22CA1900 Peo v Gonsalez 02-20-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA1900 Jefferson County District Court No. 21CR2914 Honorable Robert Lochary, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
John Raymond Gonsalez,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE WELLING J. Jones and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 20, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kevin M. Whitfield, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, John Raymond Gonsalez, appeals the judgment of
conviction on one count of felony driving while ability impaired
(DWAI) – fourth or subsequent (FDWAI), a class 4 felony. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 At around 10:30 a.m., employees at the Jefferson County
Action Center1 called police to report a possible drunk driver whom
employees had seen “driving erratically” and cutting in line.
According to Action Center employees, the driver was stumbling,
mumbling, and “very animated,” and after an employee opened the
car door to give him food, an empty alcohol bottle — a shooter of
Fireball — fell out. The driver was later identified as Gonsalez.
¶3 Although the first call was made at around 10:30 a.m., due to
a clerical error, officers weren’t dispatched until about 11 a.m.,
after receiving a second call from an Action Center employee.
Officers began arriving on scene about twenty minutes after being
dispatched. Agent Timothy Hazel was the first officer to arrive,
followed shortly by Agent Clay Guidry and then Agent Paul
1 The Action Center acts as a resource center for individuals in need
by providing them with access to necessities such as food, clothing, and rental assistance.
1 Ciarvella. When Agent Hazel first approached Gonsalez’s vehicle, he
saw an empty shooter of Fireball on the ground near the driver’s
side of the vehicle.
¶4 At some point while speaking with Agent Hazel, Gonsalez
“demanded to speak to a sergeant,” so Agent Hazel contacted one.
Agent Ciarvella, however, was unaware that Gonsalez had
requested to speak with a sergeant. According to Agent Ciarvella,
when he arrived, Gonsalez asked him if he was a sergeant. Agent
Ciarvella responded that he wasn’t and Gonsalez approached him
with an “aggressive” posture. Because of his aggressive posturing,
Agent Ciarvella handcuffed Gonsalez for “safety purposes.”
¶5 After placing Gonsalez in handcuffs, Agent Ciarvella began
questioning him. Agent Ciarvella asked Gonsalez “if he took a
breath test what he thought it’d show.” Gonsalez replied that he
thought it would be a “.34.” When Agent Ciarvella said the
estimated number sounded high, Gonsalez said that “he was an
alcoholic, and that’s . . . where he thought he was at then.” At
some point, after that exchange with Gonsalez, Agent Ciarvella
noticed the Fireball shooter on the ground and Gonsalez “blurted”
2 out that “the shooter probably came from him.” According to Agent
Ciarvella, his conversation with Gonsalez lasted only a few minutes.
¶6 After speaking with witnesses, Agent Ciarvella placed Gonsalez
in his patrol car, told him he was under arrest, and advised him of
the law regarding express consent at around 12:15 p.m. After being
advised, Gonsalez refused to submit to a chemical test of his breath
or blood.
¶7 The People charged Gonsalez with one count of driving under
the influence (DUI) (fourth or subsequent offense) and one count of
violation of a protection order prohibiting Gonsalez from consuming
alcohol. A jury found Gonsalez guilty of the lesser included offense
of FDWAI, and the People voluntarily dismissed the count for
violation of a protection order.
II. Analysis
¶8 Gonsalez raises three arguments on appeal, two of which
relate to the trial court’s rulings on suppression motions and the
third of which relates to the sufficiency of the evidence. First,
Gonsalez contends that his seizure by police — specifically, placing
him in handcuffs — constituted an arrest unsupported by probable
cause and necessitating the suppression of any evidence obtained
3 thereafter. Second, he contends that inculpatory statements he
made after he was handcuffed were the product of a custodial
interrogation in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and, therefore, should have been suppressed. Third, he
contends that the People failed to introduce sufficient evidence that
he had been convicted of at least three prior qualifying convictions,
which was necessary to secure a conviction for FDWAI. Below, we
address Gonsalez’s two suppression contentions together, followed
by an analysis of his sufficiency contention.
A. The Trial Court Didn’t Err by Denying Gonsalez’s Motions to Suppress Evidence
¶9 Both of Gonsalez’s suppression arguments involve his status
when he was placed in handcuffs. Gonsalez contends that upon
being placed in handcuffs, he was (1) formally arrested without
probable cause and (2) in custody for purposes of Miranda and then
interrogated in the absence of proper advisements. The trial court
rejected both of these arguments because it concluded that
Gonsalez was handcuffed during, and as part of, a proper
investigatory stop and that he was neither arrested nor in custody
when he was handcuffed and questioned.
