Justice EID
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In this interlocutory appeal, we review the trial court's order disqualifying the Office of the District Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial District from prosecuting defendant Alejandro Perez. The District Attorney sought the death penalty against Perez, an inmate at the Limon Correctional Facility, stemming from his alleged involvement in the murder of another inmate, Jeffrey Heird. The trial court disqualified the entire District Attorney's Office from prosecuting the case based on its conclusion that "special cireum-stances ... would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial" under section 20-1-107(2), C.R.S. (2008).
The trial court cited four grounds to support its disqualification of the entire Office. First, it found that disqualification was required because an individual prosecutor in the case, Dan Edwards, had previously represented Perez as a private defense attorney on a Crim. P. 35(c) motion challenging a second-degree murder conviction-the same second-degree murder conviction that the prosecution used as a death penalty aggravator in the instant case. Second, the trial court found that disqualification of the entire Office was further warranted due to the involvement of another individual prosecutor, Robert Watson, who aided in the initial investigation of the Heird murder. Watson, when he was a private defense attorney, had previously represented Michael Snyder, an inmate witness and possible alternate suspect in the Heird murder. Third, the trial court [1224]*1224found that the prosecution's witness list, which contained the names of several inmate witnesses, was inaccurate and insufficiently detailed. Finally, the court concluded that the funding arrangement between the District Attorney's Office and the Department of Corrections, under which the Office directly billed the department for costs associated with prosecuting Perez, violated section 16-18-101(8), C.R.S. (2008). That section permits counties to seek reimbursement of costs associated with the prosecution of erimes occurring in correctional facilities.
We hold that there are no "special cireum-stances" that would "render it unlikely that the defendant [Perez] would receive a fair trial" under section 20-1-107(2), and therefore reverse the trial court's order disqualifying the entire District Attorney's Office. The inquiry into whether an entire district attorney's office should be disqualified, due to a prior representation by an individual prosecutor, depends on whether confidential information gained from that prior representation has been or could be passed from the individual prosecutor to other members of the office who continue to prosecute the case. Here, there was no showing that either Edwards or Watson ever possessed confidential information from their prior representations. Therefore, no confidential information was passed, or could have been passed, to other members of the Office. We also hold that the allegedly inadequate witness list and the funding arrangement do not constitute "special cireumstances" that would prevent a fair trial. - Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's disqualification of the entire Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
On March 28, 2004, Jeffrey Heird, an inmate at the Limon Correctional Facility, was found stabbed to death in his cell. The Department of Corrections ("DOC") and Robert Watson, then Deputy District Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office ("DA's Office"), began an investigation. In December 2005, after further investigation, Carol Chambers, the District Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial District, filed first-degree murder charges against Alejandro Perez and David Bueno, both Li-mon Correctional Facility inmates at the time of the murder.1
Chambers announced her intent to seek the death penalty against Perez and Bueno in October 2006. 'When a prosecutor in Colorado announces intent to seek the death penalty, the prosecutor has twenty days to provide the defendant with, among other things, a list of aggravating factors and a list of witnesses whom the prosecutor may call, specifying for each the witness' name, address,2 and date of birth, and the subject matter of the witness' testimony. § 18-1.3-1201(8)(b), C.R.S. (2008); Crim. P. 82.1(d)(2). Pursuant to these provisions, the People filed a Notice of Aggrava-tors, Witnesses, and Evidence, P-9 ("P-9"), listing witnesses who may testify to the subject matter described.3 The prosecution also listed statutory aggravating factors in support of its intent to seek the death penalty. Specifically, aggravator number one stated, "[the class one felony [the Heird murder] was committed by a person under sentence [1225]*1225of imprisonment for a class 1, 2, or 8 felony as defined by Colorado law." At the time of Heird's murder, Perez was serving a sentence for a 1997 second-degree murder conviction, a class two felony.
