23CA0086 Peo v Mitchell 07-17-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0086 Boulder County District Court No. 21CR98 Honorable Thomas F. Mulvahill, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Sheridan Orlando Jauques Mitchell,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Tow and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 17, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Leo T. Nguyen, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Joseph Paul Hough, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Sheridan Orlando Jauques Mitchell, appeals the
judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty
of three counts of possession with intent to sell or distribute a
controlled substance and three counts of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Mitchell, while on parole, escaped from a community
placement program. The Department of Corrections’ Fugitive
Apprehension Unit, with assistance from the United States
Marshals Service and other law enforcement agencies, investigated
his escape. At the time, Mitchell had three active arrest warrants.
¶3 Officers eventually located Mitchell at a residence in Lafayette
by using cell site location information, known colloquially as
“pinging” Mitchell’s cell phone. After Mitchell exited the residence
and entered a vehicle, officers contacted Mitchell and placed him
under arrest. Officers then searched Mitchell and the vehicle,
finding a firearm, $2,648 in cash, and various amounts of
methamphetamine, cocaine, and oxycodone pills.
¶4 Before trial, Mitchell filed (1) multiple motions to suppress
evidence based on officers allegedly violating his Fourth
1 Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures and (2) a motion to dismiss for alleged discovery violations
after the Marshals Service failed to disclose requested cell site
location information. The district court denied Mitchell’s motions.
¶5 The district court also granted two requests by the prosecution
to continue the trial date, one due to the unavailability of two
prosecution witnesses and one due to the prosecutor contracting
COVID-19 a week before trial.
¶6 On appeal, Michell asserts that the district court erred by (1)
denying his motions to suppress evidence; (2) denying his motion to
dismiss for discovery violations; and (3) violating his statutory right
to a speedy trial. We address each contention in turn.
II. Fourth Amendment
¶7 Mitchell contends that the district court erred by denying his
motions to suppress, arguing that law enforcement officers’
warrantless “pinging” of his cell phone and search of his vehicle
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. We aren’t persuaded.
2 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶8 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.” See also Colo. Const. art. II, § 7.
¶9 But this prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures doesn’t apply with the same force to parolees as it does to
others. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 (2006); People
v. McCullough, 6 P.3d 774, 777 (Colo. 2000). Parolees have a
“substantially diminished expectation of privacy” because the state
possesses an overwhelming interest in supervising parolees to
reduce recidivism. Samson, 547 U.S. at 853, 855. As a result, a
suspicionless search of a parolee, when authorized by state law, is
generally considered reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances. See id. at 846; United States v. Mathews, 928 F.3d
968, 976 (10th Cir. 2019).
¶ 10 Colorado law reflects this understanding of a parolee’s
diminished rights under the Fourth Amendment. For example,
Colorado law generally prohibits government entities from obtaining
location information regarding a person’s electronic device without
3 a warrant, subpoena, or court order, § 16-3-303.5(2), C.R.S. 2024,
but this restriction doesn’t apply to the division of adult parole
within the Department of Corrections, § 16-3-303.5(4).
¶ 11 Similarly, like the California law discussed in Samson,
Colorado law requires that an offender eligible for parole agree to
certain conditions before being granted parole. See § 17-2-
201(5)(f)(I), C.R.S. 2024. A prospective parolee must, for example,
sign a written agreement in which they agree, among other things,
to “allow the community parole officer to make searches of the
parolee’s person, residence, or vehicle.” § 17-2-201(5)(f)(I)(D); see
also In re Miranda, 2012 CO 69, ¶ 13 (“[P]arole officers may search
parolees’ persons, residences, or vehicles unannounced, without a
warrant, and without reasonable suspicion.”). A warrantless parole
search under this provision is constitutional, even in the absence of
“reasonable grounds,” if the search is (1) conducted pursuant to
4 any applicable statute and (2) not arbitrary, capricious, or
harassing.1 McCullough, 6 P.3d at 781.
¶ 12 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress as a
mixed question of law and fact. People v. Alameno, 193 P.3d 830,
834 (Colo. 2008). “[W]e defer to the trial court’s factual findings so
long as there is sufficient evidence in the record to support those
findings, but we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.”
