KENNEDY, Circuit Judge:
This case requires a determination, among other matters, of the extent to which the anti-injunction mandate of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et [953]*953seq., is applicable to common carriers and collective bargaining units subject to and regulated by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.1 The RLA extends to airlines, 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-188, and Trans International Airlines (TIA), a principal party in this case, is one of the nation’s largest supplemental air carriers. On November 30, 1976, TIA merged with Saturn Airways. The company operates separate flights for military and civilian carriage, transporting passengers and freight on both kinds of flights. At issue are two strikes against TIA, a primary strike by TIA’s flight attendants and a sympathy strike by its flight engineers and pilots. At the time of the events in question both the flight attendants and the engineers are represented by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Airline Division (Teamsters). TIA’s pilots are represented by the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), which also represented the premerger Saturn pilots.2 The company obtained federal injunctive relief prohibiting both strikes to the extent they were directed to military flights, but the district court did not enjoin the strikes against civilian flights. Both the company and the affected Teamsters unions appeal from the rulings.
The. contract negotiations between the Teamsters and the company, and the subsequent strikes, have the following history. TIA and the flight attendants were parties to a collective bargaining agreement for the period July 21, 1974, to April 1, 1976. The agreement contained a general no-strike clause, effective “during the term of this agreement.” At the heart of the dispute over the legality of the primary strike lie further contract provisions, by which the parties agreed there would be no strikes against military flights and that this clause was effective “after the expiration of this agreement and/or during and after procedures of the Railway Labor Act have been exhausted . . .”3 In February of 1976 the Teamsters, acting for the flight attendants, served a notice of intent to amend the agreement. Under the Railway Labor Act this is a section 6 notice, which signals the union’s intent to negotiate a new employment agreement. 45 U.S.C. § 156. The contract expiration date (April 1, 1976) arrived without the parties having reached accord. Pursuant to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, the agreement remained in force during the dispute resolution procedures set in motion by the section 6 notice. See id. Further negotiations between the parties produced no agreement, [954]*954and a mediator was assigned by the National Mediation Board on August 19, 1976.
The union refused voluntary arbitration, the mediator withdrew, and after expiration of the statutory 30-day cooling off period expired at midnight, September 7, 1977, the flight attendants struck all flights. TIA’s flight engineers and pilots, in a sympathy strike, honored the flight attendants’ primary strike and refused to cross the picket line.
TIA applied to the district court for an order prohibiting these groups of employees from striking. The district court ultimately granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the flight attendants from striking TIA’s military flights, but denied an injunction prohibiting flight attendants from striking TIA’s other operations. A similar injunction was issued against the flight engineers and pilots, enjoining the sympathy strike as to military flights only.
In this court, the Teamsters moved to stay the military strike injunctions, and TIA moved for temporary injunctive relief pending decision of the appeal. Oral argument on these motions was heard by this panel. In addition to the motions for preliminary relief, the principal appeal from the district court’s preliminary injunctions is pending before this circuit. Further, TIA and ALPA have filed separate appeals. Some of the issues raised in these appeals were not argued in the parties’ motions for interim relief. Concluding, however, that further oral argument in these cases is unnecessary, these appeals, Nos. 77-3362, 77-3363, 77-3395, 77-3781, 78-1148 & 78-1232 are considered submitted to this panel on the date of filing of this opinion, and their disposition is controlled by this opinion.
In general, three contentions are advanced by the parties. First, quite apart from the argument that federal courts are prohibited by statute from enjoining the strikes, the Teamsters contend that TIA was not entitled to seek a preliminary injunction because the company’s actions during the strike were so unfair that the company had unclean hands. In summary, the Teamsters claimed that TIA improperly stranded flight attendants at foreign ports; hired replacements; expanded the number of military flights (which the district court had enjoined the flight attendants, engineers and pilots from striking); terminated pilots for refusal to fly commercial planes or for other carriers; refused sick pay and monthly guarantees to strikers; and violated seniority rights in the selection of pilots for the military flights.
Second, TIA argues that the Teamsters’ conduct during the course of the major disputes mediation procedures violated section 152 First of the RLA, which requires parties “to exert every reasonable effort to make” a collective bargaining agreement. If that were so, there would be authority to enjoin the strike and require the Teamsters to return to the bargaining table. See Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570, 91 S.Ct. 1731, 29 L.Ed.2d 187 (1971). The principal bases of TIA’s claim are (1) that the Teamsters, in the process of negotiating the integration of the premerger Saturn and TIA flight attendant agreements, more than doubled the number of proposals on the bargaining table by requesting approximately 200 contract changes after a year of negotiations and six months prior to the strike, and (2) that the cost of the Teamsters’ initial proposal for flight attendants exceeded 250% of TIA’s then-present payroll costs for TIA flight attendants, and its proposals after mediation by the National Mediation Board exceeded 200% of TIA’s total company-wide profits for 1976 and represented a 294.6% increase in flight attendant payroll costs.
