United States v. Gabrion

517 F.3d 839, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 5489, 2008 WL 680212

Opinions

OPINION

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal from a federal criminal conviction, we are confronted with the precursory issue of whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution for murder — the federal statute for which predicates subject matter jurisdiction on the murder’s having been committed on certain federal property — when the property in question is within the national forest. The dispositive question is whether certain national forest land falls within the federal government’s territorial jurisdiction. Because, in this case, it does, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this criminal prosecution.

I.

On June 3, 1999, the United States Attorney, acting on the finding of the federal grand jury sitting in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, charged Marvin Gabrion with committing first degree murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a), at a location within the federal government’s special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 7(3), which is a capital felony under 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b).¹ The text of the indictment reads, in its entirety:

Between on or about June 3, 1997, and on or about July 5, 1997, in the County of Newaygo, in the Southern Division of the Western District of Michigan, Marvin Charles Gabrion II did, after deliberation, premeditation and malice aforethought, willfully kill Rachel Timmerman within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States by drowning her in Oxford Lake, which lies within the Man-istee National Forest.

18 U.S.C. § 1111

18 U.S.C. § 7

Indictment, Case No. L99-CR-76 (W.D. Mich. June 3, 1999).² The first statute cited in the indictment, the federal murder statute, provides in pertinent part:

(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing ... is murder in the first degree.

(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, [wjhoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life[.]

18 U.S.C. § 1111. Congress has defined the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” to include “[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof.” 18 U.S.C. § 7(3).

Following a six-day trial, a jury convicted Gabrion as charged and the district court sentenced him to death. See United States v. Gabrion, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60578 at * 1, 2006 WL 2473978 at * 1 (W.D.Mich. Aug.25, 2006) (“Defendant Marvin Gabrion was convicted of first degree murder within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 and 18 U.S.C. § 7. The Court imposed a sentence of death pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3594 in accordance with the jury’s recommendation.” (footnote omitted)). Ga-brion appealed the conviction and his court-appointed appellate counsel asserted 23 claims of error.³ Gabrion himself, in a pro se supplemental brief, asserted at least three additional claims.

Upon reviewing the briefs, the panel was intrigued by a “curious issue of jurisdiction” that had not been addressed by the district court, but had nonetheless been raised on appeal, although only in footnotes to the appellate briefs. Specifically, Gabrion’s counsel had noted:

The government never presented any evidence proving that in 1938 when the Manistee National Forest was created and then in 1939 when the particular land surrounding the southern portion of Oxford Lake was sold to the federal government that the government gave proper notice of its acceptance of jurisdiction. Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122, 87 L.Ed. 1421 (1943) (‘Since the government had not accepted jurisdiction [of Camp Claiborne, Louisiana in the manner required by the Act of October 9, 1940] the federal court had no jurisdiction’ over rape prosecution). Gabrion filed several pro se motions relevant to the jurisdiction question. In one, he raised the question of whether the federal government, pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 255, had ever properly accepted jurisdiction in 1939 of the land surrounding Oxford Lake that became part of the Manistee National Forest. Gabrion tried to argue his pro se motions at the jurisdiction evidentiary hearing, but the court would not let him speak.

Appellant’s Final Br. at 24, fn. 20 (Dec. 12, 2005) (brackets in original; record citations omitted). The government reciprocated with a footnote in its own brief, in which it noted:

Defendant now argues that the federal government never formally accepted jurisdiction over the southern portion of Oxford Lake pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 255. See Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122, 87 L.Ed. 1421 (1943). Defendant did not litigate this issue in the trial court and his own expert conceded federal ownership of the southern portion of Oxford Lake at hearing. In any event, 40 U.S.C. § 255 was enacted in 1940. For lands acquired prior to 1940, federal jurisdiction is presumed. United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842, 91 S.Ct. 86, 27 L.Ed.2d 78 (1970); Markham v. United States, 215 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 939, 75 S.Ct. 360, 99 L.Ed. 735 (1955); see also SRA Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 563 n. 7, 66 S.Ct. 749, 90 L.Ed. 851 (1946). The southern portion of Oxford Lake was acquired for the Manistee National Forest in 1939.

Appellee’s Final Br. at 72, fn. 10 (Dec. 5, 2005) (record citations omitted).

Thus, on our own initiative and prior to argument, we ordered the parties to “further brief what appears to be a subject matter jurisdiction issue raised for the first time in this case only in footnote 20 on page 24 of defendant’s opening brief and discussed briefly in the government’s brief at footnote 10 at page 71.” Order (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 2006). We explained that this “issue arises from 40 U.S.C. § 255[,] which says that the government must first give notice that it is asserting law enforcement jurisdiction before it displaces the State’s jurisdiction,” and expressed our concern that the Supreme Court, in Adams, 319 U.S. at 315, 63 S.Ct. 1122, “seems to have regarded such notice as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. We also issued to the parties six specific questions,⁴ the answers to which, we hoped, would assist us in resolving this heretofore unaddressed jurisdictional issue.

Rather than responding with supplemental briefing, however, the parties filed a “Joint Motion to Remand for Hearing on Subject Matter Jurisdiction,” in which they explained:

The exercise of federal prosecutorial power over lands in national forests is dependent upon the date and method of land acquisition, and the relevant state statute, if any, authorizing that acquisition. After preliminary research, the parties jointly ask for a remand to further develop the record. This issue was never litigated in the district court so that, beyond establishing the bare minimum of the date the land was acquired, the record on appeal does not contain details related to the method of acquisition, how the land was acquired and held by the Forest Service, or the title history of the particular tract. Moreover, expert testimony may be necessary to explain various issues related to land acquisition by the federal government in the early 20th century and better inform the Court as to the respective arguments of both parties. In addition, although this Court reviews jurisdictional issues de novo, it will allow the district court to hear testimony and better inform the Court with further development of the record and its own legal analysis of the issue.

