was initially

stopped because of the active traffic warrant, “a shift in

investigatory purpose is not improper when the underlying

detention remains lawful.” Chavez-Barragan, ¶ 26; see also People

v. Johnson, 2024 CO 47, ¶ 43 (concluding drug-detection dog’s sniff

and search of defendant’s vehicle need not be examined as an

extension of an investigatory stop because officer had probable

cause to arrest defendant).

¶ 21 Thus, because Seargent Hansen had probable cause to arrest

Suazo when he initiated the traffic stop, we need not examine

whether the stop was unreasonably extended. See Fields, ¶ 12.

D. Reliability of the Drug-Detection Dog

¶ 22 Second, Suazo challenges the district court’s ruling as to the

reliability of the drug-detection dog in creating probable cause for a

search. Again, we discern no error.

10

1. Applicable Law

¶ 23 An officer may conduct a search of a car without first

obtaining a warrant if the officer has lawfully stopped a vehicle and

has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a

crime. McKnight, ¶ 24. A police officer has probable cause to

conduct a search when there are facts available to the officer that

would cause a reasonably cautious person to believe that

contraband or evidence of a crime is present. People v. Zuniga,

2016 CO 52, ¶ 16. In analyzing probable cause, we consider the

totality of the circumstances. People v. Smith, 2022 CO 38, ¶ 29.

And, in instances where a satisfactorily trained drug-detection dog

is involved, the dog’s alert alone may be sufficient to support

probable cause. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246-47 (2013);

Gamboa-Jimenez, ¶ 59.

2. Analysis

¶ 24 Officer Gonzalez testified that he and Merlin had been through

extensive training together, that Merlin was certified through the

Colorado Police Canine Association and the National Police Canine

Association, that they both maintain ongoing certification, and that

they were both certified in October 2020. He also testified that he

11

had been in the K-9 unit for approximately three years, that he had

been Merlin’s only handler during that time, and that he was

familiar with the changes in Merlin’s body language and breathing

patterns that signal the potential presence of illegal substances.

Officer Gonzalez further testified that at the time of the stop, Merlin

was trained to detect cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin and

that Merlin alerted positively at the exterior passenger side door

handle of Suazo’s car.

¶ 25 The district court found there was probable cause to search

Suazo’s car for narcotics because Merlin was a reliable, properly

trained, and certified drug-detection dog. And because the district

court’s findings are supported by the record, we won’t disturb them.

III. Testimony Regarding Search Warrant

¶ 26 Suazo next asserts the district court erred when it permitted

Detective Simpson to testify that he applied for and received a

search warrant to attach a GPS tracking device to Suazo’s vehicle in

the weeks before the traffic stop because whether the Task Force

had probable cause to surveil Suazo was not at issue. We aren’t

persuaded.

12

A. Additional Relevant Facts

¶ 27 Suazo objected to Detective Simpon’s testimony that he had

“applied for a search warrant which would authorize [him] to place

a GPS device on . . . Suazo’s vehicle,” arguing that it was “judicial

bolstering.” The district court overruled Suazo’s objection, but later

indicated that Suazo could supplement her objection with case law,

and if appropriate, the court would provide a limiting instruction to

the jury.

¶ 28 The next day, Suazo supplemented her objection by citing

People v. Mullins, 104 P.3d 299 (Colo. App. 2004). The district court

reviewed Mullins and again overruled the objection — noting that

Mullins was distinguishable — but indicated it would provide a

curative jury instruction if Suazo desired. Suazo declined to have

the court provide a curative instruction to the jury.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 29 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Gonzales v. People, 2020 CO 71, ¶ 25. A court abuses

its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair or based on an erroneous understanding of

the law. Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 463 (Colo. 2009).

13

¶ 30 Because Suazo preserved this issue, we review for

nonconstitutional harmless error and reverse only for errors that

substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the

trial. See People v. Martinez, 2020 COA 141, ¶¶ 26-28.

