Millard v. Chase

108 F. 399, 47 C.C.A. 429, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 3781
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedApril 24, 1901
DocketNo. 367
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 108 F. 399 (Millard v. Chase) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Millard v. Chase, 108 F. 399, 47 C.C.A. 429, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 3781 (1st Cir. 1901).

Opinion

PUTNAM, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises on patent No. 620,-278, issued to George W. Chase on February 28, 1899, on an application filed on February 24,1896. The general statement of the invention in the specification is that it relates to that class of shoes wherein the upper 'is made without a heel seam, and that it has for its object “the production of a shoe without a heel seam, formed from a blank cut with the minimum of waste and labor, and obviating the removal of portions of material from the upper to properly shape the heel line of the ankle portion when completed; the said heel line being reinforced by an integral stay portion of the upper.” The patent contains three claims. The first and second claims are not now in issue, but it is necessary to state them, in order that the relation of the third claim to the case may be properly understood. The claims are as follows:

“(1) A unitary shoe upper, comprising a toe portion, continuous heel portion, and ankle or instep portions, the hack of the upper above the heel portion having two symmetrically located, upright slits therein, outwardly curved at their middle portions and inwardly curved between such middle portions and their out-turned upper and lower ends, to form a strip between them having its edges correspondingly curved and integral with the upper at top and bottom, substantially as described.
“(2) A shoe upper provided in the vicinity of the heel with two vertical cuts having irregular edges, forming a heel stay integrally attached at its opposite ends to said upper, the irregular edges of said upper at said cuts being joined or seamed together beneath the stay in a single straight line to crimp or mold the shoe upper to fit the foot, and the stay thereafter stitched down upon and to conceal the said single line joint or seam, the adjacent ends of the said cuts being directed outwardly or made divergent to smoothly blend the crimped and stayed portions of the upper into the material of the said upper at the ends of the stay, and thereby avoid a sharp point or pucker at said stay ends, substantially as described.
“(3) A shoe made from a blank or pattern provided at the back of the upper with incisions or slits having a reinforcing stay strip between them, said stay strip being integral with the upper adjacent the counter line, the slitted upper being sewed together at the rear beneath said stay strip to form a seam, said stay strip extending over the sewed seam and being stitched to the upper at the opposite sides of the said seam by rows of stitches close to the edges of said stay strip, said rows of stitches extending from adjacent the counter line uninterruptedly throughout the entire length of the stay strip on each side thereof, as and for the purpose described.”

The circuit court found thé first and second claims were not infringed, but it sustained the third claim, and held that the respondents below infringed it. One defénse in the circuit court was based on a patent to John S. Powell for improvements in back pads, used beneath harness saddles, being patent No. 539,300, issued on May 14, 1895, on an application filed on January 12, 1895, and thus, on the [401]*401face of the record, anticipating the patent in suit. The opinion of the learned judge who heard this case in the circuit court said that this patent was too remote as an anticipation. On the arguments before us, the respondents, now the appellants, rested their case entirely on this patent to Powell; but it is a thoroughly settled rule that, as to patentability and the range of the claims in a patent, inasmuch as these matters concern the public at large, the court will not allow parties to frame their issues in such way as to take from it the scrutiny of all the questions which may be involved. This rule applies to this case, and the court declines to rest it where the respondents offered to rest it. Fortunately, notwithstanding the position taken by the respondents, the line of discussion when the appeal was heard branched out to cover the propositions which we will consider, so that we will not pass through them without a guide.

In addition to the patent by Powell, twro patents to Alfred Bélaire become of substantial interest in the case, and will be referred to again. One is No. 554,229, issued on an application filed on November 22, 1895, and the other is No. 613,958, issued on an application filed on August 27, 1896. With reference to the later patent to Bélaire, it was adjudicated on an interference proceeding in the patent office that he has priority over Chase. Chase now claims priority of invention with reference to all three patents, — that is, the one to Powell and the two to Bélaire; but, with regard to the later patent to Bélaire, the issue, as we have said, was fully determined against Chase on the interference proceeding. Chase did not appeal, but narrowed his claims to meet the adjudication. As to the other two patents, the evidence is so clearly of the character which was rejected by this court on the issue of priority in Brooks v. Sacks, 26 C. C. A. 456, 81 Fed. 403, that, without attempting any explanation of particulars, we decline to award Chase priority. Thus it follows that the three patents enumerated were parts of the stale of the art at the time of Chase’s invention, even if not strictly anticipatory.

Before coming to the merits of the case, it is necessary to observe on the proceedings in the “file wrapper,” so called, — that is to say, in the patent office, — with reference to the application for the patent in issue. The topic was fully discussed hv us, and carefully explained, in Reece Button-Hole Mach. Co. v. Globe Button-Hole Mach. Co., 10 C. C. A. 194, 61 Fed. 958, and, so far as the rules of law are concerned, we add nothing to what we there said. All which we have occasion to do is to apply them to the particular circumstances of this case. As we have seen, Chase’s application was pending in the patent office four days over three years. It was very extensively agitated, and the claim now an issue, as originally drawn, was twice rejected. The position of the office was thoroughly discussed, and was fully understood by the applicant. It cannot he questioned that the issues made by it were substantial, and not incidental, while the invention is of a narrow and doubtful character, and necessarily to be carefully limited; so that the [402]*402patentee must be lield to the results of the proceedings on his application, and be restricted thereby. In this respect the case is altogether different from what it would have been if the invention had been of a fundamental character, and the inventor was sought to be deprived of substantial rights by reason of incidental action on the part of the examiners.

Coming, now, more particularly to the facts of the case before us: The specification of the patent in issue refers to the necessity of obtaining “the desired crimped or molded formation to the sides of the upper,” so that there will be “no sharp'pucker, or point, where the ends of the stay strip blend into the integral material of the shoe upper or blank.” It provides for “symmetrically disposed slits,” so cut as “to leave an intermediate stay strip of material integral at the top and bottom with the blank or upper.” It directs that the edges of the blank or upper, along the line of the slits, shall be stitched together under the stay strip which is left by the slits, and that then the stay strip shall be “laid and stitched over and upon, and to conceal, the seam” thus made between the edges of the upper, in order to get “the desired crimped or molded formation” already referred to.

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Bluebook (online)
108 F. 399, 47 C.C.A. 429, 1901 U.S. App. LEXIS 3781, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/millard-v-chase-ca1-1901.