Appellate Case: 24-5147 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 24, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-5147 (D.C. No. 4:22-CR-00017-JFH-1) DANIEL LEE JUMPER, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Defendant-Appellant Daniel Lee Jumper appeals from a 24-month revocation
sentence imposed following his violation of three conditions of supervised release.
Mr. Jumper argues the 24-month sentence is substantively unreasonable under the
totality of the circumstances because the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“Guidelines”) recommended a sentence between 5 and 11 months. For the reasons
explained below, we disagree and affirm.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-5147 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 2
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2023, Mr. Jumper pleaded guilty to one count of assault of an
intimate partner in Indian Country and was sentenced to 20 months in prison, to be
followed by three years of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153. In his
sentencing statement provided to the district court, Mr. Jumper stated that he had
sought substance abuse and mental health treatment for a diagnosis of Bipolar
Disorder I and was seeking “to curtail the behaviors which led to his current
situation.” ROA Vol. I at 59. In May 2023, Mr. Jumper was released from custody
early and began his three-year supervised release term.
In September 2023, the U.S. Probation Office petitioned to revoke
Mr. Jumper’s supervised release after he tested positive for methamphetamine and
failed to attend a mandatory counseling appointment. When Mr. Jumper failed to
appear at his first revocation hearing, the district court issued a warrant for his arrest.
Following Mr. Jumper’s arrest, the district court granted Mr. Jumper’s request to
enter an inpatient rehabilitation program and to continue the revocation proceedings.
It also cautioned Mr. Jumper that “this is an opportunity that you need to take
advantage of” and that it did not “want to hear any more excuses.” ROA Vol. III at
27.
Mr. Jumper left his rehabilitation program two weeks later without notifying
his probation officer, prompting the U.S. Probation Office to file a second petition to
revoke his supervised release. At the revocation hearing, the district court sentenced
Mr. Jumper to 11 months in prison to be followed by a two-year term of supervised
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release. The court explained, “Mr. Jumper has shown disregard for the rules and
conditions of supervised release,” “failed to attend [] his counseling appointments as
directed,” and left inpatient treatment after being “given an opportunity to attend.”
ROA Vol. III at 153.
In September 2024, Mr. Jumper began his second term of supervised release.
After just a few weeks, his probation officer reported that Mr. Jumper had “struggled
to comply with his conditions of supervision.” ROA Vol. I at 127. Namely,
Mr. Jumper failed to attend a required counseling appointment. He stated that he
missed the appointment because he was “spending time with his family due to his
nephew unexpectedly passing away.” Id. Mr. Jumper then failed to move into a sober
living program as required, missing intake appointments, despite numerous
conversations with his probation officer explaining this requirement. The U.S.
Probation Office petitioned for a one-week jail sanction, which the district court
granted.
Prior to his one-week jail sanction, Mr. Jumper submitted a urine sample that
tested positive for methamphetamine. This prompted the U.S. Probation Office to
move to revoke Mr. Jumper’s term of supervised release because he violated
mandatory conditions, including one requiring him to refrain from unlawful use of
controlled substances.
At the revocation hearing, Mr. Jumper stipulated that he had violated his
mandatory conditions of release by missing counseling appointments, failing to enter
a sober living facility, and testing positive for methamphetamine. But he urged “that
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his issues on supervised release are the result of a continuing struggle with
methamphetamine addiction,” and requested a within-Guidelines sentence to “have
an opportunity to seek some drug treatment.” ROA Vol. III at 163.
The district court noted that the policy provisions of the Guidelines at
§ 7B1.4(a) specified a range of imprisonment between 5 and 11 months, while the
statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) provided for a term of imprisonment of
up to 24 months. It further explained that it had reviewed the policies, Guidelines,
and the sentencing factors enumerated at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and 3553(a). The court
then stated that because Mr. Jumper had “shown disregard for the rules and
conditions of supervised release as indicated by” the stipulated violations, along with
a “repeated unwillingness to comply with the terms of supervised release imposed by
this court,” it had determined “a sentence outside the advisory guideline range is
needed to serve as an adequate deterrent to [him], as well as others, and provide
protection for the public.” Id. at 166. The court then pronounced it was revoking the
term of supervised release and imposing a sentence of 24 months in prison.
The court further explained that while it “believe[d] in second chances,”
because Mr. Jumper “had a fourth chance and then beyond,” it was not willing to
grant Mr. Jumper’s request for a within-Guidelines sentence. Id. at 167. The court
also addressed Mr. Jumper’s addiction struggles and encouraged him “to go all in on
[his] treatment and accept the help that [he] need[s]” while in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 169.
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Mr. Jumper timely appealed.1
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), a district court may revoke a term of
supervised release if a defendant violates conditions of supervised release. See, e.g.,
United States v. Salazar, 987 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2021). The district court
may reincarcerate a defendant up to the “term of supervised release authorized by
statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3). In “deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised release and
determining the sentence imposed after revocation, the district court must consider
the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4),
(a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).”2 United States v. McBride, 633 F.3d 1229, 1231 (10th Cir.
