MEMORANDUM OPINION
JUSTICE, Chief Judge.
In 1970 and 1971, this court issued orders in United States v. State of Texas, 321 F.Supp. 1043 (E.D.Tex.1970), 330 F.Supp. 235 (E.D.Tex.1971), requiring the Texas Education Agency (“TEA”), inter alia, to minimize racial segregation in the public schools of Texas by refusing to accredit and distribute state monies to those school districts which discriminate on the basis of race. Continuing jurisdiction was retained by this court to oversee TEA’s ongoing responsibility to diminish segregation in the state’s schools. With slight modifications, these orders were affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 447 F.2d 441 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016, 92 S.Ct. 675, 30 L.Ed.2d 663 (1972). The modifications were incorporated in subsequent orders of this court, dated July 13, 1971, and August 9, 1973. Pursuant to the Fifth Circuit’s modification, the August 9, 1973, order permitted any school district to petition this court for relief when faced with a cut off of funds for suspension of accreditation by TEA.
On November 5, 1973, TEA sent a letter to the Gregory-Portland Independent School District (“GPISD”). In essence, the letter stated that, by its practice of segregating Mexican-American students, the district had violated the standards laid down in United States v. Texas; further, that the district would face suspension of accreditation and withholding of state funds if the violations were not remedied. TEA proposed student assignment plans to remedy the violations, but these plans were not accepted by GPISD. Rather than petitioning this court for relief, GPISD filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking temporary and permanent injunctions to prevent TEA from suspending accreditation and funding, and demanding a declaratory judgment that GPISD had not discriminated on the basis of race. On January 30, 1976, the United States District Court for the Southern District entered judgment granting the relief requested by the GPISD. On appeal,1 [1358] the Fifth Circuit held that the Southern District had no jurisdiction to determine these matters and directed it to dissolve the injunction, vacate all orders, and to dismiss the action or transfer it to this court. Gregory-Portland Independent School District v. Texas Education Agency, 576 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 1423, 59 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979). The transfer was effectuated on March 16, 1979, and the civil action has now been consolidated with United States v. Texas. GPISD now seeks the same relief here as was sought by it from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
I.
A.
Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973), marked the Supreme Court’s first encounter with a school desegregation case where racial separation of students had not been previously mandated by a state constitutional provision or statute. In Keyes, the Court held that the touchstone of a Fourteenth Amendment violation in such circumstances is the finding of an intent on the part of school authorities to discriminate. “We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann [v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554] is purpose or intent to segregate.” 413 U.S. at 208, 93 S.Ct. at 2697.2 Prior to Keyes, it had been the holding of the Fifth Circuit that intent need not be proven; that even where school segregation was non-statutory, the fact that it was caused by state action sufficed to make out a constitutional violation.3 This court held the same view; therefore, in the prior United States v. Texas opinions, the issue of segregatory intent was never addressed.
The record in this case demonstrates that the policies and practices of TEA in administering the public school system in Texas have frequently-whether inadvertently or by design-encouraged or resulted in the continuation of vestiges of racially segregated public education within the state.
321 F.Supp. at 1057.
The existence of unconstitutional discrimination is not determined solely by intent
330 F.Supp. at 244.
As of 1954, the Texas Constitution explicitly required the segregation of Black children in the public schools.4 The TEA is thus under a continuing affirmative obligation to eliminate “all vestiges of state-imposed segregation” against Black students. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 200, 93 S.Ct. at 2693, Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1275, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). Because no [1359] further showing of intent need be. made, the Keyes holding raises no question as to the continued vitality of this court’s orders in United States v. Texas, as they apply to discrimination against Black students.5 However, the segregation of Mexican-American students was not mandated by Texas state law. Hence, the effect of the supervening Keyes intent requirement on United States v. Texas, as it relates to Mexican-Americans, is presented for consideration.6
Before proceeding further, it is important to note that the problems inherent in Mexican-American desegregation cases are of the same magnitude as those in similar cases involving Black Americans. Clearly, Mexican-Americans are an identifiable ethnic group, historically subjected to many of the same discriminatory deprivations which Black Americans have been forced to suffer.7 Segregation of Mexican-American students, like that of Black students, can generate “a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely-ever to be undone.” Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954); see Keyes, 413 U.S. at 195-198, 93 S.Ct. at 2690-2692.