4 ¶ 10 We approach Gonsalez’s challenges by considering (1) whether
the investigatory stop was reasonable in scope and duration
considering Gonsalez was placed in handcuffs during the course of
that investigatory stop; and (2) whether handcuffing Gonsalez
placed him in custody for Miranda purposes. Because we conclude
that officers conducted a proper and reasonable investigatory stop
and that Gonsalez wasn’t in custody for Miranda purposes, we
reject Gonsalez’s constitutional contentions and don’t reach the
issue of whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Gonsalez.
1. Additional Facts
¶ 11 Before trial, Gonsalez filed a motion to suppress evidence for
lack of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to detain and
arrest him and a motion to suppress illegally obtained statements.
The court held a two-day hearing on Gonsalez’s suppression
motions, at which the court heard from Agent Ciarvella, Agent
Guidry, and Agent Hazel. We recount relevant portions of the
officers’ testimony below.
¶ 12 Agent Hazel testified that upon arriving at the scene, he got
out of his car and Gonsalez approached him, appearing “highly
agitated” and “animated.” Agent Hazel also testified that Gonsalez’s
5 eyes were watery, and that, although he couldn’t smell any alcohol
on Gonsalez because he had lost his sense of smell due to COVID-
19, dispatch aired that someone had smelled alcohol on Gonsalez.
According to Agent Hazel, Gonsalez was “wondering what was going
on” and Agent Hazel told him that there were concerns about his
ability to drive. Gonsalez gave Agent Hazel his identifying
information, and using that information, Agent Hazel learned that
Gonsalez was subject to a protection order prohibiting him from
consuming or possessing alcohol.
¶ 13 Agent Hazel also testified that, when Agent Ciarvella arrived,
Gonsalez “was very agitated, and he walked up and asked him if he
was a sergeant, [and] got really close to him with his arms up by his
side.” On cross-examination, Agent Hazel testified that he believed
Gonsalez got within approximately two to three feet of Agent
Ciarvella and that Gonsalez’s body language was “aggressive.”
Agent Ciarvella similarly testified that, when he arrived, Gonsalez
approached him with an “aggressive posture.” Specifically, Agent
Ciarvella testified that Gonsalez leaned forward until he was about
eight inches from Agent Ciarvella’s face and put his arms out.
According to Agent Ciarvella, this prompted him to place Gonsalez
6 in handcuffs for safety purposes because of “how quickly [Gonsalez]
came up to [him], . . . pushing his face and chest forwards toward
[him]” in a manner that he deemed “aggressive.” Agent Ciarvella
testified that he told Gonsalez that he detained him “because of the
way he was acting.”
¶ 14 Agent Ciarvella also testified that before he detained Gonsalez,
he noticed indicia of alcohol intoxication, including a “moderate-to-
strong odor of a[n] unknown alcoholic beverage on [Gonsalez’s]
breath” and watery eyes. Once Gonsalez was handcuffed, Agent
Ciarvella began questioning him about whether he had been
drinking. According to Agent Ciarvella, Agent Hazel was near him
while he was questioning Gonsalez, but he “didn’t remember Agent
Guidry being within [the] immediate area.” Agent Ciarvella and
Agent Hazel both testified that they knew that Action Center staff
had taken Gonsalez’s keys.
¶ 15 Because the Action Center didn’t want Gonsalez’s car left on
their property, Agent Guidry began the impoundment process. As
part of the impoundment process, Agent Guidry conducted an
inventory search of Gonsalez’s car and empty Fireball shooters were
7 found in the car.2 Although Agent Guidry began impounding
Gonsalez’s car, the officers were able to find a family member of
Gonsalez’s who came and picked up the car, which obviated the
need for the officers to have the car towed.
¶ 16 After the hearing, the court denied both of Gonsalez’s
suppression motions. Regarding Gonsalez’s motion to suppress
evidence for lack of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, the
court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct
an investigatory stop. With regard to Gonsalez’s motion to suppress
illegally obtained statements, the court found that the statements
didn’t need to be suppressed because Gonsalez wasn’t in custody
for Fifth Amendment purposes when they were obtained.
2. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶ 17 Individuals are protected from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution.
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. Under the umbrella
2 Agent Ciarvella also testified that Gonsalez asked him to get a
cigarette lighter from his car and that, when he entered the car, he saw empty Fireball shooters in the car.