Finally, even if enjoining the Teamsters’ strike was not proper because of the union’s bargaining tactics, TIA contends an injunction against strikes of military flights was proper because, among other reasons, the various groups of employees had promised not to strike TIA’s military operations, even after bargaining under the RLA’s disputes resolution procedures had been exhausted, and that an injunction against the sympathy strikes was proper pending minor dispute arbitration of the legality of the strikes.
[955]*955The strikes which were the subject of this lawsuit have been settled, and a new collective bargaining agreement was signed on January 12,1978.4 We must first decide whether this appeal is now moot.
We hold these appeals are not moot, primarily because resolution of the issues presented is crucial to deciding a substantial pending claim for damages sought by TIA against the Teamsters. The district court’s preliminary injunctions were entered on September 26, 1977, and September 28, 1977. On October 26, 1977, the district court entered a further order in which it rejected the Teamsters’ and ALPA’s claim that TIA had “unclean hands” and thus was not entitled to the injunctions. This order formed the basis for appeals number 78-1148 and 78-1232. The Teamsters continued to urge employees to strike military flights. On November 1, 1977, the Teamsters were adjudicated in contempt of the district court’s orders. TIA alleges its military operations were virtually shut down by striking flight attendants and flight engineers, causing TIA approximately $400,000 in compensatory damages which it still seeks to recover from the Teamsters. The matter of compensatory fines was stayed by the district court on January 24, 1978, “pending the results of the appeals before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in TIA v. Teamsters, Nos. 77-3362/3363/3395/3781.”
Thus, the right of TIA to recover its alleged damages and the extent of recovery will be controlled, in part, by resolution of the overriding issue in these appeals: whether TIA was entitled to injunctive relief against either the primary or the sympathy strike. See, e. g., Lewis v. S. S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1976) (“A judgment of civil contempt, being remedial in nature, stands or falls with the validity or invalidity of the order, and the opposing party should be compensated only if he was entitled to the order.”); Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1345-46 (3d Cir. 1976). Under these circumstances this appeal presents a live case or controversy for our decision.
The Teamsters agree that if the compensatory fine proceeding is permitted to continue, the issues presented on this appeal must be decided. They conclude, however, that we should order dismissed the contempt proceedings as well as these appeals. The Teamsters’ argument is essentially this: in evaluating whether the controversy presented by this appeal from the original orders is moot, this court may not examine the posture of the pending contempt proceedings. We should, it is argued, decide whether this appeal is moot without reference to the possibility of damage liability in the contempt proceedings below, and if we determine the case is moot we should also instruct the district court to dismiss the contempt proceedings. We disagree with that reasoning.
The Teamsters contend we are governed by Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911). Procedurally Gompers does resemble this case. The company had secured an injunction against a boycott. Appeals were taken from this injunction. Before the appeal wás decided, the company initiated contempt proceedings, and the defendants were adjudicated in contempt and sentenced to jail sentences. The original injunctive decree was upheld by the court of appeals, and some time later the contempt adjudication was also affirmed. By the time the appeals from the original injunction reached the Supreme Court, the parties had settled their differences. The Court accordingly dismissed the appeal as moot. Buck’s Stove & Range Co. v. American Federation of Labor, 219 U.S. 581, 31 S.Ct. 472, 55 L.Ed. 345 (1911). Thereafter the Court also dismissed the appeal of the contempt adjudication as moot. It held:
[W]hen the main cause .was terminated by a settlement of all differences between the parties, the complainant did not require and was not entitled to any compensation or relief [in the contempt proceedings].
[956]*956221 U.S. at 451-52, 31 S.Ct. at 503. Gompers has subsequently been refined, see, e. g., Backo v. Carpenters Local 281, 438 F.2d 176, 182 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858, 92 S.Ct. 110, 30 L.Ed.2d 99 (1971), but we think the Teamsters’ discussion of Gompers and its progeny ignores a crucial distinction between that case and the instant case.
In Gompers, the parties had entered into a settlement which completely resolved all matters involved in the litigation between them. 221 U.S. at 451, 31 S.Ct. at 502; 219 U.S. 581, 31 S.Ct. 472. The determinations of mootness were predicated on this finding. In our case, by contrast, there has been no out-of-court settlement by the parties of “every material controversy which the record present[s].” 219 U.S. at 581, 31 S.Ct. at 472. The strike has ended and the parties have signed a new collective bargaining agreement, but this does not constitute a settlement of the controversies which spawned this litigation. A recent Third Circuit case illustrates the point. In Bituminous Coal Operators’ Association, Inc. v. U. M. W., 585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978), the employer had sued for both injunctive relief and damages. While the appeal from the district court’s orders was pending, the collective bargaining agreement which was allegedly breached expired and a new agreement was signed. The union argued that this development mooted the case; the court of appeals disagreed:
We note at the outset that the expiration of the 1974 agreement and the execution of the 1978 agreement have not mooted a claim for damages by the mine owners.