This court dealt specifically with the segregation of Mexican-American students in United States v. State of Texas (San Felipe Del Rio Independent School District), 342 F.Supp. 24 (E.D.Tex.1971), where some intimations of a finding of intentional discrimination against Mexican-American students can be found:
In other words, had it not been for the substantial contributions of the state under the terms of the Texas Minimum Foundation program and under other various additional arrangements, neither the former San Felipe School District nor the former Del Rio School District could have continued .in operation. Hence, since the state and its agencies knew, or should have known of the segregated educational system being operated, largely at state expense, . . and in light of this Court’s previous findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the State of Texas and the Texas Education Agency in this case [citations omitted], this Court believes that the segregated system described above existed as a result of state action.
342 F.Supp. at 25. Despite such intimations, the ultimate determination of a constitutional violation was based on the fact that the segregated system “existed as a [1360] result of state action”, and the question of intent was not decided.
A brief historical review is appropriate to put the question in perspective. The 1876 Constitution of the state of Texas included the following provision: “Separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children and impartial provision shall be made for both.”8 In 1930, a Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that Mexican-Americans were not to be segregated from white students under this clause of the constitution, but added that, in certain instances, language differences could furnish the justification for separate Mexican-American schools. Independent School District v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio, 1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 580, 52 S.Ct. 28, 76 L.Ed. 503 (1931). Both before and after the Salvatierra decision, however, many school districts throughout the state, including the predecessor districts to the GPISD,9 maintained explicitly separate “Mexican schools.”10
In 1948, the federal district court for the Western District of Texas, writing in Delgado v. Bastrop Independent School District, Civil Action No. 388 (W.D.Tex.1948) (unreported), pronounced the unconstitutionality of the arbitrary segregation of Mexican-American students. The State Board of Education (TEA’s predecessor) thereupon promulgated regulations and policy statements reflecting the Delgado decision.11 The Attorney General of Texas occasionally issued opinions, in response to specific school district inquiries, to the effect that Mexican-American students could not be segregated solely on the basis of their ancestry.12
The public pronouncements of certain state officials, responding to the Delgado decision, were in opposition to segregation. Nonetheless, the evidence presented in this case in present and prior hearings demonstrates that the State of Texas and its educational administrative agencies have persistently and intentionally segregated and discriminated against Mexican-American children in the public schools.
The most telling evidence against TEA in connection with this issue are its admissions, which were made in the course of this and related litigation. Indeed, in its brief filed in this action, TEA devotes an entire section to the question, headed as follows: “The application of the De Jure remedy set forth in United States v. Texas, No. 5281 (August 9, 1973), is fully justified in the context 'of one race schools for Mexican-Americans.” More detailed admissions made by TEA are in the factual stipulations entered into by TEA and other parties in a separate segment of this case, United States v. Texas (Bilingual), No. 5281 (E.D. Tex.), a copy of which was introduced as an exhibit at the GPISD trial.13
Included among the admissions by TEA are the following:
“State education authorities cooperated to allow local school districts to systemat[1361] ically reject the burden of Delgado.” Stipulation No. 735 (emphasis added).
“Texas sanctioned creation of separate school systems through approval of construction bonds which school minutes indicate were explicitly designed for the construction or repair of Mexican schools.” Stipulation No. 750 (emphasis added).
“The State Department of Education in Texas, by allowing county school trustees to classify schools on ‘the basis of conditions and needs regardless of the wishes of the residents of the local district,’ sanctioned the locals interpretation as a general authorization to continue a system of segregated schools.” Stipulation No. 733 (emphasis added).