C. Applicable Law and Analysis

¶ 31 “[W]here probable cause to arrest or search is not at issue, it is

improper to present to the jury evidence about obtaining an arrest

or search warrant.” Mullins, 104 P.3d at 301. However, under

some circumstances, police officers may testify about why they took

certain investigative steps, even when “this testimony touches upon

prohibited subjects.” People v. Penn, 2016 CO 32, ¶ 32.

¶ 32 As the district court found, Detective Simpson wasn’t testifying

about the process of obtaining a search warrant or the standard for

probable cause. See Mullins, 104 P.3d at 300. Instead, his

testimony was offered to provide context about the Task Force’s

investigation of Suazo and the chain of events preceding the traffic

stop. See Penn, ¶ 33. And because Detective Simpson’s testimony

was brief and didn’t suggest that Suazo had committed a particular

offense or that the court believed the same, the concern addressed

14

by the supreme court in Mullins was not present here. See Mullins,

104 P.3d at 302.

¶ 33 Further, even if admission of this testimony was erroneous, we

aren’t persuaded that it substantially influenced the verdict or

affected the fairness of the trial. The statement was isolated, the

prosecution didn’t mention the statement in closing argument or

otherwise reference it again, and Suazo declined the court’s

proffered limiting jury instruction. And the evidence of Suazo’s

guilt was overwhelming. In addition to the nearly half a pound of

methamphetamine found in her car following her arrest, officers

found paraphernalia and evidence of distribution in Suazo’s car,

home, and storage unit, and multiple witness testified they had

observed Suazo in possession of large amounts of

methamphetamine or that Suazo had sold them methamphetamine.

¶ 34 Accordingly, any error in permitting Detective Simpson’s

testimony that he applied for a warrant was harmless.

IV. Double Jeopardy

¶ 35 Suazo also argues her convictions for possession with intent to

distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine violate double jeopardy. We disagree.

15

A. Standard of Review

¶ 36 We review de novo a claim that a defendant’s conviction

violates her constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

People v. Arzabala, 2012 COA 99, ¶ 19.

¶ 37 Suazo did not preserve this issue. However, when a defendant

establishes a district court violated double jeopardy principles, an

appellate court is required to remedy the error by merging the

convictions. Whiteaker v. People, 2024 CO 25, ¶¶ 23-28; see also

People v. Lowe, 2020 COA 116, ¶ 38 (“[W]hen a defendant’s double

jeopardy rights have been violated, [she] is entitled to the

appropriate relief on appeal.”).

B. Applicable Law

¶ 38 The double jeopardy clause protects criminal defendants from

multiplicity, Arzabala, ¶ 20, which occurs “when the same offense

is charged in multiple counts and results in multiple punishments,”

People v. Borghesi, 66 P.3d 93, 98 (Colo. 2003). However, the

prosecution may “pursue multiple convictions if the underlying

evidence supports factually distinct offenses.” Woellhaf v. People,

105 P.3d 209, 218 (Colo. 2005).

16

¶ 39 To determine whether a defendant is prosecuted for multiple

charges under the same criminal statute, we apply a two-pronged

test. People v. Manzanares, 2020 COA 140M, ¶ 41. First, we

identify the legislatively prescribed unit of prosecution. Woellhaf,

105 P.3d at 215. Second, we determine if the defendant’s conduct

constitutes factually distinct offenses by examining the “factual

components of each prosecution and the evidence in support

thereof.” Id. (quoting People v. Williams, 651 P.2d 899, 902-03

(Colo. 1982)). “If the convictions are not based on separate

offenses, they merge with one another.” Arzabala, ¶ 22.

¶ 40 Section 18-18-405(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, states,

[I]t is unlawful for any person knowingly to

manufacture, dispense, sell, or distribute, or to

possess with intent to manufacture, dispense,

sell, or distribute, a controlled substance; . . .

or conspire with one or more other persons, to

manufacture, dispense, sell, distribute, or

possess with intent to manufacture, dispense,

sell, or distribute, a controlled substance . . . .