Id.
B. Analysis
¶ 13 Based on Mitchell’s substantially reduced expectation of
privacy as a parolee, we perceive no error in the district court’s
orders denying his motions to suppress evidence.
¶ 14 We first turn to whether the officers’ “pinging” of Mitchell’s cell
phone and subsequent search of his vehicle were performed
pursuant to any applicable statute. See McCullough, 6 P.3d at 781.
For purposes of our analysis, we will assume, without deciding, that
1 The court in People v. McCullough, 6 P.3d 774, 781 (Colo. 2000),
also imposed a third requirement — that the search be performed in furtherance of the purposes of parole. The United States Supreme Court, however, later rejected that requirement in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 116-18 (2001). See People v. Samuels, 228 P.3d 229, 234 n.1 (Colo. App. 2009).
5 “pinging” a cell phone to obtain its real-time location information
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. See People v.
Licona-Ortega, 2022 COA 27, ¶ 19 (making this same assumption).
¶ 15 In opposing Mitchell’s suppression motions, the prosecution
argued, in part, that law enforcement authorities collected cell site
location information for Mitchell’s phone and searched his vehicle
under the authority conferred over parolees by sections 17-2-
201(5)(f)(I)(D) and 16-3-303.5(4). The district court agreed and
adopted the prosecution’s position.
¶ 16 The record supports the court’s determination. During a
motions hearing, one of the Department of Corrections community
parole officers who arrested Mitchell testified that his job duties
included investigating parolees, like Mitchell, who had active arrest
warrants. He explained that Mitchell participated in a parole
community placement program and had agreed as a condition of
the program to allow community parole officers to search his person
and vehicles. The officer stated that officers searched Mitchell
because, as a parolee, he remained under the Department of
Corrections’ supervision. Nothing in the officer’s testimony, or in
the record generally, suggests that law enforcement authorities
6 were investigating Mitchell for reasons unrelated to his status as an
escaped parolee. Thus, the record supports the court’s
determination that the officers’ “pinging” of Mitchell’s cell phone
and the search of his vehicle were conducted pursuant to their
statutory authority over parolees. See §§ 17-2-201(5)(f)(I)(D), 16-3-
303.5(4).
¶ 17 Nor was the officers’ search of Mitchell impermissibly
arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. McCullough, 6 P.3d at 781.
After waiting for Mitchell to leave the residence, officers arrested
Mitchell and searched his vehicle at a reasonable time, 4:30 p.m.
The officers’ arrest and search of Mitchell lasted approximately eight
minutes. See id. at 783 (concluding officers’ search wasn’t
arbitrary, capricious, or harassing when it was “conducted at a
reasonable time, 5:00 p.m. in the afternoon, was reasonable in its
scope, and was not unnecessarily prolonged”). Mitchell makes no
argument on appeal revealing any arbitrary, capricious, or
harassing action by officers at the scene.
¶ 18 We reach the same conclusion with respect to officers’
“pinging” of Mitchell’s cell phone. Officers knew that Mitchell had
escaped while on parole and that he had agreed to warrantless
7 searches as a condition of his parole. See People v. Delrio, 259 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 301, 311 (Ct. App. 2020) (search of parolee’s cell phone
wasn’t arbitrary, capricious, or harassing when parolee was
suspected of burglary and the officers’ search “was related to
legitimate parole monitoring”). And again, Mitchell points us to
nothing in the record suggesting that officers harbored “personal
animosity” toward him that might have rendered their search
arbitrary, capricious, and harassing. Id.
¶ 19 Accordingly, the district court didn’t err by denying Mitchell’s
motions to suppress.
III. Discovery Violations
¶ 20 Mitchell next contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to dismiss for alleged discovery
violations. He asserts that the Marshals Service unlawfully
withheld information about its surveillance and the pinging of his
cell phone. We discern no abuse of discretion.
A. Additional Background
¶ 21 During a motions hearing, an officer involved in Mitchell’s
arrest testified that law enforcement authorities located Mitchell by
using cell site location information. The officer also testified that
8 the Marshals Service may have been involved in locating Mitchell.
