Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham

386 U.S. 670, 87 S. Ct. 1244, 18 L. Ed. 2d 394, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 1747
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJune 5, 1967
Docket712
StatusPublished
Cited by79 cases

This text of 386 U.S. 670 (Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 386 U.S. 670, 87 S. Ct. 1244, 18 L. Ed. 2d 394, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 1747 (1967).

Opinions

Per Curiam.

' In -November. 1964, the petitioner became a tenant in McDougald Terrace, a federally assisted, low-rent public [671]*671housing project owned and managed by the Housing - Authority of the City of Durham, North Carolina. The lease provided for a tenancy from month to month, and gave both the tenant and the Authority the right to. terminate by giving notice at least 15 days before the end .of any monthly term. On August 10, 1965, the petitioner was elected president of a McDougald Terrace tenants’ organization. The next day the Authority gave her notice of termination of her tenancy as of August 31. • The notice did not give any reasons for the cancellation, and the Authority declined to accede to the petitioner’s demands for an explanation. The petitioner refused to' vacate the premises, and the Authority thereupon brought a summary ejectment action in the Justice of the Peace Court in Durham. The Authority there obtained a judgment of eviction, which- was affirmed on appeal by the Superior Court of Durham County and the Supreme Court of North Carolina.1. We granted certiorari. 385 U. S. 967. Th<? petitioner has remained in possession of her apartment pursuant to a stay granted by the North Carolina Supreme Court.

The petitioner contends that she was constitutionally entitled to notice setting forth the reasons for the termination of her lease, and a hearing fhereon. She also suggests that her eviction was invalid because it allegedly was based on her participation in constitutionally protected associational activities.2 We find it unnecessary [672]*672to reach the large issues stirred by these claims, because of a significant development that has occurred since we granted the writ of certiorari.

On February 7, 1967, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a directive to local'housing authorities. After reciting the fact that dissatisfaction had been expressed with eviction procedures in loW-rent housing projects and that suits had been brought to challenge evictions in which the local authority had not given any reason for its action, the circular stated:

“Since this is a federally assisted program, we believe it is essential that no tenant, be given notice to vacate without being told by the Local Authority, in a private conference or other appropriate manner, the reasons for the eviction, and given an opportunity to'make such reply or explanation as he may wish.”

The circular goes on to require local authorities to keep future records of evictions, the reasons therefor, and summaries of any conferences held with tenants in connection with evictions.3

[673]*673While the directive provides that certain records shall. - be kept commencing with the date of its issuance, them'is no suggestion that the basic procedure it prescribes is not to be followed in all eviction proceedings that have not become final. If this procedure were accorded to the petitioner, her case would assume a posture quite different from the one now presented.4 Compare Wabash R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 273 U. S. 126, 131; Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600, 607; Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is accordingly vacated, and the case remanded for such [674]*674further proceedings as may be appropriate in the light of the February 7 circular of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

/É ⅛ so ordered.

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Bluebook (online)
386 U.S. 670, 87 S. Ct. 1244, 18 L. Ed. 2d 394, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 1747, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thorpe-v-housing-authority-of-durham-scotus-1967.