Id. at 599.
The possibility of compensatory damage liability in this case arises from the civil contempt adjudication and not, as in Coal Operators, from a damages action under the NLRA. We perceive no constitutional distinction in this fact. Cf. Latrobe Steel Co., supra, 545 F.2d at 1345-46. A proceeding for civil contempt is part of the original action. See, e. g., Gompers, supra, 221 U.S. at 444-45, 31 S.Ct. at 499-500. For purposes of determining whether a live controversy exists on this appeal from the injunctive orders of the district court, we may consider the fact that the union has been adjudicated in civil contempt of those orders, and that imposition of substantial compensatory damages depends on resolution of the issues presented on this appeal. Cf. also American Bible Society v. Blount, 446 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1971); Meyers v. Jay Street Connecting Railroad, 288 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1961).5
[957]*957The Teamsters raise another, more limited, mootness argument. They contend TIA’s appeal from the district court’s refusal to enjoin a strike against its commercial operations is moot. Noting that TIA’s flight attendants (but not its engineers) now have a different bargaining representative (the Association of Flight Attendants), the Teamsters argue there can be no expectation that TIA will be subjected again to the Teamsters’ alleged bad faith bargaining tactics. We reject this argument. If the Teamsters did not make a reasonable effort to reach an agreement during major disputes bargaining, see p. 2052 infra, its strikes against both commercial and military flights could be enjoined. The union’s bargaining conduct was an alternative ground — in addition to the military no-strike clause — for the injunction underlying the contempt order. For this reason alone, even apart from our reluctance to fragment this appeal into “live” and “moot” issues, and the possibility that the dispute is not moot under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” standard, see Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975); Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 187, 99 S.Ct. 983, 992, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979); Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1237, 1238 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837, 98 S.Ct. 127, 54 L.Ed.2d 99 (1977), the union’s bargaining behavior is part of the live case or controversy before us. See Coal Operators, supra, 585 F.2d at 600.
Turning to the merits, we address first the clean hands issue. We affirm the district court’s finding, on the motion for preliminary relief, that TIA was not prevented from seeking injunctive relief because of its own conduct. Without explicitly passing on the accuracy of the Teamster’s characterization, the district court concluded:
TIA’s varied and extensive efforts to continue its operations during the current strike in an attempt to defeat the strike . are all legally permissible and fairly common methods of countering the impact of a strike . . . These parties are engaged in a hard-fought labor dispute that unfortunately has resulted in a test of their relative economic strength. In such a situation, it is not unusual or unfair for both sides to resort to all of the weapons legally available to them.
The activities of which the union complains are not discussed in detail in the district court’s opinion of October 26, 1977,6 but the [958]*958parties have presented their views of TIA’s conduct in their briefs. Having reviewed their contentions, we cannot conclude that the district court applied a legally improper standard or made clearly erroneous findings of fact. On the motion for preliminary relief it was not improper to conclude that the-practices complained of were not sufficiently likely to be found illegal or otherwise wrongful that TIA should be prevented from seeking injunctive relief. See Illinois Central R. R. v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 398 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1968); Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Akron & B. B. R. R., 128 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 92, 385 F.2d 581, 614 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923, 88 S.Ct. 851, 852, 19 L.Ed.2d 983 (1968); Long Island R. R. v. System Federation No. 156, 368 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1966).
Similarly, .we affirm the district court’s finding that the Teamsters did not violate the obligations imposed by section 152 First in the course of their bargaining with TIA. The facts allegedly demonstrating the Teamsters’ lack of reasonable effort to make an agreement have already been described. The district court, in finding no violation, noted that the increase in the number of Teamster bargaining proposals, from 61 in early 1976 to over 200 in March of 1977, was a reasonable response to the merger between TIA and Saturn:
The testimony heard by the court on this matter indicates that what the Teamsters were trying to do with the introduction of their March, 1977, proposal was to integrate the old Saturn and old TIA agreements, taking the best from both. Since the carriers were newly merged and the Teamsters were now representing a larger group of flight attendants, it hardly seems unreasonable for them to modify their previous proposal substantially to meet the new conditions.
The court found, “negotiations did not get under way [ ] in earnest until approximately the time the Teamsters introduced their new proposal,” and concluded that the increased number of proposals was reasonable in light of the recent merger between TIA and Saturn. The district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous and must be affirmed. Similarly, its finding that the assertedly exorbitant size of the Teamsters’ proposals regarding wages, benefits, and working conditions did not demonstrate a refusal to make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement must, on this record, also be affirmed. The court held: “The court can find no previous decision under the RLA, nor can TIA suggest one, which has inferred lack of reasonable effort solely from the size of the proposals put forth by the parties.” The court noted that the union had reduced its proposals on two occasions, and characterized the bargaining as “obstinate and unyielding” but not in violation of the statute- „ ry standards.