Hearing this, Mitchell filed a discovery motion seeking the “[c]ell-site
information location data derived from the electronic surveillance”
that law enforcement authorities used to track his location.
Mitchell also attempted to subpoena the cell site location
information, among other things, directly from the Marshals
Service.
¶ 22 When the Marshals Service didn’t respond to the subpoena,
the court issued an order directing it to provide the requested
information. The Marshals Service provided some information but
moved to quash the subpoena and vacate the court’s order as to the
remainder (including the cell site location information), citing both
the Supremacy Clause and federal regulations that barred
disclosure of “investigative techniques.” The court granted the
Marshals Service’s motion to vacate.
¶ 23 Mitchell then moved to dismiss the charges, asserting the
government had elected to invoke privilege rather than comply with
its discovery obligations. The prosecution opposed the motion by
arguing, in part, that the requested information was “irrelevant”
because (1) law enforcement arrested Mitchell pursuant to a valid
9 arrest warrant; (2) Mitchell, as a parolee, had a diminished
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment; and (3) the
information requested from the Marshals Service didn’t relate to
any witness’s testimony. The court agreed with the prosecution and
denied Mitchell’s motion.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 24 As relevant to this case, the prosecution must provide the
defense with certain “material and information which is within the
possession or control of the prosecuting attorney,” Crim. P.
16(I)(a)(1), including but not limited to “[a]ny books, papers,
documents, photographs or tangible objects held as evidence in
connection with the case,” Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(1)(IV). The prosecution
must also disclose to the defense any material or information within
its control “which tends to negate the guilt of the accused” or
reduce their punishment for the charged offenses. Crim. P.
16(I)(a)(2). These obligations extend to material and information in
the possession or control of “others who have participated in the
investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly
report, or with reference to the particular case have reported,” to
10 the prosecution’s office. Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3); see also People v.
Grant, 2021 COA 53, ¶ 22.
¶ 25 When crafting an appropriate sanction for a discovery
violation, the court should take into account the reasons the
disclosure wasn’t made, the extent of any prejudice to the opposing
party, the feasibility of rectifying the prejudice by a continuance,
and any other relevant circumstances. People v. Lee, 18 P.3d 192,
196 (Colo. 2001). The court should impose the least severe
sanction that will cure the prejudice to the defendant. People v.
Perez, 201 P.3d 1220, 1233 (Colo. 2009).
¶ 26 If the court finds a discovery violation, the decision whether to
impose a sanction lies within the trial court’s sound discretion.
Lee, 18 P.3d at 196. We accord great deference to the trial court’s
decision on discovery sanctions and won’t disturb its decision
absent an abuse of discretion. Id. A court abuses its discretion
when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or
is contrary to law. People v. Castro, 854 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Colo.
1993).
11 C. Analysis
¶ 27 We will assume, again without deciding, that a discovery
violation occurred when the Marshals Service declined to disclose
the requested cell site location information. See Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3)
(prosecution’s discovery obligations extend to those who
“participated in the investigation” and reported to the prosecution
on a “particular case”).
¶ 28 But even with the benefit of that assumption, Mitchell doesn’t
explain what prejudice he suffered from the Marshals Service’s
nondisclosure. The district court agreed with the prosecution that
the requested cell site location information was “irrelevant,” a
conclusion that Mitchell doesn’t directly challenge on appeal. Cf.
People v. Bueno, 2018 CO 4, ¶ 47 (upholding discovery sanction
where a “reasonable probability” existed that the “[withheld]
evidence — which was relevant to the central issue in the case —
may have affected the verdict”). Nor does Mitchell explain how the
cell site location information, if produced, might have held
exculpatory value. See People v. Daley, 97 P.3d 295, 299 (Colo.
App. 2004) (reversing discovery sanction where the exculpatory
value of lost evidence was speculative); see also People v. Stone,
12 2021 COA 104, ¶ 52 (noting appellate courts don’t consider
undeveloped arguments) (cert. granted Oct. 17, 2022).