8 of the Fourth Amendment, there are “three types of police-citizen
contacts: consensual encounters, investigatory stops, and arrests.”
People v Martinez, 200 P.3d 1053, 1056 (Colo. 2009). Arrests and
investigatory stops are “seizures implicating the protections of the
Fourth Amendment and Article II, section 7.” Outlaw v. People, 17
P.3d 150, 154 (Colo. 2001).
¶ 18 An investigatory stop is less intrusive than an arrest and is
“justified upon reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the
detainee is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a
crime, and is limited in scope to a brief detention to confirm or
dispel that suspicion.” People v. Fields, 2018 CO 2, ¶ 12. When
assessing the reasonableness of an investigatory stop, courts
consider “(1) the length of the detention; (2) whether the officer
diligently pursued the basis for the initial stop; (3) whether the
suspect was required to move from one location to another; and (4)
whether there were alternative, less intrusive means available.”
People v. Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 66, ¶ 22. This list of factors
isn’t exhaustive; indeed, in other cases, courts have considered the
degree of force used by officers during an encounter. Id. at ¶ 23.
9 ¶ 19 An investigatory stop can become an arrest when it “involves
more than a brief detention and questioning.” Martinez, 200 P.3d at
1057. An arrest is more intrusive than an investigatory stop and “is
justified only upon the acquisition of probable cause to believe a
crime has been committed by the detainee.” Fields, ¶ 12. “Whether
a formal arrest has been announced or not, an infringement on the
liberty of a detainee exceeding that permitted as an investigatory
stop, in the absence of probable cause to arrest, amounts to an
unlawful seizure.” Id.
¶ 20 A suspect must be advised of his rights under the Fifth
Amendment before being subjected to a custodial interrogation.
People v. Sampson, 2017 CO 100, ¶ 17. The prosecution can’t
introduce in its case-in-chief any statement “procured by custodial
interrogation” that wasn’t preceded by “certain warnings.” Effland
v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 873 (Colo. 2010) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 444). A person is in custody for purposes of Miranda protections
if “a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have
believed that his freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree
associated with a formal arrest.” Sampson, ¶ 18. In assessing
whether a suspect is in custody, courts evaluate the totality of the
10 circumstances surrounding questioning and should consider the
following non-exhaustive list of factors:
(1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; (7) the officer’s response to any questions asked by the defendant; (8) whether directions were given to the defendant during the interrogation; and (9) the defendant’s verbal or nonverbal response to such directions.
Id. (quoting People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 465-66 (Colo. 2002)).
¶ 21 Review of a “trial court’s suppression order presents a mixed
question of law and fact.” People v. Moreno, 2022 CO 19, ¶ 12
(quoting People v. McIntyre, 2014 CO 39, ¶ 13). We defer to the trial
court’s findings of fact if they are supported by the record, but “we
review the legal effects of those facts de novo.” Id. Determining
whether a suspect was in custody for the purposes of Miranda “is a
mixed question of law and fact.” Sampson, ¶ 16. We defer to the
trial court’s findings of fact and credibility if they are supported by
the record, but “we review de novo the legal determination of
11 whether an individual is in custody for” the purposes of Miranda.
Id.
3. Analysis of the Suppression Issues
a. The Investigatory Stop Was Reasonable in Scope and Duration and Handcuffing Gonsalez Didn’t Convert the Investigatory Stop Into an Arrest
¶ 22 We first address Gonsalez’s assertion that the trial court
erroneously found that he was subjected to a reasonable
investigatory stop when Agent Ciarvella handcuffed him. Gonsalez
contends that rather than subject him to a proper investigatory
stop, the officers arrested him without probable cause. This,
Gonsalez argues, warrants suppression of the fruits of his illegal
arrest, including any incriminating statements, the empty shooters
found in his car, and his express consent refusal. We discern no
error.
¶ 23 When considering the reasonableness of the officers’
investigatory stop, the court found that (1) “the length of the
intrusion was very brief”; (2) the agents did “diligently pursue the
investigation during the detention”; (3) while Gonsalez “was
required to move from one location to another,” it was reasonable
because the intrusion was relatively brief and for the safety of the
12 officers and others; and (4) “there weren’t any less intrusive means
that were appropriate given the totality of the circumstances here.”