We do not hold that a union’s insistence on proposals of the kind involved here could [959]*959never be the basis for a finding that a union did not comply with its obligations under section 152 First; but in this case the district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous. Cf. REA Express, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 358 F.Supp. 760, 772 n.43 (S.D.N.Y.1971) and cases cited therein. Cf. also Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, 262 F.Supp. 177, 183-85 (D.D.C.1967).
We are confronted, then, with TIA’s argument that injunctive relief against the primary strike was appropriate because of language contained in the collective bargaining agreement. The Teamsters argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction by reason of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104, maintaining that once the major dispute mechanisms of the RLA had been exhausted, the unions could not be enjoined from using their full economic power in support of their demands. We agree.
The accommodation reached between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National Labor Relations Act does not necessarily carry over to disputes controlled by the RLA. In this regard, the Supreme Court has stated: “The relationship of labor and management in the railroad industry has developed on a pattern different from other industries. The fundamental premises and principles of the Railway Labor Act are not the same as those which form the bases of the [NLRA] . . .” Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. R., 353 U.S. 30, 31-32 n.2, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957). On the other hand, in cases which present difficult questions under the RLA but do not require statutory interpretations that are unique to the mechanisms of that Act, the doctrines developed by Congress and the courts from their experience in questions of labor law policy generally are instructive. For an analogy, and to determine national labor policy, it is appropriate to refer to the NLRA for assistance in construing the RLA. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383-84, 89 S.Ct. 1109, 22 L.Ed.2d 344 (1969).
The principal question with respect to the primary strike is whether the contract provision by which the union agreed not to strike military flights, even after RLA dispute mechanisms had been exhausted, is enforceable by injunctive relief. Decision of this question requires an analysis of the dispute resolution mechanisms of the RLA. The RLA’’provides that “minor disputes” are to be resolved by binding arbitration. A second set of procedures is designed to facilitate a voluntary agreement of the parties in major disputes. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945); O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 551 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1977). The minor disputes provisions
contemplate[ ] the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a new one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case.
Elgin, supra, 325 U.S. at 723, 65 S.Ct. at 1290. The major disputes provisions relate to disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them. The Act’s procedures for major disputes have been described as follows:
A party desiring to effect a change of rates of pay, rules, or working conditions must give advance written notice. § 6. The parties must confer, § 2 Second, and if conference fails to resolve the dispute, either or both may invoke the services of the National Mediation Board, which may also proffer its services sua sponte if it finds a labor emergency to exist. § 5 First. If mediation fails, the Board must endeavor to induce the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration, which can take place however, only if both consent. § 5 First, 7. If arbitration is rejected and the dispute threatens “substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation [960]*960Board shall notify the President,” who may create an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. § 10. While the dispute is working its way through these stages, neither party may unilaterally alter the status quo. § 2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., supra, 394 U.S. at 378, 89 S.Ct. at 1115.
In general, when a contract provision is opened to negotiation, the provision is not kept in effect by operation of the RLA once the procedures for major dispute resolution are exhausted. To encourage voluntary settlement of major disputes, the RLA postpones the time for self-help remedies. However, if after reasonable efforts the parties have exhausted the bargaining procedures specified by the RLA without agreement, the statute does not bar such remedies, including a strike.
For [the] settlement [of major disputes] the statutory scheme retains throughout the traditional voluntary processes of negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation. Every facility for bringing about agreement is provided and pressures for mobilizing public opinion are applied. The parties are required to submit to the successive procedures designed to induce agreement. § 5 First (b). But compulsions go only to insure that those procedures are exhausted before resort can be had to self-help.
Elgin, supra, 325 U.S. at 725, 65 S.Ct. at 1291. See also Jacksonville Terminal Co., supra, 394 U.S. at 379-80, 89 S.Ct. at 1115-16. All concede that the primary strike by the flight attendants did not commence until the major dispute resolution procedures of the Act had been exhausted.
We think there can be no question about the meaning of the military no-strike clause in this case. We agree with the conclusions of the district court in this regard. As Judge Peckham stated:
The clear import of this provision is to extend the no-strike obligation of the flight attendants beyond the term of the collective-bargaining agreement, even beyond the expiration of the 30-day cooling-off period mandated by the RLA, when the Teamsters would otherwise have the right to strike against all of TIA’s operations. The Teamsters do not dispute the meaning of this provision . . .. This military no-strike clause could not be clearer in expressing its intent that the flight attendants thereby give up their right to strike TIA’s military flights even during those periods when they might strike all of TIA’s other operations.
A contrary interpretation would render material portions of the clause meaningless. TIA would not secure the union’s promise not to strike military flights after exhaustion of RLA procedures if it were intended that operation of the procedures nullified the obligation. The flight attendants’ strike, therefore, violated the military no-strike clause, and resort to minor dispute arbitration is not necessary to reach this conclusion. See Wien, 551 F.2d at 1146-47; Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 425 F.2d 1086, 1090 (2d Cir. 1970).