¶ 29 To the extent Mitchell argues that the cell site location
information might have revealed a Fourth Amendment violation, we
have already concluded that a suspicionless search of a parolee,
when authorized by state law, is generally considered reasonable
under the totality of the circumstances. See Samson, 547 U.S. at
846; Mathews, 928 F.3d at 976. Moreover, officers testified that
Mitchell had outstanding arrest warrants for parole violations and
other crimes when they arrested him. See People v. Bischofberger,
724 P.2d 660, 665 (Colo. 1986) (outstanding arrest warrants
authorized the custodial arrest and search of the defendant, even
absent evidence to believe that the defendant might possess a
weapon or evidence of criminal activity). As a result, we perceive no
prejudice suffered by Mitchell as a result of the Marshals Service’s
failure to disclose the requested cell site location information.
¶ 30 Accordingly, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion by
denying Mitchell’s motion to dismiss for alleged discovery violations.
13 IV. Statutory Speedy Trial
¶ 31 Mitchell contends that the district court erred by twice
continuing the trial beyond the statutory speedy trial deadline.
Specifically, Mitchell challenges the continuances caused by (1) the
unavailability of two prosecution witnesses and (2) the prosecutor
contracting COVID-19. We see no basis to reverse.
¶ 32 Mitchell pleaded not guilty on September 3, 2021. After twice
postponing trial at Mitchell’s request, the district court scheduled
the trial for June 13, 2022. The court calculated the new speedy
trial deadline as July 3, 2022. Mitchell agreed with the court’s
calculation. In setting the June 13 trial date, the court didn’t allow
counsel the opportunity to first clear the date with witnesses but
rather directed both sides to “make it work.”
¶ 33 Shortly after the court set the trial date, the prosecution
learned that two of its witnesses, Nick Goldberger and Laura Bell,
would be unavailable. Goldberger, the lead investigator on the
case, had a preplanned vacation out of state; and Bell, a chemical
analyst from the Colorado Bureau of Investigation who tested the
substances found at the scene, was scheduled to attend a multi-day
14 work conference. The prosecution moved to continue the trial to
accommodate both witnesses’ schedules, asserting that their
testimony was material to its case. The court granted the
prosecution’s motion over Mitchell’s objection, reset the trial for
July 18, and tolled the speedy trial deadline until the reset trial
date.
¶ 34 The prosecution filed a second motion to continue on July 12,
approximately one week before the rescheduled trial, after the sole
prosecutor contracted COVID-19. The prosecutor explained that he
was experiencing worsening symptoms that severely impacted his
ability to work and that public health protocols prevented him from
being in the office to attend trial preparation meetings. The court
granted the prosecution’s request, agreeing that the reasons set
forth in its motion justified continuing the trial. The court also
found that a different prosecutor couldn’t substitute for the
assigned prosecutor because the case was “very serious and
complicated” and “require[d] more than five days to prepare.” Trial
commenced approximately six weeks later, on August 22, after the
assigned prosecutor recovered.
15 B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 35 Section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. 2024, requires that the defendant
be brought to trial within six months of pleading not guilty. But
certain periods of time may be excluded from the time computation.
Section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I), for example, authorizes a trial court to
grant the prosecution’s request for a continuance without the
defendant’s consent and exclude the resulting delay, not exceeding
six months, from the speedy trial calculation if the prosecution
shows that (1) evidence material to the prosecution’s case is
unavailable; (2) the prosecution exercised due diligence in
attempting to obtain the evidence; and (3) reasonable grounds exist
to believe that the evidence will be available at a later date. See
People v. Scialabba, 55 P.3d 207, 209 (Colo. App. 2002); Crim. P.
48(b)(6)(VII)(A).
¶ 36 In felony cases, the court may also exclude from the speedy
trial calculation the period of delay, not exceeding six months,
caused by a continuance granted “to allow the prosecuting attorney
additional time in felony cases to prepare the state’s case and
additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances of
the case and the court enters specific findings with respect to the
16 justification.” § 18-1-405(6)(g)(II); see Delacruz v. People, 2017 CO
21, ¶ 20; Crim. P. 48(b)(6)(VII)(B).
¶ 37 We review a trial court’s decision granting a continuance
under section 18-1-405(6) for an abuse of discretion. Delacruz,
¶ 20.
