Greer v. United States

• Court: District Court, M.D. Florida
• Decided: March 4, 2025
• Docket: 3:22-cv-00061
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

GREGORY GREER,

Petitioner,

vs. Case No. 3:22-cv-61-BJD-SJH 3:17-cr-173-BJD-SJH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent. _________________________________

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Gregory Greer, a federal inmate, is proceeding pro se on a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Civ. Doc. 1, Crim. Doc. 89; Pet. Mot.) with a supporting memorandum of law (Civ. Doc. 1-1, Crim. Doc. 89-1; Pet. Mem.).1 The Government opposes the Motion (Civ. Doc. 4; Gov’t Resp.) but concedes Petitioner timely filed it and exhausted his single claim for relief. Petitioner filed a Reply (Civ. Doc. 5; Pet. Reply).

1 Citations to the record in the civil case will be denoted, “Civ. Doc.,” and citations to the record in the criminal case will be denoted, “Crim. Doc.” Page numbers are those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management system. Under § 2255 and Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings,2 and in accordance with Petitioner’s request, see Pet. Mem. at 10, the Court has

considered the need for an evidentiary hearing and determines that a hearing is unnecessary. See Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The district court is not required to grant a petitioner an evidentiary hearing if the § 2255 motion ‘and the files and records of the case conclusively show

that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.’”). See also Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a § 2255 movant is not entitled to a hearing “when his claims are merely conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics or contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible”).

Thus, the Motion is ripe for review. II. BACKGROUND On February 22, 2018, a jury returned a verdict finding Petitioner guilty under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) for being a felon in possession of a

firearm, as charged by Indictment (Crim. Docs. 3, 44). He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 120 months in federal prison (Crim. Docs. 45, 57). Petitioner appealed his judgment and sentence (Crim. Doc. 59). The United States Supreme Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s initial opinion affirming

2 Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings expressly requires the Court to review the record, including any transcripts and submitted materials to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted before resolving a § 2255 motion. 2 Petitioner’s conviction and remanded for reconsideration in light of its intervening decision in Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019) (Crim. Doc.

85). See Greer v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 41 (2019) (Mem.), vacating United States v. Greer, 753 F. App’x 886 (11th Cir. 2019). On remand, the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed Petitioner’s conviction (Crim. Doc. 85). See United States v. Greer, 798 F. App’x 483, 484 (11th Cir. 2020). The United States

Supreme Court affirmed. See Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021). The underlying facts are fully set forth in the Eleventh Circuit’s and the Supreme Court’s opinions. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Title 28, United States Code, § 2255, a person in federal custody may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on one of four grounds: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the

imposed sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the imposed sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Only jurisdictional claims, constitutional claims, and claims of error that are so fundamentally defective as to cause a complete miscarriage of justice will

warrant relief through collateral attack. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184–86 (1979). The movant “bears the burden to prove the claims in his §

3 2255 motion.” Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015). See also Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1221 (11th Cir. 2017).

The United States Constitution provides criminal defendants the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See U.S. Const., amend. VI. As such, a claim that a criminal defendant has received the ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment may properly be brought in a

collateral proceeding under § 2255. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). To establish the ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must satisfy two prongs: (1) that his counsel’s conduct amounted to constitutionally deficient performance; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Martin v. United States, 949 F.3d 662, 667 (11th Cir. 2020). In assessing the “performance” prong, courts adhere to the standard of reasonably effective assistance. Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir.

1994) (citing Strickland,466 U.S. at 688). Under this standard, a review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000). The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial…. We are not interested in grading lawyers’ performances; 4 we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.

Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 1992)). To establish his attorney was deficient under the highly deferential Strickland standard, a petitioner must show that, given all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Scott v. United States, 890 F.3d 1239, 1258 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Payne v. Allen, 539 F.3d 1297, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008)).

To satisfy the “prejudice” prong, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Martin, 949 F.3d at 667 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010)). A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “It is not enough for the [petitioner] to show that the error had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” United States v. Phillips, 853 F. App’x at 626 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693)).

