Fort Bend Independent School District v. City of Stafford

507 F. Supp. 211, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16081
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedMay 12, 1980
DocketCiv. A. No. H-77-1752
StatusPublished

This text of 507 F. Supp. 211 (Fort Bend Independent School District v. City of Stafford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fort Bend Independent School District v. City of Stafford, 507 F. Supp. 211, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16081 (S.D. Tex. 1980).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND PINAL ORDER

SINGLETON, Chief Judge.

The Fort Bend Independent School District (FBISD), students of FBISD, and parents of students of FBISD brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment to permanently enjoin the City of Stafford from breaking away from FBISD to operate a municipal school district independent of FBISD. A trial occurred and judgment was entered by this court enjoining Stafford from breaking away from FBISD.1 Stafford appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed this court’s decision and remanded the case.2 The fifth circuit ruled that FBISD’s achievement of unitary status is a condition which must be met before Stafford may break away. The circuit court stated that the “[cjreation of a separate school district which will impede the dismantling of a segregated system,” whether operating under court order or not, “will be enjoined.” 594 F.2d at 74. However, where a district has achieved unitary status, the break away should not be enjoined. The court wrote,

Creation of a new district is not a constitutional violation, however, merely because at some time in the past the parent district engaged in discrimination. Once a district achieves unitary status, the methods, means and procedures employed to reach that status are not frozen and unchangeable, immunized from the consequences of subsequent racially neutral attempts to alter or divide the district.

594 F.2d at 74-75.

The circuit court ruled that “the district court walked a narrow line between deciding whether unitary status has or has not been attained.” 594 F.2d at 76. The appellate court quoted portions of this court’s opinion which suggested that FBISD had not achieved unitary status. The fifth circuit noted that despite such suggestions, “the [district] court made no express findings that constitutional violations remain uncorrected, and the parties are not able to point out to us hard evidence that would justify our making such a finding at the appellate level.” 594 F.2d at 76. The circuit court also referred to portions of this court’s opinion which suggested that FBISD already achieved unitary status. The circuit court concluded that this court did not determine whether or not FBISD achieved unitary status. It remanded the case for an unequivocal finding on that issue.

In Green v. County School Board of New Kent Co., Va., 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968), the Supreme Court first characterized school systems as “dual” or “unitary,” according to their racial status in six major areas.

[213]*213Racial identification of the system’s schools was complete, extending not just to the composition of student bodies at the two schools but to every facet of school operations-faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities. In short, the State, acting through the local school board and school officials, organized and operated a dual system, part “white” and part “Negro”

391 U.S. at 435, 88 S.Ct. at 1693.3 Green’s six criteria must be considered in an inquiry into the status of a school district that is intentionally racially segregated on a de facto basis.4 They also apply where a school district is segregated along ethnic lines.5

One component of a unitary system is an integrated faculty. Whether the faculty of a school district has achieved unitary status is a two pronged inquiry. First, the minority teachers must be evenly distributed throughout the system. In U. S. v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School District, 406 F.2d 1086, (5th Cir. .1969), the fifth circuit firmly stated that,

The school board must put its shoulder to the wheel and assume the burden of integrating the faculty and staff of each school.... The transformation to a unitary system will not come to pass until the board has balanced the faculty of each school so that no faculty is identifiable as being tailored for a heavy concentration of Negro or white students.

406 F.2d at 1093-1094. See also, Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, supra note 3, at 1217-1218; Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, supra note 5.

The second prong of the inquiry is an examination of the percentage of minority teachers in the district. The faculty must reflect the racial and ethnic composition of the students. In U. S. v. Texas Education Agency, supra note 5, the fifth circuit considered the school desegregation plan for the Austin Independent School District. The school district was 65% white, 20% Mexican-American, and 15% black. Only three percent of the total faculty was Mexican-American. The plan integrated white and black students, but omitted integration of the Mexican-American students. The plan also did not seek to improve the percentage of Mexican-American faculty. The court of appeals ruled that the omission of Mexican-American students from the integration plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 467 F.2d at 852, 862-870. The court also ruled that, “The school board ... should attempt to employ more Mexican-American teachers with the goal of attaining a ratio of Mexican-American teachers within the faculty that reflects more truly the ratio of Mexican-American students to the total population.” 467 F.2d at 873.6

[214]*214In summary, in order to achieve unitary status a school district must be fully integrated in six respects: faculty, staff, student bodies, facilities, extra-curricular activities, and transportation. In the area of faculty composition, two considerations are significant: the minority teachers must be evenly distributed throughout the district, and the percentage of minority faculty must be approximately the same as the percentage of minority students.

In this case, the plaintiffs and Stafford stipulated that FBISD achieved unitary status in four of the six critical areas; they dispute FBISD’s status in the areas of faculty and staff composition. The plaintiffs’ evidence pertains to certified personnel, i. e. all employees required to be certified by the Texas Education Agency, including administrators, teachers, principals, counselors, nurses, librarians, etc. The data illustrated that FBISD’s 12.14% minority certified personnel are evenly distributed throughout the district, with a few, minor exceptions. (See Appendix I.)

The statistics reveal slight maldistributions of minority personnel throughout the district. Two schools have under 5% and one has 6% minority certified personnel, although the district has 12.14% minority certified personnel. Two schools have 14% or more black certified personnel, and two have under 3% black certified personnel, whereas the district has 8.6% black certified personnel. Three schools have no Mexican-American teachers, although Mexican-Americans make up 3.11% of the certified personnel.

In no instance is the percentage of minority personnel so high or so low that the school is identifiable as a minority or black school.

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Related

Green v. County School Board of New Kent County
391 U.S. 430 (Supreme Court, 1968)
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443 U.S. 449 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman
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Horton v. Lawrence County Board of Education
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Bluebook (online)
507 F. Supp. 211, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16081, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fort-bend-independent-school-district-v-city-of-stafford-txsd-1980.