The Star

16 U.S. 37, 3 Wheat. 37
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedFebruary 16, 1818
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 16 U.S. 37 (The Star) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Star, 16 U.S. 37, 3 Wheat. 37 (1818).

Opinion

16 U.S. 37 (____)
3 Wheat. 37

The STAR: DICKENSON et al., Claimants.

Supreme Court of United States.

February 11th. Key, for the appellants and claimants.

Winder and Harper, contrà.

*38 *40 February 16th, 1818. STORY, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court.

This is the case of an American ship, captured by the enemy, during the late war, and after condemnation and sale to an enemy merchant, re-captured by the American private armed ship Surprise. And the question is, whether, *86] under these circumstances, *the ship is to be restored, on salvage, to the former American owner, or condemned as good prize of war? If the case were to stand on the general salvage act of 1800, in cases of re-capture (act of 3d of March 1800, ch. 14), it is perfectly clear, that the claimants are barred of all right; for that act expressly excepts from its operation, all cases where the property has been condemned by competent authority. The same result would flow from the principles of the law of nations. It is admitted, on all sides, by public jurists, that in cases of capture, a firm possession changes the title to the property; and although there has been, in former times, much vexed discussion as to the time at which this change of property takes place, whether on the capture, or on the pernoctation, or on the carrying infra prœsidia, of the prize; it is universally allowed, that at all events, a sentence of condemnation completely extinguishes the title of the original proprietor, and transfers a rightful title to the captors or their sovereign. It would follow, of course, that property re-captured from an enemy, after condemnation, would, by the law of nations, be lawful prize of war, in whomsoever the antecedent title might have vested.

It is supposed, however, that the provisions of the salvage act of 1800, ch. 14, are materially changed, in cases of captures by private armed ships, by the fifth section of the prize act of the 26th of June 1812, ch. 107. That section declares, "that all vessels, goods and effects, the property of any citizen of the United States, or of persons resident within and under the protection of *87] the United States, or of persons *permanently resident within, and under the protection of any foreign prince, government or state, in amity with the United States, which shall have been captured by the enemy, and which shall be re-captured by vessels commissioned as aforesaid, shall be restored to the lawful owners, upon payment by them, respectively, of a just and reasonable salvage, to be determined by the mutual agreement of the parties concerned, or by the decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, according to the nature of each case, agreeably to the provisions heretofore established by law." The argument is, that as the section directs all vessels, goods and effects of citizens and neutrals, re-captured from the enemy, to be restored, without any reference of the fact, whether they had been previously condemned or not, it so far qualifies and repeals the salvage act of 1800; and that, consistently with this construction, the words "agreeably to the *41 provisions heretofore established by law," may and ought to be referred to the rate of salvage fixed by the act of 1800, and not to the provisions of that act generally. In support of this argument, it has been urged, that upon any other construction, the whole section becomes completely inoperative, as every case is embraced in the previous law. That congress may well be presumed to have intended to make a discrimination between cases of re-capture by public and private ships of war, unfavorable to the latter; and that congress may had in view, a conformity to the British prize code, which, since the passing of the act of 1800, had been changed in the manner now contended for by the claimant.

*The argument asserted from the British prize code, certainly, [*88 cannot be supported upon the notion of any supposed recent change in the law relative to re-captures. So early as the reign of George II., the jus postliminii was, by statute, reserved to British subjects, upon all re-captures of their vessels and goods, by British ships, even though a previous condemnation had passed upon them, with the exception of cases where such vessels, after capture, had been set forth as ships of war. The statute of 43 Geo. III., ch. 160, § 39, has no further altered the previous laws, than to fix the salvage at uniform stipulated rates, instead of leaving it to depend upon the length of time the re-captured ship was in the hands of the enemy. And the terms of this statute are very different from the language of the fifth section of our prize act of 1812, and expressly exclude from its operation and benefits all neutral property.

In respect to the legislative intention, it is extremely difficult, to draw any conclusion unfavorable to private armed ships, from the language or policy of the prize act, or any subsequent act of congress passed during the war. The bounties held out to these vessels, not only by the prize act, but by other auxiliary acts, manifest a strong solicitude in the government to encourage this species of force. But we are not at liberty to entertain any discussions in relation to the policy of the government, except so far as that policy is brought judicially to our notice, in the positive enactments, and declared will of the legislature. We must interpret, therefore, this clause of the prize act by the general rules of construction applicable to *all [*89 statutes; and in this view, we are of opinion, that the doctrine contended for by the claimant ought not to prevail.

In the first place, the section in question contains no repealing clause of any of the provisions of the salvage act of 1800, and therefore, the whole laws on this subject are to be construed together, and unless so far as there is any repugnancy between them, are to be considered as in full force. That the section is free from all doubt in its language, need not be asserted; but that every portion of it may, by fair rules of interpretation, be deemed merely affirmative of the existing law, is, with great confidence, maintained. There is no repugnancy which requires or even affords a presumption of legislative intent to repeal any portion of the salvage act. It is true, that the section declares that all vessels, goods and effects re-captured, shall be restored; but to whom are they to be restored? Certainly, by the very terms of the act, to the "lawful owners," which, to prevent the most injurious, and we had almost said absurd, consequences, must mean the "lawful owners," at the time of the re-capture. But the lawful owner of re-captured property, which has been already lawfully condemned, is not the *42 original proprietor, but the person who has succeeded to that title, under the decree of condemnation. Suppose, the property at the time of the capture had belonged to one neutral, and after condemnation, had been sold to another neutral, and then captured and re-captured by the enemy, can there be a doubt, that the latter is, to all intents and purposes, the true and lawful *90] owner, and that he may assert his *title against the first proprietor? Besides, re-capture, by force of the term, would seem most properly applied to cases where an inchoate title only was vested by capture.

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Bluebook (online)
16 U.S. 37, 3 Wheat. 37, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-star-scotus-1818.