1 We have jurisdiction over Mr. Jumper’s timely appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2 As set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), those factors are (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;” (2) “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocation training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;” (3) “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established;” (4) “any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission;” (5) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities;” and (6) “the need to provide restitution to any victims.” “Notably absent from this list is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which directs courts to consider the ‘(2) need for the sentence imposed . . . (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.’” United States v. Booker, 63 F.4th 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2023); see also Estreras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031, 2040–41 (2025). Here, the district court properly did not reference § 3553(a)(2)(A). See ROA Vol. III at 166.
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2011). “Our review of the court’s application of these factors is deferential,” and we
will uphold a revocation sentence “if it can be determined from the record to have
been reasoned and reasonable,” i.e., both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
Id. at 1231–32 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Jumper argues his 24-month
revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable.
“Substantive reasonableness focuses on whether the length of the sentence is
reasonable in light of the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v.
Halliday, 665 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2011). Substantive reasonableness is
reviewed under the “familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review,” id. (quoting
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007)), “looking at the totality of the
circumstances,” United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079, 1090 (10th Cir. 2019)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it
renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly
unreasonable.” United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks omitted).
This standard applies “without regard to whether the district court imposes a
sentence within or outside the advisory Guidelines range.” Id. As such, “we do not
apply a presumption of unreasonableness to sentences outside the [G]uidelines
range.” Cookson, 922 F.3d at 1090. “Instead, we give due deference to the district
court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justify the extent of the
variance.” Id. at 1090–91 (internal quotation marks omitted). “That we might
reasonably have concluded a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to
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justify reversal of the district court.” Id. at 1091 (quotation marks omitted). However,
“[a] ‘major’ variance” from the Guidelines range “should have ‘a more significant
justification than a minor one.’” United States v. Lente, 759 F.3d 1149, 1158 (10th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). Given that the Guidelines range in this case
was 5 to 11 months, Mr. Jumper’s revocation sentence of 24 months requires a “more
significant justification.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
District courts imposing sentences are charged with “engag[ing] in a holistic
inquiry of the § 3553(a) factors,” Lente, 759 F.3d at 1174 (quotation marks omitted),
and “consider[ing] every convicted person as an individual,” Gall, 552 U.S. at 52
(quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)). A district court should not
rely solely on one § 3553(a) factor without addressing other relevant factors. See
United States v. Walker, 844 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 2017). “A limited, brief, or
inconsistent explanation” can hinder our review of a sentence’s substantive
reasonableness. Cookson, 922 F.3d at 1091. Therefore, we have concluded a sentence
is substantively unreasonable where the district court placed “nearly exclusive focus”
on one § 3553(a) factor and did not explain the weight afforded to other factors,
preventing us from deferring to its determination that the sentence was supported by
all the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 1094–95.
At the same time, we owe considerable deference to the weight the district
court affords each § 3553(a) factor and to its determination of the sentence “given all
the circumstances of the case in light of the [§ 3553(a)] factors.” United States v.
Gieswein, 887 F.3d 1054, 1064 (10th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). We have
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recognized that “the district court need not afford equal weight to each § 3553(a)
factor,” and we defer “not only to a district court’s factual findings but also to its
determinations of the weight to be afforded to such findings.” Cookson, 922 F.3d
at 1094 (quotation marks omitted). This is because the district court “is in a superior
position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility
determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not conveyed by
the record.” United States v. Barnes, 890 F.3d 910, 915–16 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
III. ANALYSIS
Mr. Jumper argues the district court “imposed a major variance without a
compelling justification,” and therefore his sentence was substantively unreasonable.
Appellant’s Br. at 12. We disagree. The district court explained that it was troubled
by Mr. Jumper’s repeated violations of his conditions of supervised release, and that
the most recent violations illustrated his “disregard for the rules and conditions of
supervised release.” ROA Vol. III at 166. It determined a sentence outside of the
Guidelines range was therefore necessary to serve as an adequate deterrent to
Mr. Jumper “as well as others,” and to protect the public. Id. The district court then
acknowledged Mr. Jumper’s addiction struggles and encouraged him to seek the
treatment available in prison. This discussion explicitly or implicitly considered “the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant,” the need for the sentence “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
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conduct,” “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” and “to
provide the defendant with needed . . . correctional treatment,” and the sentencing
range established by the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),
(a)(2)(D), (a)(4). Put another way, the district court “gave careful consideration to the
Guidelines[] but concluded that other § 3553(a) factors—promoting respect for the
law, affording adequate deterrence, and protecting the public from further crimes—
required a substantial upward variance.” Gieswein, 887 F.3d at 1064. We owe
“substantial deference” to that determination and we cannot say the district court
abused its discretion. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Each of Mr. Jumper’s arguments
to the contrary are unavailing.