Because the prosecutors sought the death penalty, the attorneys in the Capital Crimes Unit of the Attorney General's Office became available as a resource to them. In Colorado, attorneys in the Capital Crimes Unit assist counties throughout the state with death penalty cases. The Attorney General's Office describes the responsibilities of these attorneys as "[plrovid[ing] special assistance to district attorneys in death penalty ... cases." The two members of the Capital Crimes Unit, Dan Edwards and Sue Trout, were assigned to the DA's Office as "Special Deputy District Attorneys" to aid in the death penalty prosecutions of Perez and Bue-no. They became part of the DA's Office for the purpose of prosecuting Perez and Bueno and acted under the direction of the DA's Office.
Six days after Edwards made his first appearance in the Perez case, Perez filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, for Disqualification of the District Attorney and Appointment of a Special Prosecutor, P-46 ("P-46"). He sought the disqualification of the entire DA's Office and the Office of the Attorney General,4 arguing, in part, that the People had a conflict of interest in prosecuting the case because Edwards previously represented Perez.
On the same day, Perez also filed his Motion for Immediate Protective Order, P-47 ("P-47"). Although the trial court ultimately held multiple hearings on the P-46 motion, it granted the P-47 motion the same day it was filed, without a hearing or response from the People. Entering Perez Order No. 25 in response to P-47, the court stated:
Daniel Edwards is preclud[ed] from appearing in any capacity in [Perez's] case. Mr. Edwards is precluded from speaking with the district attorneys, members of the Attorney General's Office, or any other person regarding this case, Alejandro Perez.... Mr. Edwards is further precluded from reviewing material connected with this case, and from filing any pleading.
The alleged conflict asserted in P-46 and P-47 arose out of Edwards' prior representation of Perez. On August 27, 2002, the Denver District Court appointed Edwards, then a defense attorney in private practice, as counsel to represent Perez on a Crim. P. 35(c) motion. This motion challenged Perez's 1997 second-degree murder conviction-the same second-degree murder conviction that the prosecution used as a death penalty aggravator in the present case. After his appointment, in order to prepare to serve as Perez's defense counsel on the Crim. P. 85(c) motion, Edwards filed a request to withdraw the trial transcripts. Edwards' next filing in the case was a motion to withdraw as counsel because of severe eyesight problems. Edwards never filed any pleading on Perez's Crim. P. 85(c) motion, and the court granted his motion to withdraw.
During hearings challenging Order No. 25, Edwards testified that when he was assigned to work on the present prosecution of Perez, he did not recall previously representing Perez on the Crim. P. 35(c) motion and thus did not disclose the prior representation either to the court or to the defense.5 Edwards stated that while his typical practice, upon assignment as counsel, is to send a letter to the defendant introducing himself and explaining the process, he did not specifically recall [1226]*1226communicating with Perez. He further testified that he did not receive any information, confidential or otherwise, from Perez.6 Edwards said that there was no information to pass along to any of the members of the Attorney General's Office or the DA's Office, and that no information had in fact been passed.
The trial court ultimately reaffirmed Order No. 25-the order prohibiting Edwards from working on the instant Perez litigation-and further ordered Edwards not to search for his file, time records, or any material involving his previous representation of Perez. After the court reaffirmed the protective order, Chief Deputy District Attorney Dan May, the lead prosecutor for the Perez and Bueno cases, sought to clarify whether Edwards could work on the Bueno case without violating Order No. 25. The trial court replied, "Itlhe deeper Mr. Edwards gets into this case, the more it muddles the Bueno case and that's the problem here. That's just my own thinking. And I guess that's a risk that you take; he takes; everybody takes." The judge later clarified this comment to May, stating that he was alerting the People that they proceeded at their own risk, in the Perez case, if Edwards worked on the Bueno case.
After Order No. 25, Edwards ceased all work on the pending Perez case but continued to work on the Bueno case, performing general legal research and analysis concerning both aggravating factors in death penalty cases and jury selection. He also prepared drafts of pleadings in the Bueno case.