Upon consideration of this request, we granted the parties’ motion and instructed the district court on remand to “hold such further proceedings as it determines are appropriate to fully develop the record on subject matter jurisdiction.” Order (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2006).

On remand, the district court accepted additional briefing and held an evidentiary hearing to expand the record. At that hearing, Gabrion introduced 24 exhibits and the testimony of three witnesses, the government introduced nine additional exhibits; and the parties entered a stipulation:

It is stipulated and agreed between the parties that the United States does not possess records of notice filings pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 255 for the Manistee National Forest. In the absence of records reflecting [that] such notice has been given, [] it must be conclusively presumed at this time that no jurisdiction was accepted for those post February 1,1940 parcels.

Confronted with this accumulation of evidence and the parties’ revised arguments, the district court explained: “The parties’ briefings in this Court have gone beyond the limited inquiry into the notice provisions of 40 U.S.C. § 255. They have focused on the manner in which the United States acquired the property that comprises the Manistee National Forest, and the United States’ policies regarding the acquisition of jurisdiction over national forest land.” Gabrion, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60578 at *1, 2006 WL 2473978 at *1. From this, the district court drafted an opinion documenting its findings of fact and, through a methodical analysis in which it addressed each of Gabrion’s several arguments, rendered conclusions of law, ultimately concluding “that the United States had [concurrent] jurisdiction to prosecute crimes occurring on the Oxford Lake parcel of the Manistee National Forest.” Id. at 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60578 at *31, 2006 WL 2473978 at * 10. Consequently, the district court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the trial, and hence, authority to enter the order of conviction and impose the prescribed punishment.

Gabrion appealed and the parties submitted supplemental briefs on the limited issue of subject matter jurisdiction. In his supplemental brief to this court, Gabrion explained:

It was Gabrion’s position on remand and now on appeal that the United States never had any jurisdiction, exclusive, concurrent, partial, or otherwise over the Manistee National Forest because the federal government’s interest in federal forest lands has always, even prior to February 1, 1940 (the date 40 U.S.C. § 255 was enacted), been of a proprietorial nature. And, because the United States’ interest in the Manistee National Forest is only proprietorial, the District Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute Marvin Gabrion for the murder of Rachel Timmerman.

Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 2-3 (Feb. 2, 2007). The government responded with 38 pages in support of its fundamental proposition that “concurrent jurisdiction was ceded to the federal government at the time of acquisition of the Oxford Lake parcel and it remains to this day.” Appellee’s Supp. Br. at 2 (Feb. 7, 2007). In his reply brief, Gabrion sought to specify the issues in dispute:

Marvin Gabrion does not disagree with much of the government’s primer on federal jurisdiction setting forth the manner by which the federal government has over the course of time obtained jurisdiction over federal land. What Gabrion disagrees with the government about is (1) the nature of the jurisdiction offered by the state of Michigan and accepted by the federal government in 1923, (2) the interpretation of and evidentiary value of the government’s own jurisdictional reports as well as the USDA’s legal memoranda, and, (3) the interpretation of 16 U.S.C. § 480.

Appellant’s Supp. Reply Br. at 1 (Feb. 9, 2007) (citations omitted).

In one sense, then, we are back to the beginning and the issue before us is generally the same: Section 1111(b) empowers the federal courts to impose punishment for murders committed “[w]ithin the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”; Section 7(3) defines that “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” as including “lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof’; and consequently, the question to be answered is whether the Manistee National Forest is under federal jurisdiction. But, in another sense, we confront this issue from a new perspective, informed and educated by the additional record evidence, the district court’s opinion, and the parties’ supplemental briefing. For the reasons that follow, we hold, without regard to the merits of Gabrion’s overall appeal, that the federal government has concurrent criminal jurisdiction over the Oxford Lake parcel of the Manistee National Forest, and therefore, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the prosecution.⁵

II.

There are two provisions in the United States Constitution under which Congress may create jurisdiction for the federal government to prosecute federal crimes on federal property: the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, and the Federal Enclave Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 17.⁶ The Supreme Court discussed these two provisions, and their interplay, in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 96 S.Ct. 2285, 49 L.Ed.2d 34 (1976).

The Property Clause states: “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Supreme Court has given this Clause an “expansive” reading and stated, unequivocally, that the federal government “doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several States.” Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539-40, 96 S.Ct. 2285. “[Wjhile the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, [the Supreme Court has] repeatedly observed that the power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.” Id. at 539, 96 S.Ct. 2285 (quotation marks and edits omitted). “In short, Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain.” Id. at 540, 96 S.Ct. 2285.

Indeed, Kleppe certainly appears to support—if not stand for—the broad proposition that the federal government’s rights in federally owned property are never merely those of an ordinary proprietor, despite the “dicta in two cases to the effect that, unless the State has agreed to the exercise of federal jurisdiction, Congress’ rights in its land are ‘only the rights of an ordinary proprietor.’ ” See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 538-39, 96 S.Ct. 2285 (quoting Ft. Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 527, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264 (1885), and citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264, 83 S.Ct. 426, 9 L.Ed.2d 292 (1963)). That is, even if the federal government expressly declined a State’s cession of jurisdiction at the time of acquisition, the federal government would still— under the Property Clause—hold authority beyond that of an ordinary proprietor. In a piece, of analysis particularly pertinent to the present case, the Kleppe Court referred to Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 49 S.Ct. 38, 73 L.Ed. 200 (1928), in which the Court held that Arizona State officials could not prevent federal officials from killing deer in the Kaibab National Forest:

Indeed, Hunt ... [is] inconsistent with the notion that the United States has only the rights of an ordinary proprietor with respect to its [national forest] land. An ordinary proprietor may not, contrary to state law, kill game that is damaging his land, as the [Federal] Government did in Hunt[.]

Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539 n. 9, 96 S.Ct. 2285; see also id. at 538, 96 S.Ct. 2285 (explaining that the Court, in Hunt, had “upheld the [Federal] Government’s right to kill deer that were damaging foliage in the national forests”).

The Federal Enclave Clause provides Congress with the power: “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever ... over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, doek-Yards, and other needful Buildings[.]” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 17. “The Clause has been broadly construed, and the acquisition by consent or cession of exclusive or partial jurisdiction over properties for any legitimate governmental purpose beyond those itemized is permissible.” Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 542 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 2285 (citing Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528-30, 58 S.Ct. 1009, 82 L.Ed. 1502 (1938)).

The Court, in Kleppe, labeled the powers available under the Federal Enclave Clause “derivative legislative powers,” id. at 541, 96 S.Ct. 2285 (emphasis added), and explained:

Congress may acquire derivative legislative power from a State pursuant to Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution [a.k.a., the Federal Enclave Clause] by consensual acquisition of land, or by non-consensual acquisition followed by the State’s subsequent cession of legislative authority over the land. In either case, the legislative jurisdiction acquired may range from exclusive federal jurisdiction with no residual state police power, to concurrent, or partial, federal legislative jurisdiction, which may allow the State to exercise certain authority.

Id. at 542, 96 S.Ct. 2285 (citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264-65, 83 S.Ct. 426, 9 L.Ed.2d 292 (1963); Collins, 304 U.S. at 528-30, 58 S.Ct. 1009; James v. Dravo Contr. Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147-49, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155 (1937); Ft. Leavenworth R.R., 114 U.S. at 541-42, 5 S.Ct. 995). In reconciling the two Clauses, the Court explained:

Congress can acquired by way of the Federal Enclave Clause,] exclusive or partial jurisdiction over lands within a State by the State’s consent or cession[; but,] the presence or absence of such [Federal-Enclave-Clause-based] jurisdiction has nothing to do with Congress’ powers under the Property Clause. [Unless there is] consent or cessionf,] a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause.

Id. at 542-43, 96 S.Ct. 2285 (citations omitted) (clarifying the State of New Mexico’s “confus[ion of] Congress’ derivative legislative powers [under the Federal Enclave Clause], which [we]re not involved in [Kleppe], with [Congress’] powers under the Property Clause[, which were]”).

Thus, regardless of any possible questions regarding the “furthest reaches” of the Property Clause, see id. at 539, 96 S.Ct. 2285 the Federal Enclave Clause certainly provides for the federal government to obtain legislative jurisdiction— “ranging] from exclusive federal jurisdiction with no residual state police power, to concurrent, or partial, federal legislative jurisdiction, which may allow the State to exercise certain authority”—over land it has acquired “for any legitimate governmental purpose,” and the extent of the jurisdiction obtained depends on the State’s consent to federal jurisdiction or cession of its own jurisdiction over that land. See id. at 542, 96 S.Ct. 2285. “The terms of the cession, to the extent that they may lawfully be prescribed, determine the extent of the Federal jurisdiction.” United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 142, 50 S.Ct. 284, 74 L.Ed. 761 (1930) (concerning a federal murder prosecution).

The facts established at Gabrion’s trial demonstrate that Rachel Timmerman’s body was found in the southern portion of Oxford Lake, which lies on an 80-acre parcel in the Manistee National Forest. In 1923, the State of Michigan formally consented to the cession of forest lands to the federal government, provided that the State would retain concurrent criminal jurisdiction over those lands. See M.C.L.S. §§ 3.401 & 3.402 (Aug. 30, 1923). The parcel in question was deeded to the federal government on July 11, 1939, for reservation as national forest. Thus, there was acquisition and cession, and the extent of jurisdiction was described at the time of cession.

III.

As was explained at the outset, we interrupted this appeal to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and—taking a cue from Gabrion’s footnote 20—we directed our inquiry towards the effects of 40 U.S.C. § 255 and Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122, 87 L.Ed. 1421 (1943), as well as other pertinent authority, such as 16 U.S.C. § 480, a jurisdictional statute peculiar to national forests.

A.

Prior to the enactment of 40 U.S.C. § 255 on February 1, 1940, the federal government’s acceptance of jurisdiction over acquired land was “presumed in the absence of any dissent on [the federal government’s] part.” See Ft. Leavenworth R.R., 114 U.S. at 528, 5 S.Ct. 995 (justifying the presumption on the basis that the grant of jurisdiction “conferred a benefit” on the federal government).⁷

As such a transfer [of jurisdiction to the federal government] rests upon a grant by the State, through consent or cession, it follows, in accordance with familiar principles applicable to grants, that the grant may be accepted or declined. Acceptance may be presumed in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, but we know of no constitutional principle which compels acceptance by the United States of an exclusive jurisdiction contrary to its own conception of its interests.

Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 302 U.S. 186, 207, 58 S.Ct. 233, 82 L.Ed. 187 (1937); see also Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Waggonner, 376 U.S. 369, 373, 84 S.Ct. 857, 11 L.Ed.2d 782 (1964) (“It is the established rule that ... refusal to accept may be proved by evidence.”); Atkinson v. Tax Comm’n, 303 U.S. 20, 23, 58 S.Ct. 419, 82 L.Ed. 621 (1938); Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 330, 13 S.Ct. 60, 36 L.Ed. 991 (1892) (“although it did not appear that any application had been made therefor by the United States, yet, as it conferred a benefit, acceptance of the cession was to be presumed”).