There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir. 2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance

5 prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in

Strickland, “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697. IV. DISCUSSION

In a single ground for relief, Petitioner argues his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to “challenge the U.S. Government[’s] [and the Court’s] jurisdiction over the place in which the [crime] occurred.” See Pet. Mot. at 4. According to Petitioner, the Government did not demonstrate that

the apartment where he was arrested was “ceded” to the Government or was a place over which the Government had “accepted” criminal jurisdiction as required under 40 U.S.C. § 3112.3 Id. See also Pet. Mem. at 1; Pet. Reply at 3. Petitioner’s argument is misguided. He cites numerous authorities, both

statutory and case law (some from the 1800s), which are not on point but rather deal with jurisdiction in other contexts (i.e., maritime jurisdiction, original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, removal jurisdiction, extraterritorial jurisdiction, and concurrent jurisdiction where land is ceded by a state to the

3 Section 3112 addresses the government’s jurisdiction over land it acquires from states. 6 federal government). See generally Pet. Mem; Pet. Reply.4 Upon review of the authorities Petitioner cites, it appears he argues the Government lacked

jurisdiction to charge him with a crime that occurred at the property where he was arrested, apparently under the theory that the State of Florida had not “ceded” that land to the United States. See Pet. Mem. at 2–3. Petitioner’s argument is “utterly without merit.” See United States v.

Ward, 833 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding “utterly without merit” the argument that the “United States has jurisdiction over only Washington, D.C., the federal enclaves within the states, and the territories and possessions of the United States” where the defendant was charged with three counts of tax

evasion in violation of the Income Tax Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7201). In a well- reasoned, published order this Court finds persuasive, a jurist of the Ocala Division of this Court previously addressed the argument Petitioner advances, explaining:

[Section 3112(b)] affects only the manner in which the federal

4 Petitioner cites the “Enclave Clause” in the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17. See Pet. Mem. at 4. This clause is inapplicable to Petitioner’s criminal action. See, e.g., United States v. Gabrion, 517 F.3d 839, 854–55 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “[t]he violation of a federal statute . . . is an offense against the United States,” and therefore under the government’s jurisdiction to prosecute even if the crime occurs on property considered a “federal enclave,” such as a National Forest); Emily S. Miller, The Strongest Defense You’ve Never Heard of: The Constitution’s Federal Enclave Doctrine and Its Effect on Litigants, States, and Congress, 29 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 73 (2011) (explaining the Enclave Clause “renders certain state and common law claims inapplicable within areas of land ceded by a state to the federal government”). 7 government acquires some or all of the residual powers normally exercised by the state with respect to a piece of land. . . . It does not . . . affect the federal government’s ability to exercise the enumerated powers constitutionally delegated to it by each of the several states with respect to any land anywhere within these states, that is to say the United States.

United States v. Kahn, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1358 (M.D. Fla. 2004). The court found “inane” the argument that the government lacked jurisdiction to enjoin activities proscribed by the Internal Revenue Code because the government “ha[d] not produced a ‘notice of acceptance’ [in accordance with 40 U.S.C. § 3112] evidencing the federal government’s acceptance of jurisdiction over the land on which the prohibited conduct occurred.” Id. at 1355. See also United States v. Focia, No. 2:15CR17-MHT, 2015 WL 1567375, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 6, 2015) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss “for lack of territorial jurisdiction” under 40 U.S.C. § 3112 and concluding the court “indisputably ha[d] jurisdiction” over the action because the defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 923(a), and 924(a)(1)(D)). The central inquiry for determining if a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal matter is “whether the indictment alleges ‘offenses

against the laws of the United States.’” United States v. Moore, 954 F.3d 1322, 1333 (11th Cir. 2020). See also United States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2014) (“So long as the indictment charges the defendant with violating a valid federal statute as enacted in the United States Code, it alleges

8 an ‘offense against the laws of the United States’ and, thereby, invokes the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”).

Petitioner was indicted for violating provisions of the United States Code. See Crim. Doc. at 1–3. Specifically, the Indictment alleged that Petitioner, a convicted felon, who was physically present “in the Middle District of Florida” at the relevant time, “knowingly possess[ed], in and

affecting interstate commerce, a firearm,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 942(a)(2). In other words, Petitioner was charged with an offense against the laws of the United States. As such, this Court had jurisdiction to try and convict him. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (“The district courts of the United States

shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”). Because the Court had jurisdiction over Petitioner’s criminal action, his trial and appellate attorneys could not have been deficient for not advancing a meritless argument.

Accordingly, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is denied. V. CONCLUSION Finding Petitioner advances no argument warranting relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Petitioner’s Motion (Civ. Doc. 1, Crim. Doc. 89) is DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

9 2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment denying the Motion and dismissing the action with prejudice, terminate any pending motions as moot, and close the file. 3. If Petitioner appeals this Order, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.° Because this Court has determined that a certificate of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion. DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 4th day of March 2025.

ef) - fd /iton— ( | by 14___ BRIAN/I, DAVIS United States District Judge

Jax-6 C: Gregory Greer Counsel of Record

5 This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-86 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Upon due consideration, this Court will deny a certificate of appealability. 10