Similarly, we think the Teamsters’ strike in violation of their contract obligation did not present a major dispute. In the normal case, once having exhausted major disputes procedures the parties are free to resort to self-help. The military no-strike clause had already been the subject of bargaining in the major disputes sessions. We hold, infra, that, as the parties intended, the clause was binding even after exhaustion of those procedures, but TIA advances no theory by which this fact makes the strike enjoinable as involving a major dispute.
We find no authority by which the contract clause in question can be held to violate RLA policies. Once major dispute procedures are completed and the different pressures put on the parties to achieve voluntary settlements have been exhausted, it is true that ordinarily the employer and the union are free to resort to the traditional economic weapons. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & O. R.R., 372 U.S. 284, 291, 83 S.Ct. 691, 695, 9 L.Ed.2d 759 (1963) (per curiam); Elgin, su[961]*961pra. The RLA does not, however, preclude the parties from adopting a different procedure by contract. Cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 279-84, 76 S.Ct. 349, 356-59, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956).7
Whatever the limitations may be on the extent of damages properly awarded in an action at law, see note 9 infra, a question we do not reach here, we perceive no policies peculiar to the RLA which prohibit the parties from regulating by contract their post-major disputes relations in the manner they have here. It is true that ordinarily a union’s promise not to strike is accompanied by a promise that the employer agrees to submit the dispute to binding arbitration. The parties have not directed our attention, however, to cases requiring an arbitration clause as a condition to holding the no-strike promise binding.
A determination that the military no-strike clause is valid and not contrary to RLA policies does not control the ultimate question whether the contract clause may be enforced by injunctive relief. The anti-injunction command of the Norris-LaGuardia Act may operate independently to bar an injunction notwithstanding the validity of the contract clause to be enforced, and we rule the injunctive power of the federal court may not be used to enforce the no-strike clause here.
If this case arose under the NLRA, an injunction would not be granted. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 404-12, 96 S.Ct. 3141, 3146-50, 49 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1976) id. at 424 n.15, 426 n.20, 96 S.Ct. at 3155 n.15, 3156 n.20 (dissent); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970). As the Court in Buffalo Forge stated:
“[T]here is no general federal anti-strike policy; and although a suit may be brought under § 301 against strikes which, while they are breaches of private contracts, do not threaten any additional public policy, in such cases the anti-injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia should prevail.”
428 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. at 3148, quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 225, 82 S.Ct. 1328, 1344, 8 L.Ed.2d 440 (1962) (dissent). If we were persuaded that a substantial purpose unique to the RLA, or protection of its dispute settlement mechanisms, would be substantially furthered by specific enforcement of the clause, we would sustain the order for injunctive relief, but no such conditions exist here.
We do acknowledge that there are some considerations which make an injunction appear appropriate in this case, although for reasons stated below we do not find them dispositive. Enforcement of a no-strike clause may have a salutary effect on labor relations, since the employer presumably will consent to a contract for a shorter term in return for a no-strike clause enforceable by an injunction, which reduces the risks inherent in renegotiating the contract. Frequent negotiation, under this view, furthers industrial stability by permitting more precise adjustments to meet changing economic conditions.
Further, the breach of contract in this case is plain and unambiguous. One might argue that unambiguous contract breaches could be enjoined without doing violence to any Norris-LaGuardia Act policy. See Note, The Applicability of Boys Markets to Refusals to Cross a Picket Line, 76 Colum.L.Rev. 113, 136-41 (1976). Cf. Buffalo Forge, supra, 428 U.S. at 416-17, 96 S.Ct. at 3151-52 (dissent) (purpose of Norris-LaGuardia Act is to protect labor organizing and ability to bargain collectively, not to prohibit enforcement of collective bargaining agreements); F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, The Labor Injunction 5-46 (1930); Smith, The Supreme Court, Boys Markets Labor Injunctions, and Sympathy Work Stoppages, 44 U.Chi.L.Rev. 321, 341 (1977).
Moreover, in this case the military no-strike clause was directed to the discrete transportation function of military flights, the union retaining the right to strike other [962]*962TIA flights. In addition, apparently the federal government insisted that the company insert the clause as a condition of obtaining military contracts. The no-strike clause therefore furthered specific government transportation interests.8
Finally, the RLA contains a statutory provision requiring the parties to a contract to maintain their agreement without breach. 45 U.S.C. § 152 First provides:
It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes ... in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof.