First, Mr. Jumper stresses that the upward variance to 24 months from a 5- to
11-month range is “an increase ranging from 118 to 380[] percent.” Appellant’s Br.
at 13. But “[w]e do not apply ‘a rigid mathematical formula that uses the percentage
of a [variance] as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications for a
specific sentence,’” as long as the justification for the variance is “sufficiently
compelling.” United States v. Sample, 901 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Gall, 552 U.S. at 47). In fact, we have previously upheld an identical variance where
the explanation given by the district court under the § 3553(a) factors was adequate.
See United States v. Williams, 994 F.3d 1176, 1179–80 (10th Cir. 2021) (holding
district court did not abuse discretion in imposing 24-month revocation sentence
despite Guidelines range being 5 to 11 months because the district court adequately
explained its concerns about the defendant’s history of violating supervised release
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conditions during hearing); see also United States v. Booker, 63 F.4th 1254, 1263
(10th Cir. 2023) (holding that even where district court impermissibly mentioned 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) in revocation hearing, imposition of 24-month revocation
sentence instead of a sentence within 5- to 11-month Guidelines range did not violate
the defendant’s substantial rights because district court adequately explained why
under the § 3553(a) factors as a whole the longer sentence was needed).
Second, Mr. Jumper argues the “court’s reasons for deviating so far above the
Guidelines were unreasonable.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. Specifically, Mr. Jumper
argues that the district court’s statement that “a sentence outside the advisory
guidelines is needed to serve as an adequate deterrent to this defendant, as well as to
others, and provide protection for the public” was not sufficient. Id. (quoting ROA
Vol. III at 166). Instead, according to Mr. Jumper, the district court needed to
account for the “nature and circumstances” of the violations leading to the revocation
hearing. Id. at 13–14. Because those circumstances—the positive drug test, failing to
attend a counseling session, and not participating in a sober living program—were
not violent, he contends they “did not create a need to incarcerate someone for two
years to protect the public.” Id. at 14.
Again, we owe considerable deference to the weight the district court affords
each § 3553(a) factor and to its determination of the sentence “given all the
circumstances of the case in light of the [§ 3553(a)] factors.” Gieswein, 887 F.3d
at 1064 (quotation marks omitted). Where a defendant “simply disagrees” with how
the district court weighed the § 3553(a) factors, a sentence is not substantively
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unreasonable. United States v. DeRusse, 859 F.3d 1232, 1240–41 (10th Cir. 2017);
see also United States v. Washington, No. 24-7042, 2025 WL 1602766, at *6 (10th
Cir. June 6, 2025) (unpublished) (explaining “we cannot reweigh the § 3553(a)
factors on appeal”).3 As recounted above, the district court here explained that it had
considered each of the § 3553(a) factors; it specifically discussed the history and
characteristics of Mr. Jumper, the nature and circumstances of Mr. Jumper’s
supervised release violations, the need for deterrence, and the need to protect the
public in explaining why a statutory maximum 24-month sentence was necessary.
Considering all the circumstances of this case, we cannot say the district court abused
its discretion in imposing this sentence.
Third, Mr. Jumper argues that his history and characteristics, “including his
struggles with substance abuse and bi-polar disorder,” “mitigate his culpability” and
militate in favor of a lower sentence. Id. at 16. Similarly, he argues that § 3553(a)’s
statement that “a sentence must be imposed in the ‘most effective manner’ to provide
any needed treatment” means that someone, like him, “with nonviolent violations and
a drug problem,” should not be subject to a two-year prison sentence which is “less
likely to have a meaningful deterrent effect” given his underlying substance abuse
issues. Id. at 17 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D)).
3 We cite unpublished cases for their persuasive value only and do not treat them as binding authority. See United States v. Ellis, 23 F.4th 1228, 1238 n.6 (10th Cir. 2022). 11 Appellate Case: 24-5147 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 07/24/2025 Page: 12
But Mr. Jumper’s cited case law supports only the unremarkable proposition
that the district court would have had discretion to weigh the § 3553(a) factors
differently and impose a different sentence given Mr. Jumper’s addiction struggles.
Nothing in our case law required the district court to conclude that Mr. Jumper’s
substance abuse and mental health challenges required a lower revocation sentence,
much less indicates that the district court abused its discretion in not crediting
Mr. Jumper’s arguments for a lower sentence. Cf. United States v. Lucero, 130 F.4th
877, 887–88 (10th Cir. 2025) (affirming statutory maximum sentence where district
court’s explanation established it had considered and rejected the defendant’s
argument in favor of a lower sentence). Indeed, we have never required district courts
to explicitly discuss every § 3553(a) factor—much less specific subsets of those
factors—for a sentence to be substantively reasonable. See, e.g., United States v.
Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Fowler, No.
24-6087, 2025 WL 1166455, at *4 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 2025) (unpublished) (holding
district court did not abuse its discretion by not considering a subset of history and
characteristics—the defendant’s age—as a mitigating factor at sentencing).
In short, we afford considerable deference to a district court’s weighing of the
§ 3553(a) factors in each individual case, and we cannot say the district court abused
that discretion here. Rather, the district court provided a sufficiently compelling
justification for the upward variance which we will not disturb on appeal.
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IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM Mr. Jumper’s sentence.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge