United States v. Ng Lap Seng
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Opinions
Judge Sullivan concurs in a separate opinion.
Reena Raggi, Circuit Judge:
*116Defendant Ng Lap Seng paid two United Nations ("U.N.") ambassadors-one of whom was for a time also serving as President of the General Assembly-more than $1 million to secure a U.N. commitment to use Ng's Macau real estate development as the site for an annual U.N. conference. Based on this conduct, Ng now stands convicted after a jury trial of paying and conspiring to pay bribes and gratuities in violation of
Ng now appeals his conviction, arguing that (1) his conduct cannot have violated § 666 because the U.N. is not an "organization" within the meaning of that statute; (2) the jury instructions as to both § 666 and FCPA bribery were deficient in light of McDonnell v. United States , --- U.S. ----,
BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution Evidence at Trial
Because Ng appeals a judgment of conviction following a jury trial, we summarize the evidence adduced in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See United States v. Thompson ,
A. Ng's Convention Center Plan
In 2009-10, Chinese national Ng sought to develop his already extensive Macau real estate holdings into a multi-billion-dollar complex that would include hotels, luxury apartment buildings, and a world-class convention center. To ensure the reputation *117of his convention center, and thereby to enhance the use and value of adjacent real estate within his complex, Ng sought to have the U.N. formally designate his center as the permanent site for the annual convention, or "Expo," of its Office for South-South Cooperation ("UNOSSC"), an event with broad attendance throughout the private as well as public sectors.2 Toward this end, Ng engaged in a sustained effort over five years to bribe two U.N. officials: (1) Francis Lorenzo, a United States citizen serving as the Dominican Republic's Deputy Ambassador to the U.N.; and (2) John Ashe, the U.N. Ambassador for Antigua and Barbuda and, for a time during the bribery scheme, President of the General Assembly, the second-ranking position within the U.N.
B. Ng Recruits Lorenzo and Ashe
Ng first met Lorenzo in March 2009, and in December of that year named him president of South-South News ("SSN"), a media organization owned by Ng and incorporated in New York. Lorenzo, who pleaded guilty to bribery and other charges pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the government,3 testified that he understood that a portion of the $20,000 a month that Ng was paying him as SSN salary, as well as other payments described herein-which, by 2015, totaled over $1 million-were in fact bribes to secure for Ng, not merely general U.N. support for UNOSSC's use of his Macau convention center, but a formal documented commitment to do so. In short, Lorenzo understood that Ng was paying him in order to procure "an official document from the United Nations," Trial Tr. at 652, i.e. , he wanted "a contract," id. at 671.
Ng and Lorenzo agreed that as the first step toward this goal, Lorenzo would host "working sessions" for other ambassadors to discuss issues of South-South cooperation. App'x 1449. The plan was for the sessions to produce a report making it appear that the attending ambassadors were urging the U.N. to designate an official UNOSSC meeting center.
At Lorenzo's suggestion, Ng recruited Ashe to attend the first meeting, which was held in China in April 2011. To induce Ashe's attendance, Ng paid for a vacation trip to New Orleans by Ashe's family. Ng also promised Ashe whatever financial assistance he might need if he were to become President of the U.N. General Assembly.4 After the China meeting, at Ashe's request, Ng began funneling *118$2,500-$6,000 per month to Ashe personally, disguised as payments to Ashe's wife for consulting services provided to SSN. In fact, as SSN employees testified, Ashe's wife never performed any such services. Nevertheless, the sham monthly payments continued through early 2015. Indeed, even when SSN was reducing expenses in 2014, Lorenzo told Ng that payments to Ashe's wife should continue because "we need[ ] John [Ashe] to continue his support on the [E]xpo." Trial Tr. at 1258.
C. Acts in Furtherance of the Expo Scheme
In return for Ng's payments, Lorenzo and Ashe took various actions to support UNOSSC designating Ng's convention center as its permanent Expo site. On appeal, as at trial, the government highlights four particular acts taken by the two ambassadors.
1. Placing Documents in the Official Record of the U.N. General Assembly Reporting Ambassadorial Support for Ng's Convention Center Plan
Following the 2011 working sessions, Ng directed Lorenzo and Ashe to publicize and inflate ambassadorial support for UNOSSC's use of Ng's convention center. Toward that end, the ambassadors drafted and, on March 15, 2012, Ashe signed, a letter on U.N. letterhead, addressed to the U.N. Secretary General, reporting that representatives from eight member nations and various U.N. departments had held "high-level meetings and working sessions" that resulted in the launching of a "Global Business Incubator." App'x 1449.5 With the assistance of an unwitting U.N.
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Judge Sullivan concurs in a separate opinion.
Reena Raggi, Circuit Judge:
*116Defendant Ng Lap Seng paid two United Nations ("U.N.") ambassadors-one of whom was for a time also serving as President of the General Assembly-more than $1 million to secure a U.N. commitment to use Ng's Macau real estate development as the site for an annual U.N. conference. Based on this conduct, Ng now stands convicted after a jury trial of paying and conspiring to pay bribes and gratuities in violation of
Ng now appeals his conviction, arguing that (1) his conduct cannot have violated § 666 because the U.N. is not an "organization" within the meaning of that statute; (2) the jury instructions as to both § 666 and FCPA bribery were deficient in light of McDonnell v. United States , --- U.S. ----,
BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution Evidence at Trial
Because Ng appeals a judgment of conviction following a jury trial, we summarize the evidence adduced in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See United States v. Thompson ,
A. Ng's Convention Center Plan
In 2009-10, Chinese national Ng sought to develop his already extensive Macau real estate holdings into a multi-billion-dollar complex that would include hotels, luxury apartment buildings, and a world-class convention center. To ensure the reputation *117of his convention center, and thereby to enhance the use and value of adjacent real estate within his complex, Ng sought to have the U.N. formally designate his center as the permanent site for the annual convention, or "Expo," of its Office for South-South Cooperation ("UNOSSC"), an event with broad attendance throughout the private as well as public sectors.2 Toward this end, Ng engaged in a sustained effort over five years to bribe two U.N. officials: (1) Francis Lorenzo, a United States citizen serving as the Dominican Republic's Deputy Ambassador to the U.N.; and (2) John Ashe, the U.N. Ambassador for Antigua and Barbuda and, for a time during the bribery scheme, President of the General Assembly, the second-ranking position within the U.N.