The Supreme Court in Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570, 91 S.Ct. 1731, 29 L.Ed.2d 187 (1971), held that this section imposed a substantive duty on parties, enforceable by injunctive relief, to exert reasonable efforts during the negotiating process to reach an agreement. More to the point, the duty to maintain agreements was found a basis for injunctive relief in Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 425 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1970), reaff’d in further consideration, 443 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1971), and Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Railway & Steamship Clerks, 81 Lab.Cas. (CCH) ¶ 13,113 (N.D.Cal.1975). The Second Circuit in Seaboard permitted an injunction to prohibit a strike in violation of the union’s contractual promise not to reopen certain subjects for RLA major disputes bargaining before a given date.9
The difficulty in relying on the above considerations to justify injunctive relief is that, with the exception of the language in section 152, all of these factors if present in a case arising under the NLRA would be insufficient to permit an injunction to issue. The result contended for by TIA and Judge Wallace in his thoughtful opinion would mean that a federal court has radically different powers to Enjoin a strike which, clearly violates language in the collective bargaining agreement, depending on whether the controlling statute is the NLRA or the RLA. Admitting the different genesis of the RLA, see Chicago River, supra at 31-32 n. 2, we do not think the statutory policies are sufficiently distinct to justify such different application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s anti-injunction mandate. Absent a substantial nexus with statutory dispute settlement mechanisms or an agreement to arbitrate, an injunction may not issue to prevent a plain breach of a no-strike clause by a union. The language of section 152 is perhaps unique to the RLA. The history of the RLA, nevertheless, prevents us from finding in the Act’s obligation to “maintain agreements” a broad, mandate to enjoin all, or even plain, breaches of collective bargaining agreements by a union. Without question, the RLA was a response to the perceived dangers of disruption in the transportation industry. This history has been described elsewhere and [963]*963need not be repeated here. See Chicago & N.W. Ry., supra, 402 U.S. at 574-84, 91 S.Ct. at 1733-39; Chicago River, supra, 353 U.S. at 40, 77 S.Ct. at 640; Elgin, supra, 325 U.S. at 724-27, 65 S.Ct. at 1290-92; Wien, supra, 551 F.2d at 1145-46. The important point is that Congress responded to these concerns by implementing a comprehensive system of binding arbitration and mandatory nonbinding mediation involving drawn-out procedures designed to encourage parties to reach agreement. The policy of the statute is not that any act which disrupts the transportation industry may be enjoined. Instead, after major disputes procedures are completely exhausted, with reasonable efforts having been made to reach an agreement, see Chicago & N.W. Ry., supra, the policies peculiar to the RLA are also exhausted, and the parties are governed by general labor law principles. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed to limit our role in enforcing labor contracts, in part because of mistakes of the past and in part, perhaps, for fear that personal bias sometimes difficult to detect even in ourselves will weigh too heavily in the enforcement process. See, e. g., Chicago River, supra, 353 U.S. at 40-41, 77 S.Ct. at 640-641; F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, supra. Congress has mandated the courts not to alter through injunctions the economic balance between employers and unions without a weighty statutory reason for doing so.10 The RLA plan for avoiding disruption is not threatened by the flight attendants’ strike, and a proper accommodation between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA, as determined by the Supreme Court, prohibits enjoining the Teamsters’ strike; therefore, the strike in this case may not be enjoined. See generally Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., supra, 394 U.S. at 374-93, 89 S.Ct. at 1113-24 “[PJarties who have unsuccessfully exhausted the Railway Labor Act’s procedures for resolution of a major dispute [may] employ the full range of whatever peaceful economic power they can muster, so long as its use conflicts with no other obligation imposed by federal law.” Id. at 392, 89 S.Ct. at 1123.
Seaboard does not require a different result. There the court held that a section 6 notice does not open all possible subjects for bargaining between the parties if they have contracted otherwise, and that the parties may agree beforehand not to reopen certain issues when the rest of the collective bargaining agreement comes up for renegotiation pursuant to section 6. Its reasoning does not support TIA’s view of section 152. Seaboard involved the effect of contractual efforts to limit the scope of a section 6 proceeding, instead of efforts to specify permissible post-mediation measures. Also, unlike the case before us, the injunction in Seaboard enabled the parties to complete required bargaining on all other issues subject to a section 6 notice, and thus pursue dispute settlement procedures not yet exhausted.
Chicago & N.W. Ry. similarly does not support enjoining a primary strike for the purpose of enforcing a clause in the collective bargaining agreement. The rationale for the injunction in that case was that the union had failed to use reasonable efforts to comply with the mandatory disputes settlement mechanisms that lie at the heart of the Act. The integrity of these mechanisms was thus protected by the injunction in Chicago & N. W. Ry.; enjoining the Teamsters’ primary strike in this case would not similarly further the RLA’s arbitration policies. We do not think Chicago & N.W. Ry. is authority for abandoning the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s anti-injunction provisions whenever a union subject to the RLA has plainly violated its collective bargaining agreement.