In the present case, the parcel in question was deeded to the federal government on July 11, 1939, without any expression by the federal government of decimation of jurisdiction. “[I]t follows, in accordance with familiar principles applicable to grants, that ... [acceptance may be presumed in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent,” Silas Mason, 302 U.S. at 207, 58 S.Ct. 233, because the grant of jurisdiction “conferred a benefit” on the federal government, Ft. Leavenworth R.R., 114 U.S. at 528, 5 S.Ct. 995. Under this pre-1940 presumption-of-acceptance approach, the federal government accepted jurisdiction when it acquired the parcel in 1939 and no further affirmation was necessary.⁸

In 1940, Congress acted to reverse the presumption of acceptance, by amending 40 U.S.C. § 255⁹ to add a new provision: “Unless and until the United States has accepted jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it shall be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted.”¹⁰ See 54 Stat. (Feb. 1, 1940); see also Paul, 371 U.S. at 264-6, 83 S.Ct. 4265 (“Since 1940 Congress has required the United States to assent to the transfer of jurisdiction over the property, however it may be acquired.”). The critical phrase, “hereafter to be acquired,” establishes, within the context of the statute itself, the existence of the prior, opposite presumption.

The Supreme Court has indicated that § 255 applies to the national forests. See Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 315 n. 6, 63 S.Ct. 1122, 87 L.Ed. 1421 (1943) (“In view of the general applicability of the 19JpO Act [i.e., the provision added to § 255, see fn. 10, supra ], it is unnecessary to consider the effect of the Weeks Forestry Act, 16 U.S.C. 480, and the [State’s] statute dealing with jurisdiction in national forests [i.e., the state’s ceding statute], ... even though the land involved here was originally acquired for forestry purposes.” (emphasis added)). Elsewhere, at least one other court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, has applied § 255 to a jurisdictional claim involving a national forest; specifically, a habeas claim on a capital murder conviction that the State of Missouri lacked criminal jurisdiction over the Mark Twain National Forest. See Hankins v. Delo, 977 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir.1992) (“Unless the United States accepts jurisdiction over lands ceded by a state by filing a notice of acceptance with the Governor or in some other manner the state prescribes, it is conclusively presumed that the United States has not accepted jurisdiction. 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1988).”).¹¹

Finally, as the district court noted, the Department of Agriculture considered the meaning and effect of the amendment shortly after its enactment. See USDA Op. No. 2979 (Dec. 18, 1940) (letter from Mastín G. White, USDA Solicitor, to Edward F. Mynatt, USDA Regional Law Director). After quoting the newly added provision of § 255, the Solicitor began by reciting the question posed: “You state that the Regional Forester has asked to be advised of the procedure which must be followed in order to comply with this provision of the statute.” In answer, the Solicitor explained:

[W]hereas jurisdiction consented to, or ceded by, a State act was normally presumed to have been accepted, the amendment [to § 255] now provides that it shall be conclusively presumed that no jurisdiction has been accepted, unless it is affirmatively accepted in the manner provided in the amendment. That being the case, State laws, such as § 2050 of the South Carolina Code (1932), consenting to the acquisition of lands for national forest purposes, as required by Section 7 of the Weeks Act (U.S.C., Title 16, § 517) ... will not result in the acquisition of jurisdiction by the Federal Government, unless action is taken to accept such jurisdiction, pursuant to the procedure provided in the amendment.

USDA Op. 2979 at 9665 (emphasis omitted; new emphasis added). The Solicitor concluded by advising that, “[a] copy of this opinion is being sent to the Chief of the Forest Service, so that he may consider whether there are certain cases in which the Forest Service feels that it is desirable to obtain jurisdiction from the State over lands administered by it.” Id. at 9667.¹²

Therefore, as a general matter, § 255 and its prior opposite presumption apply to national forest lands. Several things support this conclusion: the reasoning behind the presumption and its common application, the Supreme Court’s indication in Adams, the Eighth Circuit’s application of § 255 in Hankins, and the USDA’s acknowledgment of § 255’s applicability to national forests.¹³

B.

The national forest concept is somewhat unique among the family of federally owned properties, but one facet is universal—the parameters of federal ownership depend on congressional enactment. Congress enacted specific legislation to create the national forests, which included 16 U.S.C. § 480, a jurisdictional statute that appeared to have some bearing on the present case.¹⁴

1.

The federal government — either the President, pursuant to the Creative Act of 1891, 16 U.S.C. § 471, 26 Stat. 1103, § 24 (Mar. 3, 1891) (-repealed Oct. 21, 1976), or the Secretary of Agriculture, pursuant to the Weeks Act, 16 U.S.C. § 521, 36 Stat. 963, § 11 (Mar. 1, 1911) — has designated certain federally owned lands as “national forests.” In providing for the designation of these national forests, Congress also prescribed the division of state and federal jurisdiction:¹⁵

The jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, over persons within national forests shall not be affected or changed by reason of their [i.e., the national forests’] existence, except so far as the punishment of offenses against the United States therein is concerned; the intent and meaning of this provision being that the State wherein any such national forest is situated shall not, by reason of the establishment thereof, lose its jurisdiction, nor the inhabitants thereof their rights and privileges as citizens, or be absolved from their duties as citizens of the State.

16 U.S.C. § 480 (codifying the Organic Act, 30 Stat. 36, § 1 (June 4, 1897) (captioned “Civil and criminal jurisdiction.”); reenacted under the Weeks Act, 36 Stat. 963, § 12 (Mar. 1, 1911) (captioned “State jurisdiction not affected. Offenses against the United States excepted.”)).

There is, of course, nothing remarkable about the prospect that our separate systems of government, state and federal, would each retain jurisdiction to enforce its respective criminal laws in lands over which both are sovereign. In fact, when considered in its proper context, a provision for concurrent jurisdiction is perfectly understandable, mainly because national forests, unlike other federally owned lands, may have people actually residing within their boundaries. The Forest Reserve provisions of the Organic Act, 30 Stat. 11, 34-36 (June 4, 1897), were drafted with this in mind, and included statements that addressed many aspects of this habitation, such as rights to ingress and egress, prospecting, land claims, maintenance of schools and churches, water use, and— most pertinent here — civil and criminal jurisdiction. Perhaps more to the point, the provision for civil and criminal jurisdiction, which eventually became 16 U.S.C. § 480, was drafted in light of the prevailing sentiment of the time: that a traditional federal enclave was effectively “a state within a state,” see Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624, 627, 73 S.Ct. 465, 97 L.Ed. 617 (1953), and its inhabitants were thus excepted from the benefits of state citizenship, such as the right to file for marriage or divorce, receive state education, vote or hold office, or “receive any [other] benefits derived from state residency.” See Maj. Stephen E. Castlen & Lt. Col. Gregory 0. Block, Exclusive Federal Legislative Jurisdiction: Get Rid of It!, 154 Mil. L.Rev. 113,122 (1997).