Although Order No. 25 immediately screened Edwards from the Perez litigation, the trial court still had to consider P-46. In P-46, in addition to arguing that the Edwards' conflict should be imputed to disqualify the entire DA's Office and the Capital Crimes Unit, Perez also argued that the People's P-9 witness list violated Crim. P. 32.1(d)(2) and C.R.C.P. 11, because it was inadequate. Specifically, he claimed that in filing the P-9, the "prosecutor knowingly filed a document purporting to give the 'subject matter of the witnesses' testimony' [as required by section 18-1.3-1201(8)(b) and Crim. P. 82.1(d)(2) ], which the prosecutor knew to be false." Perez stated that "the prosecution had no good faith basis whatsoever, and continue[s] to have no good faith basis, for believing that any given inmate ... will testify as to any of the facts contained in the above-referenced endorsement." Perez argued that these inadequacies were further grounds for disqualification of the DA's Office.
The trial court, beginning in June 2007, held numerous hearings on the P-46. Throughout the hearings, Perez filed a series of supplemental motions to P-46. In one of these motions, he argued that because Edwards continued to work on the Bueno case, "the entire Office of the District Attorney is implicated in the conflict of interest and must be disqualified, as well as the Capital Crimes Unit." He also contended that the funding arrangement7 for the prosecution of the Perez and Bueno cases, whereby the DA's Office directly billed the DOC with the understanding that the money would then be forwarded to the counties, violated section 16-18-101(8), C.R.S. (2008) and presented a further conflict of interest warrant, ing disqualification.8 More specifically, Perez alleged that the financial arrangement prevented the DA's Office from remaining [1227]*1227independent and disinterested, and that because of the arrangement, the DA had a personal financial interest in the case.
Perez's final supplement to P-46 advised the court that Watson, who aided in the initial investigation of the Heird murder, had previously represented Michael Snyder, a Li-mon Correctional Facilities inmate at the time of the murder and a possible alternate suspect.9 Perez argued that this conflict also supported disqualification of the entire DA's Office and the Capital Crimes Unit.
Watson testified that he worked on the Heird murder for five months, and that he was not involved with the case after leaving the DA's Office in August 2004, which was before Perez (or Bueno) was charged.10 Watson also testified that, while investigating the murder, he did not recall his previous representation of Snyder.
In sum, when ruling on P-46, the district court considered four arguments Perez had presented as grounds for the disqualification of the DA's Office, Edwards as an individual,11 and the Capital Crimes Unit: (1) the alleged conflict presented by Edwards' prior representation of Perez; (2) the alleged conflict presented by Watson's prior representation of Snyder; (8) the P-9 witness list; and (4) the alleged conflict created by the funding arrangement. In reliance on its "inherent powers" and on section 20-1-107(2), C.R.S. (2008), which permits disqualification upon a showing that "special cireumstances would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial," the trial court issued Order No. 60, disqualifying Edwards as well as "[the entire office of the district attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial District and the capital crimes unit of the attorney general's office."
As to Edwards, the court found that his prior representation of Perez was substantially related to the present case, because the People had designated Perez's prior second-degree murder conviction as a statutory ag-gravator. The court further concluded that while Edwards did not violate Order No. 25, which required him to discontinue work on the instant Perez case, his work on the Bue-no case was problematic.12 The court stated:
[Edwards'] efforts in drafting pleadings in Bueno; his efforts in researching aggrava-tors in death penalty cases; and his efforts in researching jury selection and jury instructions, indicate that neither Perez Order No. 25 nor the attorney general's screening policy were enough to protect against Mr. Edwards' involvement in the Perez case. In the back room, Mr. Edwards was providing the fodder that could be used indiscriminately by the district attorney's office and the capital crimes unit in prosecuting death penalty cases, including Mr. Edwards' own client, Mr. Perez. Mr. Edwards' efforts against Mr. Bueno, an individual charged with conspiracy allegedly conducted with Mr. Perez, were efforts applied against Mr. Perez. Mr. Edwards has literally switched sides.