[964]*964It might appear anomalous that if a no-strike clause in force during the life of the contract was ambiguous as to whether the strike was permitted, the strike could be enjoined pending the outcome of minor dispute arbitration, and an arbitrator’s determination that the strike should stop could be enforced in federal court by an injunction, see Order of Ry. Conductors & Brakemen v. Spokane P. & S. R.R., 366 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1025, 87 S.Ct. 752, 17 L.Ed.2d 673 (1967) (RLA); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960) (NLRA), but that where the breach is so clear that arbitration is not necessary to determine the violation, no injunction may issue. This result, however, is compelled by the combination of the manner in which Congress and the RLA chose to reduce disruption in the transportation industry, and the controlling interpretations of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Judge Wallace, dissenting in part, contends that he “can see little practical difference between an injunction enforcing the arbitrator’s decision that a strike was forbidden by the contract, despite an underlying major dispute, and an injunction in support of a judicial determination that an anti-strike provision is not only clear, but also valid and binding under the Act.” Dissent slip op. at 7 (footnote omitted). Yet this is precisely the distinction which the Supreme Court adopted in the very case cited by Judge Wallace, Buffalo Forge. See 428 U.S. at 404-12, especially at 409.
The second principal issue on this appeal is the authority of the district court to enjoin any aspect of the sympathy strike. The district court held that it could enjoin only the sympathy strike directed against military flights. Trans International Airlines, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 439 F.Supp. 184 (N.D.Cal.1977). We think the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin the sympathy strike in its entirety-
Differences among the contracts of the premerger TIA flight engineers and pilots, the former Saturn flight engineers, and the former Saturn pilots, bear on the issues addressed below, and we set forth relevant portions of the contracts in the margin.11 [965]*965The controlling collective bargaining agreements between the carrier and the flight engineers and pilots, both with premerger TIA employees and former Saturn employees, contained a no-strike clause and a military no-strike clause, and the question whether the sympathy strike was in violation of the contracts presents a minor dispute under the Act. Both TIA and the Teamsters agree that the dispute must be resolved through the Act’s binding arbitration procedures for minor disputes. We cannot say that either TIA’s or the Teamsters’ interpretation of the contracts are completely without merit. Interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements with respect to the sympathy strike is therefore in the first instance a matter for the adjustment board rather than a court. The question presented for our decision is whether the flight engineers and pilots are required to resort to the minor dispute mechanisms of the Act to have their rights clarified before engaging in the sympathy strike.
The Court in Chicago River, supra, permitted injúnctions to be issued, the NorrisLaGuardia Act notwithstanding, when the strike threatened the jurisdiction of the minor dispute arbitrator. Subsequent to Chicago River, the Court also permitted strikes to be enjoined to protect binding arbitration provisions in a collective bargaining agreement arising under the NLRA. Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970) (reversing Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 82 S.Ct. 1328, 8 L.Ed.2d 440 (1962)). Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 96 S.Ct. 3141, 49 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1976), then clarified the Boys Markets case, holding that in NLRA cases the NorrisLaGuardia Act deprived federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin a sympathy strike, even where the strike is clearly forbidden by a contractual no-strike clause and the parties have agreed to binding arbitration. The Court concluded that the sympathy strike was not “over an arbitrable grievance.”
Chicago River, arising under the RLA, and Boys Markets, arising under the NLRA, reached parallel results; indeed the later case made specific reference to the principles elaborated in Chicago River. The close relation of those cases does not mean, however, that the injunctive power of the federal courts is coextensive under the two statutes. See Sinclair Refining, supra, 370 U.S. at 210-11, 82 S.Ct. at 1336-37. We conclude that not all of the reasoning of Buffalo Forge applies in RLA cases and that policies unique to the RLA support jurisdiction to enjoin the sympathy strike in this case.
A principal goal of the Court in Buffalo Forge was to avoid judicial intrusion on an arbitration form established by contract. The Court pointed to the dangers of judicial declarations that might control an arbitrator’s determination of .the case, a responsibility assigned exclusively to him by agreement of the parties. See 428 U.S. at 410-12, 96 S.Ct. at 3148-50. The Court refused to conclude, in the absence of express language in the contract, that the parties intended to allow preliminary injunctive relief pending arbitration, where such relief [966]*966was not necessary to insure arbitration of the dispute. See id. at 411, 96 S.Ct. at 3149. Perhaps the Court was also worried that a contrary result would lead to fewer arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements, the unions being less willing to agree to arbitrate disputes or to proceed to arbitration following a preliminary injunction. See id. at 412, 96 S.Ct. at 3149. These considerations are inapplicable here. Congress in the RLA established a process of minor dispute settlement without reference to any arbitration framework which would have been agreed upon by the parties. The permissible prearbitration remedies agreed upon by the parties, and the effect of our decision on the number of minor disputes likely to be settled by arbitration, are not issues presented by this case.