“When the Mexican American school age population grew rapidly, Mexican-American districts were created to serve them.” Stipulation No. 730 (emphasis added). “Official publications of the Texas State Department of Education at one time reflected a policy of Anglo racial domination over Mexican-American people, their language and culture.” Stipulation No. 704.
“Segregation of Mexican American students is a historical fact in the Texas Public Schools.” Stipulation No. 701. “Mexican-American children have, historically been provided inferior facilities, often drastically overcrowded, sometimes necessitating Vfe day classes.” Stipulation No. 748.
“Negative stereotyping and racial isolation is a form of discrimination which still affects the educational experience of Mexican American students.” Stipulation No. 702.
“Under the tri-ethnic system during 1920-40 formation of Mexican schools, Mexican Americans were required to attend Mexican schools regardless of residential proximity.” Stipulation No. 743. “The State school directory for 1931-32 evidenced patterns of locally established Mexican schools where school age population existed.” Stipulation No. 742.
“By 1920, ‘Mexican schools’ existed in North, Central, West, and South Texas.” Stipulation No. 740.
These admissions make it clear that segregation of Mexican-American students has existed and continues to exist in Texas, and that this segregation is directly traceable to the intentional actions of state education officials.
The admissions also demonstrate that TEA and its predecessor agency knew of the segregation of Mexican-American students in Texas; yet the agency continued to fund and accredit those school districts which were segregated. This funding and accreditation unquestionably permitted the districts effectively to continue their unlawful practices. Indeed, without the financial and other contributions of the state, many of the segregated school districts could not continue in operation. United States v. Texas (San Felipe Del Rio Consolidated Independent School District), 242 F.Supp. at 25. Simple logic shows that state education authorities, knowing of segregated conditions and being aware that state contributions were necessary to support and maintain some of the segregated school districts, were fully cognizant of the consequence: that state contributions promoted and supported segregation of Mexican-American students in Texas schools. “Adherence to a particular policy or practice, ‘with full knowledge of the predictable effects of such adherence upon racial imbalance in a school system is one factor among many others which may be considered by a court in determining whether an inference of segregative intent should be drawn.’ ” Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465, 99 S.Ct. 2941, 2950, 61 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979), quoting with approval the district court opinion, 429 F.Supp. 229, 255 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
Further evidence for a finding of intent comes from Texas state law, specifically, a Texas statute prohibiting the speaking of Spanish in the public schools. Texas Penal Code Ann. art. 288 (Vernon, 1925). The statute was passed in 1909; in 1918, it was amended so as to make it a misdemeanor [1362] offense and an automatic loss of a teaching certificate for a teacher to teach in a language other than English. This statute remained as a part of Texas law until its repeal in 1969; in some places, however, the “No-Spanish” rule remained in effect into the 1970’s. Indeed, in October, 1970, a Mexican-American school teacher in the Crystal City Independent School District was indicted for teaching a United States history class in Spanish, although the indictment was later dismissed.14 As TEA has admitted, the rule was enforced in many Texas schools in such manner as to prohibit Mexican-American children from speaking their native tongue anywhere on the school grounds.15 According to TEA’s stipulation, “[vjiolators of the ‘no Spanish rule’ were corporally punished, shamed, threatened, fined, suspended and expelled from school by Texas school administrators.” 16 Finally, TEA has admitted that the statute “had a severe and debilitating effect on the education of Spanish speaking children for over 50 years.” 17 TEA is correct. The presence of a statutorily mandated and rigorously enforced policy preventing a child from speaking his native tongue — the language which he and his parents may have spoken all of their lives, the language which is often spoken in their home, the language of their ethnic and national heritage — is calculated to produce the stigma of inferiority so soundly condemned in Brown v. Board of Education.