B. Ng Recruits Lorenzo and Ashe
Ng first met Lorenzo in March 2009, and in December of that year named him president of South-South News ("SSN"), a media organization owned by Ng and incorporated in New York. Lorenzo, who pleaded guilty to bribery and other charges pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the government,3 testified that he understood that a portion of the $20,000 a month that Ng was paying him as SSN salary, as well as other payments described herein-which, by 2015, totaled over $1 million-were in fact bribes to secure for Ng, not merely general U.N. support for UNOSSC's use of his Macau convention center, but a formal documented commitment to do so. In short, Lorenzo understood that Ng was paying him in order to procure "an official document from the United Nations," Trial Tr. at 652, i.e. , he wanted "a contract," id. at 671.
Ng and Lorenzo agreed that as the first step toward this goal, Lorenzo would host "working sessions" for other ambassadors to discuss issues of South-South cooperation. App'x 1449. The plan was for the sessions to produce a report making it appear that the attending ambassadors were urging the U.N. to designate an official UNOSSC meeting center.
At Lorenzo's suggestion, Ng recruited Ashe to attend the first meeting, which was held in China in April 2011. To induce Ashe's attendance, Ng paid for a vacation trip to New Orleans by Ashe's family. Ng also promised Ashe whatever financial assistance he might need if he were to become President of the U.N. General Assembly.4 After the China meeting, at Ashe's request, Ng began funneling *118$2,500-$6,000 per month to Ashe personally, disguised as payments to Ashe's wife for consulting services provided to SSN. In fact, as SSN employees testified, Ashe's wife never performed any such services. Nevertheless, the sham monthly payments continued through early 2015. Indeed, even when SSN was reducing expenses in 2014, Lorenzo told Ng that payments to Ashe's wife should continue because "we need[ ] John [Ashe] to continue his support on the [E]xpo." Trial Tr. at 1258.
C. Acts in Furtherance of the Expo Scheme
In return for Ng's payments, Lorenzo and Ashe took various actions to support UNOSSC designating Ng's convention center as its permanent Expo site. On appeal, as at trial, the government highlights four particular acts taken by the two ambassadors.
1. Placing Documents in the Official Record of the U.N. General Assembly Reporting Ambassadorial Support for Ng's Convention Center Plan
Following the 2011 working sessions, Ng directed Lorenzo and Ashe to publicize and inflate ambassadorial support for UNOSSC's use of Ng's convention center. Toward that end, the ambassadors drafted and, on March 15, 2012, Ashe signed, a letter on U.N. letterhead, addressed to the U.N. Secretary General, reporting that representatives from eight member nations and various U.N. departments had held "high-level meetings and working sessions" that resulted in the launching of a "Global Business Incubator." App'x 1449.5 With the assistance of an unwitting U.N. official, Lorenzo and Ashe then had the letter made a part of the official General Assembly record (hereafter "U.N. Document"), a step that could only be taken by an accredited U.N. ambassador and that allows the document to be circulated to all member states.6
In December 2012, Ng instructed Lorenzo to revise the March U.N. Document so that it expressly referenced a permanent Expo center to be developed by Ng's company, Sun Kian Ip Group ("SKI"). Ashe and Lorenzo achieved this objective by securing reissuance of the U.N. Document on June 6, 2013, "for technical reasons." Id. at 1586 (hereafter "Revised U.N. Document"). In fact, changes to the reissued document went well beyond the technical. Consistent with Ng's instructions, Ashe and Lorenzo added two entirely new substantive paragraphs to the letters, as follows:
In this regard, I am pleased to inform you that in response to the recommendation, *119Sun Kian Ip Group of China has welcomed the initiative and will serve as the representative for the implementation of the Permanent Expo and Meeting Centre for the countries of the South. This is one of the first centres in a network of incubator centres in a public-private partnership with the support of leading partner South-South News.
As envisaged, I foresee that this permanent exposition centre of innovation and excellence will play an important role, not only in accelerating the development and deploying of technologies, including through South-South and triangular cooperation, but also in harnessing the potential of [information and communication technologies] for sustainable growth, investment, capacity-building and job creation, particularly in developing countries.
Id. (emphases added).
2. UNOSSC's Letter of Support for Ng's Convention Center Plan
Ng further directed Lorenzo to obtain a letter from UNOSSC endorsing a permanent Expo center, characterizing such support as a "top priority." Id. at 1452. Lorenzo testified that such a letter from UNOSSC would, indeed, provide "very significant" support within the U.N. for Ng's convention center plan. Trial Tr. at 1092. Ng paid Lorenzo $30,000 per month to secure such a letter (in addition to the $20,000 per month already being paid to him as SSN president), funneling the money through sham contract payments to a Dominican company operated by Lorenzo's brother.
The opportunity for procuring such a letter arose when, for a time in 2013, Ashe served as President of both the U.N. General Assembly and the Assembly's High-Level Committee on South-South Cooperation, which was serviced by UNOSSC, then headed by Chinese national Yiping Zhou. Taking advantage of these circumstances, Ashe and Lorenzo proceeded to procure the demanded UNOSSC commitment letter, creating a paper trail that made no mention of payments the two men were receiving from Ng to do so but, rather, suggested that they were objectively performing their official duties in supporting Ng's plan.