Moreover, implementation of the RLA’s process for resolving minor disputes is not limited to granting preliminary injunctive relief only-where the relief will make it more likely that the dispute will be arbitrated.12 The requirement of arbitration under the RLA is an essential part of the congressional purpose of avoiding interruption of the transportation industry. Chicago River, supra, 353 U.S. at 40, 77 S.Ct. at 640; Elgin, supra, 325 U.S. at 724-27, 65 S.Ct. at 1290-92; Wien, supra, 551 F.2d at 1145-46. The minor dispute arbitration procedure was designed as a substitute for prearbitration strikes, cf. Chicago River, supra, and we think this includes sympathy strikes of the character presented in this case. See Detroit and T. Shoreline R.R. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148, 90 S.Ct. 294, 298, 24 L.Ed.2d 325 (1969); Texas and N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 565, 50 S.Ct. 427, 432, 74 L.Ed. 1034 (1930). The legislative history of the RLA suggests an intent to prevent a dispute that involves a small number of transportation workers from disrupting the carrier’s existing operations and its relations with other employees. It would be contrary to this objective to permit a sympathy strike before completion of the minor dispute mechanisms for determining the legitimacy of the strike. We therefore reject ALPA’s argument that Boys Markets and other related cases declare the policies underlying the use of arbitration to be identical under the NLRA and the RLA.
The policy of avoiding disruption of transportation businesses is not, of course, all encompassing. As we held above, a federal court under the RLA may not enjoin a strike plainly in breach of contract where the major disputes mechanisms of the Act have been used and exhausted. The policy is strong enough, however, to require that where a minor dispute exists the union must first establish its contractual right to engage in a sympathy strike before disrupting a carrier’s operation, at least where traditional standards governing preliminary relief are met.13 [967]*967This does no more than preserve the status quo pending clarification of the parties’ rights by statutory procedures. Maintenance of the status quo before and during major dispute procedures is required by the RLA. See Detroit and T. Shoreline R.R., supra; 45 U.S.C. § 156. Similarly where changes in the status quo are likely to lead to serious harm and threaten to disrupt the operation of the transportation carrier, injunctive relief is proper pending operation of the Act’s minor dispute procedures. Maintenance of the status quo is, of course, a traditional basis for equitable relief. See, e. g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-K.-T.R.R., 363 U.S. 528, 532-35, 80 S.Ct. 1326, 1329-1330, 4 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1960); Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 808-09 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 821, 84 S.Ct. 59, 11 L.Ed.2d 55 (1963). Given the. special concern of the RLA over continuous operation by carriers, it is appropriate to require the union to accept the status quo pending the arbitrator’s decision. See Smith, supra at 340-49. International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 771, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 1801, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961).
The preservation of the status quo is especially proper where failure to grant injunctive relief would make the arbitrator’s ultimate decision a meaningless one. This was a consideration in Missouri-K.-T.R,R., supra. Upholding the action of the district court, which issued an injunction against a strike pending resolution of the minor dispute by the settlement mechanisms of the Act, the Court stated:
From the point of view of these employees, the critical point in the dispute may be when the change is made, for, by the time of the frequently long-delayed Board decision, it might well be impossible to make them whole in any realistic sense. If this be so, the action of the district Judge, rather than defeating the Board’s jurisdiction, would operate to preserve that jurisdiction by preventing injury so irreparable that a decision of the Board in the unions’ favor would be but an empty victory.
363 U.S. at 534, 80 S.Ct. at 1330.
For these reasons we conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin the sympathy strike, in its entirety, pending determination of the contractual rights of the parties by the adjustment board.
Although the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin the sympathy strike in its entirety, in light of the principles discussed in our opinion, relevant differences in the contract provisions of different groups of TIA employees may not have been considered as they should have been by the district court. In addition to the general and military no-strike clauses, the contract of the premerger TIA flight engineers and pilots contains a “picket line” clause which seems to permit the honoring of other employees’ legal pickét lines. Although the clause probably does not apply to the sympathy strike in this case,14 the language would be a factor to consider in weighing the likelihood of the employer ultimately succeeding in its claim.15
[968]*968SUMMARY
As to the primary strike, the order enjoining the strike of military flights is reversed and the order declining to enjoin the strike of nonmilitary strikes is affirmed.
As to the sympathy strike, the trial court’s ruling that it had jurisdiction to enjoin the strike of military flights is affirmed. If the strike were still in force we would remand this aspect of the case to the trial court for further consideration of the propriety of the injunction in view of our discussion of Buffalo Forge, the RLA, and the standards for granting injunctive relief in this situation. The strike having ended, however, such further proceedings are not required. The order of the district court declining to enjoin the sympathy strike of nonmilitary flights on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is reversed.
Because of the contempt proceedings pending in the district court, a remand is appropriate. The pre-merger TIA engineers were represented by the Teamsters, and the agreement quoted in footnote 11 was in force when the district court issued its injunctions and contempt orders in this case. The trial court will consider the question of the legal rights of the parties for the alleged contempt in light of the principles set forth herein, together with such, other considerations as it may deem appropriate to a just determination of the case.
The orders of the district court are AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and the case REMANDED for further proceedings.
The parties shall bear their own costs for the appeals taken to this court.