American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co.

90 U.S. 566, 23 L. Ed. 31, 23 Wall. 566, 1874 U.S. LEXIS 1333
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 26, 1874
StatusPublished
Cited by43 cases

This text of 90 U.S. 566 (American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. 566, 23 L. Ed. 31, 23 Wall. 566, 1874 U.S. LEXIS 1333 (1874).

Opinion

Mi’. Justice STRONG

delivered the opinion of the court.

Though the two reissued patents (Nos. 1448 and 1449 * ) were granted on the same day and to the same patentees, and though they are both substitutes for the one original patent granted July 18th, 1854, antedated August 19th, 1858, they are to be carefully distinguished one from the other. The first (No. 1448) is a patent for a product or a manufacture, and not for any process by which the product may be obtained. The second (No. 1449) is for a process and not for its product. It is quite obvious that a manufacture, or a product of a process, may be no novelty, while, at the same time, the process or agency by which it is produced may be both new and useful—a great improvement on any previously known process, and, therefore, patentable as such. And it is equally clear, in eases of chemical inventions, that when, as in the present case, the manufacture claimed as novel is not a new composition of matter, but an extract obtained by the decomposition or disintegration of material substances, it cannot be of importance from what it has been extracted.

There are mauy things well known and valuable in medicine or in the arts which may be extracted from divers substances. But the extract is the same, no matter from what it has been taken. A process to obtain it from a subject from which it has never been taken may be the creature of inven *594 tion, but the thing itself when obtained cannot be called a new manufacture. It may have been in existence and in common use before the new means of obtaining it was invented, and possibly before it was known that it could be extracted from the subject to which the new process is applied. Thus, if one should discover a mode or contrive a process by which prussic acid could be obtained from a subject in which it is not now known to exist, he might have a patent for his process, but not for prussic acid. If, then, the Watt & Burgess patent for a product is sustainable it must be because the product claimed, namely, “a pulp suitable for the manufacture of paper, made from wood or other vegetable substances,” was unknown prior to their alleged invention. But we think it is shown satisfactorily that it had been produced and used in the manufacture of paper long before 1853, the year in which the original patent of Watt & Burgess was dated.

It is insisted, however, that the paper-pulp which had been produced before the invention of Watt & Burgess was not pure cellulose, that it was only approximately pure, and from this it is argued that the pure article obtained from wood by their process is a different and new product, or manufacture. Whether a slight difference in the degree of purity of an article produced by several processes justifies denominating the products different manufactures, so that different patents may be obtained for each, may well be doubted, and it is not necessary to decide. The product of the complainants’ patent is a pulp suitable for the manufacture of paper, and, confessedly, to make white paper it requires bleaching. The pulp which bad been obtained by others from rags in large quantities, and from straw, wood, and other vegetable substances to a lesser extent, was undeniably also cellulose, suitable for manufacturing paper, and, so far as appears, equally suitable. The substance of the products, therefore, was the same, and so were their uses. The design and the end of .their production was the same, no matter how or from what they were produced.

It is freely admitted that the patent of an originator of a *595 complete and successful invention cannot be avoided by proof of any number of incomplete and imperfect experiments made by others at an earlier date. This is true, though the experimenters may have had the idea of the invention, and may have made partially successful efforts to embody it in a practical form. And though this doctrine has been more frequently asserted when patents for machines have been under consideration, we see no reason why it should not be applied in cases arising upon patents for chemical products. But the doctrine has no applicability to the present case. What had been done before the Watt & Burgess invention was more than partially successful experimenting. A product or a manufacture had been obtained and had been used in the arts, á manufacture which was the same in kind and in substance, and fitted for the same uses as the article of which the complainants now claim a monopoly. That this manufacture may have been the product of one or more different processes is, as we have said, quite immaterial in considering the question whether it is the same as that produced by the complainants.

It has -been, however, argued that the product of the complainants’ process and the product claimed as a new manufacture is cellulose, of the proper consistency and dimensions, and with a fibre of a proper length for immediate felting into paper, while the cellulose obtained from rags or wood, or other vegetable substances, by other processes than that of the Watt & Burgess patent, had a longer fibre, and required, in addition to chemical agency, mechanical treatment to prepare it for use in paper making. Hence, it is inferred the product is a different one, that it is properly denominated a new manufacture, and that it was patentable as such.

This argument rests upon a comparison of the finished product of the complainants with an article in an intermediate stage, and while undergoing treatment preparatory to its completion. It may be quite true that at some stage of its preparation the paper-pulp made and used before 1853 was not of the proper consistency for paper making, or that *596 its fibre was too long, and that it required additional manipulation to fit it for use. But when it had received that treatment, its fibres were reduced to the proper length, and it became capable of all the uses to which it is claimed the product of the complainants is adapted. It is with the finished article that the comparison must be made, aud, being thus made, we are of opinion that no substantial difference is discoverable.

It may be that if the cellulose which had been produced prior to 1853, of such form and with such properties that it’ could be at once felted into paper, had been only a chemical preparation in the laboratory or museum of scientific men, and had not been introduced to the public, the Watt & Burgess product might have been patented as a new manufacture. Such appears to be the doctrine asserted in some English cases, and particularly in Young v. Fernie. * In that case, Vice-Chaucellor Stuart remarked upon a distinction between the discoveries of a merely scientific chemist, and of a practical manufacturer who invents the means of producing in abundance, suitable for economical and commercial purposes, that which previously existed as a beautiful item in the cabinets of men of science. “ What the law looks to,” said he, “ is the inventor and discoverer who finds out and introduces a manufacture which supplies the market for useful and economical purposes with an article which was previously little more than the ornament of a museum.” But this is no such case.

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Bluebook (online)
90 U.S. 566, 23 L. Ed. 31, 23 Wall. 566, 1874 U.S. LEXIS 1333, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-wood-paper-co-v-fibre-disintegrating-co-scotus-1874.