In this light, § 480 evinces a focus on the inhabitants of the national forest, rather than the forests themselves, and when read in its entirety, § 480 reveals a purpose beyond the mere division of labor between the state and federal systems. The section has two distinct clauses:

The jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, over persons within national forests shall not be affected or changed by reason of their existence, except so far as the punishment of offenses against the United States therein is concerned;

and

[T]he intent and meaning of this provision being that the State wherein any such national forest is situated shall not, by reason of the establishment thereof, lose its jurisdiction, nor the inhabitants thereof their rights and privileges as citizens [of the State], or be absolved from their duties as citizens of the State.

The first clause merely provides—in broad terms—that no State will lose its jurisdiction over national forest lands merely by virtue of the designation of those lands as national forests, and, concomitantly, inhabitants of lands that have been thus designated will continue to have the rights, privileges, and duties of citizens of the State in which the national forest lands are located. The second clause simply clarifies and reinforces this reading of the first clause.

An argument could be made that § 480 categorically rejects any federal jurisdiction over the national forests—by reading the first clause as saying that federal jurisdiction shall not be affected or changed (i.e., by adding the word “federal” to the first clause), and construing this to mean that the preexisting absence of federal jurisdiction shall not be affected or changed.¹⁶ But, such an interpretation is simply not plausible because of the second clause, which expressly clarifies that: “the intent and meaning of this provision being that the State ... shall not ... lose its jurisdiction” (emphasis added). In short, § 480 provides that the designation of land by the United States as a national forest does not—without something more—deprive the inhabitants of that land of their rights as state citizens, but neither does this protection prevent the United States from exercising jurisdiction over congres-sionally enacted federal crimes committed on that land. This statute first appeared in the Organic Act of 1897, which was “Congress’ answer to the[] continuing problems” with the then six-year-old national-forest concept, not the least of which was the “rampant” and “indiscriminate” reservation of millions of acres of “generally settled” forest land, and the apprehension that such reservation “might prove disastrous to the settlers living on or near these lands.” United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 705-06, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 57 L.Ed.2d (1978) (quotation marks, citations, and footnotes omitted) (recounting the origins of the national forest legislation).¹⁷ Recall that the sentiment of the time was that a “federal enclave” was considered a “state within a state,” so the birth of this new national-forest-type federal enclave— coupled with the “rampant” and “indiscriminate” reservation of lands as national forests, if national forests were to be considered traditional federal enclaves—presaged an expectation that this national-forest concept might incidentally remove a substantial amount of territory (and the inhabitants therein) from the governance of the States, and correspondingly deny those inhabitants the associated benefits and burdens of State citizenship.

In this context, § 480’s first clause clearly addresses these implications—i.e., the birth of this new type of vast federal enclave within the territorial boundaries of the State—and ensures that the mere change in ownership (from privately-owned or State-owned to federally-owned) and designation (as the “national forest” variety of federal enclave) does not result in exclusive federal jurisdiction over these lands. Specifically, the federal government could prosecute federal offenses committed on these newly owned, newly designated, newly established national forest lands, see infra, but nothing else changed; the inhabitants were not excepted from the benefits or burdens of State citizenship and the State was not prevented from exercising its own jurisdiction, just as it would have done prior to the transition. The second clause simply clarifies this view.

2.

The second important aspect of § 480 is the exception for “offenses against the United States.” “It has long been established that the words ‘offense against the United States’ encompass all offenses against the laws of the United States, not just offenses directed at the United States as target or victim.” United States v. Gibson, 881 F.2d 318, 321 (6th Cir.1989) (citing Radin v. United States, 189 F. 568, 571-72 (2d Cir.1911); Thomas v. United States, 156 F. 897, 900-01 (8th Cir.1907)); accord Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. 229, 231, 11 How. 229, 13 L.Ed. 675 (1850) (explaining that offenses against the United States are those which are defined by congressional statute); United States v. Gill, 204 F.2d 740, 742 (7th Cir.1953) (reasoning that Congress, when enacting Title 18, meant “crimes against the United States” to mean “offenses which Congress had defined and for which Congress had fixed a penalty”); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (“The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”); 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (“each United States attorney, within his district, shall—prosecute for all offenses against the United States”); U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (the President has the “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States”).

By virtue of its own express exception, § 480 does not bar the federal government from obtaining jurisdiction over the prosecution of offenses against the United States. The violation of a federal statute in this case, namely 18 U.S.C. § 1111, is an offense against the United States. Therefore, even if this prosecution “affected or changed” the jurisdictional status quo, such effect or change is expressly allowed by the statute. Section 480 simply cannot be read as preventing the federal government from prosecuting federal offenses committed in the national forest.

3.

Finally, 16 U.S.C. § 480 is commonly understood as allowing concurrent jurisdiction over the national forests. United States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 2008 U.S.App. LEXIS 4018 at *19-20, 2008 WL 483281 at *6 (10th Cir. Feb.25, 2008); see also, e.g., United States v. California, 655 F.2d 914, 919 (9th Cir.1980) (citing § 480 for the proposition that “Congress has determined that the states shall maintain concurrent criminal and civil jurisdiction over national forests”); United States v. Raffield, 82 F.3d 611, 613 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that § 480 “does not in any way preclude state and federal governments from entering into a relationship of concurrent jurisdiction”); cf. United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir.2004) (upholding federal jurisdiction and affirming a federal conviction for a murder committed in the Homochitto National Forest, despite the defendant’s acquittal in state court, albeit without reference to or consideration of § 480); United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 281 (4th Cir.2003) (upholding federal jurisdiction and conviction for a murder committed in the Pisgah National Forest, despite the defendant’s conviction for the same crime in state court, albeit without reference to § 480).