In addition to TEA’s admissions of widespread Mexican-American public school segregation, the Fifth Circuit has made a number of findings of de jure segregation, applying the Keyes standard, in school districts throughout Texas. See United States v. Texas Education Agency (Lubbock Independent School District), 600 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Texas Education Agency (Austin III) (Austin Independent School District), 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 443 U.S. 915, 99 S.Ct. 3106, 61 L.Ed.2d 879 (1979); Zamora v. New Braunfels Independent School District, 519 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Midland Independent School District, 519 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1975); Morales v. Shannon (Uvalde), 516 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1975). These judicial determinations, alongside TEA’s own admissions, show that segregation of Mexican-American students, stemming from intentional state action, exists in a substantial portion of the school districts in Texas. “[PJroof of state-imposed segregation in a substantial portion of the district will suffice to support a finding of the trial court of the existence of a dual system.” Keyes, 413 U.S. at 203, 93 S.Ct. at 2695. Applying the Keyes formulation to the instant case, a presumption of statewide de jure segregation arises. The segregation of Mexican-Americans in any district of the state raises the further presumption that it is related to the state’s intentional acts. As the Supreme Court recently noted in Columbus, “purposeful discrimination in a substantial part of a school system furnishes a sufficient basis for an inferential finding of a systemwide discriminatory intent unless otherwise rebutted, and that given the purpose to operate a dual school system one could infer a connection between such a purpose and racial separation in other parts of the school system.” 443 U.S. at 467-468, 99 S.Ct. at 2952.
According to the Fifth Circuit’s recent pronouncement, an additional presumption is generated by Keyes : a finding of intentional segregation against Black students creates a presumption that segregation against Mexican-Americans was also intentional. Writing for the panel in the latest installment of the lengthy Austin school litigation, Judge Wisdom said:
The second Keyes presumption is that “ ‘even if it is determined that different areas of the school district should be viewed independently of each other’, ‘a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful por[1363] tion of a school system ... creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious.’” 413 U.S. at 208, 93 S.Ct. at 2697. In a tri-ethnic setting, Keyes means that a finding of intentional segregation against one minority group raises the presumption that any segregation suffered by the second minority group was intentional. Here, there is no doubt [of discrimination] against blacks. This fact alone, therefore, created a presumption — here, we consider, unrebutted— that the segregated schooling of Mexican-Americans was not “adventitious.”
United States v. Texas Education Agency (Austin Independent School District), 579 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978) (denying the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc from the Austin III decision), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915, 99 S.Ct. 3106, 61 L.Ed.2d 879 (1979). The state of Texas blatantly and intentionally discriminated against Black Americans through its constitutional provision mandating segregated schools. The presumption arises, therefore, that it has intentionally created the existing segregation of Mexican-American students.
Thus, Keyes calls for two presumptions, both leading to the proposition that the state of Texas is liable for de jure segregation of Mexican-American students. The first arises from the existence of intentional state action leading to segregation of Mexican-Americans in a substantial portion of the state’s schools. The second stems from Texas’ segregation of Black students, mandated as it was by the state constitution. No party to this action has come forward with evidence to rebut these presumptions of statewide de jure segregation. The Texas Education Agency, which would have the most information bearing on the issue, insists that there are indeed grounds for a finding of statewide de jure segregation of Mexican-Americans. GPISD has presented no evidence to contravene that assertion.
It should be noted that some of the intentional acts which give rise to the finding of de jure segregation occurred before 1954. In assessing liability for segregation resulting from those acts, this has little effect. As the Supreme Court opined in Keyes:
The Courts below attributed much significance to the fact that many of the Board’s actions in the core city area antedated our decision in Brown. We reject any suggestion that remoteness in time has any relevance to the issue of intent. If the actions of school authorities were to any degree motivated by segregative intent and the segregation resulting from those actions continues to exist, the fact of remoteness in time certainly does not make those actions any less “intentional.”
413 U.S. at 210-211, 93 S.Ct. at 2698.
Finally, the facial opposition of the State Board of Education and the Attorney General to the “Mexican schools” in the late 1940’s in no way masks what the foregoing recital has made clear: that the State of Texas and its educational agencies have actively assisted in the intentional segregation of Mexican-American students on a statewide level and that this conduct produced substantial statewide impact. Public pronouncements of good faith by state authorities' in no way obviate an unconstitutional intent to discriminate. Cf. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 457 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. at 2946.
