United States v. Cookson

922 F.3d 1079
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedApril 26, 2019
Docket18-3070; 18-3071
StatusPublished
Cited by50 cases

This text of 922 F.3d 1079 (United States v. Cookson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 2019).

Opinion

McHUGH, Circuit Judge.

Daniel Eugene Cookson pleaded guilty to two counts of possessing child pornography after the FBI identified him in the course of its large-scale sting operation involving the website "Playpen." At his sentencing hearing, the district court determined Mr. Cookson's criminal history and total offense level correlated to a Guidelines range of 97-121 months. The district court announced its intention to sentence Mr. Cookson to a term of seventy-two months' imprisonment. But after entertaining argument from both parties and inviting Mr. Cookson's allocution, the district court imposed a sentence of five years' probation.

The United States appealed, challenging Mr. Cookson's sentence as substantively unreasonable. Mr. Cookson cross-appealed, arguing the district court erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained from his computer by the FBI pursuant to a warrant issued in the Eastern District of Virginia

We affirm the district court's suppression ruling based on our decision involving the same warrant in United States v. Workman , 863 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017), but we vacate Mr. Cookson's sentence as unreasonable and remand to the district court for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Search and Seizure

In 2015, the FBI tracked down and arrested the operator of Playpen, a website that facilitated the distribution of child pornography. Instead of discontinuing Playpen's operations, however, the FBI decided to use the site to locate individuals using it to access child pornography. Workman , 863 F.3d at 1315 .

Finding Playpen's users presented a challenge because Playpen was accessible *1083 only through "Tor" (short for "The Onion Router"), a network and software program designed to allow users to browse the internet anonymously. Id. at 1315 . To access Playpen, users "had to employ [Tor] software that routed ... connections through [a series of] third-party computers called 'nodes.' " Id. By routing connections in this manner, Tor enabled its users to access Playpen without disclosing their IP addresses (unique numbers assigned to a given user's computer, see United States v. Henderson , 595 F.3d 1198 , 1200 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010) ) or other identifying information.

To bypass the steps Playpen took to keep its users anonymous, the FBI, after seizing control of the website, loaded Playpen's contents-pornography and all-onto a government server in the Eastern District of Virginia. Workman , 863 F.3d at 1315 . The FBI then sought a warrant in the Eastern District of Virginia which would authorize it to deploy a network investigative technique ("NIT") on the government server hosting Playpen. In support of their application for a search warrant, the FBI obtained an affidavit from Agent Douglas Macfarlane explaining the operation of the proposed NIT as follows:

In the normal course of operation, websites send content to visitors. A user's computer downloads that content and uses it to display web pages on the user's computer. Under the NIT authorized by this warrant, the TARGET WEBSITE [Playpen], which will be located in Newington, Virginia, in the Eastern District of Virginia, would augment that content with additional computer instructions. When a user's computer successfully downloads those instructions from [Playpen] ... the instructions, which comprise the NIT, are designed to cause the user's ... computer to transmit certain information [including IP addresses] to a computer controlled by or known to the government. ... The NIT will not deny the user ... access to any data or the functionality of the user's computer.

App. at 342-43. Essentially, when someone logged in to Playpen by entering a username and password, the NIT would cause that person's computer to transmit identifying information (including the user's IP address) to the FBI. A magistrate judge in the Eastern District of Virginia signed the warrant, and the FBI operated Playpen with the NIT for approximately two weeks. 1

On February 22, 2015, someone with the username "shishkabobs" logged into Playpen. Shishkabobs's computer downloaded the NIT, causing it to transmit identifying information to the FBI. Using this identifying information, the government sought an administrative subpoena for the Southern Kansas Telephone Company to identify the physical address associated with the IP address obtained from shiskabobs's computer. Based on information received from the Southern Kansas Telephone Company, the FBI connected shiskabobs's IP address to a home Mr. Cookson shared with his parents and brother in Howard, Kansas. The FBI obtained and executed a search warrant for this home, where they found child pornography on various devices owned by Mr. Cookson. Mr. Cookson later confessed to using Playpen to view child pornography.

*1084 The government charged Mr. Cookson with two counts of possessing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Mr. Cookson moved to suppress all evidence derived from the operation of the NIT on his computer, arguing the magistrate judge in the Eastern District of Virginia lacked authority to issue the NIT warrant and the warrant therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, Mr. Cookson argued that magistrate judges generally may not issue warrants for the search of persons or property outside of their district. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (a) (provision of the Federal Magistrates Act giving magistrate judges authority "within the district in which [they sit]"). Although he recognized that the version of Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b) in force at the time created a limited set of exceptions to this general rule, including for warrants concerning the installation of a tracking device, Mr. Cookson contended the exceptions did not include the NIT.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Sletten
Tenth Circuit, 2026
United States v. Swan
Tenth Circuit, 2026
United States v. Glaze
Tenth Circuit, 2026
United States v. Lopez
Tenth Circuit, 2026
United States v. Murphy
Tenth Circuit, 2026
United States v. Holt
Tenth Circuit, 2025
United States v. Bright
Tenth Circuit, 2025
United States v. King
Tenth Circuit, 2025
United States v. Moon Seals
Tenth Circuit, 2025
United States v. Doty
Tenth Circuit, 2025
United States v. Candelaria
Tenth Circuit, 2025
United States v. Rocha
Tenth Circuit, 2025
United States v. Jumper
Tenth Circuit, 2025
United States v. Washington
Tenth Circuit, 2025
United States v. Fowler
Tenth Circuit, 2025
United States v. Lucero
130 F.4th 877 (Tenth Circuit, 2025)
United States v. Maestas
Tenth Circuit, 2025
United States v. Rios-Flores
Tenth Circuit, 2024

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
922 F.3d 1079, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-cookson-ca10-2019.