Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chapman

826 F. Supp. 2d 847, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137203
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedNovember 29, 2011
DocketCivil No. WDQ-03-1877
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 826 F. Supp. 2d 847 (Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chapman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chapman, 826 F. Supp. 2d 847, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137203 (D. Md. 2011).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM D. QUARLES, JR., District Judge.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) sued Nathan Chapman, Chapman Capital Management (“CCM”),1 and others for securities fraud and related claims. For the following reasons, the SEC’s motion for partial summary judgment against Chapman will be granted. Its motion for partial summary judgment against CCM will be denied, but default judgment will be entered on all claims asserted against it.

1. Background2

Before 1999, Chapman founded and was the chairman of the board, chief executive [850]*850officer (“CEO”), and majority shareholder of several financial services companies, including The Chapman Company (“TCC”), a securities broker-dealer, and CCM, an investment advising and management firm. ECF No. 66 ¶ 19.

CCM was the investment manager for the DEM-MET Trust, a pooled trust designed for diversified investments using minority-owned sub-advisers. Id. ¶ 16. From January 1997 to August 2001, Alan Bond was a sub-adviser to the DEM-MET Trust through his investment company, Albriond Capital Management. Id. ¶ 17.3 The trust had three clients in 2000: the Maryland State Retirement and Pension System, Bankers Trust Company Pension Plan, and Affiant Energy Corporation. Id. ¶ 16.

In 1998, Chapman took two companies public: Chapman Holdings, Inc. (“CHI”), ICC’s parent company, and Chapman Capital Management Holdings, Inc. (“CCMH”), CCM’s parent company. Id. ¶ 21. The Initial Public Offerings (“IPO”) were successful, netting over $12 million, and by November 1999, Chapman owned about 73 percent of CHI’s and CCMH’s outstanding shares. Id.

In November 1999, Chapman introduced eChapman, a new public company he planned to form by merging CHI and CCMH. TCC would be the lead, and largest, underwriter for eChapman’s IPO. Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 27. At that time, eChapman filed an initial registration statement with the SEC for an IPO of 3,333,333 shares of its common stock, costing $14 to $16 per share. Id. ¶ 25. CHI and CCMH’s shares would be converted into eChapman shares during the merger, and Chapman would own about 63 percent of the new company. Id. 126. Chapman solicited Bond to buy 200.000 of the IPO shares using DEM-MET funds at the $13 per share price, and other DEM-MET sub-advisers to buy 20,-000 of the shares during the IPO. ECF No. 1 ¶ 47; ECF No. 66 ¶¶ 44, 47.

In early 2000, stock values of internet companies dropped sharply and interest in eChapman fell. By June 2000, the underwriters had commitments for slightly more than one-third of the shares to be offered in the IPO, and eChapman reduced the number and asking price of shares it would offer, and pushed back its offering date. ECF Nos. 1 ¶¶ 33-34; 66 ¶ 35.

On June 15, 2000, eChapman’s IPO opened and the underwriters offered 1.260.000 shares at $13 per share. The IPO purchases were recorded with trade and process dates of June 15, 2000, and a settlement date of June 20 — the first day of public trading. Id. ¶ 38. On June 20, 2011, eChapman, available for public trading, opened at $8 per share, hovered between $7 and $8 per share for two days, then slid until it fell below $1 per share, where it remained. ECF No. 66 ¶ 89.

Chapman told the sub-advisers’ representatives that there would be no conflict of interest when they purchased the [851]*851shares, but CCM, as the trust’s investment adviser, was an “insider,” Chapman, who controlled CCM, was a majority owner of eChapman, and TCC, which Chapman also controlled, would broker the deal. ECF No. ¶ 149.

On June 26, 2000, Chapman convinced Bond to purchase more eChapman stock at $13 per share because an underwriter had dropped out of the IPO. Bond bought 175,-000 more shares for $13 per share when the market price was $7 per share. The sale was backdated to June 20, 2000, as if it had been part of the IPO. Id. ¶ 50; United States v. Chapman, 209 Fed.Appx. 253, 260 (4th Cir.2006).

On June 26, 2003, the SEC sued Chapman, CCM, TCC, eChapman, and several of Chapman’s employees for violating § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (“Securities Act”), § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), SEC Rule 10b-5, § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6, and § 13(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC rules associated with that section. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 95-108. In February 2009, the Court dismissed TCC and eChapman on the SEC’s motion, and the SEC settled with two of the three employees.4 ECF Nos. 138, 142, 144.

In 2004, a jury convicted Chapman on 23 counts of Mail and Wire Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, Investment Adviser Fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6, and other crimes, based on the eChapman IPO, including the backdated share sales.5 Chapman, 209 Fed.Appx. at 260-61. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Chapman’s criminal conduct cost the DEM-MET clients $5,000,856. United States v. Chapman, No. 03-0301, ECF No. 100 at 27 (Aug. 13, 2004) [hereinafter “Jury Verdict”]. On February 20, 2007, the Court sentenced [852]*852Chapman to 68 months imprisonment and ordered that he make restitution of the full $5,000,856 of loss.6 ECF No. 149 Attach. 6 at 2, 4.

On June 3, 2010, the SEC moved for partial summary judgment in the civil case. ECF No. 149. On July 9, 2010, Chapman opposed the motion. ECF No. 159. On January 24, 2011, he filed a memorandum in support of his opposition.7 ECF No. 162.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Under Rule 56(a), summary judgment “shall [be] grant[ed] ... if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In considering the motion, “the judge’s function is not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to ... the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in h[is] favor,” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc.,

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