¶ 41 The supreme court examined section 18-18-405 and

concluded that the “acts enumerated in [sub]section 405(1)(a) all

represent stages in the commission of one crime.” People v.

Abiodun, 111 P.3d 462, 468 (Colo. 2005). However, “[t]he various

17

enumerated acts are related, or fall along the same continuum . . .

only to the extent that they potentially involve the distribution of

the same quantum of contraband.” Id. at 470. Thus, “[a]s long as

each legally distinct offense has been charged with sufficient

specificity to distinguish it from other offenses, and the evidence at

trial is sufficient to support convictions of each charge, general

verdicts of guilt will be adequate to support multiple convictions.”

Id. at 471 (citation omitted).

¶ 42 Whether the prosecution presented evidence of factually

distinct conduct to support two separate convictions “hinges on

whether the prosecution provided sufficient evidence to show the

existence of more than one quantum of drugs.” People v. Davis,

2015 CO 36M, ¶ 36. The convictions must merge if both “charges

arise out of actions involving a single ‘discrete quantum of drugs.’”

Id. at ¶ 35 (citation omitted).

C. Analysis

¶ 43 Suazo’s convictions for possession with intent to sell or

distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to sell or distribute

were based on factually distinct conduct. The prosecution

presented evidence linking the specific quantities of drugs to the

18

respective charges during trial — namely, the possession charge

was based on the 202.88 grams of methamphetamine found in

Suazo’s car, and the conspiracy charge was based on witness

testimony indicating Suazo was observed on multiple occasions

with up to a pound of methamphetamine that she gave to others to

sell. The prosecution also presented evidence that the respective

charges were based on different events separated by space and

time — specifically, methamphetamine found in Suazo’s car during

the October 2020 traffic stop and quantities of up to one pound sold

and delivered to individuals for resale from August through

December 2020. See Abiodun, 111 P.3d at 471 (noting factors like

“proximity in space and time, intervening events, and volitional

departures” assist in assessing whether transactions are sufficiently

distinct); see also People v. Flowers, 128 P.3d 285, 290-91 (Colo.

App. 2005) (concluding that the defendant’s convictions for

possession of cocaine and distribution of cocaine were based on

factually distinct conduct when counsel argued that the charges

were based on different quantities of drugs involved in different

events). Therefore, the prosecution presented evidence

19

demonstrating that the charges were based on factually distinct

conduct.

¶ 44 Accordingly, because the evidence was sufficient to support

the separate offenses of possession with intent to sell or distribute

and conspiracy to sell or distribute, we conclude Suazo’s

convictions do not violate double jeopardy.

V. Considerations During Sentencing

¶ 45 Suazo next argues that the district court erred when it

considered her lack of expression of remorse during sentencing. We

discern no error.

A. Additional Relevant Facts

¶ 46 At Suazo’s sentencing hearing, the district court informed

Suazo of her right to remain silent and her right to address the

court before sentencing. Suazo affirmatively chose to exercise her

right to remain silent.

¶ 47 In its sentencing order, the court noted that Suazo had three

prior drug-related felony convictions (two of which were for

distribution), that she had “been doing this for over 20 years,” and

that the evidence overwhelmingly showed Suazo was the leader of a

20

drug organization and was dealing substantial quantities of

methamphetamine.

¶ 48 The court then stated the case was about the following:

[A] dealer, plain and simple, who chose to

peddle methamphetamine to those in our

community who are most in danger of it and

she has no remorse for it, and she did it all

while on probation, having twice, three times

before been convicted of controlled substance

related activity.

¶ 49 The court went on to emphasize that Suazo ran an

organization engaged in the distribution of pounds of

methamphetamine and that she “tried to run it from the jail, too”

before concluding that the circumstances were “aggravating.”

¶ 50 The court considered the sentencing range of twelve to thirty-

two years — with twenty-two years as the midpoint. Ultimately, the

court determined that Suazo’s case didn’t fall on the “lesser end of

the spectrum” given the allegations proved at trial and Suazo’s

criminal history but that the case also didn’t warrant the highest

end of the range given the “nature of the organization.”