“By this enactment Congress in effect has declined to accept exclusive legislative jurisdiction over forest reserve lands, and expressly provided that the state shall not lose its jurisdiction in this respect nor the inhabitants ‘be absolved from their duties as citizens of the State.’ ” Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 487, 66 S.Ct. 663, 90 L.Ed. 793 (1946) (emphasis added). The Court did not say that Congress declined to accept any jurisdiction, nor did it say that Congress declined to accept any change in jurisdiction. The Court simply said that Congress did not want federal jurisdiction to be exclusive. See also United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 455, 97 S.Ct. 699, 50 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) (noting that “[pjursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 480, the States retain civil and criminal jurisdiction over the national forests notwithstanding the fact that the national forests are owned by the Federal Government”). Concurrent jurisdiction is fine.

Indeed, a majority of this court has at least tacitly endorsed the idea that § 480 provides for concurrent jurisdiction. See Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 70 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir.1995), vacated on grant of reh’g en banc, 81 F.3d 651 (6th Cir.1996) (Moore, J., writing, joined by Nelson and Brown, JJ.) (“Section 480 merely provides that both the state and the United States shall have general concurrent jurisdiction over individual citizens in forest areas.”); Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1271 (6th Cir.1996) (affg without opinion by an equally divided en banc court) (Moore, J., concurring, joined by Merritt, C.J., and Daughtrey, J.) (“I would adhere to the panel opinion in its entirety, and I incorporate it herein by reference.”); id. at 1284 n. 18 (Boggs, J., dissenting, joined by Norris, Suhrheinrich, and Bat-chelder, JJ.) (acknowledging, and agreeing with, the concurrence’s opinion that “§ 480 does provide for concurrent federal-state jurisdiction”).

C.

Congress has established a specific procedure by which the Secretary of Agriculture can relinquish federal jurisdiction over national forest lands: by either (1) filing a notice of relinquishment with the Governor of the State, to take effect upon acceptance, or (2) taking such action towards relinquishment “as the laws of the State may otherwise provide.” See 7 U.S.C. § 2268. There is no evidence of such relinquishment in the present case. The letters and reports entered into the record fall well short of this procedure, and are therefore insufficient.¹⁸

IV.

In 1923, the State of Michigan formally consented to the cession of its forest lands to the federal government, expressly reserving concurrent criminal jurisdiction over those lands. See M.C.L.S. §§ 3.401-02. An 80-acre parcel containing the southern portion of Oxford Lake was deeded to the federal government on July 11, 1939, and is currently part of the Manistee National Forest. There was federal acquisition and state consent, and the extent of jurisdiction was described at the time of consent. Because this transfer occurred prior to 1940, acceptance of jurisdiction was presumed. Congress has not acted to retrocede jurisdiction back to the State of Michigan.

Rachel Timmerman was found murdered on this parcel of the Manistee National Forest on July 5, 1997, and the federal government indicted, prosecuted, and convicted Marvin Gabrion for this crime. The federal government had concurrent legislative jurisdiction over the Manistee National Forest in accordance with Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, and hence, territorial jurisdiction over the prosecution of this crime, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 7(3). To the extent that the federal government’s acquisition of this land, coupled with Michigan’s cession of concurrent jurisdiction, somehow “affected or changed” the jurisdictional status of the Manistee National Forest, the federal government prosecuted Gabrion for an “offense against the United States,” and was thus nonetheless in compliance with 16 U.S.C. § 480. The grand jury charged Gabrion with murder under federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1111, committed within federal territorial jurisdiction, § 7(3). After the petit jury convicted him on that charge, the court sentenced him to death pursuant to federal statute, § 3594. Both the federal prosecutor and the federal district court had jurisdiction.

V.

Based on the foregoing, the district court was correct in both its analysis and its conclusion on the issue of federal jurisdiction. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over Gabrion’s trial, and correspondingly, authority to enter an order of conviction and impose punishment. Consequently, we will set a date to hear argument on the merits of Gabrion’s appeal and his 25 remaining claims of error.

1 . Just to be abundantly clear, this case does not involve any state criminal law. It involves a violation of federal law, namely 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (murder), meaning that the crime at issue, murder, has been made punishable by an enactment of Congress, and therefore, the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13(a), which applies to state-law-based crimes “not made punishable by any enactment of Congress,” is neither applicable nor relevant.

2 . On February 14, 2002, the United States Attorney, acting on the finding of the federal grand jury, entered a "Superseding Indictment,” the text of which reads, in its entirety:

Between on or about June 3, 1997, and on or about July 5, 1997, in the County of Newaygo, in the Southern Division of the Western District of Michigan, Marvin Charles Gabrion II did, after deliberation, premeditation and malice aforethought, willfully kill Rachel Timmerman within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, specifically in the Manistee National Forest.

18 U.S.C. §1111

18 U.S.C. § 7

Superseding Indictment, Case No. 1:99-CR-76 (W.D.Mich. Feb. 14, 2004). This su-perceding indictment omitted the "by drowning her in Oxford Lake” accusation, but did not alter any other aspect of the charge. The present decision, which involves only subject matter jurisdiction, offers no opinion as to the sufficiency of either indictment.

3 . The concurrence provides some thoughtful analysis of some of these claims, such as Gabrion's complaints regarding due process, equal protection, sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury instructions. But, at this stage of the proceeding — prior to argument on these issues — a decision or opinion on these issues would be premature.