As the first step in the charade, on October 10, 2013, Ng sent Lorenzo a letter congratulating his U.N. leadership on South-South cooperation; referencing SKI's purported appointment (as indicated in the Revised U.N. Document) to implement a "Permanent Expo and Meeting Center for the countries of the South"; and seeking Lorenzo's ambassadorial assistance in bringing to the attention of the President of the General Assembly, i.e. , Ashe, and UNOSSC an attached "master plan and proposal for implementation" of the center. App'x 1602. The letter gave Lorenzo an excuse to meet with Ashe and Zhou and, thereafter, to make a formal request "on behalf of the Ambassadors" who had attended earlier Expos to give favorable consideration to the "offer made by Macao7 Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China to provide the Global South-South Development Expo a permanent home." Id. at 1536-37.
When a month passed with no action on Lorenzo's request, Ng had his subordinate threaten to halt future payments to Lorenzo "unless further progress is made." Id. at 1478. Ten days later, on November 28, 2013, Lorenzo met in New York with the *120subordinate, who gave Lorenzo $20,000 to pay Ashe as a further inducement for his influencing Zhou to endorse Ng's permanent Expo plan.8 After more meetings among Lorenzo, Ashe, and Zhou, the UNOSSC director provided the desired letter of support.9
The letter, which was backdated to June 7, 2013-so that it could be copied to Ashe as if he were still serving as President of the General Assembly High-Level Committee-was addressed to both Lorenzo in his ambassadorial capacity and to Ng's SKI organization. Written on UNOSSC letterhead and signed by Zhou as UNOSSC director, the letter observed that the Revised U.N. Document "clearly state[s] that Sun Kian Ip Group of China is tasked to establish the Permanent Expo and Meeting Centre for the countries of the South," professed UNOSSC's view that this was "a very welcome initiative," and expressed its "strong support for this initiative led by Sun Kian Ip Group with the coordination of [SSN]." Id. at 1642.
3. Ashe's March 2014 Trip to Macau
In March 2014, Ng arranged for Ashe, as General Assembly President, and accompanying U.N. staff and security officers, to visit Macau for a first-hand inspection of the almost-completed convention center complex. Ashe agreed to make the trip only if Ng made a sizable contribution to the Office of the President of the General Assembly. See id. at 1493 ("I will not go unless I see the funds ... to help fund the PGA office."). On the trip, Ashe assured Ng of his support for U.N. use of the Macau center in return for Ng's continued financial support of Ashe's endeavors as General Assembly President.
Soon thereafter, Ashe asked Ng to pay the $200,000 cost of a concert that Ashe wished to host at the U.N. Lorenzo advised Ng to make the payment to ensure that Ashe "continues supporting" a convention center agreement. Trial Tr. at 1310. On June 3, 2014, Ng wired the requested amount to an account designated by Ashe.
4. UNOSSC's Expo Commitment and Pro Bono Agreement
On June 13, 2014, approximately ten days after Ng wired Ashe the requested $200,000, Zhou sent Lorenzo a letter stating that "with the support of the President of the General Assembly"- i.e. , Ashe-UNOSSC expected to have a pro bono agreement drafted in a matter of weeks for SKI to host the 2015 UNOSSC Expo as well as another global forum. App'x 1641.10 On December 25, 2014, Ng on behalf of SKI and Zhou on behalf of UNOSSC did, in fact, sign what was entitled the "Pro Bono Agreement ... [f]or the hosting of the United Nations Global South-South Development Expo and Permanent Meeting Center and other Mutually Agreed Events." Id. at 1836-48.11
*121A few weeks later, on February 2, 2015, Zhou sent a letter to Lorenzo-identified therein as President of both SSN and SKI-formally inviting these two entities to host both the 2015 Expo and a 2015 global forum on poverty. Zhou therein reported that "the President of the ... General Assembly, H.E. John Ashe, [had] been calling upon [Zhou's] office to step up the efforts to support ... in particular, the Permanent Expo and Meeting Centre in Macao," and that UNOSSC "strongly support[ed]" such a center by SKI and SSN. Id. at 1525.
D. The 2015 Expo
In August 2015, Ng launched his Macau convention center with a UNOSSC forum attended by U.N. ambassadors, as well as other public- and private-sector officials. Lorenzo prepared an "outcome document" for circulation within the U.N., which reported, among other things, participants' call for the establishment of a permanent convention center for the Expo. Lorenzo and Ashe then worked to incorporate the document into a General Assembly resolution, broaching such action to the then-president of the High-Level Committee on South-South Cooperation. The plan was abandoned, however, after Ng's arrest the following month.
II. Defense Evidence at Trial
The defense case was limited to offering into evidence financial records and a U.N. report, and to having a witness testify to certain of these documents.
III. Conviction
On July 27, 2017, a jury found Ng guilty on all counts charged. The district court sentenced Ng on May 11, 2018, to a total of 48 months' imprisonment and a $1 million fine, and ordered forfeiture of $1.5 million and restitution of $302,977.20. Judgment was entered on June 7, 2018. This timely appeal followed. On June 27, 2018, this Court denied Ng's motion for bail pending appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. The § 666 Challenge
Ng argues that his § 666 convictions cannot stand because the U.N. is not an "organization" within the meaning of that statute.12 13 Ng does not dispute that *122the U.N. meets the dictionary definition of the term "organization."14 Indeed, he acknowledges that the "UN is undeniably a public international organization." Appellant Reply Br. at 4; see also Appellant Br. at 23-24. Nevertheless, he maintains that "organization," as used in § 666, must be construed narrowly to reference only private, and not public, entities.