Regarding Watson, the court called Watson's prior representation of Snyder "problem{[atic}," referring to Chambers' testimony that had she known of Watson's prior representation of Snyder, "it would have been 'unseemly' for him to lead the investigation." Additionally, in its factual findings, the court observed that there was "information obtained very close to the date of the murder that would or could lead one to believe that Snyder may have committed the Heird murder," and that "[olf significance and for rea[1228]*1228sons unknown, Snyder was not investigated, his cell was never tossed and he was never considered to be a suspect in the case." However, the court recognized that "standing alone, [Watson's prior representation of Snyder] might not require disqualification of the entire office."
Regarding the P-9 witness list, the trial court struck "witnesses listed in [the] People's P-9 numbered 72 through 147" as prosecution witnesses against Perez. The court acknowledged that the People were dealing "with a unique kind of witness"-inmate witnesses-whose level of cooperation is unpredictable. Ultimately, however, the court found that the People violated section 18-1.3-1201(8)(b), and C.R.C.P. 11, because the P-9 endorsements contained inaccuracies and should have been more detailed.
Finally, addressing the funding arrangement, the court held that section 16-18-101(8) was violated because "the counties have been completely bypassed ... [and] it remains that the statutory violations [of seetion 16-18-1018) ] cannot be ignored in view of the fact that compliance could have been easily accomplished." The court, however, remained "unwilling to conclude that the district attorney was obtaining any intentional financial gain," or that there was any evidence of double billing.
The People sought review in this court pursuant to sections 20-1-107(8) and 16-12-102(2), which create a right of interlocutory appeal for prosecutors to contest disqualification orders. We review for abuse of discretion, see, eg., People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274, 1276 (Colo.2007), and now reverse.
IL.
The trial court relied upon section 20-1-107(2), C.R.S. (2008) to disqualify the entire DA's Office, Dan Edwards as an individual, and the Capital Crimes Unit. As a preliminary matter, we consider which disqualifications are appropriately pursued in this appeal. We must examine three interrelated questions: first, which parties under section 20-1-107(2) are properly subject to disqualification; second, which parties may properly appeal their disqualification pursuant to see-tions 20-1-107(8) and 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2008); and third, which parties did in fact appeal in this case.
Section 20-1-107(2) states, "a district attorney may be disqualified." (emphasis added). Therefore, the trial court's authority to disqualify is limited to district attorneys or district attorney's offices prosecuting the case. Under this statutory language, the DA's Office was subject to disqualification because it was the office prosecuting the instant case. Regarding Edwards, he was designated a "Special Deputy District Attorney" (along with Sue Trout) within the DA's Office, making him a member of the office for the purpose of prosecuting Perez. As a result, he was a "district attorney" also subject to disqualification under section 20-1-107(@). In sum, we find that both the DA's Office and Edwards as an individual were proper subjects of disqualification in the trial court's order.
In addition to disqualifying Edwards and the DA's Office, however, the trial court also disqualified the Capital Crimes Unit, of which Trout and Edwards were members. The disqualification of the unit was beyond the authority granted in section 20-1-107(2) because the unit was not a district attorney or district attorney's office prosecuting the case. We therefore interpret the trial court's order disqualifying the Capital Crimes Unit as an order designed to disqualify the DA's Office in its entirety, including Special Deputy District Attorneys Trout and Edwards (though, as noted above, the trial court separately disqualified Edwards as an individual). Ultimately, the functional effect is the same, as the Capital Crimes Unit consisted only of Trout and Edwards at the time of the trial court's ruling.
As to which parties can properly appeal disqualification, section 20-1-107(8) authorizes interlocutory appeal of a disqualification order pursuant to section 16-12, 102(2), which states, "the prosecution may file an interlocutory appeal in the supreme court ...." (emphasis added). Section 16-12-102(2) thus permits disqualified prosecutors-those with the authority to prosecute-to challenge their disqualification. See, eg., [1229]*1229People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274, 1276 (Colo.2007) (appellants comprised of individual disqualified prosecutors and a disqualified district attorney's office). In this case, only the DA's Office has filed an appeal of the trial court's disqualification ruling. Of note, however, is the fact that the DA's Office did not appeal-and makes no argument regarding the disqualification of Edwards as an individual.13 Although Edwards as a member of the DA's Office could have challenged his own disqualification through an appeal, he did not do so. Additionally, while the Attorney General challenges Edwards' disqualification in an amicus brief, the Attorney General is neither a party to this interlocutory appeal, nor a "prosecutor" (in this case) who may properly appeal under section 16-12-102(2). We therefore confine our consideration in this appeal to the propriety of the trial court's disqualification of the DA's Office under section 20-1-107(2).