B.
Once segregatory intent has been found to exist, as here, the state authorities come under the same affirmative obligation imposed upon statutory dual systems: to eliminate “all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.” Swann, 402 U.S. at 15, 91 S.Ct. at 1275. The measure of this obligation “is the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual system.” Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 538, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2979, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979). The evidence indicates that TEA has yet to eliminate the vestiges of the state’s intentional segregation.
TEA’s own admissions, detailed earlier with respect to the issue of intent, relate a number of acts which also indicate a failure affirmatively to extirpate Mexican-American segregation. Furthermore, TEA has, [1364] over the years, provided funds and accreditation to school systems which it knew to be segregated. It is clear that the foreseeable consequence of accrediting and funding these districts is to allow the continuing operation of the districts as segregated entities. As the Supreme Court said in Dayton II, “proof of foreseeable consequences . . . may itself show a failure to fulfill the duty to eradicate the consequences of prior purposefully discriminatory conduct.” 443 U.S. at 536 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. at 2978.
In fact, this court made a finding in the original United States v. Texas opinion, which was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, 447 F.2d 441, that TEA has not only failed to eliminate continuing vestiges of racial segregation, but, in addition, has exacerbated the segregation. “The record in this case demonstrates that the policies and practices of TEA in administering the public school system in Texas have frequently .. . encouraged or resulted in the continuation of vestiges of racially segregated public education within the State.” United States v. Texas, 321 F.Supp. at 1057. It having been here determined that TEA is liable for the intentional segregation of Mexican-American students, the prior holding of United States v. Texas that TEA has not eliminated the vestiges of segregation, stands as “the law of the case.”18 None of the parties has introduced evidence to suggest that, in the years subsequent to the prior United States v. Texas opinion, TEA has totally fulfilled its obligation affirmatively to eliminate segregation. Indeed, TEA, with admirable candor, has admitted to its liability for the de jure segregation of Mexican-American students and its remaining obligation to eradicate that segregation.
II.
A.
The August 9, 1973, order of this court in United States v. Texas requires of TEA the following:
F. Student Assignment
* * * * * S
(a) Defendants shall not permit, make arrangement for, acquiesce in or give support of any kind to the assignment of students to schools, individual classrooms or other school activities on the basis of race, color, or national origin, except where required to comply with constitutional standards.
(3) Defendants shall review each year all school districts in the state in which there exists schools enrolling more than 66 percent minority group students as reported in accordance with [a provision of a prior order in the action] and shall make findings as to whether or not the student assignment plans of these districts have resulted in compliance with the terms of this order .... Any district found not to be in compliance shall be notified that it is in violation, and, further, shall be provided in writing by the defendants with a specific detailed plan designed to eliminate all such violations of the terms of this order ....
(4) If, by the end of the first week of the semester or term following receipt of the notice and plan provided for in paragraph F(3), a district has failed to implement such plan, or, has failed to adopt and implement an equally effective alternate plan to eliminate all racially or ethnically identifiable schools found to be in violation of constitutional standards as provided by paragraph F(3), the defendants shall warn the district through the President of its Board of Trustees and through its Superintendent (if the district has such an official) that its accreditation is in danger. This warning shall remain in effect for ten days after which time, if the dis[1365] trict has still failed to achieve compliance, the Texas Education Agency shall suspend the district’s TEA accreditation.
(5) In addition to suspension of accreditation and simultaneously therewith defendants shall suspend payment of all state funds granted to the district under the Minimum Foundation Program for salaries, operating expenses, transportation and all other purposes.
The briefs of the parties in this case indicate some confusion about the meaning of the directives in this portion of the order, particularly the sixty-six percent figure in section F(3). In its brief, TEA states that the order
directed the Texas Education Agency to notify each school district in which there were schools enrolling more than 66 percent minority group students that the district was in violation of this court’s order ....