A. Precedent Supports § 666 Prosecution of U.N. Bribery
In arguing that § 666 does not reach a public international organization such as the U.N., Ng confronts a high hurdle: this court's decision in United States v. Bahel,
Ng argues that Bahel does not control this appeal because the defendant there challenged only whether United States' contributions to the U.N., specified by international agreement, qualified as federal program benefits under § 666. He did not ask the court to decide whether the U.N. was an "organization" under § 666. Perhaps not. But the court's opinion is more reasonably read to suggest that the matter is beyond, rather than open to, question. Bahel explains that Congress having allocated money to the U.N., the United States "has a legitimate and significant interest in prohibiting ... acts of bribery being perpetuated at the organization ," and identifies "no principled basis on which to distinguish congressional authorization of the payment [of] U.N. dues from federal monies flowing to [other] nongovernmental organizations ."
B. Section 666 's Text and Context Warrant Excluding Only Governments, not Public International Organizations, from the Word "Organization"
Even without Bahel , Ng's urged narrow reading of § 666 is not persuasive. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, see, e.g., United States v. Epskamp ,
"Statutory analysis necessarily begins with the plain meaning of a law's text and, absent ambiguity, will generally end there." Dobrova v. Holder ,
*123Section 666 specifically defines certain words used in that statute. For example, the term "State," as used in the phrase "or of a State, local or Indian tribal government," is statutorily defined to mean "a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States."
The context in which "organization" is used in § 666, however, does signal some definitional narrowing; specifically, governments and their constituent parts are not among the legal persons that Congress intended to include within the word as used in that statute. See generally United States v. Epskamp ,
Construing "organization" to mean all legal persons except governments *124yields no peculiar result. Indeed, in other contexts, Congress has so limited the word, while otherwise maintaining its broad application. See, e.g. ,
Neither the text nor structure of § 666, however, supports the still narrower construction of "organization" urged by Ng. He would have us cabin the word, as used in § 666, to private organizations, excluding from the statute's protection scores of public international organizations in which the United States is a member and for which it is frequently a major financial contributor.16 In addition to the U.N., such organizations include the International Monetary Fund, the World Health Organization, the Organization of American States, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and many more. See
*125C. The U.N. Is Not Excludable from § 666 as a Foreign Government
Nor can Ng avoid § 666 culpability by analogizing the U.N. to a foreign government. The U.N. is not a sovereign entity. Rather, it is an association of more than 190 independent sovereigns that have joined in, and agreed to fund, what they themselves describe as an "Organization ... based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members," for the purpose of "maintain[ing] international peace and security." Charter of the United Nations, ch. I, art. 1, § 1, art. 2, § 1. Thus, from a definitional perspective, the U.N. cannot reasonably be deemed a "foreign government" rather than an international "organization" under § 666.
This conclusion finds further support in statutes that refer separately to "foreign governments" and "international organizations," even when Congress chooses to apply the law equally to both. See, e.g. , 10 U.S.C. § 130c (explaining that statutory protection for sensitive information of foreign governments reaches information provided by or produced in cooperation with an international organization as well as a foreign government);
Ng nevertheless argues that the U.N. should be treated as a government outside the scope of § 666 to avoid the "international conflict" that could arise because that statute-by contrast to the FCPA-can apply to "both the payor and the recipient of a bribe," the latter of whom may be a foreign government official or diplomat. Appellant Br. at 22 (emphasis in original). We are not persuaded. As we observed in Bahel, the law already provides a comprehensive framework for affording government officials and diplomats immunity from prosecution. See United States v. Bahel ,
*126D. The Federalism Concerns Informing Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League Are Not Present Here
Ng maintains that if Congress intended for § 666 to prohibit bribes pertaining to public, as well as private, organizations, it was required to say so explicitly. In support, he cites Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League ,
This argument fails to persuade because Nixon used "public and private" to distinguish between government and non-government entities in circumstances where the animating concern was federalism-i.e. , the constitutional principle for distributing "power as between the Nation and the States." Staub v. City of Baxley ,
In Nixon, a Missouri law stated that "[n]o political subdivision of this state shall provide or offer for sale ... a telecommunications service ... for which a certificate of service authority is required." Missouri Rev. Stat. § 392.410(7) (emphasis added); see Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League ,
Thus, even assuming arguendo that Congress's extension of § 666 protection to state and local governments could implicate federalism, Congress here satisfied Nixon and Gregory by expressly stating its intent to reach such governments in the statutory phrase, "or of a State, local, or Indian tribal government."
E. Statutory History Does Not Require Construing § 666 To Exclude Public International Organizations
Ng maintains that the statutory histories of § 666 (enacted in 1984) and the FCPA (enacted in 1977 and as amended in 1998) compel limiting the former's use of "organization" to private entities. Specifically, he points to the 1998 amendment's addition of "public international organizations" to the FCPA's definition of "foreign officials" whose bribery violates that law. See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, P.L. 105-366, sec. 3(c),
Moreover, while certain conduct-as in this case-may violate both the FCPA and § 666, the statutes are not invariably duplicative. Section 666 focuses on the integrity of federal funding and, thus, requires proof of such receipt by the public international organization. The FCPA, however, applies to any entity designated a public international organization as provided in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(2), 78dd-3(f)(2), without regard to its receipt of federal money. Further, while both § 666 and the FCPA prohibit domestic concerns from paying bribes to officials of public international organizations, the former statute also prohibits non-domestic concerns from paying such bribes, organization officials from soliciting or receiving such bribes, and any theft or embezzlement from such organizations. Were we to construe "organization" in § 666 as categorically limited to private organizations on the ground that the FCPA now addresses bribes by U.S. concerns to officials of foreign international organizations, the result would be to leave much of the criminal activity proscribed by § 666 -and not covered by the FCPA-unaddressed as pertains to public international organizations. Nothing in the history of the statutes persuades us that was ever Congress's intent.