4 . The six questions we posed to the parties were as follows:

(1) Does the government concede that the notice referred to in 40 U.S.C. § 255 has not been filed with respect to the Manistee National Forest?

(2) If no notice has been filed establishing jurisdiction, does this Court[,] and [did] the court below[J have subject matter jurisdiction over this federal capital case?

(3) Does Adams v. United States, supra, control the disposition of the issue, or does subsequent legislation or case law from the Supreme Court alter the holding of that case?

(4) Does § 255 apply retroactively to interests acquired before enactment of the statute?

(5) Does any Michigan statute provide a grant of law enforcement authority to the federal government over Manistee National Forest?

(6) Any other information or argument relevant to this issue of jurisdiction?

Order (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 2006).

5 . Before proceeding to the analysis, it is perhaps worth pausing to note that "jurisdiction” — “a word of many, too many, meanings,” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted)—has at least three meanings, as used in this opinion: (1) Congress’s legislative jurisdiction; (2) the federal prosecutor’s adjudicative or prosecutorial jurisdiction, and (3) the federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Only the first of these three—legislative jurisdiction, which "refers to the authority of a [sovereign] to make its law applicable to persons or activities," Hartford Pire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quotation marks and citation omitted)—is actually at issue or determinative of this case.

It is undisputed (and indisputable) that Congress exercised legislative jurisdiction by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1111, which makes the commission of murder, within the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” a federally punishable offense. "Jurisdiction,” as used in the phrase “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction,” § 1111, is certainly a form of subject-matter jurisdiction. And, United States attorneys are authorized to prosecute, 28 U.S.C. § 547(1), and the federal courts authorized to adjudicate, 18 U.S.C. § 3231, violations of federal statute, such as § 1111. But, "jurisdiction,” as used in the definition of "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction”—i.e., "lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof,” 18 U.S.C. § 7(3)—certainly is not subject-matter jurisdiction. "Jurisdiction,” as used in the definition of "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” in § 7(3) is clearly "legislative jurisdiction,” in the sense that the lands in question are under "the authority of [the federal government] to make its law applicable to persons or activities [therein].” See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 813, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The only question, then, is whether Congress had legislative jurisdiction over the Oxford Lake parcel of the Manistee National Forest, so that § 1111 applies to these circumstances, and thus triggers the prosecutor’s adjudicative jurisdiction and the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction.

6 . Although at least one court, a federal district court, has held that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress in this regard, see United States v. Griffin, 58 F.2d 674, 675 (W.D.Va.1932), this proposition is immaterial to this appeal. It is perhaps worth noting, however, that the mere existence of three separate provisions necessitates that each provision has some limitation, in order that they coexist. Otherwise, the most vital of them would render the others essentially lifeless. For this reason, I find it prudent to resolve this issue under the most apposite provision—and confine this analysis as much as possible to that provision—without treading needlessly on the other provisions.

7 . See Gabrion, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60578 at *23, 2006 WL 2473978 at *8 ("Defendant does not dispute the fact that acceptance of jurisdiction was presumed prior to 1940 in the absence of evidence to the contrary.").

8 . This parcel was sold to the federal government for inclusion in the Manistee National Forest, which had been created on the theory that “it would be in the public interest to give such lands, together with certain intermingled public lands, national-forest status," Presidential Proclamation, 53 Stat. 2492 (Oct. 25, 1938), thus conferring a benefit.

9 . Section 255 was renumbered as 40 U.S.C. § 3112, effective Aug. 21, 2002, and this particular provision restated as § 3112(c): “Presumption. It is conclusively presumed that jurisdiction has not been accepted until the Government accepts jurisdiction over land as provided in this section."

10 . Section 255 was originally codified in 1930, pursuant to 46 Stat. 828, ch. 710 (June 28, 1930) ("An Act To amend section 355 of the Revised Statutes to permit the Attorney General to accept certificates of title in the purchase of land by the United States in certain cases.”). In 1940, Congress amended § 255 by deleting a provision that required the State legislature to consent to the purchase, and adding the provision regarding the presumption against acceptance (i.e., the provision at issue in this case) as part of a larger paragraph, which states in its entirety:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the obtaining of exclusive jurisdiction in the United States over lands or interests therein which have been or shall hereafter be acquired by it shall not be required; but the head or other authorized officer of any department or independent establishment or agency of the Government may, in such cases and at such times as he may deem desirable, accept or secure from the State in which any lands or interests therein under his immediate jurisdiction, custody, or control are situated, consent to or cession of such jurisdiction, exclusive or partial, not theretofore obtained, over any such lands or interests as he may deem desirable and indicate acceptance of such jurisdiction on behalf of the United States by filing a notice of such acceptance with the Governor of such State or in such manner as may be prescribed by the laws of the State where such lands are situated. Unless and until the United States has accepted jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it shall be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted.

19, 18. Congress amended § 255 again in October 1940, but did not alter the above provision. See Act Oct 9, 1940, 54 Stat. 1803, ch. 793. Thus, the pertinent amendment to § 255 was the addition, on February 1, 1940, of the statement: "Unless and until the United States has accepted jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it shall be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted."

11 . Hankins, 977 F.2d at 398, is cited here for the proposition that another federal court has applied § 255 to a national forest, but the ultimate decision in Hankins is inapposite. In Hankins, the petitioner cited the state cession statute, Mo.Rev.Stat. § 12.020 (ceding all jurisdiction but service of process), and argued "that the state court lacked jurisdiction because the United States had exclusive jurisdiction," Id. at 397. The court was unpersuaded and held that the State had retained jurisdiction, despite its cession statute, because “[tjhe parties do not indicate [that] the United States accepted jurisdiction.” Id. at 398. Thus, the Hankins court invoked § 255 and applied it to the national forest, but— with little explanation or reasoning — declined to find exclusive federal jurisdiction.