IIL.
Pursuant to section 20-1-107(2), C.R.S. (2008), a district attorney may only be disqualified in a particular case (1) at the request of the district attorney; (2) if the court finds that the district attorney has a personal or financial interest; or (8) if the court finds special cireumstances that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. This court has held that the statute enumerates the only cireum-stances under which a district attorney may be disqualified. See People ex rel. N.R., 139 P.3d 671, 674-75 (Colo.2006) (current statute "eliminates 'appearance of impropriety' as a basis for disqualification"); People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274, 1279 (Colo.2007) (same).14 The party moving for disqualification bears the burden of showing that facts exist that would render it unlikely the defendant would receive a fair trial. Lincoln, 161 P.3d at 1279.
In this case, the trial court relied upon the third prong to disqualify the DA's Office, finding "special cireumstances" existed that would render it unlikely Perez would receive a fair trial. In support of its disqualification ruling, the trial court set forth four grounds: (1) Edwards' prior representation of Perez; (2) Watson's prior representation of witness Snyder; (8) the inadequate P-9 witness list; and (4) the funding arrangement between the DA's Office and the DOC. We consider each in turn and address whether they warrant disqualification of the DA's Office.
A.
In considering whether Edwards' prior representation of Perez constitutes a "special cireumstance" requiring the disqualification of the entire DA's Office, we begin with our caselaw discussing the imputation of an individual prosecutor's conflicts to the entire prosecutor's office. Recently, in People v. Chavez, 139 P.3d 649, 655 (Colo.2006), we observed that the question is "whether confidential information from a prior representation ... has been and can continue to be adequately screened from others actually prosecuting the case." (emphasis added); see also People v. Manzanares, 139 P.3d 655, 659 (Colo.2006) (stating that the inquiry is "whether confidential information has been and can continue to be screened from those members of the District Attorney's Office who would actually prosecute defendant's case"). The foeus of the inquiry, then, is on whether confidential information has been or could be passed from the prosecutor with the conflict to other members of the district attorney's office prosecuting the case. We have noted that district attorney's offices are [1230]*1230different from private law firms in part because prosecutors do not choose the cases that come before them; instead, they are required by the Colorado Constitution to prosecute crimes in their districts. See Lincoln, 161 P.3d at 1278 (noting that section 20-1-107(2) is "designed to ensure that district attorneys can perform their public duty as mandated by the Colorado Constitution"). Thus, the focus of the disqualification ingqui-ry-that is, whether any confidential information has been passed from the individual prosecutor to other members of the office-strikes an appropriate balance between ensuring fairness to the defendant while also recognizing the public duty of district attorney's offices to prosecute cases arising in their districts.
Applying this inquiry to the case at bar, the question is whether any confidential information from Edwards' prior representation of Perez was or could have been passed to the members of the DA's Office who continue to prosecute this case. The record demonstrates that no such confidential information existed in the first place,15 and therefore, no confidential information was or could have been passed to the members of the DA's Office prosecuting the case.