In sum, where, as here, a concern for statutory superfluousness compels only that the word "organization," as used in § 666, be construed to exclude government *129entities, there is no reason for this court also to exclude non-government public international organizations, such as the U.N., from the broad scope of that word as defined in
II. The McDonnell Challenge
Before the district court, the prosecution argued that the quid pro quo elements of § 666 and the FCPA are not limited to "official acts" as defined in the general bribery statute, see
We review a challenged jury instruction not in isolation but "as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered a correct interpretation of the law" or, rather, misled the jury as to the correct legal standard or otherwise failed adequately to inform it on the applicable law. United States v. Silver,
As to sufficiency, a defendant mounting such a challenge "bears a heavy burden." United States v. Heras ,
Applying these principles here, we reject Ng's McDonnell challenge because (1) § 201(a)(3) 's definition of "official act," which informs the McDonnell standard, does not delimit the quid pro quo elements of § 666 and FCPA bribery; and (2) to the extent the district court erroneously charged an "official act" instruction as to Ng's § 666 crimes, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. The McDonnell Standard Does not Apply to § 666 or the FCPA
1. The McDonnell Standard
In McDonnell v. United States, a former Governor of Virginia was convicted of honest services fraud, see
First, the Government must identify a " 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy,' " that (a) is " 'pending' " or that " 'may by law be brought before [a] public official' "; and (b) involves "a formal exercise of governmental power" similar in nature to "a lawsuit, hearing, or administrative determination."
"Second, the Government must prove that the public official made a decision or took an action 'on' that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, or agreed to do so."
Applying these principles to the Governor's case, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury charge on the "official act" element was "significantly overinclusive" because it failed to instruct on "three important qualifications." McDonnell v. United States ,
(a) that it "must identify a 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy' involving the formal exercise of governmental power";
(b) that "the pertinent 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy' must be something specific and focused that is 'pending' or 'may by law be brought before any public official' "; and
(c) that the Governor "made a decision or took an action-or agreed to do so-on the identified 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy,' " and that "merely arranging a meeting or hosting an event to discuss a matter does not count as a decision or action on that matter."
2. Section 666 and FCPA Bribery Are Not Textually Limited to "Official Acts" as Defined in § 201(a)(3) and McDonnell
No uniform definition applies to the word "bribe" as proscribed in the federal code. See United States v. Zacher ,
*132It is this quid pro quo element-"a specific intent [corruptly] to give ... something of value in exchange" for action or decision that distinguishes bribery from the related crime of illegal gratuity. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal. ,
In addressing various manifestations of bribery under the federal criminal law, Congress may, of course, define the particular quid s and quo s prohibited. In generally proscribing the bribery of federal officials, Congress has prohibited corruptly giving such an official "anything of value" (the quid ) "to influence any official act " (the quo ).
But not all federal bribery statutes identify "official act," much less official act as defined in § 201(a)(3), as the necessary quo for bribery. Indeed, the general bribery statute itself proscribes corruptly giving anything of value in exchange for other quo s: to influence a public official to commit fraud, see
Turning to the statutes here at issue, Congress identifies still different quo s in proscribing bribery in other contexts. Section 666, which prohibits bribery concerning programs receiving federal funding, makes it a crime corruptly to give a person anything of value (the quid ) "with intent to influence ... an agent of an organization or of a State, local or Indian tribal government," any part of which receives federal funding, "in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization ... involving anything of value of $5,000 or more" (the quo ).
From these textual differences among various bribery statutes, we conclude that the McDonnell "official act" standard, derived from the quo component of bribery *133as defined by § 201(a)(3), does not necessarily delimit the quo components of other bribery statutes, such as § 666 or the FCPA.
This court has already so held with respect to § 666 bribery, reasoning that the language of that statute "is more expansive than § 201." United States v. Boyland ,
*134Boyland 's reasoning applies with equal force to the FCPA, which prohibits giving anything of value in exchange for any of four specified quo s, identified supra at note 20. While the first FCPA quo referencing an "act or decision" of a "foreign official in his official capacity" might be understood as an official act, the FCPA does not cabin "official capacity" acts or decisions to a definitional list akin to that for official acts in § 201(a)(3). 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(1)(A)(i) ; 78dd-3(a)(1)(A)(i). Nor does it do so for acts or omissions that violate an official's "duty," or that affect or influence the act or decision of a foreign government. Id. §§ 78dd-2(a)(1)(A)(ii), (B) ; 78dd-3(a)(1)(A)(ii), (B). Finally, the FCPA prohibits bribing a foreign official to "secur[e] an improper advantage" in obtaining, retaining, or directing business, without requiring that the advantage be secured by an official act as limited by the § 201(a)(3) definition. Id. §§ 78dd-2(a)(1)(A)(iii) ; 78dd-3(a)(1)(A)(iii).
Our conclusion that McDonnell 's "official act" standard does not pertain to bribery as proscribed by § 666 and the FCPA finds support in decisions of our sister circuits, which also recognize the McDonnell standard to be grounded in the narrower text of § 201(a)(3), (b)(1)(A). See, e.g. , United States v. Porter ,
3. Constitutional Concerns Do Not Mandate Application of McDonnell 's "Official Act" Standard to § 666 and the FCPA
In urging otherwise, Ng argues that McDonnell 's "official act" standard is dictated not only by the text of § 201, but also by constitutional concerns-about vagueness, representative government, and federalism-that pertain equally to § 666 and FCPA bribery. See McDonnell v. United States ,
a. Vagueness
The void-for-vagueness doctrine, derived from the Due Process Clause, see U.S. Const., amend. V, instructs that a penal statute must "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary *135people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement," Kolender v. Lawson ,
While the vagueness of a statute implicating First Amendment rights will be assessed on its face, where, as here, no such rights are at issue, we assess the vagueness of a challenged statute as applied to defendant's particular case. See Maynard v. Cartwright,
Section 666 prohibits corruptly giving anything of value to any person with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization in connection with any business or transaction of that organization having a value of $5,000 or more. See supra at note 12. The FCPA prohibits corruptly paying anything of value to the officer or employee of a foreign international organization for purposes of, inter alia, influencing any act or decision of such person in his official capacity in order to obtain, retain or direct business. See supra at note 20. The language of these statutes is adequate to alert a reasonable person to the illegality of Ng's conduct here and to avoid arbitrary enforcement of these laws against him.