¶ 24 We agree with the trial court’s conclusion as to the
reasonableness of the investigatory stop. Gonsalez was handcuffed
almost immediately upon Agent Ciarvella’s arrival approximately
twenty minutes after the first officers responded. While the entire
encounter took over an hour, that doesn’t affect our analysis of the
status of the stop from the time Gonsalez was handcuffed to the
time that he was formally arrested. Further, during the stop, the
officers limited their focus to an investigation of whether Gonsalez
had been drinking and driving. We acknowledge that Gonsalez was
moved and handcuffed during the stop. But Agent Ciarvella
testified that these actions were taken due to actions that he
perceived as aggressive, and the trial court credited that testimony.
Indeed, the record supports the conclusion that Gonsalez
approached Agent Ciarvella, got within approximately eight inches
of his face, and took on a potentially threatening posture. These
circumstances support the court’s finding that Agent Ciarvella took
the least intrusive means available to ensure his safety and the
safety of others by handcuffing Gonsalez and directing his
13 movements. This interaction, therefore, remained a reasonable
investigatory stop in both scope and duration.
¶ 25 Agent Ciarvella’s handcuffing Gonsalez, by itself, doesn’t
necessitate a finding that Gonsalez had been placed under arrest.
See People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300, 305 (Colo. 2000) (Officers may
take actions to ensure their safety during an investigatory stop,
“[e]ven the use of handcuffs does not automatically transform a
detention into an arrest.”). The trial court noted as much when it
said that Agent Ciarvella’s use of handcuffs during the stop was
reasonable because Agent Ciarvella testified that Gonsalez acted
aggressively. Accordingly, the court didn’t err by rejecting
Gonsalez’s contention that he was arrested when he was placed in
handcuffs and properly concluded that the officers conducted a
constitutional investigatory stop.
b. Gonsalez Wasn’t in Custody for Miranda Purposes
¶ 26 Gonsalez separately contends that the trial court erred by
finding that he wasn’t subjected to a custodial interrogation after
Agent Ciarvella handcuffed him. According to Gonsalez, his
incriminating statements, namely that his BAC would be a “.34”
and that he is an “alcoholic,” were the product of a custodial
14 interrogation in which he wasn’t given warnings required by
Miranda.
¶ 27 In its ruling on Gonsalez’s motion to suppress his statements
due to Miranda violations, the trial court found that the officers
subjected Gonsalez to an interrogation. The People don’t challenge
this finding, and we agree that it was correct. Thus, we need only
address the court’s conclusion that Gonsalez wasn’t in custody for
Miranda purposes.
¶ 28 In its ruling, the trial court considered the factors set forth in
Sampson. In particular, the court found that (1) when Gonsalez
was handcuffed and questioned, it was daylight, in a public parking
lot, with numerous members of the public around; (2) the officers
who communicated with Gonsalez did so in a conversational tone
and were not overbearing; (3) the duration of the interrogation was
very brief; (4) while Gonsalez was restrained, this was done for
officer safety and the safety of others; and (5) minimal directions
were given to Gonsalez.
¶ 29 The record supports the trial court’s factual findings and,
applying these factual findings to the law, we conclude that, based
15 on the totality of the circumstances, Gonsalez wasn’t in custody for
¶ 30 After considering the factors set forth in Sampson, we
conclude that a couple of factors weigh in favor of a custody finding,
namely the following:
• At least two officers, Agent Ciarvella and Agent Hazel, were
present during the interrogation.
• Officers physically restrained Gonsalez by placing him in
handcuffs.3
¶ 31 But the balance of the Sampson factors weigh against a
custody finding, including the following:
• The interrogation occurred during the day, and in a public
place.
• The officers’ tone was conversational, and they didn’t use
threatening language when addressing Gonsalez.
• None of the officers ever drew or otherwise brandished a
weapon.
3 Although Gonsalez argues that he was further restrained because
his keys were taken, his keys weren’t taken by the officers and, therefore, that fact doesn’t weigh in favor of a custody determination.
16 • Although the total encounter took over an hour, Agent
Ciarvella indicated that he began interrogating Gonsalez
almost immediately after he was handcuffed and that his
questioning only lasted a few minutes.4
• Gonsalez asked the officers questions, primarily about when
a sergeant would be present, and they responded to his
questions in a conversational tone.
• Although the officers told Gonsalez to stay in one place, that
was primarily because he was fidgety, and they had
concerns for their safety and the safety of those around
them. While it appears that Gonsalez remained fidgety
throughout the encounter, the officers’ tone remained
conversational, weighing against a custody determination.
