Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart

158 U.S. 68, 15 S. Ct. 745, 39 L. Ed. 899, 1895 U.S. LEXIS 2231
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedApril 22, 1895
Docket164
StatusPublished
Cited by131 cases

This text of 158 U.S. 68 (Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68, 15 S. Ct. 745, 39 L. Ed. 899, 1895 U.S. LEXIS 2231 (1895).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Brown,

after stating the case, delivered, the opinion of the court.

The three patents involved in this suit are for an improved belt pulley, and for the manufacture of the same." Each of them requires a separate consideration.

i. Patent No. 248,599 is for an improved process of manufacturing that class of belt pulleys formed of á'wrought-metal rim and a separate centre, usually a spider, and usually made, of cast metal. The drawings represent the machinery for carrying out the invention, and the pulley at the various stages of its manufacture. The process of manufacture is set forth in detail in the specification, and consists of the following steps: (1) centering the pulley centre or spider; (2) grinding the ends of the arms concentrically with the axis of the pulley; (3) boring the centre; (4) securing the rim to the spider; (5) grinding the face of the rim concentric with the axis of the pulley; (6) grinding or squaring the edges of the rim. This process, it may be observed, is purely a mechanical one.

Does it disclose a patentable invention? That the'patent is for a process in manufacture, and not for the mechanism employed, nor for the finished product of such' manufacture, is undeniable, and is so expressed upon the face of the specification.

The four claims of the patent make no reference to the mechanism exhibited in the drawings, and described in the specification. All claim an improvement in the art of manufacturing, and set forth in more or less detail the various steps in that process. That certain processes of manufacture are patentable is as clear as that certain others are not, but nowhere is the. distinction between them accurately defined. There is somewhat of the same obscurity in the line of demarcation as in that between mechanical skill and invention, or in that between a *72 new article <of manufacture, which is universally held to be patentable, and the function of a machine, which it is equally clear is not. It may be said in general that processes of manufacture which involve chemical or other similar elemental action are patentablé, though mechanism may be necessary in the application or carrying out of such process, while those which consist solely in the operation of a machine are not. Most processes which have been held to be patentable require the aid of mechanism in their practical application, but where such mechanism is subsidiary to the chemical action, the fact that the patentee may be entitled to a patent upon his mechanism does not impair his right to a patent for the process; since he would lose the benefit of his real discovery, which might be applied in a dozen different ways, if. he were not entitled to such patent. But, if the operatio.il of his device be purely mechanical, no such considerations apply, since the function of the machine is entirely independent of any chemical or other similar action.

A review of some of the principal cases upon the subject of patents for processes may not be out of place in this connection,' and will serve to illustrate the distinction between such as are and such as are not patentable.

The leading English cases are those which arose from the patent of September 11, 1828, to Neilson, for the improved application of air to produce heat in fires, forges, and furnaces, where bellows or other blowing apparatus were required: The patent, like many of the early English patents, contained no specific claims, but described a blast or current of air to be passed from the bellows into an air vessel or receptacle, made sufficiently strong to'endure the blast, and artificially heated to. a red. heat, or very nearly so.

It was said that the air vessel or receptacle might be conveniently made of iron or other metals, and that its form was immaterial to its effect, and might be adapted to the local circumstances or situation. In Neilson v. Harford, 1 Webst. Pat. Cas. 331, this patent was construed by the Court of Exchequer, in which the claim was made that the patent was for a principle, and was, therefore, void. Great difficulty was felt in its proper *73 construction, but after full consideration it was held that the patent did not merely claim a principle, but a machine embodying a principle; and in delivering the opinion Baron Parke observed: “We think the case must be considered as if the •principle being well known, the plaintiff had first invented a mode of applying it by a mechanical apparatus to furnaces; and his invention then consists in this by interposing a receptacle for heated air -between the blowing apparatus and the furnace. In this receptacle he directs the air. to be heated by the application of heat externally to the receptacle and thus he accomplishes the object of applying the blast, which was before of cold air, in a heated state in the furnace.” In citing this case in support of his opinion; in O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 115, Mr. Chief Justice Taney treated it as an invention of a mechanical apparatus by which a current of hot air,' instead of cold, could be thrown in. “ The interposition of a heated receptacle; in any form, was the novelty he invented.”

The Neilson patent, however, subsequently came before the House of Lords on appeal from the Scottish Court of Session in the Househill Coal and Iron Co. v. Neilson, 1 Webst. Pat. Cas. 673. The case went off upon other questions, but in delivering his opinion Lord Campbell thought the patent should be taken as extending to all machines, of whatever construction, whereby the air was heated intermediately between the blowing apparatus and the blast furnace. “ That being so, the learned judge was perfectly justified in telling the jury that it was unnecessary for them to compare one apparatus with another, because, confessedly, that system of conduit pipes was a mode of heating air by an intermediate vessel between the blowing apparatus and the blast furnace, and, therefore, it was an infraction of the patent.” S. C. 2 Bell Scotch H. L. App. Cas. 1; 9 Cl. & Fin. 788.

So in delivering the opinion of this court in Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, 724, Mr. Justice Bradley treated the Neilson patent as a patent for a process, although the patentee did not distinctly point out all the forms of apparatus by which the process might be applied. But, notwithstanding *74 the vast amount of litigation to which this patent gave rise, it can hardly be said that its proper construction has ever been definitely settled. Probably it was of no particular importance, as the air would have to be heated in a receptacle of some form before it was introduced into the furnace; and, therefore, if the patentee was not entitled to his patent as 'one for a process, he was clearly-entitled to it as one for the only method of heating the air which was practicable — his patent not claiming any particular form of receptacle or any particular material of which it should be made.

The first case in this court in which a claim for a process received attentive consideration was the great case of O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 119, involving the validity of the patent to Morse for an electric • telegraph.

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Bluebook (online)
158 U.S. 68, 15 S. Ct. 745, 39 L. Ed. 899, 1895 U.S. LEXIS 2231, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/risdon-iron-locomotive-works-v-medart-scotus-1895.