The trial evidence showed that over a period of five years, Ng paid more than a million dollars to U.N. Ambassadors Lorenzo and Ashe (the latter of whom also served for a time as President of the General Assembly) in order for them to use their influence (and that of other U.N. employees) to procure a formal contract with the U.N. designating Ng's Macau Convention Center as the permanent site for UNOSSC's annual Expo. Ng can hardly claim that he lacked notice that such payments were things "of value,"
Certainly, Lorenzo testified that he understood that Ng was corruptly paying him to circumvent the organization's established contract process. In these circumstances, Ng does not, and cannot, claim that a reasonable "ordinary person"-as payor-would not have had the same awareness. Kolender v. Lawson ,
In sum, as applied to this case, § 666 and the FCPA both provide adequate notice to a reasonable person in Ng's position that the payments made to Lorenzo and Ashe were unlawful bribery, and present no risk of arbitrary enforcement. See Mannix v. Phillips ,
b. Representative Government and Federalism
Ng next argues that our particular federalist and representative government structure compels application of McDonnell 's official act standard in this case. McDonnell observed that the "basic compact underlying representative government assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act appropriately on their concerns." McDonnell v. United States ,
Those concerns, however, do not pertain to the FCPA. None of its prohibitions operate within our federalist structure of representative government. Rather, it prohibits bribery with respect to officials of foreign governments or public international organizations, whose structure is no part of our constitutional concern.
The same conclusion applies for § 666 as applied to non-government "organizations." Not only is the U.N. a public international organization outside our federalist structure, but also, it is not an entity subject to the "basic compact" of representative government. Its members are equal sovereigns, not elected representatives. U.N. ambassadors represent sovereign nations, not an electorate, and owe no duty to hear from or act on the requests of private persons.
To be sure, § 666 also proscribes bribery with respect to the agents of State and local governments. Thus, in generally construing its quid pro quo prohibitions, we are respectful of federalism and principles of representative government. Nevertheless, we conclude that McDonnell 's constitutional concerns simply do not arise in the context of that statute.
At issue in McDonnell was the general federal bribery statute,
Section 666 presents different text in a different context. First , in § 666, Congress expressly states its intent to reach bribery within State and local governments insofar as they receive federal funding. Thus, to this extent, it was expressly recalibrating the federalism balance. Second , Congress does not use intent to influence an "official act" to limit the bribery proscribed; rather, § 666 more broadly prohibits offering " 'anything of value' " to the agent of an organization or State or local government "in exchange for the influence or reward" in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of the organization or government. Salinas v. United States ,
*138Third , the circumstances Congress does use to cabin the State, local, and organizational bribery proscribed by § 666 are (a) the organization or government entity at issue must receive more than $10,000 in federal funding benefits over the course of a year, and (b) the business or transaction intended to be influenced must have a value of $5,000 of more. See
Given the ever-growing dependency of State and local governments on federal funding, the limiting effect of these requirements may appear minimal. Nevertheless, Congress's "power to keep a watchful eye on [its] expenditures and on the reliability of those who use public money" cannot be disputed; such power "is bound up with congressional authority to spend in the first place." Sabri v. United States ,
In sum, we conclude that no McDonnell "official act" instruction was required for the § 666 and FCPA crimes charged in this case because those statutes define bribery more expansively than § 201(a)(3), the textual source for the McDonnell standard, and because none of the constitutional concerns identified in McDonnell -vagueness, representative government, federalism-requires limiting § 666 and FCPA bribery to "official acts."
Accordingly, because the McDonnell standard does not apply to the text of either § 666 or the FCPA, the district court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on that standard for Ng's FCPA crimes, and, insofar as the district court did charge "official acts" for Ng's § 666 crimes, for reasons stated in the next section of this opinion, we identify no McDonnell error warranting vacatur in any event.
B. McDonnell Error in the Challenged § 666 Jury Charge Was Harmless
1. The Charging Error
The district court charged the jury that to convict Ng on any of the § 666 charges,
The government must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to obtain "an official act" from the agent or agents of the United Nations to whom he gave or agreed to give or offered something of value.
An official act is a decision or action that must involve a formal exercise of *139power. It also must be specific and focused on something that is pending or may by law or rule be brought before the agent. The decision or action may include using the agent's official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an official act or to advise another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an official act by another official.
Expressing support for an idea, setting up a meeting, talking to another official, or organizing an event or agreeing to do so without more does not fit that definition of official act. This is not to say that expressing support for any idea, setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or making a phonecall is always an innocent act or is irrelevant. These actions could serve as evidence of (1) an agreement to take an official act, (2) an attempt to use the agent's official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an official act, or (3) an attempt to advise another official knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis of an official act by another official.
Trial Tr. at 4243-44 (emphasis added).
Ng argues that the quoted instruction-particularly the highlighted portion-was erroneous because it conflates the two McDonnell requirements for an official act. Whereas McDonnell states that it is the identified "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy" component of an "official act" that must involve the "formal exercise of governmental power," and be "something specific and focused that is 'pending' or 'may by law be brought before any public official,' " McDonnell v. United States ,
We identify charging error-but not for the reason Ng argues. As just explained, the "official act" requirement that McDonnell locates in § 201(a)(3) is not a part of § 666. Thus, the district court should not have charged "official act" at all as to the § 666 counts in this case. It sufficed for the district court to charge the requisite quid pro quo as it initially did:
[T]he government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt ... that the defendant gave or agreed to give or offered something of value to the agent with the intent to influence the agent's actions in connection with some sort of business transaction of the United Nations.
