United States v. Texas Education Agency (Austin Independent School District)

467 F.2d 848, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8094
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedAugust 2, 1972
Docket71-2508
StatusPublished
Cited by102 cases

This text of 467 F.2d 848 (United States v. Texas Education Agency (Austin Independent School District)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Texas Education Agency (Austin Independent School District), 467 F.2d 848, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8094 (5th Cir. 1972).

Opinions

WISDOM, Circuit Judge,

with whom JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and GEWIN, GOLDBERG, DYER, and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges, join:

Before 1954, the year Brown 11 was decided, and for some years thereafter the Austin Independent School District (AISD) segregated black and white school children. The law of the land, since Brown I and II, requires the conversion of a dual system into a unitary system. Every judge on this Court understands that there is no school district where this conversion has been simple. We realize too that this conversion of a dual system to a unitary system is very difficult in metropolitan areas where there is not only an accelerated population growth, as in Austin, but there is also a movement of whites to the suburbs or to the periphery of the city. The involved process of attaining a unitary system is exceptionally difficult in Austin and in some other cities in the southwest where, in addition to other obstacles, Mexican-Americans in many cities in Texas are an identifiable ethnic minority. They are as much entitled to the benefits of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as blacks or whites. Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, No. 71-2397, 5 Cir., 459 F.2d 13; Alvarado v. El Paso Independent School District, 5 Cir. 1971, 445 F.2d 1011 [71-1555, June 16, 1971]. The district judge in the instant case recognized this fact and so stated in his memorandum opinion. Unfortunately, a fatal defect in the decree is that it fails to give effect to the legal consequences of the Court’s recognition of Mexican-Americans as a separate minority group. (This is not to minimize the ineffectiveness of the decree in giving relief to blacks.) See generally, Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case — Its significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. of Chi.L. [853]*853Rev. 697 (1971); Rangel and Alcalo, De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 Harv. Civil Rights and Liberties Rev., 370 (1972).

“The reconciliation of competing values in a desegregation case is, of course, a difficult task with many sensitive facets but fundamentally no more so than remedial measures courts of equity have traditionally employed.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.2 The school board is “charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.” Green v. New Kent County School Board, 1968, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716.

I.

Procedural History

On August 7, 1970, the United States, under authority of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3 filed suit against the Texas Education Agency and the Austin Independent School District (AISD).4 The original complaint charged that the AISD (1) “has traditionally operated and continues to-operate a dual school system based on race” (i. e. segregated schools for blacks and whites) and, moreover, (2) is “discriminating against Mexican-American students”, by assigning them to schools “that are identifiable as Mexican-American schools and schools that are attended almost exclusively by Mexican-American and Negro students”. The Government asked the district court to “enjoin the defendants . . . from discriminating against black and Mexican-American children ... on the basis of race and ethnic origin and require them to take affirmative action to disestablish that dual system of schools based on race and ethnic origin and to correct the effects of past discrimination based on race and ethnic origin”. On the same day, the district court ordered the AISD, with the assistance of the Texas Education Agency and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to develop and submit a desegregation plan. If the parties could reach no agreement, the order required them to submit their respective plans to the Court.5

A hearing was held on August 27, 1970, at which the Government presented an interim desegregation plan prepared by HEW, and the defendants presented an alternative plan. After the hearing, the district court orally ordered the HEW interim plan put into effect immediately. On September 4, 1970, the court entered a written order to the same effect that also contained standards similar to those in the decree formulated in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 5 Cir. 1969, 419 F.2d 1211. These standards include provisions relating to faculty and staff, selection of schools, transportation of stu[854]*854dents, majority-to-minority transfers, and attendance outside the system. The court ordered HEW to make a comprehensive study of the AISD and to prepare a plan for the complete desegregation of all schools. The Court required AISD to cooperate with HEW, the plan to be submitted by December 15, 1970. If the parties failed to agree, they were to submit their respective plans to the Court on December 15, 1970. The district court granted four extensions of the deadline for the filing of plans. Finally, on May 14, 1971, each of the parties submitted a plan.

The trial on the merits lasted from June 14, 1971, to June 21, 1971. On June 28,1971, the Court issued a “Memorandum Opinion and Order”. The Court recognized that “Mexican Americans constitute a separate ethnic group”, but held that the Government “failed in maintaining its burden of proof” that there had been de jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans.6 As to black students, the Court held, “the Government has made no showing that in the period from 1955 to the present the AISD has intentionally perpetuated segregation of blacks; the record instead indicated that during this period the school administration’s official acts have not been motivated by any discriminatory purpose7 . . . but . . . vestiges of a dual system continue to exist with respect to blacks”.

The Court gave the parties until July 16, 1971, to review and revise their plans in light of its ruling. The Court also offered “guidelines” for use of the parties in formulating plans. First, the Court encouraged the parties to agree on a mutually acceptable plan, stating, “It will be far more desirable for all concerned to have the parties combine the best elements of their separate plans than to have the Court draw its own plan”. Second, “the Court [encouraged] the parties to combine the best elements of both their plans with a view toward minimizing bussing”. Third, the parties were told to “avoid plans which include Anderson [a 98 percent black high school] as a junior or senior high school”. Finally, the Court declared that, although it had found no de jure segregation of Mexican-Americans, it “will nevertheless consider the effect upon this ethnic minority of any plan submitted by the parties”.

On July 15, 1971, the parties filed a “Report and Submission”. The parties agreed in light of the Court’s “Guidelines” to the plan previously submitted by the defendants for the desegregation of the high schools. There was dis[855]*855agreement as to the proper method for desegregating the junior high schools and the elementary schools. On July 19, 1971, the district court issued another “Memorandum Opinion and Order” rejecting the recommendations of HEW and adopting, with minor modifications, the AISD plan.

The Government appealed.

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Bluebook (online)
467 F.2d 848, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8094, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-texas-education-agency-austin-independent-school-ca5-1972.