More importantly, at least for purposes of the present analysis, the Hankins court omitted any consideration of the pre-1940 presumption of acceptance of jurisdiction or any evidence of when the forest was created. As it turns out, this omission is critical because the "Mark Twain National Forest was established by Presidential Proclamation on September 11, 1939." See "History of the Mark Twain National Forest,” available at http:// www.fs.fed.us/r9/forests/marklwain/about/ history (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). But, the Hankins court did not acknowledge or explain that § 255 had not been enacted when the forest was created, so there was no impetus for affirmative acceptance, but rather, a presumption of acceptance. Similarly, the court offered no information as to when the federal government acquired the particular parcel. Consequently, the analysis is incomplete and reliance on Hankins must be restricted to the proposition that at least one other federal court has applied § 255 to a national forest (albeit perhaps incorrectly).

12 . See Gabrion, No. l:99-CR-76, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60578 at * 11 n. 4, 2006 WL 2473978 at *4 n. 4 (“The Forest Service has also noted that 'there appears to be concurrent jurisdiction legislation on most National Forest System lands in Region 9[,] which includes the Manistee National Forest, except for New York.' (Pl.Ex. 6, U.S.F.S. Eastern Region Law Enforcement Plan at 27).” (edits omitted)).

13 . The dissent contends that 16 U.S.C. § 480 is “a specific national forest exception to a more general statutory rule,” namely, 40 U.S.C. § 255 (currently 40 U.S.C. § 3112). If that were so, it would mean that the exception pre-dated the rule by almost 43 years: § 480 (the purported exception) was first enacted February 22, 1897, see 30 Stat. 36 (reenacted March 1, 1911, see 36 Stat. 963), almost 43 years before § 255 (the general rule) was enacted on February 1, 1940, see 54 Stat. 19. It is therefore noteworthy that Congress did not include any exceptions to § 255 (e.g., § 480 or any other statute) during the enactment of § 255 in 1940, and has not identified any exceptions in the 67 years since.

14 . The possibility exists that 16 U.S.C. § 480 might not actually apply, based on the facts and circumstances of this case. A plain reading of § 480 reveals that the broad interpretation used in this opinion might be overly favorable to Gabrion’s position. Section 480 begins: "The jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, over persons within national forests shall not be affected or changed by reason of their existence ..." — “their existence" meaning the existence of the newly created national forests. But, in this case, the mere "existence” or designation of the national forest did not change any jurisdiction. The change in jurisdiction — to the extent that there actually was a "change” in jurisdiction as it is described in this statute — was effectuated by the transfer of title coupled with the State’s ceding of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the phrase "persons within the national forest,” as originally enacted, meant "inhabitants" of the national forest, not merely persons who entered a national forest to commit a murder or dispose of a victim. See discussion in text, infra. Marvin Gabrion did not live in the Manistee National Forest. Finally, the State of Michigan did not "lose” any jurisdiction due to "cession.” Therefore, on a strict reading, § 480 may not even apply in this case.

15 . Although not included expressly, this provision covers tribal jurisdiction as well. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir.1985) (en banc) (relying on 16 U.S.C. § 480 to conclude that "Indian jurisdiction does extend to Indians on forest lands”), abrogated on other grounds by Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S.Ct. 958, 127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994).

16 . Of course, for even this stand-alone interpretation of this first clause to be both plausible and sensible, the exception at the end of the clause ("except so far as the punishment of offenses against the United States therein is concerned”) must mean something other than what it plainly says—i.e., it would be nonsensical to say that § 480 categorically rejects any federal criminal jurisdiction except for jurisdiction over federal crimes. Consequently, the dissent construes the phrase "offenses against the United States” as meaning only certain federal crimes of nationwide application. But, as discussed in the text, infra, that construction is insupportable and incorrect.

17 . The Supreme Court documented this history in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 57 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1978), explaining:

In the mid and late 1800’s, many of the forests on the public domain were ravaged and the fear arose that the forest lands might soon disappear, leaving the United States with a shortage both of timber and of watersheds with which to encourage stream flows while preventing floods. It was in answer to these fears that in 1891 Congress authorized the President to 'set apart and reserve, ... any State or Territory having public land bearing forests, in any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not, as public reservations.’ Creative Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 471 (repealed 1976).

The Creative Act of 1891 unfortunately did not solve the forest problems of the expanding Nation. To the dismay of the conservationists, the new national forests were not adequately attended and regulated; fires and indiscriminate timber cutting continued their toll. To the anguish of Western settlers, reservations were frequently made indiscriminately. President Cleveland, in particular, responded to pleas of conservationists for greater protective measures by reserving some 21 million acres of 'generally settled’ forest land on February 22, 1897. President Cleveland's action drew immediate and strong protest from Western Congressmen who felt that the ‘hasty and ill considered' reservation might prove disastrous to the settlers living on or near these lands.

Congress' answer to these continuing problems was three-fold. It suspended the President’s Executive Order of February 22, 1897; it carefully defined the purposes for which national forests could in the future be reserved; and it provided a charter for forest management and economic uses within the forests. Organic Administration Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 34, 16 U.S.C. § 473 et seq.

Id. at 705-06, 98 S.Ct. 3012 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 706 n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 3012 (“A major complaint of the Western Congressmen was that rampant reserving of forest lands by the United States might leave 'no opportunity there for further enlargement of civilization by the establishment of agriculture or mining.’ 30 Cong. Rec. 1281 (1897) (Sen. Cannon).”).

18 . The dissent cites five administrative-agency or executive-branch opinions, all of which demonstrate a preference against federal jurisdiction on national forest lands, but all of which also concede that some national forest areas nonetheless exist under either exclusive rvr nruiniirnant Í7=>rlA-ra1 HTlnQ rlic* sent fails to explain the existence of these areas or reconcile their existence with its theory that "§ 480 negates and prohibits the exercise of either exclusive or concurrent federal jurisdiction." Under the dissent's theory, these areas could not legally exist.