Trial Tr. at 4242.
2. Harmlessness
Insofar as the district court mistakenly charged the jury that it was further required to find that the action Ng intended to influence was an "official action," we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Where a jury returns a guilty verdict on instructions requiring it to find proved more than the law requires, a court can generally conclude that the jury would also have returned a guilty verdict on proper instructions omitting the unwarranted element. That is the case here. The jury, having found proved-in addition to all the other elements of § 666-that Ng intended to influence action amounting to an "official act," we easily conclude that it would have found that Ng intended to influence action not limited by such a heightened quid pro quo requirement. Cf. Musacchio v. United States , --- U.S. ----,
Nor is a different conclusion warranted because Ng argues that the jury's "official act" finding is the product of a jury charge and evidence not satisfying McDonnell . We need not here decide under what circumstances, if any, harmless error can be identified when a jury finds a defendant guilty based on an additional, unnecessary element infected by such purported McDonnell errors. Ng's charging and sufficiency challenges are meritless, and, thus, they cannot deter a finding of harmless error in the giving of an unwarranted McDonnell instruction.29
As to charging error, the record belies Ng's conflation hypothesis. The pleadings, evidence, and arguments all identify a single, overriding "question, matter, [or] cause" informing the alleged official actions in this case: procurement of formal U.N. designation of Ng's Macau convention center as the permanent site for the UNOSSC Expo.30 This objective undoubtedly presented a specific and focused "question, matter, [or] cause," requiring the formal exercise of U.N. power to achieve Ng's goal. See McDonnell v. United States , 136 S.Ct. at 2374 (contrasting "nebulous" policy objective, such as general "business and economic development," which would not qualify as official action, with question whether to initiate particular research study, which would). In these circumstances, we agree with the government that no reasonable jury could identify a decision or action on this question as focused, specific, pending, and a formal exercise of U.N. power, without also finding that the question exhibited these attributes. Thus, any imprecision in the challenged charge's discussion as between the "question" and "decision" requirements of the McDonnell standard did not mislead or misinform the jury in finding an "official act" in this case.31
*141As for sufficiency, overwhelming record evidence, much of it documented, allowed a reasonable jury to find not only that Ng's efforts to procure a U.N. contract for his convention center presented a specific and focused question, but also that the question was one that could be-and was-brought before a U.N. official. Compelling evidence further showed that the official, UNOSSC Director Zhou, exercised formal organization power when, on December 25, 2014, "on behalf of the United Nations," he signed the Pro Bono Agreement between Ng's company SKI and UNOSSC. App'x 1836-48. Whether or not the Agreement secured all that Ng desired is beside the point. What matters is that, by entering into such a contract on behalf of the U.N., Zhou took an official action. Evidence further proved that it was as a result of Ng's payments that Lorenzo and Ashe used their official positions at the U.N. to influence Zhou to take that action. Not only did Lorenzo so testify, but Zhou himself, in a June 13, 2014 letter to Lorenzo, specifically referenced Ashe's "support for Ng's convention center in reporting that UNOSSC was now ready to enter into a formal agreement for SKI to host the 2015 Expo. App'x 1641. The letter is dated only ten days after Ng complied with Ashe's request for $200,000. And in a February 2, 2015 letter formally inviting Ng's companies to host the U.N.'s 2015 Expo, Zhou stated that General Assembly President Ashe had "been calling upon my office to step up the efforts to support the early implementation of ..., in particular, the Permanent Expo and Meeting Centre in Macao." Id. at 1525.
Other record evidence also shows how Lorenzo and Ashe used their official positions at the U.N. to enhance the likelihood that Zhou would follow their advice to have the U.N. enter into a contract with Ng. This began with the working sessions that Lorenzo organized for U.N. ambassadors so that he and Ashe could then place a letter into the General Assembly record-something only U.N. ambassadors could do-for circulation throughout the membership, documenting purported ambassadorial agreement for the designation of an Expo site. It continued with Lorenzo and Ashe effectively tampering with the U.N. record under the guise of a "technical" amendment. In this way, they modified the original letter to add language indicating that an agreement had already been reached for using Ng's company, SKI, to implement the desired permanent Expo site. See supra at pp. 118-19. That this alteration was used to influence Zhou's subsequent contract decision is evident from the fact that Zhou referenced the Revised U.N. Document as a predicate for UNOSSC's support for designation of Ng's center. See App'x 1642 (observing that Revised U.N. Document "clearly state[s] that [SKI] is tasked to establish the Permanent Expo and Meeting Centre" (emphasis added)); see supra at p. 120. Thus, we need not resolve the parties' dispute as to whether any of these additional actions could themselves qualify as "official acts"
*142under McDonnell. They reinforce the conclusion that Zhou's entry into the December 25, 2014 Pro Bono Agreement was an official action that, because influenced by Lorenzo and Ashe in their official capacities, satisfied the second McDonnell requirement for an "official act."
In sum, Ng's McDonnell challenge to the jury charge fails because McDonnell 's "official act" standard does not apply to § 666 and the FCPA. To the extent the district court nevertheless applied that standard in charging the jury as to the quid pro quo element of Ng's § 666 crimes, it was error to do so. That error, however, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury, having found more proved than required by law-i.e. , the intent to influence an "official act"-it certainly would have found Ng guilty on proper instructions omitting that inapplicable standard. Finally, no different conclusion is warranted by Ng's charging and sufficiency challenges based on McDonnell; those challenges are meritless.