C. Analysis
¶ 38 We first address Mitchell’s challenge to the district court’s
decision continuing the June 13 trial due to Goldberger’s and Bell’s
unavailability. Next, we assess Mitchell’s challenge to the court’s
decision continuing the rescheduled July 18 trial after the assigned
prosecutor contracted COVID-19.2
1. Witness Unavailability
¶ 39 Mitchell challenges the court’s determination that (1)
Goldberger’s and Bell’s testimony was material and (2) the
prosecution exercised due diligence to obtain their attendance.
2 For both challenges, Mitchell doesn’t take issue with the length of
the period that the district court excluded from the speedy trial period. Rather, he challenges the reasoning that the court employed to grant the prosecution any length of a continuance beyond the speedy trial deadline. In any event, the aggregate delay resulting from the two continuances didn’t exceed six months. § 18-1-405(6)(g), C.R.S. 2024.
17 ¶ 40 Turning to materiality, evidence is material if it has “some
greater consequence to the state’s case beyond mere relevance.”
People v. Roberts, 146 P.3d 589, 593 (Colo. 2006). But the evidence
need not be “indispensable.” People v. Koolbeck, 703 P.2d 673, 676
(Colo. App. 1985).
¶ 41 The record supports the court’s finding that Goldberger’s and
Bell’s testimony met this standard. The prosecution made an offer
of proof that Goldberger was its “primary” witness because he
retrieved both the firearm and a majority of the controlled
substances from Mitchell’s person. See Roberts, 146 P.3d at 595
(the prosecution’s offer of proof may provide the trial court with
sufficient information regarding the evidence’s materiality to
support a continuance past the speedy trial deadline). The
prosecution also explained that it had previously endorsed
Goldberger as an expert in narcotics investigations, and that he
would opine that the evidence suggested that Mitchell was involved
in distributing controlled substances.
¶ 42 As to Bell, the prosecution argued that it had endorsed her as
an expert witness to testify regarding her chemical analysis of the
substances found on Mitchell and in his vehicle. The prosecution
18 said Bell’s testimony was “critical” to prove that Mitchell possessed
controlled substances. Although Mitchell argues that “any number
of chemists” could have testified regarding the recovered
substances, Bell herself conducted the chemical analysis. See
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 652 (2011) (explaining
“surrogate testimony” by a scientist who didn’t sign the certification
or perform or observe the test doesn’t satisfy the Confrontation
Clause). Moreover, Mitchell had previously requested under section
16-3-309(5), C.R.S. 2024, that “any and all” laboratory technicians
be required to testify in person concerning “samples, testing, test
results, [and] chain of custody information.”
¶ 43 Given the prosecution’s offers of proof, the importance of the
witnesses’ lay and expert testimony, and Mitchell’s demand that
Bell appear in person, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the
court’s decision that Goldberger’s and Bell’s testimony was of
consequence, and therefore material, to the prosecution’s case. See
Roberts, 146 P.3d at 593.
¶ 44 Turning next to the prosecution’s due diligence, the court
found that the prosecution had made reasonable efforts to obtain
Goldberger’s and Bell’s testimony. The record supports this finding.
19 The prosecution contacted both witnesses almost immediately after
the court scheduled the trial for June 13. Indeed, the prosecution
filed its motion to continue, alerting the court to its witnesses’
unavailability, just nine days after the court set the trial.
¶ 45 In addition, the prosecution explained that it had been in
contact with both Goldberger and Bell about previous trial settings
and both had been cooperative in scheduling. Based on their prior
cooperation, the prosecution wasn’t obligated to subpoena
Goldberger or Bell to establish due diligence. See People v. Valles,
2013 COA 84, ¶ 38 (“[W]here an unavailable witness demonstrates
a history of cooperation with the prosecution, the prosecution is not
required to attempt to secure the witness’s presence with a
subpoena in order to demonstrate due diligence.”), cert. granted on
other grounds, judgment vacated, and case remanded, No. 13SC551,
2015 WL 4999239 (Colo. Aug. 24, 2015) (unpublished order). Thus,
we can’t conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
finding that the prosecution exercised due diligence.