When Edwards was assigned to the DA's Office, he did not even recall his prior representation of Perez. After learning of the alleged conflict, Edwards testified about the limited work he performed on Perezg's previous case: he filed a motion to withdraw the transcripts and a motion to withdraw from the case. He further testified that he never met with Perez and does not recall any communication with him. The only information Edwards possessed regarding the prior case is the fact that Perez was convicted of second-degree murder-information that is in the public record.16Indeed, he stated that he never received any information from Perez, confidential or otherwise, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Although we take Edwards' assertion as true because "the prosecuting attorney as an officer of the court must not lie or misrepresent facts to the court," Lincoln, 161 P.3d at 1281, we do not rely solely on his representations. Rather, we reach our conclusion based upon the facts in the record, Edwards' testimony, and the cireumstances surrounding both his prior representation and his involvement in the current case. Given that Edwards did not recall his prior representation of Perez, never performed any substantive work on the case, and never received information from Perez, there is no risk that Edwards passed confidential information to other members of the DA's Office. Additionally, according to our standard outlined in Lincoln, the defendant must establish facts sufficient to support a conclusion that he will not receive a fair trial. 161 P.3d at 1279 (citing People ex rel. N.R., 139 P.3d at 677; People v. C.V., 64 P.3d 272, 275-76 (Colo.2003); Wheeler v. Dist. Court, 180 Colo. 275, 278-79, 504 P.2d 1094, 1096 (1973)). Perez has presented no facts to show that Edwards either possessed confidential information or passed it to members of the DA's Office.
Moreover, although Edwards had no confidential information that could have been passed to other prosecutors, Order No. 25 served as an additional precaution by screening Edwards from Perez's case. The order prohibited Edwards from working on the Perez case, and the trial court found that he never violated it. Thus, although the trial court pointed to the fact that the DA's Office had no screening policy in place, Order No. 25 effectively sereened Edwards from the case. We therefore conclude that Edwards' previous representation of Perez did not constitute a "special cireumstance" warranting disqualification of the entire DA's Office, because no confidential information was, or could have been, passed to other members of the office.
[1231]*1231Our conclusion that "special cireum-stances" do not exist here is reinforced by the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. See In Re J.C.T., 176 P.3d 726, 735 (Colo.2007) (stating that "we seek guidance from ... the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct"). The rules distinguish between the imputation of individual conflicts of interest to all members of private law firms and the imputation of individual conflicts to all members of government legal offices. Rule 1.10 sets forth the cireumstances under which the conflict of an individual private attorney is imputed to a private law firm. By contrast, Rule 1.11 creates a "special imputation rule" for the conflicts of individual government lawyers. The comments state,
Because of the special problems raised by imputation within a government agency, paragraph (d) [which describes the ethical responsibilities for individual government lawyers when presented with a conflict] does not impute the conflicts of a lawyer currently serving as an officer or employee of the government to other associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers.
Colo. RPC 1.11 emt. 2 (2008) (emphasis added). Thus, Rule 1.11 does not impute an individual prosecutor's conflict to the entire office. Even assuming Edwards' prior representation of Perez ereated a conflict, it would not automatically be imputed to the entire DA's Office under Rule 1.11. Accordingly, it is difficult to see how his previous involvement necessarily constitutes a "special cireumstance" requiring disqualification under section 20-1-107(2).
In considering whether to disqualify the DA's Office, the trial court focused on whether any legal work Edwards did in the Bueno case-and on death penalty prosecution in general-could have been used in the prosecution of Perez. More specifically, the court pointed to Edwards' "efforts in drafting pleadings in Bueno; his efforts in researching aggravators in death penalty cases; and his efforts in researching jury selection and jury instructions," all of which could have been used by prosecutors against Perez. The court concluded that "[iJn the back room, Mr. Edwards was providing the fodder that could be used indiscriminately by the district attorney's office and the capital crimes unit in prosecuting death penalty cases," including the case against Perez.