¶ 51 The district court sentenced Suazo to concurrent sentences of

twenty-four years in the custody of the Department of Corrections

for the possession and conspiracy charges. As the court was

21

imposing this sentence, it stopped to ask, “Is something funny, Ms.

Suazo?” Suazo replied, “Absolutely. That is a whole lot of time.”

Suazo didn’t object to the court’s remarks and didn’t move for

reconsideration of her sentence.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 52 We review constitutional challenges to the district court’s

sentencing determinations de novo. Villanueva v. People, 199 P.3d

1228, 1231 (Colo. 2008). Because Suazo raised an unpreserved

argument premised on a constitutional violation, we review for plain

error. See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14.

C. Applicable Law

¶ 53 “In exercising its sentencing discretion, a trial court must

consider a number of factors, including the rehabilitative potential

of the offender.” People v. Lopez, 129 P.3d 1061, 1067 (Colo. App.

2005). “An offender’s lack of remorse and failure to accept

responsibility are relevant to the issue of rehabilitative potential.”

Id. But “[w]hen a defendant maintains [their] constitutional right to

remain silent throughout trial and the sentencing hearing, the court

cannot construe this silence to indicate a lack of remorse that will

22

support a sentence in the aggravated range.” People v. Everett, 250

P.3d 649, 664 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 54 A court “may rely on any evidence in the record to justify a

finding that [the] defendant lacked remorse.” Id. Indeed, a district

court’s “remarks about [the] defendant’s lack of remorse . . . and

failure to take responsibility must be viewed in the context of its

other findings.” Lopez, 129 P.3d at 1068.

¶ 55 If a district court considers a defendant’s silence in violation of

their Fifth Amendment right, the error is harmless, and “the

sentence imposed may be affirmed only if the record clearly

supports the conclusion that the trial court would have imposed the

same sentence even had it not considered the constitutionally

illegitimate factor.” People v. Young, 987 P.2d 889, 895 (Colo. App.

1999).

D. Analysis

¶ 56 Relying on Young, Suazo argues that the district court

reversibly erred by interpreting the exercise of her right to remain

silent as a lack of remorse. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 57 In Young, a division of this court held that “if a defendant

maintains [their] innocence and invokes [their] right against

23

self-incrimination both at trial and at sentencing, a trial court

cannot constitutionally consider [their] lack of an expression of

remorse as an aggravating circumstance.” 987 P.2d at 894-95.

¶ 58 Here, the court’s brief statement about Suazo’s lack of remorse

was made in the context of its review of Suazo’s actions in the case

and her prior relevant criminal history. See Lopez, 129 P.3d at

1068; see also Everett, 250 P.3d at 664. Notably, the court did not

indicate it intended to punish Suazo for exercising her right to

remain silent.

¶ 59 Before sentencing Suazo, the district court made detailed

findings taking into consideration many factors, including Suazo’s

prior felony convictions, the impact of methamphetamine on the

community, deterrence principles, and punishment. After

considering these factors, the court imposed a sentence of twenty-

four years, just over the median range of twelve to thirty-two years.

The court thus imposed a sentence within the statutory range,

based on appropriate considerations that are reflected in the record

and factually supported by the circumstances of the case. Under

these circumstances, we aren’t persuaded that the district court

improperly considered Suazo’s exercise of her right to remain silent.

24

But, even if it did, any error was harmless. See Young, 987 P.2d at

895.

VI. There is No Cumulative Error

¶ 60 Finally, Suazo argues the four errors she has asserted warrant

reversal under the cumulative error doctrine. To reverse based on

the cumulative error doctrine, we “must identify multiple errors that

collectively prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant, even if

any single error does not.” Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69,

¶ 25. Here, we need not conduct a cumulative error analysis

because we have concluded that the district court did not reversibly

err. See People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 152 (“The doctrine of

cumulative error requires that numerous errors be committed, not

merely alleged.”).

VII. Disposition

¶ 61 We affirm the judgment of conviction.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE BERNARD concur.