¶ 32 Based on the totality of circumstances, and applying the
Sampson factors, we conclude that Gonsalez wasn’t in custody for
Miranda purposes when he was interrogated. Therefore, the trial
court properly declined to suppress Gonsalez’s statements.
4 Even if, at some point, the detention of Gonsalez became custodial
because of the duration that he remained in handcuffs, he wasn’t in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements, which was almost immediately after he was handcuffed.
17 B. Whether the People Presented Sufficient Evidence that Gonsalez had Prior Qualifying Convictions
¶ 33 We next address Gonsalez’s assertion that the People
introduced insufficient evidence to prove that he had three prior
qualifying convictions. According to Gonsalez, the People only
provided sufficient evidence to prove that he had two prior
qualifying convictions and, therefore, his FDWAI conviction must be
vacated. We disagree.
1. Legal Framework and Evidence Admitted at Trial
¶ 34 To convict Gonsalez of FDWAI, the People had to prove that
Gonsalez “dr[ove] a motor vehicle or vehicle while impaired by
alcohol or by one or more drugs, or by a combination of alcohol and
one or more drugs” and that “the violation occurred after three or
more prior convictions, arising out of separate and distinct criminal
episodes, for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI; vehicular homicide . . .
vehicular assault . . . or any combination thereof.” § 42-4-
1301(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024. These prior convictions must be proven to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Linnebur v. People, 2020 CO
79M, ¶ 8, abrogated on other grounds by People v. Crabtree, 2024
CO 40M, ¶¶ 2-3.
18 ¶ 35 The jury found that Gonsalez had four prior qualifying
convictions: a DWAI in Adams County in 2003; a DWAI in Adams
County in 2005; a DUI in Jefferson County in 2008; and a DWAI in
Clear Creek County in 2015. On appeal, Gonsalez challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 2003 and 2015
convictions but concedes the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the 2005 and 2008 convictions.
¶ 36 To prove the 2003 and 2015 convictions, the People admitted
Gonsalez’s certified Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) record,
including his Colorado driving history. Gonsalez’s certified DMV
record included the following: his driver’s license photo, his driver’s
license number, his fingerprint, his full name, his date of birth, his
height, his sex, his weight, his hair color, his eye color, and the last
four digits of his social security number. His official driving history
also included the last four digits of his social security number, his
driver’s license number, his full name, his date of birth, his height,
his weight, his eye color, and his hair color. It also stated in his
official driving history that he had two prior convictions for DWAI.
The first was a 2015 conviction for a violation that occurred in 2014
19 in Clear Creek County. The second was a 2003 conviction for a
violation that occurred in 2003 in Adams County.
¶ 37 As corroborating evidence of these convictions, the People
introduced a sentencing order5 for each conviction. Both
sentencing orders included the county where Gonsalez was
convicted, his name, his date of birth, the case number, that a plea
of guilty was entered for DWAI, and a conviction date. In the
sentencing order for the 2003 conviction, Gonsalez’s date of birth,
the date of conviction, the charge he pleaded to, and the county of
conviction matched Gonsalez’s certified DMV record and his official
driving history. Despite these consistencies in the record, the
sentencing order didn’t include his middle name, and it spelled his
last name incorrectly (Gonzalez instead of Gonsalez).
¶ 38 In the sentencing order for the 2015 conviction, Gonsalez’s
date of birth, his first and last name, the charge he pleaded to, and
the county of conviction matched Gonsalez’s certified DMV record
5 The People refer to this document interchangeably as “certified
record of conviction,” “certified conviction,” or “certified copy of conviction,” whereas Gonsalez refers to it as a “sentence order.” These are all the same thing. For clarity, we opted to consistently use the term “sentencing order.”
20 and his official driving history. Like the 2003 conviction, the
sentencing order didn’t include his middle name. Even more
concerning, however, is that the conviction date didn’t match, and
in fact the sentencing order stated that Gonsalez was convicted in
2018, three years after the date of conviction on the certified DMV
record.
¶ 39 For the 2005 and 2008 convictions, the People introduced
evidence that Gonsalez committed these underlying offenses with
documents that included Gonsalez’s full name, his date of birth, his
height, his weight, his eye color, his hair color, his sex, the
conviction he pleaded to, the date of the plea, and the county where
the plea was entered. The biographical information in these
documents matches the certified DMV record. But the conviction
and the conviction date aren’t included in Gonsalez’s official driving
history. Both documents showing the 2005 and 2008 convictions
show that Gonsalez’s alias is “Gonzalez, John Raymond.”
2. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
¶ 40 When proof of a prior conviction is a necessary element for an
offense, the evidence of identity must be legally sufficient. See
Gorostieta v. People, 2022 CO 41, ¶ 35. Regardless of preservation,
21 we review sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo. McCoy v.
People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 19.
¶ 41 We apply the substantial evidence test to determine whether
the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the
conviction. Gorostieta, ¶ 16. “Under this test, we ask whether the
evidence, ‘viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion
by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting People v. Harrison, 2020
CO 57, ¶ 32). When applying the substantial evidence test, we
must “give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference
which might be fairly drawn from the evidence.” Harrison, ¶ 32
(quoting People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 25). But we can’t serve as a
thirteenth juror, even if we would have reached a different
conclusion faced with the same evidence. Id. at ¶ 33.
¶ 42 If the only evidence of identity offered to match the defendant
to the prior conviction are matching names and dates of birth, the
evidence is generally legally insufficient. See People v. Cooper, 104
P.3d 307, 312 (Colo. App. 2004). Rather, legally sufficient evidence
requires that the prosecution “establish an essential link between
22 the prior conviction and the defendant” through “documentary
evidence combined with specific corroborating evidence of
identification.” Gorostieta, ¶¶ 25-26.
¶ 43 Documentary evidence is tangible evidence contained in a
document or other writing that must be authenticated before it can
be admitted into evidence. See Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary
697 (12th ed. 2024). Corroborating evidence can include
(1) evidence specifically identifying the defendant; (2) unique identifiers such as a driver license, prison identification number, or social security number; (3) photographs or fingerprints from the prior case that link that case to the current defendant; (4) a physical description from the prior case that can be compared to the defendant in the present case; (5) distinguishable features of the defendant such as tattoos; or (6) testimony of probation officers or others with personal knowledge positively identifying the defendant as being the same person who had previously been convicted.
Gorostieta, ¶ 27. This list of sufficient corroborating evidence isn’t
exhaustive, and additional evidence, such as matching counties of
conviction, can be used to tie the defendant to the prior convictions.
Id. at ¶¶ 27, 33.
23 3. The People Proved with Sufficient Evidence that Gonsalez had been Previously Convicted of at least Three Qualifying Offenses
¶ 44 Because the People only needed to sufficiently prove that
Gonsalez had previously been convicted of three qualifying
convictions, only one of the challenged convictions must be proved
by sufficient evidence for us to affirm his FDWAI conviction. We
conclude that the People sufficiently proved that Gonsalez
committed the offense underlying the 2003 conviction. (Thus, we
don’t analyze whether the People sufficiently proved the 2015
conviction.)
¶ 45 The certified DMV record and official driving history (which
includes a photograph that was identified as Gonsalez by the
arresting officer at trial) contains abundant specific biographical
information about Gonsalez to sufficiently establish that it is his
DMV record and official driving history. Thus, the evidence will be
sufficient to sustain a felony conviction if these documents can be
linked with the sentencing order from the 2003 conviction. Under
Gorostieta, we therefore must determine whether the People
sufficiently proved an essential link between Gonsalez and his 2003
conviction. Gorostieta, ¶ 35.
24 ¶ 46 The following information in the 2003 sentencing order exactly
matches the information in Gonsalez’s certified DMV record and
official driving history: Gonsalez’s birthdate, the date of conviction,
the charge pleaded to, and the county of conviction. But, critically,
Gonsalez’s name in the 2003 sentencing order is “John R Gonzalez”
(with a “z” in place of the “s”), and the 2003 sentencing order
doesn’t contain any aliases for Gonsalez. This is certainly not a
trivial discrepancy. But in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence, we look to all of the evidence that was before the jury. In
doing so, we observe that both the 2005 and 2008 sentencing
orders show “John R Gonzalez” as a known alias. All of this taken
together establishes the requisite “essential link between the prior
conviction and the defendant” through “some documentary evidence
combined with specific corroborating evidence of identification.” Id.
at ¶¶ 25-26, 30-32 (concluding that, although “thin,” the evidence
presented by the prosecution that the defendant “had the same
name and date of birth as the prior defendant, as well as self-
authenticating court records of the prior conviction” and that “the
prior felony occurred in the same county as the instant case” was
sufficient).
25 ¶ 47 Accordingly, we conclude that the People presented sufficient
evidence that Gonsalez had previously been convicted of three
qualifying offenses and that his FDWAI conviction must stand.
III. Disposition
¶ 48 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.