Id. at 1, and further:
The most effective portion of this court’s August 9, 1973 amended order was that portion directing the Texas Education Agency to withhold accreditation and state funds from any school district operating a campus that was over 66 percent minority students.
Id. at 2.
GPISD began the conclusion of its brief in the following manner:
To summarize, the TEA, in the instant case, is carrying out an order of this Federal Court directing that state funds and accreditation be denied to any school district in which there exists a school having a minority enrollment exceeding 66%%.
Id. at page 11. The order clearly did not comprehend an interpretation requiring TEA to take remedial action based only on the determination that a particular school in a district enrolled more than sixty-six percent minority students. The plain language of Section F(3) says that TEA “shall review ... all school districts ... in which there exists schools enrolling more than 66% minority group students . . . and shall make findings as to whether or not the student assignment plans of these districts have resulted in compliance with the terms of this order.” (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, under the terms of the order, the existence of a school enrolling more than sixty-six percent minority students in a school district requires only that the TEA investigate, inter alia, the racial makeup of the district. The sixty-six percent figure is a triggering device, a judicial recognition that a requirement of yearly review of all school districts in the state is impracticable. After identifying a school district which contains a school enrolling more than sixty-six percent minority students, TEA is required to determine if the district is assigning students “in compliance with the terms of this order.” Hence, it is only when the district is failing to comply with the order that TEA is to suspend accreditation and withhold funds.
In the area of student assignment, the standards promulgated in sections F(2) and F(4) are “the terms of this order” with which school districts and the TEA must comply. Section F(2) prohibits assignment of students on the basis of race, color, or national origin, except where required to comply with constitutional standards. The elimination of “all racially and ethnically identifiable schools” which are in violation of constitutional standards is mandated in Section F(4).
The sixty--six percent figure cannot stand as a benchmark by which to identify schools which do not comply with constitutional standards. See Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 433-34, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 2703, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976); Swann, 402 U.S. at 24, 91 S.Ct. at 1280. By way of example, a school district which contained a seventy percent Mexican-American student population would not appear to be segregated simply because one of its schools had a sixty-seven percent Mexican-American student body. Similarly, those school districts which have no schools with over sixty-six percent minority students are not necessarily free from constitutional violation. To illustrate, the pres[1366] ence of a school district with a thirty-five percent minority student population, containing one school with only five percent minority students and another with sixty-five percent minority students, may symbolize a lack of constitutional compliance.
B.
This court’s prior opinions in United States v. Texas pronounced a condition of statewide de jure discrimination against Black students. It has been here found that the pattern of statewide de jure discrimination also harms Mexican-American students. These findings lead to a presumption that segregation of Blacks or Mexiean-Americans in a Texas school district is the result of this de jure discrimination, in which case the local segregation itself is unconstitutional. The subsequent shifting of the burden of proof, brought about by the presumption, was articulated by the Supreme Court in Keyes : “[B]e it a statutory dual system or an allegedly unitary system where a meaningful portion of the system is found to be intentionally segregated, the existence of subsequent or other segregated schooling within the same system justifies a rule imposing on the school authorities the burden of proving that this segregated schooling is not also the result of intentionally segregative acts.” 413 U.S. at 210, 93 S.Ct. at 2698.
At issue in this case is whether TEA was required to find discriminatory intent on the part of GPISD before implementing the United States v. Texas sanctions. Clearly, as the foregoing passage from Keyes demonstrates, it was not. When TEA investigates a school district under the terms of this court’s orders in United States v. Texas, it must determine if the district contains ethnically identifiable schools.19 As Swann (402 U.S. at 18,91 S.Ct. at 1277) and Columbus (443 U.S. at 460, 99 S.Ct. at 2948) make clear, the presence of such schools in a de jure system constitutes a prima facie constitutional violation. If TEA determines the existence of ethnically identifiable schools, it need show nothing further to implement the sanctions provided in the United States v. Texas orders.