¶ 46 We aren’t persuaded otherwise by Mitchell’s remaining
arguments. Mitchell argues, for example, that Goldberger’s and
Bell’s reasons for being unavailable — a preplanned vacation and
20 work conference — amounted to mere “inconvenience[s]” that didn’t
outweigh his speedy trial rights. Our supreme court rejected a
similar argument in People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, ¶ 30, explaining
that “when the prosecution establishes the ‘unavailability’ of
evidence material to its case — regardless of the reason for such
unavailability — it may be entitled to a continuance with a tolling of
the speedy trial period for up to six months.”
¶ 47 We also reject Mitchell’s argument that the district court
should have rescheduled the trial for an alternative date that fell
before the July 3 speedy trial deadline. Mitchell didn’t raise this
argument in the district court, and Colorado’s speedy trial statute
makes clear that a defendant waives their right to be tried within
the statutory period if they accept a trial date beyond the speedy
trial deadline:
If a trial date is offered by the court to a defendant who is represented by counsel and neither the defendant nor his counsel expressly objects to the offered date as being beyond the time within which such trial shall be had pursuant to this section, then the period within which the trial shall be had is extended until such trial date and may be extended further pursuant to any other applicable provisions of this section.
21 § 18-1-405(5.1).
¶ 48 After the court granted the prosecution’s first continuance
motion, the court offered to reschedule the trial for July 18.
Defense counsel responded, “The [d]efense can accept July 18th.”
Because neither Mitchell nor defense counsel “expressly object[ed]”
to the offered date, Mitchell waived his right to an earlier trial date.
§ 18-1-405(5.1); see also People v. Franco, 74 P.3d 357, 359 (Colo.
App. 2002) (defendant waived his right to trial within speedy trial
period under section 18-1-405(5.1) when defense counsel had
notice that court had set the trial date beyond the speedy trial
deadline and counsel didn’t object until four days before trial).
¶ 49 Accordingly, the record supports the court findings that (1)
prosecution exercised due diligence to secure their testimony.
Mitchell doesn’t assert that Goldberger and Bell wouldn’t be
available at a later date. Thus, we conclude the district court acted
within its discretion by granting the prosecution’s first continuance
motion.
22 2. Prosecutor’s Illness
¶ 50 Mitchell also contends that the district court abused its
discretion by continuing the rescheduled July 18 trial date beyond
the speedy trial deadline when it granted the prosecution’s second
continuance motion due to the prosecutor contracting COVID-19.
We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 51 Consistent with section 18-1-405(6)(g)(II), the court made
specific findings that a continuance was justified because (1) the
sole prosecutor was experiencing worsening COVID-19 symptoms
that severely impacted his ability to work and (2) public health
protocols prevented the prosecutor from being in the office to attend
preparation meetings during the week before trial. Given the
factual support for these findings in the prosecution’s motion,
which Mitchell doesn’t dispute, we can’t say that the prosecutor
contracting COVID-19 one week before trial fell short of an
“exceptional circumstance[]” that justified a brief continuance.
§ 18-1-405(6)(g)(II); see Lucy, ¶ 1 (describing COVID-19 as a “highly
contagious and potentially deadly illness” that triggered “a global
pandemic the likes of which we haven’t experienced in over a
century”).
23 ¶ 52 We aren’t convinced otherwise by Mitchell’s argument that
“any prosecutor with a pulse” could have substituted for the
assigned prosecutor to try the case. The district court found that it
was “not reasonable to expect or demand” that a prosecutor
unfamiliar with the case substitute for the assigned prosecutor, in
part, because “this is a very a serious and complicated case [that]
requires more than five days to prepare.” We agree with the court’s
assessment. By that stage of the case, the register of actions
showed more than 150 entries, reflecting intense pretrial litigation
on myriad issues. Thus, even if a new prosecutor had taken over
the case, they would have required additional time to get up to
speed before trial. See People v. Goodpaster, 742 P.2d 965, 968
(Colo. App. 1987) (concluding the trial court acted within its
discretion in granting a continuance under section 18-1-405(6)(g)(II)
when the newly appointed prosecutor needed additional time to
interview witnesses, review records, and watch tapes of the
incident).
¶ 53 Accordingly, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion by
granting the prosecution’s second continuance motion.
24 V. Disposition
¶ 54 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE YUN concur.