United States v. Chapman

209 F. App'x 253
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedDecember 8, 2006
Docket04-5010
StatusUnpublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 209 F. App'x 253 (United States v. Chapman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Chapman, 209 F. App'x 253 (4th Cir. 2006).

Opinion

TRAXLER, Circuit Judge.

Nathan Chapman was the chairman of the board, chief executive officer, and majority shareholder of various financial services companies including The Chapman Company, Chapman Capital Management, and, later, eChapman.com. Chapman was convicted of numerous crimes stemming from his management of the various companies and from his conduct during the initial public offering (“IPO”) of the stock of eChapman. Chapman appeals, raising multiple challenges to his convictions, sentence, and restitution award. We affirm Chapman’s convictions and the restitution award, but we vacate his sentence and remand for re-sentencing.

I.

The charges for which Chapman was convicted stemmed from two relatively distinct sets of facts: Chapman’s conduct in connection with the IPO of eChapman stock and his improper use of “business development funds” provided to him by his various companies. We will set out the facts surrounding the IPO first and then discuss Chapman’s use of the business development funds. The facts that we set out, of course, are those established at trial *258 when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government.

A.

After working as a public accountant for several years, Chapman started his own financial services companies: The Chapman Company, an investment banking and retail brokerage firm, and Chapman Capital Management, an investment advisory firm that managed money for public and private pension funds.

Chapman, through Chapman Capital Management, later took over management and operation of Minority Equity Trust, a “fund of funds” that managed and invested funds for several pension funds, including the State Retirement and Pension System of Maryland (the “Maryland Pension System”). Minority Equity Trust used multiple independent investment advisory firms (called subadvisors) to manage the fund and allotted a portion of the total funds it managed to each subadvisor for investing and managing. The subadvisors had different investment styles or specialties— some invested in growth stocks, others in small-capitalization companies, etc. All of the subadvisors were controlled by women or minorities.

When Chapman took over Minority Equity Trust, he renamed it Domestic Emerging Markets Minority Equity Trust (DEM-MET), but its purpose (to provide opportunities for minority money managers) remained the same, and all of the subadvisors in DEM-MET were women or minorities. Shortly after Chapman took over DEM-MET, one of the subadvisors left. Chapman replaced that subadvisor with Alan Bond, who at the time was enjoying great success on Wall Street and made regular appearances on a PBS television show focusing on investment and finance. Bond’s investment specialty was large-cap growth stocks. He received from DEM-MET an initial allocation of $10 million to manage.

Under the rules established by Chapman Capital Management, DEM-MET subadvisors were required to invest in stocks found on a list of pre-approved companies or get approval before investing in a stock not on the list. Subadvisors could .not invest in stocks where liquidity of the stocks was limited by the company size or insider ownership of more than 50% of the company shares. The various pension funds participating in DEM-MET also had certain restrictions on the stocks that could be purchased by the subadvisors.

When Chapman took over DEM-MET, his companies were private, and he was the majority stockholder. In 1997, he spun off Chapman Capital Management from The Chapman Company, placed each company under a separate holding company, and announced that he would hold IPOs for 40% of the outstanding stock in each holding company. The IPOs were structured as “firm offer” IPOs — unless the minimum number of shares specified in the registration statement were sold, the IPO would not proceed.

The IPOs were successful, in that the minimum number of shares were sold. In both cases, however, the minimum number of shares were sold only because of large purchases of the stock by Alan Bond. Bond used DEM-MET funds to purchase the shares in one of the IPOs and used funds of other clients to buy into the other IPO.

Bond testified at trial that the Chapman IPOs were not a good fit for him — the stock was not liquid, given that the companies were small and Chapman retained a majority interest, and there was a great deal of risk associated with the ventures. Bond also testified that the companies were much smaller than the large-cap *259 growth stocks he focused on. He testified that the only reason he bought into the IPOs was because Chapman pressured him and assured him that more DEM-MET money to manage would come his way if Bond invested in the IPOs. Bond was concerned that there might be a conflict of interest in using DEM-MET funds to buy into the IPOs, since Chapman (through Chapman Capital Management) controlled DEM-MET and was the one selling and benefiting from the IPOs. Chapman assured Bond that there was no conflict, and Bond ultimately invested in the IPOs.

In May 1999, Chapman began planning a third IPO. This time he was going to reunite Chapman Holdings and Chapman Capital Management Holdings and turn them into an internet-based financial services company called eChapman.com. Chapman initially hoped to sell 3.3 million shares at $14-16 dollars a share. Chapman’s early efforts to get investors to commit to purchasing shares in the eChapman IPO, however, were not overly successful.

In December 1999, Alan Bond was indicted for a kickback scheme involving a New York stock broker. After the indictment, many of Bond’s clients abandoned him, and DEM-MET’s outside advisor recommended that Bond be terminated as subadvisor. Chapman, who was solely responsible for the decision, declined to terminate Bond. Not long after the indictment, Chapman visited Bond in New York. He told Bond that he was not going to fire him, but he also told Bond that he expected Bond to be the “pinch hitter in reserve” on the eChapman IPO. Bond understood that to mean that Chapman expected Bond to again help him out if the IPO was under-subscribed.

In early 2000, before the eChapman IPO opened, the “dot-com bubble” burst, and the stock value of many Internet stocks dropped dramatically. Chapman had already spent a great deal of money in legal and accounting fees preparing for the IPO, so he pressed on despite the less favorable market conditions. Chapman reduced the number of shares to be offered to 1.26 million and lowered the price to $13 per share. Investors, however, were still expressing little interest in the eChapman IPO. The discussion about the IPO in the financial press was almost uniformly negative. Analysts believed that the $13 per share price was too high and that the Chapman companies that were merging to form eChapman did not have a good track record. There was also concern that the structuring of the deal created an incentive for the owners of the companies that were being merged to sell their shares as soon as eChapman was born, which would create an immediate downward pressure on the price of an already overvalued stock.

Faced with limited outside interest in the IPO, Chapman again pressured Bond to buy into the eChapman IPO.

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Bluebook (online)
209 F. App'x 253, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-chapman-ca4-2006.