Any connection between Edwards' work on Bueno and the instant prosecution of Perez appears, on this record, to be tenuous at best. But even if the connection were closer, the fact that Edwards' legal work might have been used against Perez is not the proper inquiry. Instead, the question is whether any confidential information possessed by Edwards could be so used. In other words, the trial court lost sight of the focus of the imputation inquiry, which is to determine whether "confidential information from a pri- or representation" was or could be passed from others prosecuting the case. Chavez, 139 P.3d at 655; see also Manzanares, 139 P.3d at 659. As demonstrated above, no such confidential information existed, and therefore, it was not used against Perez.17
[1232]*1232Finally, the trial court seemed concerned that the possible use of Edwards' legal work in this case might create an appearance of impropriety. It stressed the fact that the work could be used against "Mr. Edwards' own client" and that "Mr. Edwards has literally switched sides." However, our precedent establishes that the current version of the disqualification statute, by listing only three grounds for the disqualification of prosecutors, eliminates the previous "appearance of impropriety" standard. People ex rel. N.R., 139 P.3d at 674-75; Lincoln, 161 P.3d at 1279. To the extent that the trial court based its disqualification ruling on any "appearance of impropriety" it perceived from the possible use of Edwards' legal work in this case, the court considered an improper ground for disqualification.
In sum, because confidential information from Edwards' prior representation of Perez did not reach-and could not have reached-the prosecutors working on this case, we hold that the district court erred in finding that Edwards' prior representation of Perez was a "special circumstance" warranting disqualification of the entire DA's Office.
B.
For much the same reasons, we find that the trial court's second ground-Watson's previous representation of Snyder, an inmate witness and possible alternate suspect in the Heird murder-does not constitute a "special cireumstance" warranting disqualification of the entire DA's Office.
Watson was involved in the initial investigation of the Heird murder in his capacity as Deputy District Attorney for roughly five months before he permanently left the DA's Office to serve in Iraq. Watson left the Office before Perez and Bueno were charged, and as a result, he never worked on the prosecution of Perez. Furthermore, Watson, like Edwards, did not recall his prior representation of Snyder.
The trial court did not, as a formal matter, consider whether Watson should be disqualified from prosecuting the case against Perez, because he never prosecuted Perez-Watson left the DA's office before Perez was even charged. The court did, however, refer to Watson's involvement as an investigator, given his prior representation of Snyder, as "problem[atic]." Specifically, the court referred to Chambers' testimony that had she known of Watson's prior representation of Snyder, "it would have been 'unseemly' for him to lead the investigation." The trial court's focus on the "unseemly" nature of Watson's work investigating Heird's murder sounds like it based its disqualification ruling on an "appearance of impropriety." As noted above, this court has held that section 20-1-107(2) eliminates "appearance of impro-pricty" as a ground for disqualification. See People ex rel. N.R., 139 P.3d at 674-75; Lincoln, 161 P.3d at 1279.
In addition, there was no showing that Watson possessed confidential information from his prior representation of Snyder that could be passed to members of the DA's Office who continue to prosecute the case.18 Moreover, Watson was screened from the case by the fact that he left the DA's Office before charges were filed. Even the trial court recognized that "standing alone, [Watson's prior representation of Snyder] might not require disqualification of the entire office."19 We agree and find that Watson's prior representation of Snyder does not con[1233]*1233stitute a "special cireumstance" warranting disqualification of the entire DA's Office.
Finally, Perez suggested that Watson conducted an inadequate investigation of Snyder, as a possible alternate suspect in the Heird murder, because he had previously represented Snyder. The trial court, in its factual findings, observed that there was "information obtained very close to the date of the murder that would or could lead one to believe that Snyder may have committed the Heird murder," and that "(olf significance and for reasons unknown, Snyder was not investigated, his cell was never tossed and he was never considered to be a suspect in the case." The court, however, did not refer to these matters later in its "Conclusions of Law" when it discussed Watson's prior representation of Snyder as grounds for disqualifying the entire DA's Office. It therefore appears that the court did not base its disqualification order on the rationale proposed by Perez. To the extent that it did, however, such concerns about the adequacy of the investigation and alternate suspects do not constitute "special cireumstances" warrant ing disqualification, but instead are issues that may be explored at trial under the appropriate cireumstances. See, eg., Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1075 (Colo.2007) (discussing defendant's use of alternate suspect evidence).
In sum, we find that the district court erred in finding that Watson's prior representation of Snyder was a "special circumstance" warranting disqualification of the DA's Office.
C.
The district court cited a third ground for its disqualification order-namely, that the prosecutors applied an insufficiently detailed "shotgun approach" to the creation of the P-9 witness list. The court concluded that the P-9 witness list violated section 18-1.3-1201(8)(b), C.R.S. (2008), and Crim. P. 82.1(d)(2), which require the prosecutor, within twenty days of announcing intent to seek the death penalty, to provide the defendant with, among other things, a list of aggravating factors and a list of witnesses whom the prosecutor may call, specifying for each the witness' name, address, and date of birth, and the subject matter of the witness' testimony. The court also concluded that the P-9 witness list violated C.R.C.P. 11, which imposes a good faith requirement for all filings.
As stated above, in analyzing a motion for disqualification pursuant to section 20-1-107(2), the district court must determine whether "special cireumstances" exist such that the defendant would be unlikely to receive a fair trial,. This court has never found a discovery violation to be the type of special cireumstance warranting disqualification. In fact, in People v. District Court, 808 P.2d 831, 836-37 (Colo.1991), we held that for a discovery violation the trial court should impose the least restrictive sanction that preserves the truth-finding process, restores a level playing field, and deters prosecutorial misconduct. See also People v. Dist. Court, 793 P.2d 163, 168 (Colo.1990) ("[TJhe court should impose the least severe sanction that will ensure that there is full compliance with the court's discovery orders."). Disqualification of the entire DA's Office is a drastic remedy and certainly not the least restrictive sanction available for a discovery violation. See, e.g., People v. Harlan, 54 P.3d 871, 877 (Colo.2002) (describing disqualification as a "severe" remedy).
Furthermore, Perez has made no showing as to how the P-9 endorsements might interfere with his right to a fair trial and warrant disqualification of the DA's Office. Nor did the trial court make such a finding. Consequently, to the extent that the trial court relied on the P-9 witness list as a ground for disqualification of the DA's Office, we find that the allegedly inadequate witness list did not constitute "special cirenmstances" warranting disqualification.20
[1234]*1234D.
The trial court's fourth ground for disqualification was its determination that the funding arrangement, whereby the DA's Office directly billed the DOC for the cost of prosecuting Perez and Bueno, violated seetion 16-18-101(8), C.R.S. (2008). We find that the funding arrangement was not a "special cireumstance" warranting disqualification of the DA's Office.
Section 16-18-101(8) states, "The department of corrections, from annual appropriations made by the general assembly, shall reimburse the county or counties in a judicial district for the costs of prosecuting any crime alleged to have been committed by a person in the custody of the department." Here, under an arrangement arising out of tradition, the DA's Office directly billed the DOC for the cost of prosecuting Perez and Bueno with the understanding that the office would then forward that reimbursement to the counties. There is no evidence that the counties ever objected to this arrangement.
The trial court appears to have determined that the funding arrangement violated seetion 16-18-101(8), because the DA's Office billed the DOC directly, rather than submitting cost statements to the counties first and having the counties seek reimbursement from the DOC. We find that this sort of funding arrangement does not constitute a "special circumstance" warranting disqualification. Perez has made no showing as to how this arrangement interferes with his right to a fair trial, and the trial court made no such conclusion. On the contrary, the trial court explicitly stated that it was "unwilling to conclude that the district attorney was obtaining any intentional financial gain" or that there was any double-billing. In other words, the trial court found no violation of the second prong of section 20-1-107(2), which provides for disqualification "if the court finds that the district attorney has a personal or financial interest" in the case. Nevertheless, according to the trial court, "it remains that the statutory violations cannot be ignored in view of the fact that compliance could have been easily accomplished." The question, however, is not whether compliance could have been easily accomplished, but rather whether non-compliance created a "special cireumstance" rendering it unlikely Perez would receive a fair trial. We find that it did not, and that the trial court erred in determining that the financial arrangement warranted disqualification of the DA's Office.21
IV.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's disqualification of the entire Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice BENDER dissents, and Chief Justice MULLARKEY and Justice MARTINEZ join in the dissent.