III. The "Corruptly" Challenge
When a statute uses the word "corruptly," the government must prove more than the general intent necessary for most crimes. It must prove that a defendant acted "with the bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means." United States v. McElroy ,
Ng's arguments are defeated by precedent. In United States v. Kozeny ,
A person acts corruptly if he acts voluntarily and intentionally, with an improper motive of accomplishing either an unlawful result or a lawful result by some unlawful method or means. The term "corruptly" is intended to connote that the offer, payment, and promise was intended to influence an official to misuse his official position.
More instructive still is United States v. Alfisi , wherein this court expressly declined to construe the term "corruptly"- there, as used in the general bribery statute,
Alfisi 's conclusion that the "corruptly" element of bribery does not invariably require intent to secure a breach of duty finds further support in the fact that § 201(b) separately proscribes corruptly paying a public official with intent "to influence any official act," and making such a payment with intent "to induce such public official to "act in violation of [his] lawful duty." Compare
United States v. Rooney,
Alfisi applies this same reasoning to the person paying the bribe. He acts corruptly under § 201(a)(1)(A) if he pays a government official intending "to influence any official act," whether or not the intent is "to procure a violation of the public official's duty." United States v. Alfisi ,
Nor was the evidence insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that Ng acted corruptly. Ng argues that the government "did not introduce any evidence at trial describing any duties that Ashe and Lorenzo may have owed to the UN or the public, let alone any evidence that Ng sought to induce them to breach any such duty." Appellant Br. at 46-47 (emphasis in original). The second part of this argument fails for reasons just explained: the "corruptly" element of the crimes of conviction does not require proof of a breach of duty. As for Ng's sufficiency challenge to evidence of duty, we need not here decide what, if any, duties ambassadors accredited to the U.N. owe to that organization34 because the evidence here showed that, at times pertinent to the charged crimes, Ashe served not only as an ambassador to the U.N., but also as an official of that organization, indeed, its second highest official, the President of the General Assembly. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find that, at least in that role, Ashe was an agent of the U.N. and, as such, owed a duty to that organization not to sell his ability to influence subordinate U.N. employees in entering into transactions or business arrangements for the U.N. See
Accordingly, there is no merit to Ng's charging or sufficiency challenges as to the "corruptly" element of the crimes of conviction.
IV. The "Obtaining or Retaining Business" Challenge
The FCPA prohibits bribing foreign officials for the purpose of "obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(1)(B), 78dd-3(a)(1)(B). Although the district court tracked this statutory language in charging the jury, Ng argues that it erred in rejecting his request to define "business" as "commercial" business. Trial Tr. at 3843. According to Ng, the given instruction was erroneous because the jury had "no way to know whether 'business' referred to commercial business or more broadly to any transaction." Appellant Br. 54. Moreover, Ng argues that the trial evidence was insufficient for the jury to find this "business" element because he intended to build the convention center and to make it available for UNOSSC use at no cost to the U.N.
These arguments merit little discussion. Assuming arguendo that Congress intended to limit the FCPA to "commercial bribery," United States v. Kay ,
Moreover, the record evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find that Ng paid the two U.N. ambassadors intending for them to obtain a commercial business deal with the U.N., specifically, a contract for his Macau Conference Center to serve as the official host site for the U.N.'s UNOSSC Expo. Ng does not dispute that contracts are a routine tool in obtaining, maintaining, and directing commercial business. See generally United States v. Kay,
Ng's argument fails because the FCPA prohibits commercial bribery without regard to whether the briber himself profits directly from the business obtained. Indeed, it prohibits bribery designed to obtain, retain, or direct business not only for or to the briber, but for or to "any person." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a)(1)(B), 78dd-3(a)(1)(B). Here, "any person" could refer *146to the U.N. A reasonable jury could find Ng guilty under the FCPA for bribing Lorenzo and Ashe in return for them using their influence to direct Ng's business to the U.N. , specifically, his willingness contractually to obligate himself to provide the U.N. with the cost-free use of his Macau convention center as its permanent UNOSSC Expo site. While such a contract, on its face, might appear to give all commercial benefits to the U.N., the jury could find that by thus using bribery to direct his own business obligation to the U.N., Ng thought he would best be able to obtain greater business for and, thus, to maximize profits from, the larger commercial complex of which the convention center was a part. Thus, his sufficiency challenge to the business purpose component of the FCPA crimes also fails.
V. Ng's Derivative Arguments
Because Ng's challenges to his § 666 and FCPA convictions are meritless, so too are his derivative challenges to his money laundering convictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
To summarize, we conclude as follows:
1. The word "organization" as used in18 U.S.C. § 666 , and defined by1 U.S.C. § 1 and18 U.S.C. § 18 , applies to all non-government legal persons, including public international organizations such as the U.N.
2. The "official act" quid pro quo for bribery as proscribed by18 U.S.C. § 201 (b)(1), defined byid. § 201(a)(3), and explained in McDonnell v. United States , --- U.S. ----,136 S. Ct. 2355 ,195 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016), does not delimit bribery as proscribed by18 U.S.C. § 666 and the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2, 78dd-3. Thus, the district court did not err in failing to charge the McDonnell standard for the FCPA crimes of conviction.
3. Insofar as the district court nevertheless charged an "official act" quid pro quo for the § 666 crimes, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury, having found Ng guilty under the higher McDonnell official act standard, would certainly have found him guilty under a proper instruction omitting that unnecessary standard. No different conclusion obtains because Ng argues that the jury's "official act" finding was a product of charging error conflating the McDonnell standard and of insufficient evidence, as these arguments fail on the merits.
4. The jury was not misinstructed as to the "corruptly" element of § 666 and the FCPA, and the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that element proved.
5. The jury was not misinstructed as to the "obtaining or retaining business" element of the FCPA, and the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that element proved.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED in all respects.
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