However, the school district should have the opportunity to rebut the prima facie case. In order to prevail, it must prove the following: (1) that its segregated condition is in no way the result of the state’s intentionally segregative acts; and (2) that its segregated condition in no way results from its own intentionally segregative acts. It is entirely likely that local segregation will be the result of intentional acts by both the state and local authorities. Where the state’s intentional acts have contributed to the segregation, yet the school district itself has done nothing intentionally segregative, TEA is, nevertheless, under an obligation to [1367] withdraw support for the segregated district, inasmuch as the state agency is responsible for the illegality of conditions in the district. Furthermore, the school district, as an administrative unit of the state, is necessarily implicated by and responsible for the state’s acts in this connection. Where the school district alone has intentionally created segregation, without state influence, TEA is also required to withdraw its support; otherwise, it would be knowingly assisting in a continuing violation of the constitution.20
C.
TEA did not misinterpret or misapply the 1973 order in relation to GPISD. In his letter to the President of the Board of Trustees of GPISD, dated November 5, 1973, the Commissioner of Education states that the 1973 Order “requires the Texas Education Agency to review all school districts in the state in which there exists one or more schools enrolling more than 66 percent minority group students and to make findings as to whether or not the student assignment plans have resulted in compliance with the terms of the order.” (Emphasis added.) The Commissioner made the following finding in the letter:
It is our considered opinion that the existence of Austin Elementary School, Gregory-Portland Independent School District, with a 92.37 minority student enrollment, while T. M. Clark Elementary School and East Cliff Elementary School have minority enrollment of 20.83 and 9.04 percent respectively does constitute a violation of the terms of the court order.
This finding, while perhaps not as detailed as might be desired, was based on a TEA staff report prepared after a review of GPISD. The conclusion there reached is both factually and legally correct. (See part III of this opinion.)
By failing to make explicit findings concerning the causes of the segregation at GPISD, TEA did not violate any rights of GPISD or any provisions of the 1973 Order. Under the Keyes presumption (as outlined in part IIB of this opinion), the presence of segregated schools in the midst of Texas’ statewide de jure segregation is enough to make out a prima facie constitutional violation. TEA’s finding of segregation within GPISD was sufficient; no further inquiry into the cause of the segregation was required of the agency. Of course, a school district should have the opportunity to furnish TEA with countervailing evidence to rebut the presumption that its segregation results from a constitutional violation. It is clear that TEA did not afford GPISD a formal hearing. Whether the district had the opportunity to engage in less formal communication with TEA and present whatever offsetting evidence it may have had is not readily apparent. It does not appear from the record that GPISD attempted to proffer any evidence to TEA. In any event, the absence of an opportunity to do so would not nullify TEA’s action here, as the occasion to make proof on the issues has been amply afforded GPISD in this court proceeding. It would serve no good cause, and only delay would be exalted, if this matter were now remanded to TEA for consideration of GPISD’s evidence.
D.
GPISD contends that, in this court, the burden of proof was on TEA to show discriminatory intent. This contention is incorrect. When a school district faced with a potential suspension of funding and accreditation by TEA petitions this court for relief, as GPISD has done, the burdens of proof'are dictated by the Keyes presumption, as outlined in part IIB of this opinion. Statewide de jure segregation of both Black American and Mexican- Americans having been established, present segregation of either group actuates a presumption that [1368] such segregation is linked to discriminatory intent. Therefore, when a school district comes before this court to complain of imminent TEA sanctions, TEA need only prove the existence of segregation in the district. The burden then falls on the district to show that the segregation is not the product of unconstitutional actions. Specifically, it must prove to this court: (1) that its segregated condition is in no way the result of the state’s intentionally segregative acts, and (2) that to no extent was its segregated condition the result of its own intentionally segregative acts.21 Unless both are proved by the school board, the court will find the existence of unconstitutional segregation and uphold TEA’s implementation of the sanctions of United States v. Texas.