United States Consol. Seeded Raisin Co. v. Selma Fruit Co.

195 F. 264, 115 C.C.A. 234, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1378
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 5, 1912
DocketNo. 1,909
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 195 F. 264 (United States Consol. Seeded Raisin Co. v. Selma Fruit Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States Consol. Seeded Raisin Co. v. Selma Fruit Co., 195 F. 264, 115 C.C.A. 234, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1378 (9th Cir. 1912).

Opinion

MORROW, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above).

[1] The first objection urged by the complainant to the proceedings in the court below is that defendant did not in its answer plead the prior use of the process as therein alleged in accordance with the requirements of the statute.

Section 4920 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3394) provides, among other things:

“In any action for infringement the defendant may plead the general issue, and. having given notice in writing to the plaintiff or his attorney thirty days before, may prove on trial any one or more of the following special matters: * * * That it had been in public use or on sale in this country for more than two years before Ms application for a patent; * * * and in notices as to proof of previous invention, knowledge, or use of the thing patented, the defendant shall state * * * where and by whom it had been used. * 's * And the like defenses may be pleaded in any suit in equity for relief against an alleged infringement; and proofs of the same may be given upon like notice in the answer of the defendant, and with the same effect.”

This being a suit in equity, the notice required by the statute was given in defendant’s answer, and the amendment thereto; but it appears with respect to the use of the alleged invention by Edwin Hayden his residence was given as being in the city and county of San Francisco, and the time of his use of the process from about the year 1883 continuously for man}' years, but it is not alleged where the process was used. The defendant gave notice of the person who it was alleged had used the process, and liis residence, and the time when it was used. If this notice was not deemed sufficient, it was open to the complainant to except to the answer for insufficiency on the ground that the place of use had not been stated. Having failed to interpose such an exception to the answer, the defendant now contends that under the sixty-first equity rule (29 Sup. Ct. xxxii) the answer must be deemed and taken to be sufficient. That rule provides for exceptions to answers on the ground of insufficiency, and, where no exceptions are filed, “the answer shall he deemed and taken to be sufficient.” Defendant makes the further answer to this objection that it wras not urged in the Circuit Court, and it has not: been assigned as error on this appeal. It appears from the record that all the particulars, including the place of use, were stated in the evidence, and, although this evidence was objected to by the complainant, it does not appear that the complainant was in any way prejudiced by the omission of the allegation from the answer, or the introduction of the evidence. The complainant had abundant time in which to in[268]*268vestigate the facts alleged and make such showing in rebuttal as the facts warranted.

We think, under the circumstances, the objection must be deemed to have been waived. In any event, the evidence was admissible without notice to show the state of the art. Morton v. Llewellyn, 164 Fed. 693, 694, 90 C. C. A. 514, and that is sufficient for this case.

[2] The appellant contends that the decree of the lower court dismissing the bill was based solely on the ground of anticipation as evidenced by the prior use of appellant’s process by one Hayden, and the disclosure of the process in a book entitled, “The Raisin Industry,” by Gustav Eisen, and that the only question involved in this appeal is whether or not the lower court was correct in so holding. The court expressly stated that its decision wás based upon the lack of novelty in the process. It is true that the court in its opinion referred to the prior use by Hayden and the book on “The Raisin Industry,” but these references were clearly for the purpose of showing the state of the art at the time of the alleged invention by Forsyth. It was the duty of the court to read and construe the claims and specification of the patent in the light of a knowledge of the state of the art at the time the patent was issued. This the court did, and determined in the light of that knowledge that the process lacked novelty.,

But, whatever may be deemed to be the scope of that decision, this court will not be limited by its terms. As -said by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Millard v. Chase, 108 Fed. 399, 401, 47 C. C. A. 429, 431:

“It is a thoroughly settled rule, as to patentability and the range of the claims in a patent, inasmuch as these matters concern the' public at large, the court will not allow parties to frame their issues in such a way as to take from it the scrutiny of all the questions which may be involved.”

The rule applies to this case, and requires us to examine the range of the claims and all the material questions involved in the patentability of the process in controversy.

We will first consider the range of the claims. The process as there set forth may be applied to either dried fruit or raisins. We are only concerned in this case with its application to raisins, as described in claims numbered 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

The seventh claim is for “the process of treating raisins,” the essential elements of which consist “in heating the raisins and then cooling them.”

The eighth claim is for the same heating process of treating raisins, with the added element,' “and then subjecting them to a current of air,” whereby they are “quickly cooled.”

The ninth claim is for the treatment of raisins, the essential elements of which consist in subjecting them to “a current of warm air-,” whereby they are heated, and then subjecting them to “a current of cool air,” whereby they are “quickly cooled.”

The tenth claim returns to the essential element of the primary method of the seventh claim in treating the raisins, “which consists in heating the raisins and then cooling them,” with the added effect, “whereby the points of attachment of the stems are rendered brittle, [269]*269and then subjecting them to abrasive treatment whereby the stems are detached.”

The eleventh claim repeats the essential elements of the tenth claim with the added effect, “whereby the raisins and the points of attachment of the stems are rendered hard and brittle, and then subjecting the raisins to abrasive and separating treatment, whereby they are stemmed and cleaned.”

The twelfth claim is a combination of the ninth and eleventh claim, having the essential elements of the ninth claim, consisting of “a current of warm air” for heating the raisins, and “a current of cool air” whereby the raisins are “quickly cooled,” and the essential element of the eleventh claim, “subjecting the raisins to abrasive and separating treatment whereby they are stemmed and cleaned.”

The process as here described and claimed does not appear on its face to be either new or novel. The treating of raisins by “heating the raisins and then quickly cooling them,” as described in the seventh claim, is certainly not new or novel.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
195 F. 264, 115 C.C.A. 234, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1378, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-consol-seeded-raisin-co-v-selma-fruit-co-ca9-1912.